Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-863

Allowed-with-Review

Incorrect Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

The product performs an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action, but it does not correctly perform the check.

5669 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-7R29-W7VH-5P6Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:40 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:40
VLAI
Details

The vulnerability have been reported to affect earlier versions of QTS. If exploited, this improper access control vulnerability could allow attackers to obtain control of a QNAP device. This issue affects: QNAP Systems Inc. Helpdesk versions prior to 3.0.3.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-2507"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-02-03T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The vulnerability have been reported to affect earlier versions of QTS. If exploited, this improper access control vulnerability could allow attackers to obtain control of a QNAP device. This issue affects: QNAP Systems Inc. Helpdesk versions prior to 3.0.3.",
  "id": "GHSA-7r29-w7vh-5p6q",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:40:47Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:40:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-2507"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.qnap.com/zh-tw/security-advisory/qsa-20-08"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-7R2P-P57X-PQQ4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-27 00:00 – Updated: 2022-06-09 00:00
VLAI
Details

The issue was addressed with additional permissions checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Monterey 12.4, macOS Big Sur 11.6.6. A malicious application may be able to bypass Privacy preferences.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-26767"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-05-26T20:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The issue was addressed with additional permissions checks. This issue is fixed in macOS Monterey 12.4, macOS Big Sur 11.6.6. A malicious application may be able to bypass Privacy preferences.",
  "id": "GHSA-7r2p-p57x-pqq4",
  "modified": "2022-06-09T00:00:26Z",
  "published": "2022-05-27T00:00:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26767"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213256"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213257"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7R4H-2H23-6JQ9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:12 – Updated: 2022-07-01 18:28
VLAI
Summary
Incorrect Authorization in Jenkins
Details

Jenkins before versions 2.44 and 2.32.2 is vulnerable to an insufficient permission check. This allows users with permissions to create new items (e.g. jobs) to overwrite existing items they don't have access to (SECURITY-321).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.32.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.32.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.43"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.jenkins-ci.main:jenkins-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.34"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.44"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-2599"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-01T18:28:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-04-11T16:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Jenkins before versions 2.44 and 2.32.2 is vulnerable to an insufficient permission check. This allows users with permissions to create new items (e.g. jobs) to overwrite existing items they don\u0027t have access to (SECURITY-321).",
  "id": "GHSA-7r4h-2h23-6jq9",
  "modified": "2022-07-01T18:28:34Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:12:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-2599"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/jenkins/commit/4ed5c850b6855ab064a66d02fb338f366853ce89"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2017-2599"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/jenkins"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jenkins.io/security/advisory/2017-02-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Incorrect Authorization in Jenkins"
}

GHSA-7R57-25XW-X723

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:14 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01
VLAI
Details

IBM Security Secret Server up to 11.0 stores sensitive information in URL parameters. This may lead to information disclosure if unauthorized parties have access to the URLs via server logs, referrer header or browser history. IBM X-Force ID: 199328.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-20582"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-09-14T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Security Secret Server up to 11.0 stores sensitive information in URL parameters. This may lead to information disclosure if unauthorized parties have access to the URLs via server logs, referrer header or browser history. IBM X-Force ID: 199328.",
  "id": "GHSA-7r57-25xw-x723",
  "modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:05Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:14:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20582"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/199328"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6488459"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7R7F-9XPJ-JMR7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-13 13:33 – Updated: 2026-04-06 23:15
VLAI
Summary
Ash Framework: Filter authorization misapplies impossible bypass/runtime policies
Details

Summary

When using filter authorization, two edge cases could cause the policy compiler/authorizer to generate a permissive filter:

  1. Bypass policies whose condition can never pass at runtime were compiled as OR(AND(condition, compiled_policies), NOT(condition)). If the condition could never be true at runtime, the NOT(condition) branch evaluated truthy and the overall expression became permissive.

  2. Runtime policy scenarios that reduce to “no checks are applicable” (an empty SAT scenario) were treated as an empty clause and dropped instead of being treated as false, which could again produce an overly broad (permissive) filter.

