Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-88

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command ('Argument Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product constructs a string for a command to be executed by a separate component in another control sphere, but it does not properly delimit the intended arguments, options, or switches within that command string.

623 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-JJ45-W38G-GFRJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 15:32 – Updated: 2026-08-19 15:32
VLAI
Details

phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7, when configured to use PostgreSQL via the native pgsql PHP extension, declares an incorrect LIKE ESCAPE character ('=') in the Search/Database/Pgsql.php backend while escapeLikeWildcards() escapes user input with the '|' prefix. As a result, wildcard escaping is a no-op and user-supplied % and _ characters remain active LIKE wildcards. An unauthenticated attacker can submit such characters in the public FAQ search form to force maximally broad pattern matches and expensive sequential scans, resulting in a denial of service. The PDO PostgreSQL backend is not affected, and quotes remain escaped so this does not enable quote-breaking SQL injection or data exfiltration.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-76212"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T14:17:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "phpMyFAQ before 4.1.7, when configured to use PostgreSQL via the native pgsql PHP extension, declares an incorrect LIKE ESCAPE character (\u0027=\u0027) in the Search/Database/Pgsql.php backend while escapeLikeWildcards() escapes user input with the \u0027|\u0027 prefix. As a result, wildcard escaping is a no-op and user-supplied % and _ characters remain active LIKE wildcards. An unauthenticated attacker can submit such characters in the public FAQ search form to force maximally broad pattern matches and expensive sequential scans, resulting in a denial of service. The PDO PostgreSQL backend is not affected, and quotes remain escaped so this does not enable quote-breaking SQL injection or data exfiltration.",
  "id": "GHSA-jj45-w38g-gfrj",
  "modified": "2026-08-19T15:32:33Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T15:32:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-5hx6-c293-588h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76212"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/phpmyfaq-before-like-wildcard-injection-via-postgresql"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JM78-9FVV-MHGR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-07 15:46 – Updated: 2026-08-07 15:46
VLAI
Summary
GitPython: git-config OPTION-name injection via =/#/whitespace bypasses name validator, enabling forged core.sshCommand/hooksPath (RCE)
Details

Summary

GitPython's config-name validator only neutralizes CR/LF/NUL for the "option" label; it does not reject =, #, ;, [, ], or whitespace in an option name. write_section writes the option name verbatim into the config file, so an option name such as sshCommand = touch <cmd> # is written as \tsshCommand = touch <cmd> # = <value>, which git parses as core.sshCommand = touch <cmd> (the trailing # comments out the intended value). This forges arbitrary config directives (core.sshCommand, core.hooksPath, alias.*) → RCE on the next git operation. This is a distinct field (option name, not section name) and distinct character class (=/#/space, not newline/bracket) from GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 (section-name bracket injection) and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w / GHSA-v87r-6q3f-2j67 (newline injection).

Root Cause

_assure_config_name_safe(name, label) (git/config.py:897) applies the bracket/quote state machine ONLY when label == "section"; for the "option" label it falls through with just the UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE = [\r\n\x00] regex. write_section then writes the option name verbatim into "\t%s = %s\n" (config.py:702).

Impact

Arbitrary git-config directive injection → remote code execution via core.sshCommand (fires on any ssh git operation, no staged file needed) or core.hooksPath (with a staged hook). Requires the embedding application to forward a caller-influenced OPTION NAME into the config writer (name-control model, the same name-control model accepted by the related published advisories GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w). Default configuration.

Proof of Concept

with repo.config_writer() as cw:
    cw.set_value("core", "sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #", "x")
# git config --get core.sshCommand  ->  touch /tmp/RCE

Attack Chain

  1. Entry: app calls config writer with attacker-controlled OPTION name: set_value("core", "sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #", "x").
  2. Check: _assure_config_name_safe(option, "option") @ config.py. Guard: regex matches only [\r\n\x00]; bracket/quote state machine is gated on label=="section". Bypass proof: =,#,space pass → no ValueError.
  3. Sink: write_section writes "\tsshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE # = x\n" (config.py:702).
  4. Impact: git parses core.sshCommand=touch /tmp/RCE → arbitrary code execution on next git op.

