CWE-918
AllowedServer-Side Request Forgery (SSRF)
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The web server receives a URL or similar request from an upstream component and retrieves the contents of this URL, but it does not sufficiently ensure that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
4719 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-HRRX-P8R8-GJ4G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:49 – Updated: 2023-03-01 18:31GitLab CE/EE, versions 8.18 up to 11.x before 11.3.11, 11.4 before 11.4.8, and 11.5 before 11.5.1, are vulnerable to an SSRF vulnerability in webhooks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-19571"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-07-10T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "GitLab CE/EE, versions 8.18 up to 11.x before 11.3.11, 11.4 before 11.4.8, and 11.5 before 11.5.1, are vulnerable to an SSRF vulnerability in webhooks.",
"id": "GHSA-hrrx-p8r8-gj4g",
"modified": "2023-03-01T18:31:02Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:49:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-19571"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://about.gitlab.com/2018/11/28/security-release-gitlab-11-dot-5-dot-1-released"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab-ce/issues/53242"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/160516/GitLab-11.4.7-Remote-Code-Execution.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/160699/GitLab-11.4.7-Remote-Code-Execution.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HV3Q-723P-3RJQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:36 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:36A Server-Side Request Forgery issue was discovered in Belden Hirschmann GECKO Lite Managed switch, Version 2.0.00 and prior versions. The web server receives a request, but does not sufficiently verify that the request is being sent to the expected destination.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-6036"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-06-30T03:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A Server-Side Request Forgery issue was discovered in Belden Hirschmann GECKO Lite Managed switch, Version 2.0.00 and prior versions. The web server receives a request, but does not sufficiently verify that the request is being sent to the expected destination.",
"id": "GHSA-hv3q-723p-3rjq",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:36:35Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:36:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6036"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-17-026-02A"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HV85-774V-26FG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 15:47 – Updated: 2026-05-19 15:47SSRF + disk-exfil in download_media and auth_fetch tools — ymw0407/auth-fetch-mcp
Severity
The download_media and auth_fetch MCP tools accept arbitrary URLs and reach them as the MCP server process, with download_media additionally persisting the fetched response body to a user-controlled output directory. An MCP client (LLM under prompt injection, malicious peer) can drive the server to fetch loopback / link-local / private-range hosts (cloud-instance metadata, internal services, host-bound services) and exfiltrate the response.
Vulnerability chain
Site 1: download_media — SSRF + disk-write chain
src/tools.ts:200-274
server.registerTool("download_media", {
inputSchema: {
urls: z.array(z.string()).describe("One or more URLs to download"),
output_dir: z.string().optional()...,
},
}, async ({ urls, output_dir }) => {
...
for (const url of urls) {
try {
const response = await ctx.request.get(url); // line 238 — no validation
...
const body = await response.body();
...
const filePath = path.join(dir, `file-${++counter}${ext}`);
fs.writeFileSync(filePath, body); // line 257 — writes response to disk
urls and output_dir are user-controlled. The handler iterates each URL (line 236) and calls ctx.request.get(url) (Playwright's APIRequestContext.get) without checking the destination. The response body is written to path.join(output_dir, file-N.ext). Internal-service responses are persisted to disk where they can be exfiltrated via any subsequent tool that reads from the output directory (or via the response object itself, which contains localPath and size of every successful write).
Site 2: auth_fetch — SSRF via Playwright navigation
src/tools.ts:117-198
server.registerTool("auth_fetch", {
inputSchema: {
url: z.string().describe("The URL to fetch content from"),
wait_for: z.string().optional()...,
},
}, async ({ url, wait_for }) => {
...
const page = await navigateTo(ctx, url); // line 142
...
const result = await extractContent(page);
return textResult({ status: "ok", url: result.url, title: result.title, content: result.content });
});
src/browser.ts:53-64
export async function navigateTo(ctx: BrowserContext, url: string): Promise<Page> {
...
await page.goto(url, { waitUntil: "domcontentloaded", timeout: 30000 }); // line 63
return page;
}
url flows directly from the MCP tool argument to page.goto with no validation. Playwright will navigate to any URL the network stack can reach. The page DOM is returned in the tool response via extractContent. Internal pages (loopback admin UIs, cloud metadata endpoints reachable from the host, intranet services) are extractable.