These bugs could allow reads to return records that should have been excluded by policy.

Impact

Projects that rely on filter-based authorization and define:

  • bypass ... do ... end blocks whose condition(s) are only resolvable at runtime and can never pass in a given request context, or
  • runtime checks that simplify to an empty scenario for a clause

may unintentionally generate a permissive query filter, potentially returning unauthorized data.

Actions primarily affected: reads guarded by filter policies. Non-filter (e.g., hard forbid) policies are not impacted.

Technical details

This patch corrects two behaviors:

  • Ash.Policy.Policy.compile_policy_expression/1 now treats bypass blocks as AND(condition_expression, compiled_policies) instead of OR(AND(...), NOT(condition_expression)). This removes the permissive NOT(condition) escape hatch when a bypass condition never passes.

  • Ash.Policy.Authorizer now treats empty SAT scenarios (scenario == %{}) as false, ensuring impossible scenarios do not collapse into a no-op and inadvertently widen the filter. The reducer also normalizes nilfalse consistently when building auto_filter fragments.

Relevant changes are in:

  • lib/ash/policy/policy.ex (bypass compilation)
  • lib/ash/policy/authorizer/authorizer.ex (scenario handling / auto_filter normalization)
  • Tests added: test/policy/filter_condition_test.exs (RuntimeFalsyCheck, RuntimeBypassResource) validate the corrected behavior.

Workarounds

  • Avoid bypass policies whose conditions are only decidable at runtime and may be perpetually false in some contexts; prefer explicit authorize_if/forbid_if blocks without bypass for those cases.
  • Add an explicit final forbid_if always() guard for sensitive reads as a belt-and-suspenders fallback until user can upgrade.
  • Where feasible, replace runtime-unknown checks with strict/compile-time checks or restructure to avoid empty SAT scenarios.

How to tell if user is affected

User is likely affected if ALL of the following are true:

  • Uses filter authorization; and
  • Defines bypass block with access_type :runtime without any policies after it; or
  • Defines bypass blocks whose conditions are evaluated at runtime (e.g., checks with strict_check/3 returning :unknown and a runtime check/4 that may never succeed in some contexts) without any policies after it

