CWE-863
Allowed-with-ReviewIncorrect Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.
6992 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FJM8-M7M6-2FJP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-14 00:00 – Updated: 2022-09-16 21:39An incorrect handling of the supplementary groups in the Buildah container engine might lead to the sensitive information disclosure or possible data modification if an attacker has direct access to the affected container where supplementary groups are used to set access permissions and is able to execute a binary code in that container.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/containers/buildah"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.27.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-2990"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-842",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-15T03:24:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-13T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An incorrect handling of the supplementary groups in the Buildah container engine might lead to the sensitive information disclosure or possible data modification if an attacker has direct access to the affected container where supplementary groups are used to set access permissions and is able to execute a binary code in that container.",
"id": "GHSA-fjm8-m7m6-2fjp",
"modified": "2022-09-16T21:39:13Z",
"published": "2022-09-14T00:00:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2990"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/containers/buildah/pull/4200"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/containers/buildah/commit/4a8bf740e862f2438279c6feee2ea59ddf0cda0b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2022-2990"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2121453"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/containers/buildah"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2022-1008"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.benthamsgaze.org/2022/08/22/vulnerability-in-linux-containers-investigation-and-mitigation"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Buildah\u0027s incorrect handling of the supplementary groups may lead to data disclosure, modification"
}
GHSA-FJV4-6MWC-7524
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:37 – Updated: 2026-07-05 00:31Incorrect Access Control vulnerability in TerraMaster TOS <= 4.2.06 allows remote authenticated attackers to bypass read-only restriction and obtain full access to any folder within the NAS
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-29189"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-24T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Incorrect Access Control vulnerability in TerraMaster TOS \u003c= 4.2.06 allows remote authenticated attackers to bypass read-only restriction and obtain full access to any folder within the NAS",
"id": "GHSA-fjv4-6mwc-7524",
"modified": "2026-07-05T00:31:16Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:37:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-29189"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ihteam.net/advisory/terramaster-tos-multiple-vulnerabilities"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://terramaster.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FJVH-MCHR-664C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-19 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-07 00:00A read-only authentication bypass vulnerability was reported in the Third Quarter 2021 release of Lenovo XClarity Controller (XCC) firmware affecting XCC devices configured in LDAP Authentication Only Mode and using an LDAP server that supports “unauthenticated bind”, such as Microsoft Active Directory. An unauthenticated user can gain read-only access to XCC in such a configuration, thereby allowing the XCC device configuration to be viewed but not changed. XCC devices configured to use local authentication, LDAP Authentication + Authorization Mode, or LDAP servers that support only “authenticated bind” and/or “anonymous bind” are not affected.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3956"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-05-18T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A read-only authentication bypass vulnerability was reported in the Third Quarter 2021 release of Lenovo XClarity Controller (XCC) firmware affecting XCC devices configured in LDAP Authentication Only Mode and using an LDAP server that supports \u201cunauthenticated bind\u201d, such as Microsoft Active Directory. An unauthenticated user can gain read-only access to XCC in such a configuration, thereby allowing the XCC device configuration to be viewed but not changed. XCC devices configured to use local authentication, LDAP Authentication + Authorization Mode, or LDAP servers that support only \u201cauthenticated bind\u201d and/or \u201canonymous bind\u201d are not affected.",
"id": "GHSA-fjvh-mchr-664c",
"modified": "2022-06-07T00:00:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-19T00:00:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3956"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.lenovo.com/us/en/product_security/LEN-72074"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FM29-4MQ3-PHG6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 18:44 – Updated: 2026-08-21 19:10Impact
Affected versions of Winter CMS did not enforce the ImportExportController behavior's granular access control on the handlers that actually perform the work.
The behavior supports per-operation access control through the import[permissions] and export[permissions] configuration keys, enforced by userHasAccess(). That check was applied only to the import() and export() page actions.