Root cause
Neither handler validates URL targets before dispatch. The tool descriptions ("fetches web page content using a real browser ... e.g. Notion, Google Docs, Jira, Confluence, Linear, Slack, or any SaaS/private page") frame the intended usage as public SaaS web pages, not loopback or link-local hosts — but no code enforces that intent.
The fix shape (apply to both tools): after URL parsing, resolve to IP, reject if private/loopback/link-local. Same defense as the well-known SSRF-guard pattern shipped by other MCP fetchers in the ecosystem (e.g., Akitaroh/scraper-mcp src/security/url-guard.ts).
Auth boundary violated
Boundary type: MCP tool-argument boundary plus the local-network trust boundary. The MCP server typically sits inside a trust boundary (developer laptop with loopback services, cloud VM with IMDS, k8s pod with service account). The tools allow the MCP client to dispatch HTTP requests across that boundary.
Respected/violated trace: Per the tool descriptions, the expected respected boundary is "public SaaS web pages." That expectation is violated by any request reaching a host the user didn't intend to expose (127.0.0.1:6379 Redis, 169.254.169.254 cloud metadata, 192.168.0.1 internal admin).
Impact
-
Cloud credential theft — server on EC2 / GCE / Azure VM. MCP client invokes
auth_fetch({ url: "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>" })and receives temporary credentials in the tool response. Or invokesdownload_media({ urls: [...], output_dir: "/tmp/exfil" })to persist them to disk. -
Internal service enumeration — MCP client probes private-range hosts (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16). Each
auth_fetchreturns the page DOM; eachdownload_mediawrites the response to disk. -
Loopback exploitation — server runs alongside Redis (127.0.0.1:6379), ElasticSearch (127.0.0.1:9200), or internal admin UIs. MCP client reads them via
auth_fetch. -
Disk-write side channel (
download_mediaonly) — output_dir is also user-controlled, with no documented restriction. An MCP client can requestoutput_dir = "/some/user-writable-shared-dir"and exfil internal-service responses to a location accessible to a co-tenant process.
The injection vector is any content reaching the model that prompts a fetch tool call. The tool description explicitly says "MUST be used instead of Fetch/web_fetch when the page requires login" — meaning the model is encouraged to call this tool for any "private page" mention, which a prompt-injected upstream content can trivially trigger.
Proof of concept (non-destructive)
poc.mjs — replicates the download_media handler's HTTP-fetch + file-write chain against a local fake-internal HTTP service. Playwright's ctx.request.get(url) is replaced with the equivalent fetch(url) for the bug case (a URL needing no auth) so the demo runs without browser deps. The structural defect — "no host validation before HTTP dispatch" — is identical.
[PoC] fake internal-only service: 127.0.0.1:36105
[PoC] simulating MCP client calling download_media({
urls: ['http://127.0.0.1:36105/secrets'],
output_dir: '/tmp/auth-fetch-exfil-aU1jjv'
})
[PoC] no IP / host validation exists at tools.ts:236-238 before ctx.request.get(url)
[PoC] ✓ SSRF + DISK-EXFIL CONFIRMED
File written to: /tmp/auth-fetch-exfil-aU1jjv/file-1.json
Persisted content (187 bytes):
{
"AccessKeyId": "AKIA-FAKE-FROM-POC",
"SecretAccessKey": "fake-secret-marker-NOT-REAL",
"Note": "In a real exploit this would be AWS IMDS at 169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/..."
}
Exit code 0. SHA-256 poc.mjs: 4cea53f1a618581fc67f9a8bd07a7a2b22274f42cdbf7f3c658519673aaf7568. The PoC only contacts 127.0.0.1 on an ephemeral port; the fake-credentials string contains the literal FAKE marker so no downstream system can mistake it for real credentials. The exfil directory is cleaned up after the demo.