A quick sanity test is to issue a read expected to return no rows under such a bypass or runtime-falsy condition and verify it indeed returns []. The included test bypass works with filter policies demonstrates the corrected, non-permissive behavior.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Hex",
        "name": "ash"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.6.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-48043"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-10-13T13:33:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-10T16:15:52Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nWhen using **filter** authorization, two edge cases could cause the policy compiler/authorizer to generate a permissive filter:\n\n1. **Bypass policies whose condition can never pass at runtime** were compiled as\n   `OR(AND(condition, compiled_policies), NOT(condition))`.\n   If the condition could never be true at runtime, the `NOT(condition)` branch evaluated truthy and the overall expression became permissive.\n\n2. **Runtime policy scenarios that reduce to \u201cno checks are applicable\u201d** (an empty SAT scenario) were treated as an empty clause and dropped instead of being treated as **`false`**, which could again produce an overly broad (permissive) filter.\n\nThese bugs could allow reads to return records that should have been excluded by policy.\n\n### Impact\n\nProjects that rely on **filter-based authorization** and define:\n\n* `bypass ... do ... end` blocks whose condition(s) are only resolvable at runtime and can never pass in a given request context, **or**\n* runtime checks that simplify to an **empty** scenario for a clause\n\nmay unintentionally generate a permissive query filter, potentially returning unauthorized data.\n\n*Actions primarily affected:* reads guarded by filter policies. Non-filter (e.g., hard forbid) policies are not impacted.\n\n### Technical details\n\nThis patch corrects two behaviors:\n\n* **`Ash.Policy.Policy.compile_policy_expression/1`** now treats **bypass** blocks as\n  `AND(condition_expression, compiled_policies)`\n  instead of `OR(AND(...), NOT(condition_expression))`. This removes the permissive `NOT(condition)` escape hatch when a bypass condition never passes.\n\n* **`Ash.Policy.Authorizer`** now treats **empty SAT scenarios** (`scenario == %{}`) as **`false`**, ensuring impossible scenarios do not collapse into a no-op and inadvertently widen the filter. The reducer also normalizes `nil` \u2192 `false` consistently when building `auto_filter` fragments.\n\nRelevant changes are in:\n\n* `lib/ash/policy/policy.ex` (bypass compilation)\n* `lib/ash/policy/authorizer/authorizer.ex` (scenario handling / auto_filter normalization)\n* Tests added: `test/policy/filter_condition_test.exs` (`RuntimeFalsyCheck`, `RuntimeBypassResource`) validate the corrected behavior.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n* Avoid `bypass` policies whose conditions are only decidable at runtime and may be perpetually false in some contexts; prefer explicit `authorize_if`/`forbid_if` blocks without `bypass` for those cases.\n* Add an explicit **final `forbid_if always()`** guard for sensitive reads as a belt-and-suspenders fallback until user can upgrade.\n* Where feasible, replace runtime-unknown checks with strict/compile-time checks or restructure to avoid empty SAT scenarios.\n\n### How to tell if user is affected\n\nUser is likely affected if ALL of the following are true:\n\n*  Uses **filter authorization**; and\n* Defines `bypass` block with `access_type :runtime` without any policies after it; or\n* Defines `bypass` blocks whose conditions are evaluated at runtime (e.g., checks with `strict_check/3` returning `:unknown` and a runtime `check/4` that may never succeed in some contexts) without any policies after it\n\nA quick sanity test is to issue a read expected to return **no** rows under such a bypass or runtime-falsy condition and verify it indeed returns `[]`. The included test `bypass works with filter policies` demonstrates the corrected, non-permissive behavior.",
  "id": "GHSA-7r7f-9xpj-jmr7",
  "modified": "2026-04-06T23:15:07Z",
  "published": "2025-10-13T13:33:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash/security/advisories/GHSA-7r7f-9xpj-jmr7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48043"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash/commit/66d81300065b970da0d2f4528354835d2418c7ae"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2025-48043.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ash-project/ash/releases/tag/v3.6.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2025-48043"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Ash Framework: Filter authorization misapplies impossible bypass/runtime policies"
}

GHSA-7R7X-GJVR-448G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 17:02 – Updated: 2026-07-24 17:02
VLAI
Summary
Open WebUI: Upload `metadata.knowledge_id` bypasses the knowledge-base write-access check (read-only users can add files to KB)
Details

Open WebUI upload metadata can add files to knowledge bases without write permission

Summary

Open WebUI's file upload background processing trusts the client-supplied metadata.knowledge_id value and inserts a knowledge_file association before validating that the uploading user has write access to the target knowledge base.

A verified user with only read access to a knowledge base can upload an arbitrary file and set metadata={"knowledge_id":"<target knowledge id>"}. The normal /api/v1/knowledge/{id}/file/add endpoint correctly requires knowledge-base write access, but the upload auto-link path bypasses that authorization check.

The immediate result is unauthorized modification of the target knowledge base's file membership. The attached attacker-controlled file becomes visible through /api/v1/knowledge/{id}/files, and readers/owners of that knowledge base can retrieve the file through the normal file endpoints because file access is derived from KnowledgeFile membership.

Affected Version

  • Repository: open-webui/open-webui
  • Tested source commit: 02dc3e689ceac915a870b373318b99c029ddf603
  • Package version observed in package.json: 0.9.6
  • Package name: open-webui

Impact

A read-only knowledge-base collaborator can perform a write operation against that knowledge base by attaching arbitrary uploaded files.

Security impact:

  • Unauthorized knowledge-base membership modification.
  • Integrity impact on shared knowledge-base file listings.
  • Attacker-controlled files become readable to other users who can read the target knowledge base.
  • If an owner/admin later reprocesses or globally reindexes the knowledge base, the unauthorized file can be indexed into the knowledge collection, turning the membership bypass into RAG/content poisoning.