Backend\Classes\Controller::execAjaxHandlers() dispatches AJAX handlers and returns before execPageAction() runs, and the behavior binds its import and export form widgets in its constructor on every request to the controller. The handlers were therefore fully functional without the gated page action ever executing, and none of them carried the check:
onImport()— reaches$model->import()with attacker-supplied column mappingsonImportLoadForm()onImportLoadColumnSampleForm()onExport()— reaches$model->export()onExportLoadForm()download()— streams a completed export file
An authenticated backend user who could reach such a controller through its coarse $requiredPermissions, but who was denied the granular import or export permission, could therefore:
- exfiltrate the entire dataset exposed by the export model, via
onExport()followed bydownload(); and - write or overwrite records through the import model, via
onImport().
userHasAccess() is default-permissive — it returns true unless the corresponding permissions key is configured — so only controllers that declare granular import/export permissions were affected. Those are precisely the controllers whose authors opted in to restricting these operations, and for which the configuration silently had no effect on the paths that mattered.
Note that CSRF tokens are still verified on all POST requests, so the attacker must be logged into the backend with a valid session.
To actively exploit this issue, an attacker would need a backend account with access to a controller that implements this behavior and declares an import[permissions] or export[permissions] value more restrictive than that controller's own $requiredPermissions.
Patches
userHasAccess() is now enforced on every handler and action that performs or exposes an import or export operation: onImport(), onImportLoadForm(), onImportLoadColumnSampleForm(), onExport(), onExportLoadForm(), and the download() action.
Because the check remains default-permissive, controllers that never configured granular permissions are unaffected. The only behavioural change is for controllers that did configure the gate — which is the intended fix.
Regression coverage was added in modules/backend/tests/behaviors/ImportExportControllerPermissionsTest.php, covering denial of each guarded entry point, proof that the underlying import() and export() model sinks are never reached, positive controls confirming a user who does hold the granular permissions is still able to import and export, and a control confirming that controllers without the configuration continue to work.
This security issue has been fixed in v1.2.14.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade, apply https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/84c81f153f2dc3e2c7b03ab14a4a3ca8456d0e4f manually, adding the following to each of the methods listed above (using 'export' for onExport(), onExportLoadForm() and download()):
if (!$this->userHasAccess('import')) {
abort(403);
}
As an interim mitigation, express the restriction in the affected controller's own $requiredPermissions property instead of relying solely on the behavior's granular keys. That check is enforced in Backend\Classes\Controller before any AJAX handler is dispatched, so it covers the handlers as well as the page actions.
References
Credit to Jace (@manus-use) for reporting the issue.
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Email us at hello@wintercms.com
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.2.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "winter/wn-backend-module"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T18:44:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nAffected versions of Winter CMS did not enforce the `ImportExportController` behavior\u0027s granular access control on the handlers that actually perform the work.\n\nThe behavior supports per-operation access control through the `import[permissions]` and `export[permissions]` configuration keys, enforced by `userHasAccess()`. That check was applied only to the `import()` and `export()` page actions.\n\n`Backend\\Classes\\Controller::execAjaxHandlers()` dispatches AJAX handlers and returns *before* `execPageAction()` runs, and the behavior binds its import and export form widgets in its constructor on every request to the controller. The handlers were therefore fully functional without the gated page action ever executing, and none of them carried the check:\n\n- `onImport()` \u2014 reaches `$model-\u003eimport()` with attacker-supplied column mappings\n- `onImportLoadForm()`\n- `onImportLoadColumnSampleForm()`\n- `onExport()` \u2014 reaches `$model-\u003eexport()`\n- `onExportLoadForm()`\n- `download()` \u2014 streams a completed export file\n\nAn authenticated backend user who could reach such a controller through its coarse `$requiredPermissions`, but who was denied the granular import or export permission, could therefore:\n\n- **exfiltrate** the entire dataset exposed by the export model, via `onExport()` followed by `download()`; and\n- **write or overwrite** records through the import model, via `onImport()`.