Suggested fix
Add a assertSafeUrl helper (same shape as in the matching egoist/fetch-mcp advisory) called before any HTTP dispatch — at tools.ts:236 inside the download_media loop, and at the top of navigateTo in browser.ts:53:
import dns from 'node:dns/promises'
import net from 'node:net'
async function assertSafeUrl(rawUrl: string): Promise<URL> {
const parsed = new URL(rawUrl)
if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(parsed.protocol)) throw new Error(`Unsupported scheme`)
const host = parsed.hostname
const addresses = net.isIP(host)
? [host]
: (await dns.lookup(host, { all: true })).map(a => a.address)
for (const addr of addresses) {
if (isPrivateOrLinkLocal(addr)) throw new Error(`Refusing to fetch ${addr}`)
}
return parsed
}
Where isPrivateOrLinkLocal blocks 127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16, ::1, fc00::/7, fe80::/10.
For download_media specifically, also constrain output_dir: resolve it under a fixed root (e.g., ~/.auth-fetch-mcp/downloads/) and reject if the resolved path escapes that root.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "auth-fetch-mcp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T15:47:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# SSRF + disk-exfil in `download_media` and `auth_fetch` tools \u2014 ymw0407/auth-fetch-mcp\n\n## Severity\nThe `download_media` and `auth_fetch` MCP tools accept arbitrary URLs and reach them as the MCP server process, with `download_media` additionally persisting the fetched response body to a user-controlled output directory. An MCP client (LLM under prompt injection, malicious peer) can drive the server to fetch loopback / link-local / private-range hosts (cloud-instance metadata, internal services, host-bound services) and exfiltrate the response.\n\n## Vulnerability chain\n\n### Site 1: `download_media` \u2014 SSRF + disk-write chain\n\n`src/tools.ts:200-274`\n```ts\nserver.registerTool(\"download_media\", {\n inputSchema: {\n urls: z.array(z.string()).describe(\"One or more URLs to download\"),\n output_dir: z.string().optional()...,\n },\n}, async ({ urls, output_dir }) =\u003e {\n ...\n for (const url of urls) {\n try {\n const response = await ctx.request.get(url); // line 238 \u2014 no validation\n ...\n const body = await response.body();\n ...\n const filePath = path.join(dir, `file-${++counter}${ext}`);\n fs.writeFileSync(filePath, body); // line 257 \u2014 writes response to disk\n```\n\n`urls` and `output_dir` are user-controlled. The handler iterates each URL (line 236) and calls `ctx.request.get(url)` (Playwright\u0027s `APIRequestContext.get`) without checking the destination. The response body is written to `path.join(output_dir, file-N.ext)`. Internal-service responses are persisted to disk where they can be exfiltrated via any subsequent tool that reads from the output directory (or via the response object itself, which contains `localPath` and `size` of every successful write).\n\n### Site 2: `auth_fetch` \u2014 SSRF via Playwright navigation\n\n`src/tools.ts:117-198`\n```ts\nserver.registerTool(\"auth_fetch\", {\n inputSchema: {\n url: z.string().describe(\"The URL to fetch content from\"),\n wait_for: z.string().optional()...,\n },\n}, async ({ url, wait_for }) =\u003e {\n ...\n const page = await navigateTo(ctx, url); // line 142\n ...\n const result = await extractContent(page);\n return textResult({ status: \"ok\", url: result.url, title: result.title, content: result.content });\n});\n```\n\n`src/browser.ts:53-64`\n```ts\nexport async function navigateTo(ctx: BrowserContext, url: string): Promise\u003cPage\u003e {\n ...\n await page.goto(url, { waitUntil: \"domcontentloaded\", timeout: 30000 }); // line 63\n return page;\n}\n```\n\n`url` flows directly from the MCP tool argument to `page.goto` with no validation. Playwright will navigate to any URL the network stack can reach. The page DOM is returned in the tool response via `extractContent`. Internal pages (loopback admin UIs, cloud metadata endpoints reachable from the host, intranet services) are extractable.