Bypass Evidence

Independently reproduced (gate harness): set_value('core','sshCommand = touch <RCE> #','x') → no ValueError; file line sshCommand = touch <RCE> # = x; git config --get core.sshCommand → touch <RCE> (rc=0). Also verified core.hooksPath via both GitConfigParser and repo.config_writer(). Fix-commit read: bracket/quote checks are inside if label == "section"; the "option" label is not covered.

Affected Versions

GitPython <= 3.1.57 (validator present verbatim on the latest release tag).

Suggested Fix

Apply the section-name safety checks (reject =, #, ;, [, ], whitespace) to the "option" label as well, or validate the fully-rendered config line after substitution.

Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.57"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "GitPython"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.58"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-74",
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-07T15:46:35Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\nGitPython\u0027s config-name validator only neutralizes CR/LF/NUL for the `\"option\"` label; it does not reject `=`, `#`, `;`, `[`, `]`, or whitespace in an **option name**. `write_section` writes the option name verbatim into the config file, so an option name such as `sshCommand = touch \u003ccmd\u003e #` is written as `\\tsshCommand = touch \u003ccmd\u003e # = \u003cvalue\u003e`, which git parses as `core.sshCommand = touch \u003ccmd\u003e` (the trailing `#` comments out the intended value). This forges arbitrary config directives (`core.sshCommand`, `core.hooksPath`, `alias.*`) \u2192 RCE on the next git operation. This is a distinct field (option name, not section name) and distinct character class (`=`/`#`/space, not newline/bracket) from GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 (section-name bracket injection) and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w / GHSA-v87r-6q3f-2j67 (newline injection).\n\n## Root Cause\n`_assure_config_name_safe(name, label)` (`git/config.py:897`) applies the bracket/quote state machine ONLY when `label == \"section\"`; for the `\"option\"` label it falls through with just the `UNSAFE_CONFIG_CHARS_RE = [\\r\\n\\x00]` regex. `write_section` then writes the option name verbatim into `\"\\t%s = %s\\n\"` (config.py:702).\n\n## Impact\nArbitrary git-config directive injection \u2192 remote code execution via `core.sshCommand` (fires on any ssh git operation, no staged file needed) or `core.hooksPath` (with a staged hook). Requires the embedding application to forward a caller-influenced OPTION NAME into the config writer (name-control model, the same name-control model accepted by the related published advisories GHSA-3rp5-jjmw-4wv2 and GHSA-mv93-w799-cj2w). Default configuration.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n```python\nwith repo.config_writer() as cw:\n    cw.set_value(\"core\", \"sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #\", \"x\")\n# git config --get core.sshCommand  -\u003e  touch /tmp/RCE\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n1. Entry: app calls config writer with attacker-controlled OPTION name: `set_value(\"core\", \"sshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE #\", \"x\")`.\n2. Check: `_assure_config_name_safe(option, \"option\")` @ config.py. Guard: regex matches only `[\\r\\n\\x00]`; bracket/quote state machine is gated on `label==\"section\"`. Bypass proof: `=`,`#`,space pass \u2192 no `ValueError`.\n3. Sink: `write_section` writes `\"\\tsshCommand = touch /tmp/RCE # = x\\n\"` (config.py:702).\n4. Impact: git parses `core.sshCommand=touch /tmp/RCE` \u2192 arbitrary code execution on next git op.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\nIndependently reproduced (gate harness): `set_value(\u0027core\u0027,\u0027sshCommand = touch \u003cRCE\u003e #\u0027,\u0027x\u0027)` \u2192 no `ValueError`; file line `sshCommand = touch \u003cRCE\u003e # = x`; `git config --get core.sshCommand` \u2192 `touch \u003cRCE\u003e` (rc=0). Also verified `core.hooksPath` via both `GitConfigParser` and `repo.config_writer()`. Fix-commit read: bracket/quote checks are inside `if label == \"section\"`; the `\"option\"` label is not covered.\n\n## Affected Versions\n`GitPython \u003c= 3.1.57` (validator present verbatim on the latest release tag).\n\n## Suggested Fix\nApply the section-name safety checks (reject `=`, `#`, `;`, `[`, `]`, whitespace) to the `\"option\"` label as well, or validate the fully-rendered config line after substitution.\n\n---\nReported by **zx (Jace)** \u2014 GitHub: @manus-use",
  "id": "GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr",
  "modified": "2026-08-07T15:46:35Z",
  "published": "2026-08-07T15:46:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-jm78-9fvv-mhgr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/pull/2204"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/commit/a495ccd3b547ccd60b2187215823b72a9c0188bf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.58"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "GitPython: git-config OPTION-name injection via =/#/whitespace bypasses name validator, enabling forged core.sshCommand/hooksPath (RCE)"
}