\n\n`userHasAccess()` is default-permissive \u2014 it returns `true` unless the corresponding `permissions` key is configured \u2014 so only controllers that declare granular import/export permissions were affected. Those are precisely the controllers whose authors opted in to restricting these operations, and for which the configuration silently had no effect on the paths that mattered.\n\nNote that CSRF tokens are still verified on all POST requests, so the attacker must be logged into the backend with a valid session.\n\nTo actively exploit this issue, an attacker would need a backend account with access to a controller that implements this behavior and declares an `import[permissions]` or `export[permissions]` value more restrictive than that controller\u0027s own `$requiredPermissions`.\n\n### Patches\n\n`userHasAccess()` is now enforced on every handler and action that performs or exposes an import or export operation: `onImport()`, `onImportLoadForm()`, `onImportLoadColumnSampleForm()`, `onExport()`, `onExportLoadForm()`, and the `download()` action.\n\nBecause the check remains default-permissive, controllers that never configured granular permissions are unaffected. The only behavioural change is for controllers that did configure the gate \u2014 which is the intended fix.\n\nRegression coverage was added in `modules/backend/tests/behaviors/ImportExportControllerPermissionsTest.php`, covering denial of each guarded entry point, proof that the underlying `import()` and `export()` model sinks are never reached, positive controls confirming a user who does hold the granular permissions is still able to import and export, and a control confirming that controllers without the configuration continue to work.\n\nThis security issue has been fixed in [v1.2.14](https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/84c81f153f2dc3e2c7b03ab14a4a3ca8456d0e4f).\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade, apply https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/84c81f153f2dc3e2c7b03ab14a4a3ca8456d0e4f manually, adding the following to each of the methods listed above (using `\u0027export\u0027` for `onExport()`, `onExportLoadForm()` and `download()`):\n\n```php\nif (!$this-\u003euserHasAccess(\u0027import\u0027)) {\n abort(403);\n}\n```\n\nAs an interim mitigation, express the restriction in the affected controller\u0027s own `$requiredPermissions` property instead of relying solely on the behavior\u0027s granular keys. That check is enforced in `Backend\\Classes\\Controller` before any AJAX handler is dispatched, so it covers the handlers as well as the page actions.\n\n### References\n\nCredit to Jace ([@manus-use](https://github.com/manus-use)) for reporting the issue.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n- Email us at [hello@wintercms.com](mailto:hello@wintercms.com)",
"id": "GHSA-fm29-4mq3-phg6",
"modified": "2026-08-21T19:10:20Z",
"published": "2026-08-20T18:44:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter/security/advisories/GHSA-fm29-4mq3-phg6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter/commit/84c81f153f2dc3e2c7b03ab14a4a3ca8456d0e4f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wintercms/winter/releases/tag/v1.2.14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Winter: ImportExportController AJAX handlers bypass granular import/export permission gate"
}
GHSA-FM3M-2GF9-6P64
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-26 00:01 – Updated: 2022-07-30 00:00The Professional Social Sharing Buttons, Icons & Related Posts WordPress plugin before 9.7.6 does not have proper authorisation check in one of the AJAX action, available to unauthenticated (in v < 9.7.5) and author+ (in v9.7.5) users, allowing them to call it and retrieve various information such as the list of active plugins, various version like PHP, cURL, WP etc.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-0594"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-25T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Professional Social Sharing Buttons, Icons \u0026 Related Posts WordPress plugin before 9.7.6 does not have proper authorisation check in one of the AJAX action, available to unauthenticated (in v \u003c 9.7.5) and author+ (in v9.7.5) users, allowing them to call it and retrieve various information such as the list of active plugins, various version like PHP, cURL, WP etc.",
