CWE-862
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewMissing Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Missing
- Behavior-Type: Authorization
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.
A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.
Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic.
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.
Effectiveness: Moderate
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Host Application Interface Scanner
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Terminology
Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.
Content history
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Detection_Factors
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
updated References
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples
updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Relationships, Terminology_Notes
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
20053 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-HF68-G98V-WP9G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 23:06 – Updated: 2026-06-23 23:06Impact
The store() method in both the web and API UsersController only strips the superuser permission when a non-superuser creates a user. It does not strip the admin permission. This allows any authenticated user with the users.create permission to create a new user with full admin privileges.
The users.create permission may commonly be delegated to HR staff, department leads, or similar roles.
Patches
Patched in aea3877718
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "snipe/snipe-it"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55483"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T23:06:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nThe `store()` method in both the web and API `UsersController` only strips the superuser permission when a non-superuser creates a user. It does not strip the admin permission. This allows any authenticated user with the `users.create` permission to create a new user with full admin privileges.\n\nThe `users.create permission` may commonly be delegated to HR staff, department leads, or similar roles.\n\n### Patches\nPatched in [aea3877718](https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/commit/aea3877718158cc2a10c2dde4597b1f439f5f6cb)",
"id": "GHSA-hf68-g98v-wp9g",
"modified": "2026-06-23T23:06:18Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T23:06:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/security/advisories/GHSA-hf68-g98v-wp9g"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/commit/aea3877718158cc2a10c2dde4597b1f439f5f6cb"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Snipe-IT Vulnerable to Privilege Escalation via Missing admin Permission Check in User Creation"
}
GHSA-HF7J-XJ3W-87G4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-10 20:09 – Updated: 2023-08-10 20:09Summary
An arbitrary file write vulnerability could lead to direct control of the server
Details
Arbitrary file creation
In the api/v1/file.go file, there is a function called SaveContentthat,It recieves JSON data sent by users in the form of a POST request. And the lack of parameter filtering allows for arbitrary file write operations.It looks like this:
- Vulnerable Code
PoC
- We can write the SSH public key into the /etc/.root/authorized_keys configuration file on the server.
-
The server was successfully written to the public key
-
Successfully connected to the target server using an SSH private key.
As a result, the server is directly controlled, causing serious harm
Impact
1Panel v1.4.3
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/1Panel-dev/1Panel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.4.3"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.4.3"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-39966"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-10T20:09:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-10T18:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Summary\nAn arbitrary file write vulnerability could lead to direct control of the server\n# Details\n## Arbitrary file creation\nIn the api/v1/file.go file, there is a function called SaveContentthat,It recieves JSON data sent by users in the form of a POST request. And the lack of parameter filtering allows for arbitrary file write operations.It looks like this:\n\n- Vulnerable Code\n\n\n\n# PoC\n\n- We can write the SSH public key into the /etc/.root/authorized_keys configuration file on the server.\n\n\n\n- The server was successfully written to the public key\n\n\n- Successfully connected to the target server using an SSH private key.\n\n\n\nAs a result, the server is directly controlled, causing serious **harm**\n\n\n# Impact\n1Panel v1.4.3\n",
"id": "GHSA-hf7j-xj3w-87g4",
"modified": "2023-08-10T20:09:47Z",
"published": "2023-08-10T20:09:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/1Panel-dev/1Panel/security/advisories/GHSA-hf7j-xj3w-87g4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-39966"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/1Panel-dev/1Panel"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/1Panel-dev/1Panel/releases/tag/v1.5.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "1Panel arbitrary file write vulnerability"
}
GHSA-HF8C-G6JR-8MF5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-12 09:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:02In messaging service, there is a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-30924"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-07-12T09:15:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In messaging service, there is a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure with no additional execution privileges needed.",
"id": "GHSA-hf8c-g6jr-8mf5",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:02:37Z",
"published": "2023-07-12T09:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30924"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/secy/announcementDetail/1676902764208259073"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HF8H-97GM-4X2P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-01 15:46 – Updated: 2026-10-01 15:46Summary
/api/file/getUniqueFilename takes a path from the request body and passes it to a filesystem existence check with no validation, confinement or authorization. The response distinguishes paths that exist from paths that do not, so an anonymous reader in publish mode can probe arbitrary locations on the host, one request per probe. Files and directories both work.