GHSA-JPGV-X3R5-PM29

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 17:47 – Updated: 2022-05-01 17:47
VLAI
Details

Argument injection vulnerability in the telnet daemon (in.telnetd) in Solaris 10 and 11 (SunOS 5.10 and 5.11) misinterprets certain client "-f" sequences as valid requests for the login program to skip authentication, which allows remote attackers to log into certain accounts, as demonstrated by the bin account.

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2007-0882"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2007-02-12T20:28:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Argument injection vulnerability in the telnet daemon (in.telnetd) in Solaris 10 and 11 (SunOS 5.10 and 5.11) misinterprets certain client \"-f\" sequences as valid requests for the login program to skip authentication, which allows remote attackers to log into certain accounts, as demonstrated by the bin account.",
  "id": "GHSA-jpgv-x3r5-pm29",
  "modified": "2022-05-01T17:47:50Z",
  "published": "2022-05-01T17:47:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-0882"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/32434"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://oval.cisecurity.org/repository/search/definition/oval%3Aorg.mitre.oval%3Adef%3A2202"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://erratasec.blogspot.com/2007/02/trivial-remote-solaris-0day-disable.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=2220"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://osvdb.org/31881"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2007/Feb/0217.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/24120"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1-26-102802-1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/881872"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/459831/100/0/threaded"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/459843/100/0/threaded"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/459855/100/0/threaded"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/459980/100/0/threaded"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/460086/100/100/threaded"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/460103/100/100/threaded"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/22512"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id?1017625"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA07-059A.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2007/0560"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-JPWP-H56F-5V3G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-13 21:30 – Updated: 2023-12-13 21:30
VLAI
Details

An OS command injection vulnerability in the XML API of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software enables an authenticated API user to disrupt system processes and potentially execute arbitrary code with limited privileges on the firewall.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-6792"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-13T19:15:09Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An OS command injection vulnerability in the XML API of Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS software enables an authenticated API user to disrupt system processes and potentially execute arbitrary code with limited privileges on the firewall.",
  "id": "GHSA-jpwp-h56f-5v3g",
  "modified": "2023-12-13T21:30:31Z",
  "published": "2023-12-13T21:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6792"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2023-6792"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JQVF-J3WW-R8C7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 18:37 – Updated: 2026-08-28 18:37
VLAI
Summary
PowSyBl Core has Command Injection in LocalCommandExecutor-s
Details

Impact

Description

Both AbstractLocalCommandExecutor OS-dependent implementations are subject to CWE-78 (OS Command Injection), with a secondary CWE-88 (Argument Injection) concern via environment variables.

The local command executor build command strings via concatenation and executes them (through bash -c for Unix, or cmd /c for Windows). Any string argument or environment variable value reaching this executor can break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary shell code as the JVM user.

The sink is reachable through public APIs that accept List<String> arguments without any documented indication that elements undergo shell interpretation.

Any caller — CLI, library integration, or embedding service — that forwards data from a less-trusted source into these APIs inherits the vulnerability.

Vulnerable elements

The vulnerable elements are: - Public methods: - UnixLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...) - WindowsLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...) - LocalComputationManager.execute(...) - ParallelLoadFlowActionSimulator.run(...) - ActionSimulatorTool.run(...) - AmplModelRunner.run(...) - AmplModelRunner.runAsync(...) - itools commands: - action-simulator, when the task-count option is defined - security-analysis, when the external option is defined - dynamic-security-analysis

Characteristics

The vulnerability characteristics are the following: - It allows arbitrary shell command execution as the JVM user (read, write, execute any file; spawn processes; exfiltrate data; etc.) - There are multiple independent injection vectors within a single vulnerable call: - args elements (weakly escaped — bypassable via $(...), backticks, escaped quotes) - Environment variable values (unescaped — bypassable via ;, \n, or shell metacharacters) - It is silent from the caller's perspective: the List<String> API gives no indication that shell interpretation occurs. - It exposes downstream projects: any service embedding powsybl-core (REST front-ends, pypowsybl tooling, multi-tenant grid analysis platforms) that exposes contingency IDs or computation parameters to external input is exploitable without needing to touch powsybl's code directly.