"id": "GHSA-fm3m-2gf9-6p64",
"modified": "2022-07-30T00:00:34Z",
"published": "2022-07-26T00:01:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0594"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/4de9451e-2c8d-4d99-a255-b027466d29b1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FM4H-HQGF-7Q6J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:06 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:06Moxa PT-7728 devices with software 3.4 build 15081113 allow remote authenticated users to change the configuration via vectors involving a local proxy.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-4514"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-06-19T20:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Moxa PT-7728 devices with software 3.4 build 15081113 allow remote authenticated users to change the configuration via vectors involving a local proxy.",
"id": "GHSA-fm4h-hqgf-7q6j",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:06:02Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:06:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-4514"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-16-168-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FM6P-42MR-X6JM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-11 18:31Dolibarr 23.0.4 before 24.0.1 ontains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files through the document storage endpoints by supplying a crafted hashp parameter value. Attackers can send a request with hashp=shared to skip token validation while satisfying the authorization condition in htdocs/document.php and htdocs/viewimage.php, gaining access to application logs, uploaded business documents, database backups containing password hashes, and files belonging to other multicompany entities.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89013"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T16:17:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Dolibarr 23.0.4 before 24.0.1 ontains an authorization bypass vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to read arbitrary files through the document storage endpoints by supplying a crafted hashp parameter value. Attackers can send a request with hashp=shared to skip token validation while satisfying the authorization condition in htdocs/document.php and htdocs/viewimage.php, gaining access to application logs, uploaded business documents, database backups containing password hashes, and files belonging to other multicompany entities.",
"id": "GHSA-fm6p-42mr-x6jm",
"modified": "2026-09-11T18:31:24Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T18:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/commit/cd05688dbed8a4af6eef32faf4fc1e823a37bce9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Dolibarr/dolibarr/releases/tag/24.0.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/dolibarr-authorization-bypass-via-hashp-parameter-in-document-php"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FM8W-2M5W-9J7R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 17:17 – Updated: 2026-09-03 17:17Impact
Standard Kubernetes NetworkPolicy specifications using CIDR-based ipBlock rules without pod or namespace selectors erroneously generate a wildcard namespace allow rule under specific cluster configurations.
When Cilium deployment is configured with a specific custom clusterName (rather than the default "any" value), the parser incorrectly instantiates a pod selector on selectorless peer definitions. This leads to Cilium appending an unintended wildcard namespace label selector to the policy's allowed Layer 3 rules, which allows traffic from other workloads in the same namespace as the subject of the policy.
Example policy affected by this issue:
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: test-server
namespace: default
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
app: test-server
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- ipBlock:
cidr: 192.0.2.3
In affected versions, this policy erroneously allows the test-server Pod in the default namespace to receive any traffic from other workloads running in the default namespace.
Patches
This issue has been patched in:
- Cilium v1.19.5
Releases below v1.19.0 are not affected.
This issue affects:
- Cilium v1.19 between v1.19.0 and v1.19.4 inclusive
Workarounds
Developers can create the equivalent policy using CiliumNetworkPolicy fromCIDR expressions. CiliumNetworkPolicy and CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy are not affected by this issue.
Acknowledgements
Special thanks to @TheBeeZee for reporting this issue and preparing the fix, and to @fristonio and @odinuge for their assistance in reviewing the solution.