This is not an unauthenticated issue. It requires a verified Open WebUI account and a valid target knowledge-base ID. The clearest exploit path is a user who legitimately has read access to a knowledge base but not write access.

Source Evidence

The normal single-file knowledge add endpoint checks write permission before processing or inserting the relationship:

  • backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py
  • add_file_to_knowledge_by_id
  • Lines 714-728 reject callers who are not owner, admin, or granted write access.
  • Lines 750-766 then process and insert the file only after that authorization gate.

The upload auto-link path does not perform the same check:

  • backend/open_webui/routers/files.py
  • process_uploaded_file
  • Lines 178-186 read knowledge_id from upload metadata and immediately call Knowledges.add_file_to_knowledge_by_id(...).
  • Lines 187-192 call process_file(... collection_name=knowledge_id ...) after the insert.

The model method inserts the relationship without validating the caller's write access to the knowledge base:

  • backend/open_webui/models/knowledge.py
  • add_file_to_knowledge_by_id
  • Lines 646-677 create and commit a KnowledgeFile row for the supplied knowledge_id, file_id, and user_id.

The later vector write check exists, but it runs too late:

  • backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py
  • process_file
  • Lines 1587-1592 call _validate_collection_access(..., access_type='write') when a collection is supplied.

Because the unauthorized KnowledgeFile row is already committed before that check runs, the failed vector processing does not undo the knowledge-base file association. The upload code catches the exception at backend/open_webui/routers/files.py lines 194-195 and logs a warning while leaving the row in place.

The unauthorized relationship affects file access decisions:

  • backend/open_webui/utils/access_control/files.py
  • has_access_to_file
  • Lines 41-53 grant file access when a file is associated with a knowledge base the user can access.

So once the attacker's file is inserted into the target KnowledgeFile table, target knowledge-base readers/owners can see and fetch that file through normal knowledge/file routes.

Reproduction Steps

Use a local Open WebUI instance with two verified users:

  1. As user owner, create a knowledge base.
  2. Grant user reader read access to the knowledge base, but do not grant write access.
  3. As reader, confirm the normal add-file endpoint is blocked:
POST /api/v1/knowledge/<knowledge_id>/file/add
Authorization: Bearer <reader token>
Content-Type: application/json

{"file_id":"<reader-owned-file-id>"}

Expected and observed behavior for the normal route: it rejects the request because reader lacks knowledge-base write access.

  1. As reader, upload a new file with the same target knowledge ID embedded in upload metadata:
POST /api/v1/files/?process=true&process_in_background=false
Authorization: Bearer <reader token>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data

file=@attacker-note.txt
metadata={"knowledge_id":"<knowledge_id>"}
  1. Observe that the upload request succeeds and returns the uploaded file record.
  2. As owner, request the knowledge-base files:
GET /api/v1/knowledge/<knowledge_id>/files
Authorization: Bearer <owner token>
  1. Observe that attacker-note.txt appears in the target knowledge base even though reader did not have write access.
  2. As owner, request the file content:
GET /api/v1/files/<attacker_file_id>/content
Authorization: Bearer <owner token>
  1. Observe that the file is retrievable because has_access_to_file derives access from the unauthorized knowledge-base membership.

Expected Behavior

The upload auto-link path should enforce the same authorization contract as /api/v1/knowledge/{id}/file/add:

  • The target knowledge base must exist.
  • The caller must be the knowledge owner, an admin, or have write access.
  • The supplied directory_id, if present, must belong to the target knowledge base.
  • The KnowledgeFile association should only be inserted after authorization and processing succeed.

Actual Behavior

metadata.knowledge_id causes Knowledges.add_file_to_knowledge_by_id(...) to insert a KnowledgeFile row before write authorization is checked. The later collection write validation can fail, but the unauthorized membership row remains committed.