Every neighbouring file route either requires an administrator or confines the path first.
Details
Route. kernel/api/router.go:289 on master, :292 on the development branch, CheckAuth only.
Handler, kernel/api/file.go:84, in full:
util.ParseJsonArgs(arg, ret, util.BindJsonArg("path", &filePath, true, true))
ret.Data = map[string]any{"path": util.GetUniqueFilename(filePath)}
The argument binder does no path handling. util.BindJsonArg (kernel/util/net.go:365) takes two booleans, required (the key must be present) and rejectEmpty (the value must be non-empty). That is its entire contract. There is no filepath.Clean, no workspace join, no traversal check. An absolute path outside the workspace reaches gulu.File.IsExist unmodified.
The oracle. util/file.go:67:
if !gulu.File.IsExist(filePath) {
return filePath
}
// otherwise loop, returning the first non-existent dir/base (i).ext
Input echoed back means the path does not exist. A (1) suffix means it does.
The asymmetry.
| Route | Middleware |
|---|---|
putFile, copyFile, globalCopyFiles, workspaceCopyFiles, removeFile, renameFile |
CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole, CheckReadonly |
readDir (directory enumeration) |
CheckAuth, CheckAdminRole |
getFile |
CheckAuth, but GetAbsPathInWorkspace returns 403 on escape, plus rejectEncryptedBoxPath and a publish-access check |
getUniqueFilename |
CheckAuth, nothing else |
getFile binds the identical BindJsonArg("path", &filePath, true, true) and confines it as its first action.
Proof of Concept
Kernel 3.7.2, publish mode on port 6808, Publish.Auth.Enable false, anonymous client. Reader context confirmed by getChildBlocks returning HTTP 403 on the same session.
{"path":"/etc/passwd"}
→ {"code":0,"msg":"","data":{"path":"/etc/passwd (1)"}}
{"path":"/etc/shadow"}
→ {"code":0,"msg":"","data":{"path":"/etc/shadow (1)"}}
{"path":"/etc/definitely-not-here"}
→ {"code":0,"msg":"","data":{"path":"/etc/definitely-not-here"}}
Directories behave the same way:
{"path":"/root"} → {"path":"/root (1)"}
{"path":"/rootnope"} → {"path":"/rootnope"}
And within the workspace, confirming whether a specific document file exists:
{"path":"<workspace>/data/<boxID>/<docID>.sy"} → "<...> (1).sy"
{"path":"<workspace>/data/nope-no-such.sy"} → echoed unchanged
Impact
An anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish RoleReader, determines whether arbitrary paths exist on the host. Because directories respond the same way as files, the filesystem can be walked rather than only guessed at. This supports identifying the operating-system user's home directory, detecting installed software, backup and synchronisation directories, mapping the workspace layout, and confirming the existence of specific documents by probing their storage paths.
It also composes with the absolute workspace path returned elsewhere, which supplies a concrete prefix rather than requiring guesswork, and it recovers the operating-system username that the browser-request path strip added under issue #17410 was introduced to conceal.
Scoped precisely: nothing is read and nothing is written. This is an existence and layout disclosure, valuable primarily as a reconnaissance step.