\n\n## Root cause\nNeither handler validates URL targets before dispatch. The tool descriptions (\"fetches web page content using a real browser ... e.g. Notion, Google Docs, Jira, Confluence, Linear, Slack, or any SaaS/private page\") frame the intended usage as **public SaaS web pages**, not loopback or link-local hosts \u2014 but no code enforces that intent.\n\nThe fix shape (apply to both tools): after URL parsing, resolve to IP, reject if private/loopback/link-local. Same defense as the well-known SSRF-guard pattern shipped by other MCP fetchers in the ecosystem (e.g., `Akitaroh/scraper-mcp` `src/security/url-guard.ts`).\n\n## Auth boundary violated\n**Boundary type:** MCP tool-argument boundary plus the local-network trust boundary. The MCP server typically sits inside a trust boundary (developer laptop with loopback services, cloud VM with IMDS, k8s pod with service account). The tools allow the MCP client to dispatch HTTP requests across that boundary.\n\n**Respected/violated trace:** Per the tool descriptions, the expected respected boundary is \"public SaaS web pages.\" That expectation is violated by any request reaching a host the user didn\u0027t intend to expose (127.0.0.1:6379 Redis, 169.254.169.254 cloud metadata, 192.168.0.1 internal admin).\n\n## Impact\n\n1. **Cloud credential theft** \u2014 server on EC2 / GCE / Azure VM. MCP client invokes `auth_fetch({ url: \"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/\u003crole\u003e\" })` and receives temporary credentials in the tool response. Or invokes `download_media({ urls: [...], output_dir: \"/tmp/exfil\" })` to persist them to disk.\n\n2. **Internal service enumeration** \u2014 MCP client probes private-range hosts (10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16). Each `auth_fetch` returns the page DOM; each `download_media` writes the response to disk.\n\n3. **Loopback exploitation** \u2014 server runs alongside Redis (127.0.0.1:6379), ElasticSearch (127.0.0.1:9200), or internal admin UIs. MCP client reads them via `auth_fetch`.\n\n4. **Disk-write side channel** (`download_media` only) \u2014 output_dir is also user-controlled, with no documented restriction. An MCP client can request `output_dir = \"/some/user-writable-shared-dir\"` and exfil internal-service responses to a location accessible to a co-tenant process.\n\nThe injection vector is any content reaching the model that prompts a fetch tool call. The tool description explicitly says \"MUST be used instead of Fetch/web_fetch when the page requires login\" \u2014 meaning the model is encouraged to call this tool for any \"private page\" mention, which a prompt-injected upstream content can trivially trigger.\n\n## Proof of concept (non-destructive)\n\n`poc.mjs` \u2014 replicates the `download_media` handler\u0027s HTTP-fetch + file-write chain against a local fake-internal HTTP service. Playwright\u0027s `ctx.request.get(url)` is replaced with the equivalent `fetch(url)` for the bug case (a URL needing no auth) so the demo runs without browser deps. The structural defect \u2014 \"no host validation before HTTP dispatch\" \u2014 is identical.\n\n```\n[PoC] fake internal-only service: 127.0.0.1:36105\n[PoC] simulating MCP client calling download_media({\n urls: [\u0027http://127.0.0.1:36105/secrets\u0027],\n output_dir: \u0027/tmp/auth-fetch-exfil-aU1jjv\u0027\n })\n[PoC] no IP / host validation exists at tools.ts:236-238 before ctx.request.get(url)\n[PoC] \u2713 SSRF + DISK-EXFIL CONFIRMED\n File written to: /tmp/auth-fetch-exfil-aU1jjv/file-1.json\n Persisted content (187 bytes):\n {\n \"AccessKeyId\": \"AKIA-FAKE-FROM-POC\",\n \"SecretAccessKey\": \"fake-secret-marker-NOT-REAL\",\n \"Note\": \"In a real exploit this would be AWS IMDS at 169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...\"\n }\n```\n\nExit code `0`. SHA-256 `poc.mjs`: `4cea53f1a618581fc67f9a8bd07a7a2b22274f42cdbf7f3c658519673aaf7568`. The PoC only contacts `127.0.0.1` on an ephemeral port; the fake-credentials string contains the literal `FAKE` marker so no downstream system can mistake it for real credentials. The exfil directory is cleaned up after the demo.