Suggested Fix

Move knowledge-base authorization before the insert in the upload auto-link path. The upload path should share the same write-access and directory validation logic used by the dedicated knowledge endpoints.

One safe pattern:

  1. Load the target knowledge base.
  2. Require owner/admin/write access before calling Knowledges.add_file_to_knowledge_by_id.
  3. Validate that directory_id, if supplied, belongs to the same knowledge base.
  4. Run vector processing before inserting the membership row, or wrap processing plus insertion in a transaction/compensating cleanup so a denied or failed process cannot leave a stale unauthorized row.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59217"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T17:02:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-09T17:17:02Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Open WebUI upload metadata can add files to knowledge bases without write permission\n\n## Summary\n\nOpen WebUI\u0027s file upload background processing trusts the client-supplied `metadata.knowledge_id` value and inserts a `knowledge_file` association before validating that the uploading user has write access to the target knowledge base.\n\nA verified user with only read access to a knowledge base can upload an arbitrary file and set `metadata={\"knowledge_id\":\"\u003ctarget knowledge id\u003e\"}`. The normal `/api/v1/knowledge/{id}/file/add` endpoint correctly requires knowledge-base write access, but the upload auto-link path bypasses that authorization check.\n\nThe immediate result is unauthorized modification of the target knowledge base\u0027s file membership. The attached attacker-controlled file becomes visible through `/api/v1/knowledge/{id}/files`, and readers/owners of that knowledge base can retrieve the file through the normal file endpoints because file access is derived from `KnowledgeFile` membership.\n\n## Affected Version\n\n- Repository: `open-webui/open-webui`\n- Tested source commit: `02dc3e689ceac915a870b373318b99c029ddf603`\n- Package version observed in `package.json`: `0.9.6`\n- Package name: `open-webui`\n\n## Impact\n\nA read-only knowledge-base collaborator can perform a write operation against that knowledge base by attaching arbitrary uploaded files.\n\nSecurity impact:\n\n- Unauthorized knowledge-base membership modification.\n- Integrity impact on shared knowledge-base file listings.\n- Attacker-controlled files become readable to other users who can read the target knowledge base.\n- If an owner/admin later reprocesses or globally reindexes the knowledge base, the unauthorized file can be indexed into the knowledge collection, turning the membership bypass into RAG/content poisoning.\n\nThis is not an unauthenticated issue. It requires a verified Open WebUI account and a valid target knowledge-base ID. The clearest exploit path is a user who legitimately has read access to a knowledge base but not write access.\n\n## Source Evidence\n\nThe normal single-file knowledge add endpoint checks write permission before processing or inserting the relationship:\n\n- `backend/open_webui/routers/knowledge.py`\n- `add_file_to_knowledge_by_id`\n- Lines 714-728 reject callers who are not owner, admin, or granted `write` access.\n- Lines 750-766 then process and insert the file only after that authorization gate.\n\nThe upload auto-link path does not perform the same check:\n\n- `backend/open_webui/routers/files.py`\n- `process_uploaded_file`\n- Lines 178-186 read `knowledge_id` from upload metadata and immediately call `Knowledges.add_file_to_knowledge_by_id(...)`.\n- Lines 187-192 call `process_file(... collection_name=knowledge_id ...)` after the insert.\n\nThe model method inserts the relationship without validating the caller\u0027s write access to the knowledge base:\n\n- `backend/open_webui/models/knowledge.py`\n- `add_file_to_knowledge_by_id`\n- Lines 646-677 create and commit a `KnowledgeFile` row for the supplied `knowledge_id`, `file_id`, and `user_id`.\n\nThe later vector write check exists, but it runs too late:\n\n- `backend/open_webui/routers/retrieval.py`\n- `process_file`\n- Lines 1587-1592 call `_validate_collection_access(..., access_type=\u0027write\u0027)` when a collection is supplied.