Am I impacted?

You are vulnerable if you make direct calls to one of the vulnerable end-user methods or itools commands listed in the "Vulnerable elements" section, with user-provided parameters, without controlling them.

Patches

com.powsybl:powsybl-computation-local:7.2.2 and higher

Workarounds

If you cannot update your powsybl-computation-local version, you can check the content of the user-provided arguments when calling the vulnerable methods, by forbidding (if possible) the following characters: - On Unix/Linux systems: - \, !, #, $, ^, &, *, (, ), {, }, |, [, ], \, ;, \, ", ,, <, >, ?, - On Windows: - %, !, ", \n, \r, ^

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.2.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.powsybl:powsybl-computation-local"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55673"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T18:37:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n#### Description\nBoth `AbstractLocalCommandExecutor` OS-dependent implementations are subject to **CWE-78** (OS Command Injection), with a secondary **CWE-88** (Argument Injection) concern via environment variables.\n\nThe local command executor build command strings via concatenation and executes them (through `bash -c` for Unix, or `cmd /c` for Windows). Any string argument or environment variable value reaching this executor can break out of the intended command and execute arbitrary shell code as the JVM user.\n\nThe sink is reachable through public APIs that accept `List\u003cString\u003e` arguments without any documented indication that elements undergo shell interpretation.\n\nAny caller \u2014 CLI, library integration, or embedding service \u2014 that forwards data from a less-trusted source into these APIs inherits the vulnerability.\n\n#### Vulnerable elements\nThe vulnerable elements are:\n- Public methods:\n  - `UnixLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...)`\n  - `WindowsLocalCommandExecutor.execute(...)`\n  - `LocalComputationManager.execute(...)`\n  - `ParallelLoadFlowActionSimulator.run(...)`\n  - `ActionSimulatorTool.run(...)`\n  - `AmplModelRunner.run(...)`\n  - `AmplModelRunner.runAsync(...)`\n- **itools** commands:\n  - `action-simulator`, when the `task-count` option is defined\n  - `security-analysis`, when the `external` option is defined\n  -  `dynamic-security-analysis`\n\n\n#### Characteristics\n\nThe vulnerability characteristics are the following:\n- It allows **arbitrary shell command execution** as the JVM user (read, write, execute any file; spawn processes; exfiltrate data; etc.)\n- There are **multiple independent injection vectors** within a single vulnerable call:\n  - `args` elements (weakly escaped \u2014 bypassable via `$(...)`, backticks, escaped quotes)\n  - Environment variable values (unescaped \u2014 bypassable via `;`, `\\n`, or shell metacharacters)\n- It is **silent** from the caller\u0027s perspective: the `List\u003cString\u003e` API gives no indication that shell interpretation occurs.\n- It exposes **downstream projects:** any service embedding `powsybl-core` (REST front-ends, pypowsybl tooling, multi-tenant grid analysis platforms) that exposes contingency IDs or computation parameters to external input is exploitable without needing to touch powsybl\u0027s code directly.\n\n\n#### Am I impacted?\n\nYou are vulnerable if you make direct calls to one of the vulnerable end-user methods or itools commands listed in the \"Vulnerable elements\" section, with user-provided parameters, without controlling them.\n\n\n### Patches\n\n`com.powsybl:powsybl-computation-local:7.2.2` and higher\n\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot update your `powsybl-computation-local` version, you can check the content of the user-provided arguments when calling the vulnerable methods, by forbidding (if possible) the following characters:\n- On Unix/Linux systems:\n  - `\\`, `!`, `#`, `$`, `^`, `\u0026`, `*`, `(`, `)`, `{`, `}`, `|`, `[`, `]`, `\\`, `;`, `\\`, `\"`, `,`, `\u003c`, `\u003e`, `?`, ` `\n- On Windows:\n  - `%`, `!`, `\"`, `\\n`, `\\r`, `^`",
  "id": "GHSA-jqvf-j3ww-r8c7",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T18:37:28Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T18:37:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/security/advisories/GHSA-jqvf-j3ww-r8c7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/pull/3973"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/commit/17461264d1d18f9bba43bb7855f251e9fa55a4db"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/commit/7aa28d8c2492bbcd061585cb498acce72d5ed79a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/powsybl/powsybl-core/releases/tag/v7.2.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PowSyBl Core has Command Injection in LocalCommandExecutor-s"
}