Suggested fix
Confine the path as the adjacent getFile route does, by routing filePath through util.GetAbsPathInWorkspace and returning 403 on escape, or add CheckAdminRole and CheckReadonly to match readDir. The frontend uses this endpoint only for naming uploads and assets inside the workspace, so neither change affects legitimate use.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260812083335-251596fc0de2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73605"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-01T15:46:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`/api/file/getUniqueFilename` takes a path from the request body and passes it to a filesystem existence check with no validation, confinement or authorization. The response distinguishes paths that exist from paths that do not, so an anonymous reader in publish mode can probe arbitrary locations on the host, one request per probe. Files and directories both work.\n\nEvery neighbouring file route either requires an administrator or confines the path first.\n\n### Details\n\n**Route.** `kernel/api/router.go:289` on master, `:292` on the development branch, `CheckAuth` only.\n\n**Handler,** `kernel/api/file.go:84`, in full:\n\n```go\nutil.ParseJsonArgs(arg, ret, util.BindJsonArg(\"path\", \u0026filePath, true, true))\nret.Data = map[string]any{\"path\": util.GetUniqueFilename(filePath)}\n```\n\n**The argument binder does no path handling.** `util.BindJsonArg` (`kernel/util/net.go:365`) takes two booleans, `required` (the key must be present) and `rejectEmpty` (the value must be non-empty). That is its entire contract. There is no `filepath.Clean`, no workspace join, no traversal check. An absolute path outside the workspace reaches `gulu.File.IsExist` unmodified.\n\n**The oracle.** `util/file.go:67`:\n\n```go\nif !gulu.File.IsExist(filePath) {\n return filePath\n}\n// otherwise loop, returning the first non-existent dir/base (i).ext\n```\n\nInput echoed back means the path does not exist. A `(1)` suffix means it does.\n\n**The asymmetry.**\n\n| Route | Middleware |\n|---|---|\n| `putFile`, `copyFile`, `globalCopyFiles`, `workspaceCopyFiles`, `removeFile`, `renameFile` | `CheckAuth`, `CheckAdminRole`, `CheckReadonly` |\n| `readDir` (directory enumeration) | `CheckAuth`, `CheckAdminRole` |\n| `getFile` | `CheckAuth`, but `GetAbsPathInWorkspace` returns 403 on escape, plus `rejectEncryptedBoxPath` and a publish-access check |\n| `getUniqueFilename` | `CheckAuth`, nothing else |\n\n`getFile` binds the identical `BindJsonArg(\"path\", \u0026filePath, true, true)` and confines it as its first action.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nKernel 3.7.2, publish mode on port 6808, `Publish.Auth.Enable` false, anonymous client. Reader context confirmed by `getChildBlocks` returning HTTP 403 on the same session.\n\n```\n{\"path\":\"/etc/passwd\"}\n\u2192 {\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":{\"path\":\"/etc/passwd (1)\"}}\n\n{\"path\":\"/etc/shadow\"}\n\u2192 {\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":{\"path\":\"/etc/shadow (1)\"}}\n\n{\"path\":\"/etc/definitely-not-here\"}\n\u2192 {\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":{\"path\":\"/etc/definitely-not-here\"}}\n```\n\nDirectories behave the same way:\n\n```\n{\"path\":\"/root\"} \u2192 {\"path\":\"/root (1)\"}\n{\"path\":\"/rootnope\"} \u2192 {\"path\":\"/rootnope\"}\n```\n\nAnd within the workspace, confirming whether a specific document file exists:\n\n```\n{\"path\":\"\u003cworkspace\u003e/data/\u003cboxID\u003e/\u003cdocID\u003e.sy\"} \u2192 \"\u003c...\u003e (1).sy\"\n{\"path\":\"\u003cworkspace\u003e/data/nope-no-such.sy\"} \u2192 echoed unchanged\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader in publish mode, or any publish `RoleReader`, determines whether arbitrary paths exist on the host. Because directories respond the same way as files, the filesystem can be walked rather than only guessed at. This supports identifying the operating-system user\u0027s home directory, detecting installed software, backup and synchronisation directories, mapping the workspace layout, and confirming the existence of specific documents by probing their storage paths.\n\nIt also composes with the absolute workspace path returned elsewhere, which supplies a concrete prefix rather than requiring guesswork, and it recovers the operating-system username that the browser-request path strip added under issue #17410 was introduced to conceal.\n\nScoped precisely: nothing is read and nothing is written. This is an existence and layout disclosure, valuable primarily as a reconnaissance step.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nConfine the path as the adjacent `getFile` route does, by routing `filePath` through `util.GetAbsPathInWorkspace` and returning 403 on escape, or add `CheckAdminRole` and `CheckReadonly` to match `readDir`. The frontend uses this endpoint only for naming uploads and assets inside the workspace, so neither change affects legitimate use.",
"id": "GHSA-hf8h-97gm-4x2p",
"modified": "2026-10-01T15:46:01Z",
"published": "2026-10-01T15:46:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-hf8h-97gm-4x2p"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73605"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-path-traversal-via-getuniquefilename"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan: getUniqueFilename passes an unvalidated client-supplied path to the filesystem, giving anonymous readers an existence oracle over the entire host filesystem"
}
GHSA-HFC8-W5F4-3X6M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 18:23 – Updated: 2026-05-29 18:23Impact
The Ironic Standalone Operator (IRSO) is the operator to maintain an Ironic deployment for Metal3. IRSO controller automatically adds its environment label to user-provided Secrets and ConfigMaps without the resource owner's consent. A high-privilege controller modifying user-owned resources constitutes an unauthorized integrity violation. Deployments running IrSO v0.7.0 through v0.8.1 that reference user-provided Secrets or ConfigMaps (TLS certificates, BMC CA, trusted CA) are affected.