\n\nBecause the unauthorized `KnowledgeFile` row is already committed before that check runs, the failed vector processing does not undo the knowledge-base file association. The upload code catches the exception at `backend/open_webui/routers/files.py` lines 194-195 and logs a warning while leaving the row in place.\n\nThe unauthorized relationship affects file access decisions:\n\n- `backend/open_webui/utils/access_control/files.py`\n- `has_access_to_file`\n- Lines 41-53 grant file access when a file is associated with a knowledge base the user can access.\n\nSo once the attacker\u0027s file is inserted into the target `KnowledgeFile` table, target knowledge-base readers/owners can see and fetch that file through normal knowledge/file routes.\n\n## Reproduction Steps\n\nUse a local Open WebUI instance with two verified users:\n\n1. As user `owner`, create a knowledge base.\n2. Grant user `reader` read access to the knowledge base, but do not grant write access.\n3. As `reader`, confirm the normal add-file endpoint is blocked:\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/knowledge/\u003cknowledge_id\u003e/file/add\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003creader token\u003e\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"file_id\":\"\u003creader-owned-file-id\u003e\"}\n```\n\nExpected and observed behavior for the normal route: it rejects the request because `reader` lacks knowledge-base write access.\n\n4. As `reader`, upload a new file with the same target knowledge ID embedded in upload metadata:\n\n```http\nPOST /api/v1/files/?process=true\u0026process_in_background=false\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003creader token\u003e\nContent-Type: multipart/form-data\n\nfile=@attacker-note.txt\nmetadata={\"knowledge_id\":\"\u003cknowledge_id\u003e\"}\n```\n\n5. Observe that the upload request succeeds and returns the uploaded file record.\n6. As `owner`, request the knowledge-base files:\n\n```http\nGET /api/v1/knowledge/\u003cknowledge_id\u003e/files\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cowner token\u003e\n```\n\n7. Observe that `attacker-note.txt` appears in the target knowledge base even though `reader` did not have write access.\n8. As `owner`, request the file content:\n\n```http\nGET /api/v1/files/\u003cattacker_file_id\u003e/content\nAuthorization: Bearer \u003cowner token\u003e\n```\n\n9. Observe that the file is retrievable because `has_access_to_file` derives access from the unauthorized knowledge-base membership.\n\n## Expected Behavior\n\nThe upload auto-link path should enforce the same authorization contract as `/api/v1/knowledge/{id}/file/add`:\n\n- The target knowledge base must exist.\n- The caller must be the knowledge owner, an admin, or have `write` access.\n- The supplied `directory_id`, if present, must belong to the target knowledge base.\n- The `KnowledgeFile` association should only be inserted after authorization and processing succeed.\n\n## Actual Behavior\n\n`metadata.knowledge_id` causes `Knowledges.add_file_to_knowledge_by_id(...)` to insert a `KnowledgeFile` row before write authorization is checked. The later collection write validation can fail, but the unauthorized membership row remains committed.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nMove knowledge-base authorization before the insert in the upload auto-link path. The upload path should share the same write-access and directory validation logic used by the dedicated knowledge endpoints.\n\nOne safe pattern:\n\n1. Load the target knowledge base.\n2. Require owner/admin/write access before calling `Knowledges.add_file_to_knowledge_by_id`.\n3. Validate that `directory_id`, if supplied, belongs to the same knowledge base.\n4. Run vector processing before inserting the membership row, or wrap processing plus insertion in a transaction/compensating cleanup so a denied or failed process cannot leave a stale unauthorized row.",
  "id": "GHSA-7r7x-gjvr-448g",
  "modified": "2026-07-24T17:02:14Z",
  "published": "2026-07-24T17:02:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-7r7x-gjvr-448g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59217"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/26001"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/b7626f05fb92b24ab923ad81a037071ebd5623d1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.10.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI: Upload `metadata.knowledge_id` bypasses the knowledge-base write-access check (read-only users can add files to KB)"
}