GHSA-JRRP-WVGF-HMFR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-16 21:30 – Updated: 2023-02-27 21:30
VLAI
Details

A improper neutralization of argument delimiters in a command ('argument injection') in Fortinet FortiNAC versions 9.4.0, 9.2.0 through 9.2.5, 9.1.0 through 9.1.7, 8.8.0 through 8.8.11, 8.7.0 through 8.7.6, 8.6.0 through 8.6.5, 8.5.0 through 8.5.4, 8.3.7 allows attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via specially crafted input parameters.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-40677"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-16T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A improper neutralization of argument delimiters in a command (\u0027argument injection\u0027) in Fortinet FortiNAC versions 9.4.0, 9.2.0 through 9.2.5, 9.1.0 through 9.1.7, 8.8.0 through 8.8.11, 8.7.0 through 8.7.6, 8.6.0 through 8.6.5, 8.5.0 through 8.5.4, 8.3.7 allows attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via specially crafted input parameters.",
  "id": "GHSA-jrrp-wvgf-hmfr",
  "modified": "2023-02-27T21:30:34Z",
  "published": "2023-02-16T21:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-40677"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-22-280"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JV35-898H-VCCG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-27 21:31 – Updated: 2026-07-28 00:31
VLAI
Details

An injection issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. An app may be able to gain root privileges.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43698"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-27T21:16:53Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An injection issue was addressed with improved validation. This issue is fixed in macOS Sequoia 15.7.8, macOS Sonoma 14.8.8, macOS Tahoe 26.6. An app may be able to gain root privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-jv35-898h-vccg",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T00:31:01Z",
  "published": "2026-07-27T21:31:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43698"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/128067"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/128071"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/128072"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JVPW-637P-H3PW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 00:04 – Updated: 2026-06-09 18:39
VLAI
Summary
File Browser has a Command Injection via Hook Runner
Details

[!NOTE] This feature has been disabled by default for all installations from v2.33.8 onwards, including for existent installations. To exploit this vulnerability, the instance administrator must turn on a feature and ignore all the warnings about known vulnerabilities. We're publishing this new advisory to make it clear that all vulnerabilities concerning this feature are disclosed.

For more information about tracking vulnerability issues related to the Command Execution features, check https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/issues/5199.

Overview

The hook system in File Browser — which executes administrator-defined shell commands on file events such as upload, rename, and delete — is vulnerable to OS command injection. Variable substitution for values like $FILE and $USERNAME is performed via os.Expand without sanitization. An attacker with file write permission can craft a malicious filename containing shell metacharacters, causing the server to execute arbitrary OS commands when the hook fires. This results in Remote Code Execution (RCE).

Affected Location

  • File: runner/runner.go
  • Function: Runner.exec

Technical Details

Runner.exec expands template variables inside hook command strings using os.Expand:

// runner/runner.go
envMapping := func(key string) string {
    switch key {
    case "FILE":
        return path       // attacker-controlled filename
    case "USERNAME":
        return username   // attacker-controlled username
    // ...
    }
}

for i, arg := range command {
    if i == 0 { continue }
    command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping) // expands $FILE, $USERNAME, etc.
}

The expanded value is then passed as a shell argument string. os.Expand performs plain string substitution with no escaping. If an admin has configured a hook such as:

sh -c "echo created $FILE"

...and an attacker creates a file named ; id #, the variable expansion produces:

sh -c "echo created /path/to/; id #"

The ; terminates the echo command and the shell executes id with server privileges. The # character comments out the remainder, preventing syntax errors.

This pattern is exploitable across all hook events: before_upload, after_upload, before_rename, after_rename, before_delete, after_delete, etc.

Attack Scenario / Reproduction Steps

  1. Admin configures an after_upload hook: sh -c "echo created $FILE".
  2. The attacker (authenticated user with upload permission) uploads a file named ; id #.
  3. The upload succeeds and the hook fires automatically.
  4. The server executes: sh sh -c "echo created /uploads/; id #"
  5. The id command runs, confirming RCE.