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nAdd a `assertSafeUrl` helper (same shape as in the matching egoist/fetch-mcp advisory) called before any HTTP dispatch \u2014 at `tools.ts:236` inside the download_media loop, and at the top of `navigateTo` in `browser.ts:53`:\n\n```ts\nimport dns from \u0027node:dns/promises\u0027\nimport net from \u0027node:net\u0027\n\nasync function assertSafeUrl(rawUrl: string): Promise\u003cURL\u003e {\n const parsed = new URL(rawUrl)\n if (![\u0027http:\u0027, \u0027https:\u0027].includes(parsed.protocol)) throw new Error(`Unsupported scheme`)\n const host = parsed.hostname\n const addresses = net.isIP(host)\n ? [host]\n : (await dns.lookup(host, { all: true })).map(a =\u003e a.address)\n for (const addr of addresses) {\n if (isPrivateOrLinkLocal(addr)) throw new Error(`Refusing to fetch ${addr}`)\n }\n return parsed\n}\n```\n\nWhere `isPrivateOrLinkLocal` blocks 127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16, ::1, fc00::/7, fe80::/10.\n\nFor `download_media` specifically, also constrain `output_dir`: resolve it under a fixed root (e.g., `~/.auth-fetch-mcp/downloads/`) and reject if the resolved path escapes that root.",
"id": "GHSA-hv85-774v-26fg",
"modified": "2026-05-19T15:47:27Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T15:47:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ymw0407/auth-fetch-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-hv85-774v-26fg"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ymw0407/auth-fetch-mcp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ymw0407/auth-fetch-mcp/releases/tag/v3.0.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "auth-fetch-mcp: SSRF and disk exfiltration via unvalidated auth_fetch and download_media URLs"
}
GHSA-HVCP-JVX5-4PMP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:52 – Updated: 2023-08-01 23:01A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in Magento 2.1 prior to 2.1.18, Magento 2.2 prior to 2.2.9, Magento 2.3 prior to 2.3.2. This can be exploited by authenticated user with admin privileges to manipulate shipment settings to execute arbitrary code.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.18"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "magento/community-edition"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-7923"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-01T23:01:37Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-02T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in Magento 2.1 prior to 2.1.18, Magento 2.2 prior to 2.2.9, Magento 2.3 prior to 2.3.2. This can be exploited by authenticated user with admin privileges to manipulate shipment settings to execute arbitrary code.",
"id": "GHSA-hvcp-jvx5-4pmp",
"modified": "2023-08-01T23:01:37Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:52:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7923"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/magento/product-community-edition/CVE-2019-7923.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://magento.com/security/patches/magento-2.3.2-2.2.9-and-2.1.18-security-update-13"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20211206084839/https://magento.com/security/patches/magento-2.3.2-2.2.9-and-2.1.18-security-update-13"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Magento 2 Community Edition SSRF vulnerability"
}
GHSA-HVV8-336G-RX3M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-03-22 23:28 – Updated: 2023-03-09 21:21Impact
The processed stream at unmarshalling time contains type information to recreate the formerly written objects. XStream creates therefore new instances based on these type information. An attacker can manipulate the processed input stream and replace or inject objects, that result in a server-side forgery request. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream's security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types.
Patches
If you rely on XStream's default blacklist of the Security Framework, you will have to use at least version 1.4.16
Workarounds
See workarounds for the different versions covering all CVEs.
References
See full information about the nature of the vulnerability and the steps to reproduce it in XStream's documentation for CVE-2021-21342.