Patches
Fixed in v0.9.0, v0.8.2, v0.7.3.
Workarounds
Manually add the environment label (ironic-standalone-operator.metal3.io/environment) to all user-provided Secrets and ConfigMaps before they are referenced in the Ironic resource. This prevents the controller from modifying them.
Resources
- https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-standalone-operator/pull/619
- https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-standalone-operator/pull/664
- https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-standalone-operator/pull/665
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.7.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/metal3-io/ironic-standalone-operator"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.7.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/metal3-io/ironic-standalone-operator"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T18:23:34Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nThe Ironic Standalone Operator (IRSO) is the operator to maintain an Ironic deployment for Metal3. IRSO controller automatically adds its environment label to user-provided Secrets and ConfigMaps without the resource owner\u0027s consent. A high-privilege controller modifying user-owned resources constitutes an unauthorized integrity violation. Deployments running IrSO v0.7.0 through v0.8.1 that reference user-provided Secrets or ConfigMaps (TLS certificates, BMC CA, trusted CA) are affected.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in v0.9.0, v0.8.2, v0.7.3. \n\n## Workarounds\n\nManually add the environment label (ironic-standalone-operator.metal3.io/environment) to all user-provided Secrets and ConfigMaps before they are referenced in the Ironic resource. This prevents the controller from modifying them.\n\n## Resources\n\n- https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-standalone-operator/pull/619\n- https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-standalone-operator/pull/664\n- https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-standalone-operator/pull/665",
"id": "GHSA-hfc8-w5f4-3x6m",
"modified": "2026-05-29T18:23:34Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T18:23:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-standalone-operator/security/advisories/GHSA-hfc8-w5f4-3x6m"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-standalone-operator/pull/619"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-standalone-operator/pull/664"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-standalone-operator/pull/665"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/metal3-io/ironic-standalone-operator"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Ironic Standalone Operator\u0027s controller modifies user-owned resources without consent"
}
GHSA-HFFC-GCJH-MJ4F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-05 12:31 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33The Geo Controller plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized menu creation/deletion due to missing capability checks on the ajax__geolocate_menu and ajax__geolocate_remove_menu functions in all versions up to, and including, 8.6.9. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to create or delete WordPress menus.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-7380"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-05T11:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Geo Controller plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized menu creation/deletion due to missing capability checks on the ajax__geolocate_menu and ajax__geolocate_remove_menu functions in all versions up to, and including, 8.6.9. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to create or delete WordPress menus.",
"id": "GHSA-hffc-gcjh-mj4f",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:36Z",
"published": "2024-09-05T12:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7380"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/cf-geoplugin/tags/8.6.9/inc/classes/Menus.php#L519"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/cf-geoplugin/tags/8.6.9/inc/classes/Menus.php#L606"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3156125%40cf-geoplugin\u0026new=3156125%40cf-geoplugin\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=#file503"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/280e1b4d-08be-4e77-abcb-5f9079111595?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HFG4-62F6-FJFF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:14 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:14SAP ERP Financial Accounting (RFOPENPOSTING_FR) versions - SAP_APPL - 600, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 616, SAP_FIN - 617, 618, 700, 720, 730, SAPSCORE - 125, S4CORE, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, allows a registered attacker to invoke certain functions that would otherwise be restricted to specific users. These functions are normally exposed over the network and once exploited the attacker may be able to view and modify financial accounting data that only a specific user should have access to.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-38164"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-09-14T12:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "SAP ERP Financial Accounting (RFOPENPOSTING_FR) versions - SAP_APPL - 600, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 616, SAP_FIN - 617, 618, 700, 720, 730, SAPSCORE - 125, S4CORE, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, allows a registered attacker to invoke certain functions that would otherwise be restricted to specific users. These functions are normally exposed over the network and once exploited the attacker may be able to view and modify financial accounting data that only a specific user should have access to.",