Impact

Any authenticated user with file create, upload, or rename permissions can achieve arbitrary RCE on the server when shell-based hooks are configured. The attacker does not need to know the exact hook command — any hook that embeds $FILE in a shell string is exploitable by crafting the filename accordingly.

Proof of Concept

package runner

import (
        "os"
        "testing"

        "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/settings"
)

func TestPoC_FileHookInjection(t *testing.T) {
        // Simulate an admin-configured shell-based hook
        r := &Runner{
                Enabled: true,
                Settings: &settings.Settings{
                        Shell: []string{"sh", "-c"},
                        Commands: map[string][]string{
                                "after_upload": {"echo Uploaded $FILE"},
                        },
                },
        }

        // Malicious filename crafted by the attacker
        maliciousFilename := "/tmp/safe; id #"

        // Simulate the exec logic in runner/runner.go
        raw := r.Commands["after_upload"][0]
        command, _, _ := ParseCommand(r.Settings, raw)

        envMapping := func(key string) string {
                if key == "FILE" {
                        return maliciousFilename
                }
                return os.Getenv(key)
        }

        for i, arg := range command {
                if i == 0 {
                        continue
                }
                // os.Expand substitutes $FILE with the attacker-controlled filename —
                // no escaping is applied, so shell metacharacters pass through unchanged.
                command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping)
        }

        // The resulting command argument is the injected shell script:
        // sh -c "echo Uploaded /tmp/safe; id #"
        expectedArg := "echo Uploaded /tmp/safe; id #"
        if command[2] != expectedArg {
                t.Errorf("Expected command argument %q, got %q", expectedArg, command[2])
        }