Credits
钟潦贵 (Liaogui Zhong) found and reported the issue to XStream and provided the required information to reproduce it.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in XStream * Contact us at XStream Google Group
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.thoughtworks.xstream:xstream"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-21342"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-502",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-03-22T23:23:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-03-23T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe processed stream at unmarshalling time contains type information to recreate the formerly written objects. XStream creates therefore new instances based on these type information. An attacker can manipulate the processed input stream and replace or inject objects, that result in a server-side forgery request. No user is affected, who followed the recommendation to setup XStream\u0027s security framework with a whitelist limited to the minimal required types.\n\n### Patches\nIf you rely on XStream\u0027s default blacklist of the [Security Framework](https://x-stream.github.io/security.html#framework), you will have to use at least version 1.4.16\n\n### Workarounds\nSee [workarounds](https://x-stream.github.io/security.html#workaround) for the different versions covering all CVEs.\n\n### References\nSee full information about the nature of the vulnerability and the steps to reproduce it in XStream\u0027s documentation for [CVE-2021-21342](https://x-stream.github.io/CVE-2021-21342.html).\n\n### Credits\n\u949f\u6f66\u8d35 (Liaogui Zhong) found and reported the issue to XStream and provided the required information to reproduce it.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [XStream](https://github.com/x-stream/xstream/issues)\n* Contact us at [XStream Google Group](https://groups.google.com/group/xstream-user)",
"id": "GHSA-hvv8-336g-rx3m",
"modified": "2023-03-09T21:21:55Z",
"published": "2021-03-22T23:28:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/x-stream/xstream/security/advisories/GHSA-hvv8-336g-rx3m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21342"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/x-stream/xstream"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r8244fd0831db894d5e89911ded9c72196d395a90ae655414d23ed0dd@%3Cusers.activemq.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r9ac71b047767205aa22e3a08cb33f3e0586de6b2fac48b425c6e16b0@%3Cdev.jmeter.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/04/msg00002.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/22KVR6B5IZP3BGQ3HPWIO2FWWCKT3DHP"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/PVPHZA7VW2RRSDCOIPP2W6O5ND254TU7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/QGXIU3YDPG6OGTDHMBLAFN7BPBERXREB"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20210430-0002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2021/dsa-5004"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com//security-alerts/cpujul2021.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2022.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2021.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://x-stream.github.io/CVE-2021-21342.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://x-stream.github.io/security.html#workaround"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://x-stream.github.io/changes.html#1.4.16"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "A Server-Side Forgery Request can be activated unmarshalling with XStream to access data streams from an arbitrary URL referencing a resource in an intranet or the local host"
}
GHSA-HW37-XG77-53HX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-14 21:34 – Updated: 2024-05-14 21:34The Proofpoint Encryption endpoint of Proofpoint Enterprise Protection contains a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability that allows an authenticated user to relay HTTP requests from the Protection server to otherwise private network addresses.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-0862"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T19:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Proofpoint Encryption endpoint of Proofpoint Enterprise Protection contains a Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerability that allows an authenticated user to relay HTTP requests from the Protection server to otherwise private network addresses.",
"id": "GHSA-hw37-xg77-53hx",
"modified": "2024-05-14T21:34:44Z",
"published": "2024-05-14T21:34:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0862"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.proofpoint.com/us/security/security-advisories/pfpt-sa-2024-0001"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HW5V-77JJ-PRP8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-31 06:30 – Updated: 2025-03-18 15:30The WP STAGING WordPress Backup Plugin WordPress plugin before 3.5.0 does not prevent users with the administrator role from pinging conducting SSRF attacks, which may be a problem in multisite configurations.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-4469"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-31T06:15:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The WP STAGING WordPress Backup Plugin WordPress plugin before 3.5.0 does not prevent users with the administrator role from pinging conducting SSRF attacks, which may be a problem in multisite configurations.",
"id": "GHSA-hw5v-77jj-prp8",
"modified": "2025-03-18T15:30:38Z",
"published": "2024-05-31T06:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4469"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/d6b1270b-52c0-471d-a5fb-507e21b46310"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HW9F-7C29-3P62