For more information
If a vulnerability affecting Cilium appears to have been found, the Cilium security team strongly encourages reporting it to the security mailing list at security@cilium.io. This is a private mailing list for the Cilium security team, and the report will be treated as top priority.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/cilium/cilium"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.19.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.19.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-56743"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-03T17:17:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T20:17:51Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nStandard Kubernetes `NetworkPolicy` specifications using CIDR-based `ipBlock` rules without pod or namespace selectors erroneously generate a wildcard namespace allow rule under specific cluster configurations.\n\nWhen Cilium deployment is configured with a specific custom `clusterName` (rather than the default `\"any\"` value), the parser incorrectly instantiates a pod selector on selectorless peer definitions. This leads to Cilium appending an unintended wildcard namespace label selector to the policy\u0027s allowed Layer 3 rules, which allows traffic from other workloads in the same namespace as the subject of the policy.\n\nExample policy affected by this issue:\n```\napiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1\nkind: NetworkPolicy\nmetadata:\n name: test-server\n namespace: default\nspec:\n podSelector:\n matchLabels:\n app: test-server\n policyTypes:\n - Ingress\n ingress:\n - from:\n - ipBlock:\n cidr: 192.0.2.3\n```\n\nIn affected versions, this policy erroneously allows the `test-server` Pod in the `default` namespace to receive any traffic from other workloads running in the `default` namespace.\n\n### Patches\n\nThis issue has been patched in:\n\n- Cilium v1.19.5\n\nReleases below v1.19.0 are not affected.\n\n### This issue affects:\n\n- Cilium v1.19 between v1.19.0 and v1.19.4 inclusive\n\n### Workarounds\n\nDevelopers can create the equivalent policy using CiliumNetworkPolicy [fromCIDR expressions](https://docs.cilium.io/en/stable/security/policy/layer3/#ip-cidr-based). CiliumNetworkPolicy and CiliumClusterwideNetworkPolicy are not affected by this issue.\n\n### Acknowledgements\n\nSpecial thanks to @TheBeeZee for reporting this issue and preparing the fix, and to @fristonio and @odinuge for their assistance in reviewing the solution.\n\n### For more information\n\nIf a vulnerability affecting Cilium appears to have been found, the Cilium security team strongly encourages reporting it to the security mailing list at security@cilium.io. This is a private mailing list for the Cilium security team, and the report will be treated as top priority.",
"id": "GHSA-fm8w-2m5w-9j7r",
"modified": "2026-09-03T17:17:47Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T17:17:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/security/advisories/GHSA-fm8w-2m5w-9j7r"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56743"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/46305"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/pull/46456"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/commit/1c84ae3b58a7cd54f7ee355e6c524c82f620eae8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/commit/bacea640404c0805c23515353dc1681c5bf35171"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cilium/cilium/releases/tag/v1.19.5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Cilium may unexpectedly allow ingress traffic from the local namespace when a Kubernetes NetworkPolicy is configured with an ipBlock match"
}
GHSA-FMH9-GPQH-G53G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 15:33 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:45Summary
The advisory GHSA-c77m-r996-jr3q patched getBookmark so that, when invoked by a publish-mode RoleReader, results are filtered through FilterBlocksByPublishAccess to remove entries from password-protected / publish-ignored notebooks. Four sibling search handlers in the same file did not receive the equivalent treatment and continue to expose metadata across the publish-access boundary.
Details
Affected files / lines (v3.6.5):
kernel/api/router.go:181-190 — all four endpoints registered with CheckAuth only, which the publish-service RoleReader JWT passes:
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchTag", model.CheckAuth, searchTag)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchTemplate", model.CheckAuth, searchTemplate)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchWidget", model.CheckAuth, searchWidget)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchAsset", model.CheckAuth, searchAsset)
kernel/api/search.go — none of the four handlers branches on model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) to filter the response, while their peers in the same file do. Compare:
// :29-65 listInvalidBlockRefs — DOES filter:
if model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) {
publishAccess := model.GetPublishAccess()
blocks = model.FilterBlocksByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, blocks)
}
// :67-93 getAssetContent — DOES filter (FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess)
// :95-115 fullTextSearchAssetContent — DOES filter
// :250-285 getEmbedBlock — DOES filter (FilterEmbedBlocksByPublishAccess)
// :156-176 searchAsset — does NOT filter
ret.Data = model.SearchAssetsByName(k, exts)
// :178-196 searchTag — does NOT filter
tags := model.SearchTags(k)
ret.Data = map[string]any{"tags": tags, "k": k}
// :198-213 searchWidget — does NOT filter
widgets := model.SearchWidget(keyword)
// :233-248 searchTemplate — does NOT filter
templates := model.SearchTemplate(keyword)
model.SearchAssetsByName, model.SearchTags, model.SearchWidget, model.SearchTemplate operate over the entire workspace database / filesystem, not just the publish-visible subset. A FilterTagsByPublishIgnore helper already exists in kernel/model/ and is used by getTag itself (kernel/api/tag.go:58-62), confirming the maintainers' intent.