        t.Logf("Confirmed: filename injection succeeded. Shell will execute: %v", command)
}
Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
7.5 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.33.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35585"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T00:04:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-07T17:16:33Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "\u003e [!NOTE]\n\u003e **This feature has been disabled by default for all installations from v2.33.8 onwards, including for existent installations**. To exploit this vulnerability, the instance administrator must turn on a feature and ignore all the warnings about known vulnerabilities. We\u0027re publishing this new advisory to make it clear that all vulnerabilities concerning this feature are disclosed.\n\u003e\n\u003e For more information about tracking vulnerability issues related to the Command Execution features, check https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/issues/5199.\n\n## Overview\n\nThe hook system in File Browser \u2014 which executes administrator-defined shell commands on file events such as upload, rename, and delete \u2014 is vulnerable to OS command injection. Variable substitution for values like `$FILE` and `$USERNAME` is performed via `os.Expand` without sanitization. An attacker with file write permission can craft a malicious filename containing shell metacharacters, causing the server to execute arbitrary OS commands when the hook fires. This results in **Remote Code Execution (RCE)**.\n\n## Affected Location\n\n- **File:** `runner/runner.go`\n- **Function:** `Runner.exec`\n\n## Technical Details\n\n`Runner.exec` expands template variables inside hook command strings using `os.Expand`:\n\n```go\n// runner/runner.go\nenvMapping := func(key string) string {\n    switch key {\n    case \"FILE\":\n        return path       // attacker-controlled filename\n    case \"USERNAME\":\n        return username   // attacker-controlled username\n    // ...\n    }\n}\n\nfor i, arg := range command {\n    if i == 0 { continue }\n    command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping) // expands $FILE, $USERNAME, etc.\n}\n```\n\nThe expanded value is then passed as a shell argument string. `os.Expand` performs plain string substitution with no escaping. If an admin has configured a hook such as:\n\n```\nsh -c \"echo created $FILE\"\n```\n\n...and an attacker creates a file named `; id #`, the variable expansion produces:\n\n```\nsh -c \"echo created /path/to/; id #\"\n```\n\nThe `;` terminates the `echo` command and the shell executes `id` with server privileges. The `#` character comments out the remainder, preventing syntax errors.\n\nThis pattern is exploitable across all hook events: `before_upload`, `after_upload`, `before_rename`, `after_rename`, `before_delete`, `after_delete`, etc.\n\n## Attack Scenario / Reproduction Steps\n\n1. Admin configures an `after_upload` hook: `sh -c \"echo created $FILE\"`.\n2. The attacker (authenticated user with upload permission) uploads a file named `; id #`.\n3. The upload succeeds and the hook fires automatically.\n4. The server executes:\n   ```sh\n   sh -c \"echo created /uploads/; id #\"\n   ```\n5. The `id` command runs, confirming RCE.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny authenticated user with file create, upload, or rename permissions can achieve arbitrary RCE on the server when shell-based hooks are configured. The attacker does not need to know the exact hook command \u2014 any hook that embeds `$FILE` in a shell string is exploitable by crafting the filename accordingly.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```go\npackage runner\n\nimport (\n        \"os\"\n        \"testing\"\n\n        \"github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2/settings\"\n)\n\nfunc TestPoC_FileHookInjection(t *testing.T) {\n        // Simulate an admin-configured shell-based hook\n        r := \u0026Runner{\n                Enabled: true,\n                Settings: \u0026settings.Settings{\n                        Shell: []string{\"sh\", \"-c\"},\n                        Commands: map[string][]string{\n                                \"after_upload\": {\"echo Uploaded $FILE\"},\n                        },\n                },\n        }\n\n        // Malicious filename crafted by the attacker\n        maliciousFilename := \"/tmp/safe; id #\"\n\n        // Simulate the exec logic in runner/runner.go\n        raw := r.Commands[\"after_upload\"][0]\n        command, _, _ := ParseCommand(r.Settings, raw)\n\n        envMapping := func(key string) string {\n                if key == \"FILE\" {\n                        return maliciousFilename\n                }\n                return os.Getenv(key)\n        }\n\n        for i, arg := range command {\n                if i == 0 {\n                        continue\n                }\n                // os.Expand substitutes $FILE with the attacker-controlled filename \u2014\n                // no escaping is applied, so shell metacharacters pass through unchanged.\n                command[i] = os.Expand(arg, envMapping)\n        }\n\n        // The resulting command argument is the injected shell script:\n        // sh -c \"echo Uploaded /tmp/safe; id #\"\n        expectedArg := \"echo Uploaded /tmp/safe; id #\"\n        if command[2] != expectedArg {\n                t.Errorf(\"Expected command argument %q, got %q\", expectedArg, command[2])\n        }\n\n        t.Logf(\"Confirmed: filename injection succeeded. Shell will execute: %v\", command)\n}\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-jvpw-637p-h3pw",
  "modified": "2026-06-09T18:39:58Z",
  "published": "2026-04-08T00:04:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-jvpw-637p-h3pw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35585"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/issues/5199"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "File Browser has a Command Injection via Hook Runner"
}

GHSA-JVWQ-53JX-C5F6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:06 – Updated: 2023-10-11 15:30
VLAI
Details

When a user clicked on an FTP URL containing encoded newline characters (%0A and %0D), the newlines would have been interpreted as such and allowed arbitrary commands to be sent to the FTP server. This vulnerability affects Firefox ESR < 78.10, Thunderbird < 78.10, and Firefox < 88.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-24002"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-74",
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-24T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "When a user clicked on an FTP URL containing encoded newline characters (%0A and %0D), the newlines would have been interpreted as such and allowed arbitrary commands to be sent to the FTP server. This vulnerability affects Firefox ESR \u003c 78.10, Thunderbird \u003c 78.10, and Firefox \u003c 88.",
  "id": "GHSA-jvwq-53jx-c5f6",
  "modified": "2023-10-11T15:30:31Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:06:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-24002"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1702374"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2021-14"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2021-15"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2021-16"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JWPW-Q68H-R678

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:47 – Updated: 2023-10-05 17:32
VLAI
Summary
Duplicate Advisory: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in dio
Details

Duplicate advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-9324-jv53-9cc8. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

The dio package prior to 5.0.0 for Dart allows CRLF injection if the attacker controls the HTTP method string, a different vulnerability than CVE-2020-35669.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Pub",
        "name": "dio"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-74",
      "CWE-88",
      "CWE-93"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-15T03:27:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-04-15T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Duplicate advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-9324-jv53-9cc8. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nThe dio package prior to 5.0.0 for Dart allows CRLF injection if the attacker controls the HTTP method string, a different vulnerability than CVE-2020-35669.",
  "id": "GHSA-jwpw-q68h-r678",
  "modified": "2023-10-05T17:32:48Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:47:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-31402"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cfug/dio/issues/1130"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cfug/dio/commit/927f79e93ba39f3c3a12c190624a55653d577984"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cfug/dio"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/GHSA-jwpw-q68h-r678"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences in dio",
  "withdrawn": "2023-10-05T17:32:48Z"
}
Mitigation
Implementation