"id": "GHSA-hfg4-62f6-fjff",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:14:27Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:14:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-38164"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/3068582"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=585106405"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-HFGF-G5X7-VVFR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-30 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:33The MWB HubSpot for WooCommerce – CRM, Abandoned Cart, Email Marketing, Marketing Automation & Analytics plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data that can lead to privilege escalation due to a missing capability check on the hubwoo_save_updates() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.5.9. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to update arbitrary options on the WordPress site. This can be leveraged to update the default role for registration to administrator and enable user registration for attackers to gain administrative user access to a vulnerable site.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-10591"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-30T14:15:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The MWB HubSpot for WooCommerce \u2013 CRM, Abandoned Cart, Email Marketing, Marketing Automation \u0026 Analytics plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data that can lead to privilege escalation due to a missing capability check on the hubwoo_save_updates() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.5.9. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to update arbitrary options on the WordPress site. This can be leveraged to update the default role for registration to administrator and enable user registration for attackers to gain administrative user access to a vulnerable site.",
"id": "GHSA-hfgf-g5x7-vvfr",
"modified": "2026-04-08T21:33:01Z",
"published": "2025-01-30T15:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10591"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/makewebbetter-hubspot-for-woocommerce/trunk/includes/class-hubwoo-ajax-handler.php#L845"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3231984"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/bd38b5f2-f13e-4433-9a8a-2f42cc1782c6?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HFH8-5FJ3-QQRH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-09 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-28 21:35Missing Authorization vulnerability in Nate Reist Protected Posts Logout Button allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Protected Posts Logout Button: from n/a through 1.4.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-25454"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-09T13:15:23Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Nate Reist Protected Posts Logout Button allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Protected Posts Logout Button: from n/a through 1.4.5.",
"id": "GHSA-hfh8-5fj3-qqrh",
"modified": "2026-04-28T21:35:16Z",
"published": "2024-12-09T15:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-25454"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/protected-posts-logout-button/vulnerability/wordpress-protected-posts-logout-button-plugin-1-4-5-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-HFJ2-23XP-72CR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-07 12:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:32The Post Form – Registration Form – Profile Form for User Profiles – Frontend Content Forms for User Submissions (UGC) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized media file deletion due to a missing capability check on the handle_deleted_media function in all versions up to, and including, 2.8.7. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary media files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-1170"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-07T11:15:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The Post Form \u2013 Registration Form \u2013 Profile Form for User Profiles \u2013 Frontend Content Forms for User Submissions (UGC) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized media file deletion due to a missing capability check on the handle_deleted_media function in all versions up to, and including, 2.8.7. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary media files.",
"id": "GHSA-hfj2-23xp-72cr",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:32:41Z",
"published": "2024-03-07T12:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1170"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/buddyforms/trunk/includes/functions.php#L1493"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3046092/buddyforms/trunk?contextall=1\u0026old=3031945\u0026old_path=%2Fbuddyforms%2Ftrunk#file7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/380c646c-fd95-408a-89eb-3e646768bbc5?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.