GHSA-7R83-P869-7995

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-20 12:31 – Updated: 2025-08-20 12:31
VLAI
Details

In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2025.2 improper access control allowed Code With Me guest to discover hidden files

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-57728"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-20T10:15:30Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In JetBrains IntelliJ IDEA before 2025.2 improper access control allowed Code With Me guest to discover hidden files",
  "id": "GHSA-7r83-p869-7995",
  "modified": "2025-08-20T12:31:14Z",
  "published": "2025-08-20T12:31:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-57728"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.jetbrains.com/privacy-security/issues-fixed"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7R86-H946-G8H2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:09 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:09
VLAI
Details

A privileged escalation vulnerability has been identified in Micro Focus ZENworks Configuration Management, affecting version 2020 Update 1 and all prior versions. The vulnerability could be exploited to gain unauthorized system privileges.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-22521"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-07-30T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A privileged escalation vulnerability has been identified in Micro Focus ZENworks Configuration Management, affecting version 2020 Update 1 and all prior versions. The vulnerability could be exploited to gain unauthorized system privileges.",
  "id": "GHSA-7r86-h946-g8h2",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:09:19Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:09:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22521"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.microfocus.com/kb/doc.php?id=7025205"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-7RJ5-723H-386Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-09 06:31 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:31
VLAI
Details

The FULL - Customer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Information Disclosure via the /health REST route in versions up to, and including, 2.2.3 due to improper authorization. This allows authenticated attackers with subscriber-level permissions and above to obtain sensitive information about the site configuration as disclosed by the WordPress health check.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-4242"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-09T04:15:10Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The FULL - Customer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Information Disclosure via the /health REST route in versions up to, and including, 2.2.3 due to improper authorization. This allows authenticated attackers with subscriber-level permissions and above to obtain sensitive information about the site configuration as disclosed by the WordPress health check.",
  "id": "GHSA-7rj5-723h-386q",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T21:31:59Z",
  "published": "2023-08-09T06:31:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4242"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/full-customer/tags/1.1.0/app/api/Health.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/full-customer/tags/2.3/app/api/Controller.php?rev=2951561"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/a77d0fb5-8829-407d-a40a-169cf0c5f837?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-7RJH-PX4V-5W55

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 19:50 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:52
VLAI
Summary
Open WebUI's Channel Access Grants Bypass filter_allowed_access_grants
Details

Channel Access Grants Bypass filter_allowed_access_grants

Affected Component

Channel creation and update endpoints: - backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py (lines 291-340, create_new_channel) - backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py (lines 617-638, update_channel_by_id) - backend/open_webui/models/channels.py (lines 825-826, set_access_grants call without filtering)

Affected Versions

Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions supporting user-created group channels with access grants.

Description

All resource routers in Open WebUI (knowledge, models, notes, prompts, tools, skills) call filter_allowed_access_grants() before persisting access grants. This function strips principal_id: "*" wildcard grants from users who lack the relevant sharing.public_* permission, and strips individual user grants from users who lack access_grants.allow_users permission.

The channel router does not call filter_allowed_access_grants on either create or update paths. A non-admin user who can create group channels (or who owns a channel) can submit arbitrary access grants — including public wildcard grants — and those grants are stored verbatim, bypassing the admin's permission framework.

# channels.py — access_grants from form data flow directly into persistence
# No call to filter_allowed_access_grants() anywhere in these paths.

# Compare with knowledge.py / models.py / notes.py / prompts.py / tools.py / skills.py,
# all of which do:
#     form_data.access_grants = filter_allowed_access_grants(user, form_data.access_grants)
# before creating or updating.

Attack Scenario

  1. Admin configures permissions so that regular users do NOT have sharing.public_channels — public sharing of channels is intended to be admin-only.
  2. Attacker (a regular user) creates or owns a group channel.
  3. Attacker sends: POST /api/v1/channels/ { "name": "public-channel", "type": "group", "access_control": { "access_grants": [ {"principal_type": "user", "principal_id": "*", "permission": "read"} ] } }
  4. set_access_grants is called directly without filter_allowed_access_grants — the wildcard grant is persisted.
  5. The channel becomes publicly readable to every user on the instance, despite the admin's policy prohibiting public channels for regular users.