Strategy: Parameterization

Where possible, avoid building a single string that contains the command and its arguments. Some languages or frameworks have functions that support specifying independent arguments, e.g. as an array, which is used to automatically perform the appropriate quoting or escaping while building the command. For example, in PHP, escapeshellarg() can be used to escape a single argument to system(), or exec() can be called with an array of arguments. In C, code can often be refactored from using system() - which accepts a single string - to using exec(), which requires separate function arguments for each parameter.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Input Validation

Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your product: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, request headers as well as content, URL components, e-mail, files, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Perform input validation at well-defined interfaces.

Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation
Implementation

Directly convert your input type into the expected data type, such as using a conversion function that translates a string into a number. After converting to the expected data type, ensure that the input's values fall within the expected range of allowable values and that multi-field consistencies are maintained.

Mitigation
Implementation
  • Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180, CWE-181). Make sure that your application does not inadvertently decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked. Use libraries such as the OWASP ESAPI Canonicalization control.
  • Consider performing repeated canonicalization until your input does not change any more. This will avoid double-decoding and similar scenarios, but it might inadvertently modify inputs that are allowed to contain properly-encoded dangerous content.
Mitigation
Implementation

When exchanging data between components, ensure that both components are using the same character encoding. Ensure that the proper encoding is applied at each interface. Explicitly set the encoding you are using whenever the protocol allows you to do so.

Mitigation
Implementation

When your application combines data from multiple sources, perform the validation after the sources have been combined. The individual data elements may pass the validation step but violate the intended restrictions after they have been combined.

Mitigation
Testing

Use dynamic tools and techniques that interact with the product using large test suites with many diverse inputs, such as fuzz testing (fuzzing), robustness testing, and fault injection. The product's operation may slow down, but it should not become unstable, crash, or generate incorrect results.

CAPEC-137: Parameter Injection

An adversary manipulates the content of request parameters for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. Some parameter encodings use text characters as separators. For example, parameters in a HTTP GET message are encoded as name-value pairs separated by an ampersand (&). If an attacker can supply text strings that are used to fill in these parameters, then they can inject special characters used in the encoding scheme to add or modify parameters. For example, if user input is fed directly into an HTTP GET request and the user provides the value "myInput&new_param=myValue", then the input parameter is set to myInput, but a new parameter (new_param) is also added with a value of myValue. This can significantly change the meaning of the query that is processed by the server. Any encoding scheme where parameters are identified and separated by text characters is potentially vulnerable to this attack - the HTTP GET encoding used above is just one example.

CAPEC-174: Flash Parameter Injection

An adversary takes advantage of improper data validation to inject malicious global parameters into a Flash file embedded within an HTML document. Flash files can leverage user-submitted data to configure the Flash document and access the embedding HTML document.

CAPEC-41: Using Meta-characters in E-mail Headers to Inject Malicious Payloads

This type of attack involves an attacker leveraging meta-characters in email headers to inject improper behavior into email programs. Email software has become increasingly sophisticated and feature-rich. In addition, email applications are ubiquitous and connected directly to the Web making them ideal targets to launch and propagate attacks. As the user demand for new functionality in email applications grows, they become more like browsers with complex rendering and plug in routines. As more email functionality is included and abstracted from the user, this creates opportunities for attackers. Virtually all email applications do not list email header information by default, however the email header contains valuable attacker vectors for the attacker to exploit particularly if the behavior of the email client application is known. Meta-characters are hidden from the user, but can contain scripts, enumerations, probes, and other attacks against the user's system.

CAPEC-460: HTTP Parameter Pollution (HPP)

An adversary adds duplicate HTTP GET/POST parameters by injecting query string delimiters. Via HPP it may be possible to override existing hardcoded HTTP parameters, modify the application behaviors, access and, potentially exploit, uncontrollable variables, and bypass input validation checkpoints and WAF rules.

CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection

In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.

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