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-05 06:31 – Updated: 2026-05-05 06:31The Gutenverse – Ultimate WordPress FSE Blocks Addons & Ecosystem plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in versions up to, and including, 3.5.3 via the import_images() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-2948"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-05T04:16:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Gutenverse \u2013 Ultimate WordPress FSE Blocks Addons \u0026 Ecosystem plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery in versions up to, and including, 3.5.3 via the import_images() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application and can be used to query and modify information from internal services.",
"id": "GHSA-hw9f-7c29-3p62",
"modified": "2026-05-05T06:31:05Z",
"published": "2026-05-05T06:31:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2948"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3507804/gutenverse"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ac909a4b-d949-42eb-871a-963bc6242c12?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HW9R-6M78-W6H3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-08 12:51 – Updated: 2026-06-08 12:51GeoNode versions 4.4.5 and 5.0.2 (and prior within their respective releases) contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the service registration endpoint that allows authenticated attackers to trigger outbound network requests to arbitrary URLs by submitting a crafted service URL during form validation. Attackers can probe internal network targets including loopback addresses, RFC1918 private IP ranges, link-local addresses, and cloud metadata services by exploiting insufficient URL validation in the WMS service handler without private IP filtering or allowlist enforcement.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "geonode"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.4.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "geonode"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39922"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-08T12:51:32Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "GeoNode versions 4.4.5 and 5.0.2 (and prior within their respective releases) contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the service registration endpoint that allows authenticated attackers to trigger outbound network requests to arbitrary URLs by submitting a crafted service URL during form validation. Attackers can probe internal network targets including loopback addresses, RFC1918 private IP ranges, link-local addresses, and cloud metadata services by exploiting insufficient URL validation in the WMS service handler without private IP filtering or allowlist enforcement.",
"id": "GHSA-hw9r-6m78-w6h3",
"modified": "2026-06-08T12:51:32Z",
"published": "2026-06-08T12:51:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39922"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/GeoNode/geonode"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/GeoNode/geonode/releases/tag/4.4.5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/GeoNode/geonode/releases/tag/5.0.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/geonode/PYSEC-2026-61.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/geonode-ssrf-via-service-registration"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "GeoNode contains a server-side request forgery vulnerability in the service registration endpoint"
}
GHSA-HWRQ-8WXH-Q4XV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 20:02 – Updated: 2026-07-14 20:02Summary
Anyquery's server mode does not restrict outbound HTTP requests initiated by its built-in SQLite virtual table modules (e.g., json_reader, log_reader). Unauthenticated attackers connecting to the MySQL-compatible server port can create virtual tables pointing to internal network endpoints or Cloud Metadata IPs (e.g., http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/). This allows attackers to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), bypassing external firewalls to scan internal ports and exfiltrate cloud credentials.
Details
When Anyquery is launched in Server Mode (anyquery server), it binds to a TCP port and accepts MySQL protocol connections. The server handler allows the creation of dynamic virtual tables using modules like json_reader or log_reader, which internally use go-getter to fetch URLs. There is no protection mechanism to prevent fetches to local (127.0.0.0/8), private (10.0.0.0/8), or special (169.254.169.254) IP addresses.
An attacker can use this to map internal networks, interact with internal APIs, or steal IAM tokens from cloud metadata servers by fetching the data and reading it as a database table.
PoC (Proof of Concept)
- Start the server on the victim machine (e.g., an AWS EC2 instance):
bash anyquery server --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8070 - Connect from an attacker machine:
bash mysql -u root -h <VICTIM_IP> -P 8070 - Execute the payload to fetch AWS Metadata or hit a local API: ```sql -- Payload 1: Fetch AWS Cloud Metadata (IAM credentials) CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE aws_meta USING log_reader('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/'); SELECT * FROM aws_meta;
-- Payload 2: Access an internal application bound only to localhost CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE local_admin USING log_reader('http://localhost:8000/admin'); SELECT * FROM local_admin LIMIT 10; ```
Impact
- Confidentiality: High. Exfiltration of sensitive internal network data or cloud credentials.