PoC
End-to-end reproduction requires enabling the SiYuan publish service, marking one notebook as private to publish access, and obtaining a RoleReader JWT from the publish reverse-proxy (per kernel/server/proxy/publish.go). Once authenticated as the Reader against the publish port:
# Returns ALL tags across the workspace, including ones drawn only from the publish-private notebook.
curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchTag \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <reader-jwt>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"k":""}'
# Returns ALL asset filenames (e.g., CV.pdf, contract.docx, salary-2026.xlsx) regardless of source notebook.
curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchAsset \
-H 'Authorization: Bearer <reader-jwt>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"k":""}'
curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchWidget -H '...' -d '{"k":""}'
curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchTemplate -H '...' -d '{"k":""}'
Each call returns the global result set without applying FilterTagsByPublishIgnore / FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess / equivalent.
In this audit I source-confirmed the missing branch in v3.6.5 but did not stand up the full publish-service flow. The fix is straightforward enough that the source-level evidence should be sufficient for triage.
Impact
A publish-service Reader (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors by default) can enumerate:
- All tag strings used anywhere in the workspace — frequently contains person names, project codenames, internal identifiers.
- All asset filenames uploaded to the workspace — frequently contains the contents of
CV.pdf,contract.docx,salary-2026.xlsx, etc. - All widget names and template names installed in the workspace.
This violates the publish-service trust boundary. Users intentionally mark notebooks as "invisible to publish" specifically to keep this metadata out of public reach.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260512140701-d7b77d945e0d"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45148"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T15:33:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T19:16:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe advisory `GHSA-c77m-r996-jr3q` patched `getBookmark` so that, when invoked by a publish-mode `RoleReader`, results are filtered through `FilterBlocksByPublishAccess` to remove entries from password-protected / publish-ignored notebooks. Four sibling search handlers in the same file did not receive the equivalent treatment and continue to expose metadata across the publish-access boundary.\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected files / lines (v3.6.5):**\n\n`kernel/api/router.go:181-190` \u2014 all four endpoints registered with `CheckAuth` only, which the publish-service `RoleReader` JWT passes:\n\n```go\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/search/searchTag\", model.CheckAuth, searchTag)\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/search/searchTemplate\", model.CheckAuth, searchTemplate)\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/search/searchWidget\", model.CheckAuth, searchWidget)\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/search/searchAsset\", model.CheckAuth, searchAsset)\n```\n\n`kernel/api/search.go` \u2014 none of the four handlers branches on `model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c)` to filter the response, while their *peers* in the same file do. Compare:\n\n```go\n// :29-65 listInvalidBlockRefs \u2014 DOES filter:\nif model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) {\n publishAccess := model.GetPublishAccess()\n blocks = model.FilterBlocksByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, blocks)\n}\n\n// :67-93 getAssetContent \u2014 DOES filter (FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess)\n// :95-115 fullTextSearchAssetContent \u2014 DOES filter\n// :250-285 getEmbedBlock \u2014 DOES filter (FilterEmbedBlocksByPublishAccess)\n\n// :156-176 searchAsset \u2014 does NOT filter\nret.Data = model.SearchAssetsByName(k, exts)\n\n// :178-196 searchTag \u2014 does NOT filter\ntags := model.SearchTags(k)\nret.Data = map[string]any{\"tags\": tags, \"k\": k}\n\n// :198-213 searchWidget \u2014 does NOT filter\nwidgets := model.SearchWidget(keyword)\n\n// :233-248 searchTemplate \u2014 does NOT filter\ntemplates := model.SearchTemplate(keyword)\n```\n\n`model.SearchAssetsByName`, `model.SearchTags`, `model.SearchWidget`, `model.SearchTemplate` operate over the entire workspace database / filesystem, not just the publish-visible subset. A `FilterTagsByPublishIgnore` helper *already exists* in `kernel/model/` and is used by `getTag` itself (`kernel/api/tag.go:58-62`), confirming the maintainers\u0027 intent.