The same attack works via POST /api/v1/channels/{id}/update for any channel the attacker owns.

Impact

  • Regular users can bypass the sharing.public_channels permission and make channels publicly accessible
  • Regular users can bypass access_grants.allow_users to grant individual-user access in environments where only group-based sharing is intended
  • Admin's permission framework for channels is silently ineffective
  • Creates an inconsistency with every other resource type in the codebase, making the security posture harder to reason about

Preconditions

  • Attacker must have an account with the ability to create group channels (default user capability), or ownership of an existing channel
  • Admin must have configured restrictive sharing permissions for regular users (otherwise there's no policy to bypass)
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.12"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.9.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44558"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T19:50:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T20:16:47Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Channel Access Grants Bypass filter_allowed_access_grants\n\n## Affected Component\n\nChannel creation and update endpoints:\n- `backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py` (lines 291-340, `create_new_channel`)\n- `backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py` (lines 617-638, `update_channel_by_id`)\n- `backend/open_webui/models/channels.py` (lines 825-826, `set_access_grants` call without filtering)\n\n## Affected Versions\n\nCurrent main branch (commit `6fdd19bf1`) and likely all versions supporting user-created group channels with access grants.\n\n## Description\n\nAll resource routers in Open WebUI (knowledge, models, notes, prompts, tools, skills) call `filter_allowed_access_grants()` before persisting access grants. This function strips `principal_id: \"*\"` wildcard grants from users who lack the relevant `sharing.public_*` permission, and strips individual user grants from users who lack `access_grants.allow_users` permission.\n\nThe channel router does not call `filter_allowed_access_grants` on either create or update paths. A non-admin user who can create group channels (or who owns a channel) can submit arbitrary access grants \u2014 including public wildcard grants \u2014 and those grants are stored verbatim, bypassing the admin\u0027s permission framework.\n\n```python\n# channels.py \u2014 access_grants from form data flow directly into persistence\n# No call to filter_allowed_access_grants() anywhere in these paths.\n\n# Compare with knowledge.py / models.py / notes.py / prompts.py / tools.py / skills.py,\n# all of which do:\n#     form_data.access_grants = filter_allowed_access_grants(user, form_data.access_grants)\n# before creating or updating.\n```\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. Admin configures permissions so that regular users do NOT have `sharing.public_channels` \u2014 public sharing of channels is intended to be admin-only.\n2. Attacker (a regular user) creates or owns a group channel.\n3. Attacker sends:\n   ```\n   POST /api/v1/channels/\n   {\n     \"name\": \"public-channel\",\n     \"type\": \"group\",\n     \"access_control\": {\n       \"access_grants\": [\n         {\"principal_type\": \"user\", \"principal_id\": \"*\", \"permission\": \"read\"}\n       ]\n     }\n   }\n   ```\n4. `set_access_grants` is called directly without `filter_allowed_access_grants` \u2014 the wildcard grant is persisted.\n5. The channel becomes publicly readable to every user on the instance, despite the admin\u0027s policy prohibiting public channels for regular users.\n\nThe same attack works via `POST /api/v1/channels/{id}/update` for any channel the attacker owns.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Regular users can bypass the `sharing.public_channels` permission and make channels publicly accessible\n- Regular users can bypass `access_grants.allow_users` to grant individual-user access in environments where only group-based sharing is intended\n- Admin\u0027s permission framework for channels is silently ineffective\n- Creates an inconsistency with every other resource type in the codebase, making the security posture harder to reason about\n\n## Preconditions\n\n- Attacker must have an account with the ability to create group channels (default user capability), or ownership of an existing channel\n- Admin must have configured restrictive sharing permissions for regular users (otherwise there\u0027s no policy to bypass)",
  "id": "GHSA-7rjh-px4v-5w55",
  "modified": "2026-05-15T23:52:41Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T19:50:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-7rjh-px4v-5w55"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44558"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI\u0027s Channel Access Grants Bypass filter_allowed_access_grants"
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.