- Integrity: Low. Possible interaction with state-changing internal REST APIs.
- Availability: None.
- CVSS Score: 8.6 (High) -
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Remediation
By default, in Server Mode, remote HTTP fetches to local/private IP ranges and known Cloud Metadata IP addresses should be blocked unless explicitly enabled via configuration.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c 0.4.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/julien040/anyquery"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54628"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-441",
"CWE-862",
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-14T20:02:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\nAnyquery\u0027s `server` mode does not restrict outbound HTTP requests initiated by its built-in SQLite virtual table modules (e.g., `json_reader`, `log_reader`). Unauthenticated attackers connecting to the MySQL-compatible server port can create virtual tables pointing to internal network endpoints or Cloud Metadata IPs (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`). This allows attackers to perform Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF), bypassing external firewalls to scan internal ports and exfiltrate cloud credentials.\n\n## Details\nWhen Anyquery is launched in **Server Mode** (`anyquery server`), it binds to a TCP port and accepts MySQL protocol connections. The server handler allows the creation of dynamic virtual tables using modules like `json_reader` or `log_reader`, which internally use `go-getter` to fetch URLs. There is no protection mechanism to prevent fetches to local (127.0.0.0/8), private (10.0.0.0/8), or special (169.254.169.254) IP addresses. \n\nAn attacker can use this to map internal networks, interact with internal APIs, or steal IAM tokens from cloud metadata servers by fetching the data and reading it as a database table.\n\n## PoC (Proof of Concept)\n1. Start the server on the victim machine (e.g., an AWS EC2 instance):\n ```bash\n anyquery server --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8070\n ```\n2. Connect from an attacker machine:\n ```bash\n mysql -u root -h \u003cVICTIM_IP\u003e -P 8070\n ```\n3. Execute the payload to fetch AWS Metadata or hit a local API:\n ```sql\n -- Payload 1: Fetch AWS Cloud Metadata (IAM credentials)\n CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE aws_meta USING log_reader(\u0027http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\u0027);\n SELECT * FROM aws_meta;\n\n -- Payload 2: Access an internal application bound only to localhost\n CREATE VIRTUAL TABLE local_admin USING log_reader(\u0027http://localhost:8000/admin\u0027);\n SELECT * FROM local_admin LIMIT 10;\n ```\n\n## Impact\n- **Confidentiality:** High. Exfiltration of sensitive internal network data or cloud credentials.\n- **Integrity:** Low. Possible interaction with state-changing internal REST APIs.\n- **Availability:** None.\n- **CVSS Score:** 8.6 (High) - `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N`\n\n## Remediation\nBy default, in Server Mode, remote HTTP fetches to local/private IP ranges and known Cloud Metadata IP addresses should be blocked unless explicitly enabled via configuration.",
"id": "GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv",
"modified": "2026-07-14T20:02:06Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T20:02:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/julien040/anyquery/security/advisories/GHSA-hwrq-8wxh-q4xv"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/julien040/anyquery"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/julien040/anyquery/releases/tag/0.4.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Anyquery: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Unrestricted SQLite Virtual Table Modules in Server Mode"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-664: Server Side Request Forgery
An adversary exploits improper input validation by submitting maliciously crafted input to a target application running on a server, with the goal of forcing the server to make a request either to itself, to web services running in the server’s internal network, or to external third parties. If successful, the adversary’s request will be made with the server’s privilege level, bypassing its authentication controls. This ultimately allows the adversary to access sensitive data, execute commands on the server’s network, and make external requests with the stolen identity of the server. Server Side Request Forgery attacks differ from Cross Site Request Forgery attacks in that they target the server itself, whereas CSRF attacks exploit an insecure user authentication mechanism to perform unauthorized actions on the user's behalf.