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnd-to-end reproduction requires enabling the SiYuan publish service, marking one notebook as private to publish access, and obtaining a `RoleReader` JWT from the publish reverse-proxy (per `kernel/server/proxy/publish.go`). Once authenticated as the Reader against the publish port:\n\n```bash\n# Returns ALL tags across the workspace, including ones drawn only from the publish-private notebook.\ncurl -X POST https://\u003cpublish-host\u003e/api/search/searchTag \\\n -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u003creader-jwt\u003e\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"k\":\"\"}\u0027\n\n# Returns ALL asset filenames (e.g., CV.pdf, contract.docx, salary-2026.xlsx) regardless of source notebook.\ncurl -X POST https://\u003cpublish-host\u003e/api/search/searchAsset \\\n -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u003creader-jwt\u003e\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027{\"k\":\"\"}\u0027\n\ncurl -X POST https://\u003cpublish-host\u003e/api/search/searchWidget -H \u0027...\u0027 -d \u0027{\"k\":\"\"}\u0027\ncurl -X POST https://\u003cpublish-host\u003e/api/search/searchTemplate -H \u0027...\u0027 -d \u0027{\"k\":\"\"}\u0027\n```\n\nEach call returns the global result set without applying `FilterTagsByPublishIgnore` / `FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess` / equivalent.\n\nIn this audit I source-confirmed the missing branch in v3.6.5 but did not stand up the full publish-service flow. The fix is straightforward enough that the source-level evidence should be sufficient for triage.\n\n### Impact\n\nA publish-service Reader (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors by default) can enumerate:\n\n- All tag strings used anywhere in the workspace \u2014 frequently contains person names, project codenames, internal identifiers.\n- All asset filenames uploaded to the workspace \u2014 frequently contains the contents of `CV.pdf`, `contract.docx`, `salary-2026.xlsx`, etc.\n- All widget names and template names installed in the workspace.\n\nThis violates the publish-service trust boundary. Users intentionally mark notebooks as \"invisible to publish\" specifically to keep this metadata out of public reach.",
"id": "GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g",
"modified": "2026-05-15T23:45:20Z",
"published": "2026-05-13T15:33:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45148"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan has broken access control in `/api/search/{searchAsset,searchTag,searchWidget,searchTemplate}` publish-mode"
}
GHSA-FMJ6-GCWC-6452
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:15 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01Improper Access Control in Gurock TestRail versions < 7.2.0.3014 resulted in sensitive information exposure. A threat actor can access the /files.md5 file on the client side of a Gurock TestRail application, disclosing a full list of application files and the corresponding file paths. The corresponding file paths can be tested, and in some cases, result in the disclosure of hardcoded credentials, API keys, or other sensitive data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-40875"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-22T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Access Control in Gurock TestRail versions \u003c 7.2.0.3014 resulted in sensitive information exposure. A threat actor can access the /files.md5 file on the client side of a Gurock TestRail application, disclosing a full list of application files and the corresponding file paths. The corresponding file paths can be tested, and in some cases, result in the disclosure of hardcoded credentials, API keys, or other sensitive data.",
"id": "GHSA-fmj6-gcwc-6452",
"modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:15:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-40875"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/SakuraSamuraii/derailed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://johnjhacking.com/blog/cve-2021-40875"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.gurock.com/testrail/tour/enterprise-edition"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/164270/Gurock-Testrail-7.2.0.3014-Improper-Access-Control.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.