CWE-862
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewMissing Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Missing
- Behavior-Type: Authorization
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.
A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.
Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic.
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.
Effectiveness: Moderate
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Host Application Interface Scanner
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Terminology
Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.
Content history
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Detection_Factors
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
updated References
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples
updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Relationships, Terminology_Notes
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
19899 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-CF7F-XM6M-HVFH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-10 18:31Missing Authorization vulnerability in Craig Hewitt Seriously Simple Podcasting seriously-simple-podcasting allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Seriously Simple Podcasting: from n/a through <= 3.14.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39505"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T09:16:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Craig Hewitt Seriously Simple Podcasting seriously-simple-podcasting allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Seriously Simple Podcasting: from n/a through \u003c= 3.14.2.",
"id": "GHSA-cf7f-xm6m-hvfh",
"modified": "2026-04-10T18:31:14Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T09:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39505"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/seriously-simple-podcasting/vulnerability/wordpress-seriously-simple-podcasting-plugin-3-14-2-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CF7G-CXH2-5VHR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-20 18:31 – Updated: 2026-02-25 21:31Missing Authorization vulnerability in aDirectory aDirectory adirectory allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects aDirectory: from n/a through <= 3.0.3.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-67975"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-20T16:22:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in aDirectory aDirectory adirectory allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects aDirectory: from n/a through \u003c= 3.0.3.",
"id": "GHSA-cf7g-cxh2-5vhr",
"modified": "2026-02-25T21:31:17Z",
"published": "2026-02-20T18:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-67975"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/adirectory/vulnerability/wordpress-adirectory-plugin-3-0-3-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CF7Q-G38X-X625
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:31 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:31AtomXCMS 2.0 is affected by Incorrect Access Control via admin/dump.php
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-26649"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-10-22T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "AtomXCMS 2.0 is affected by Incorrect Access Control via admin/dump.php",
"id": "GHSA-cf7q-g38x-x625",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:31:58Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-26649"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Drunyacoder/AtomXCMS-2/issues/19"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-CFFP-87J8-RFF2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-19 15:31Funnel Builder for WooCommerce Checkout prior to 3.15.0.3 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the public checkout endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to invoke internal methods and write arbitrary data to the plugin's External Scripts global setting. Attackers can inject malicious JavaScript through the External Scripts setting that executes in the browsers of all checkout page visitors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47100"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-19T15:16:32Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Funnel Builder for WooCommerce Checkout prior to 3.15.0.3 contains a missing authorization vulnerability in the public checkout endpoint that allows unauthenticated attackers to invoke internal methods and write arbitrary data to the plugin\u0027s External Scripts global setting. Attackers can inject malicious JavaScript through the External Scripts setting that executes in the browsers of all checkout page visitors.",
"id": "GHSA-cffp-87j8-rff2",
"modified": "2026-05-19T15:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-05-19T15:31:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47100"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3530797/funnel-builder/tags/3.15.0.3/modules/checkouts/includes/class-wfacp-ajax-controller.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sansec.io/research/funnelkit-woocommerce-vulnerability-exploited"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/funnel-builder-for-woocommerce-checkout-missing-authorization-via-ajax"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-CFH6-PV5C-38JV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-18 20:51 – Updated: 2026-08-18 20:51Summary
Repo under test: https://github.com/Netflix/lemur
The certificate create and upload endpoints accept a replaces[] (alias replacements) array that is resolved to live Certificate ORM objects with no ownership or CertificatePermission check on the referenced certificates. The SQLAlchemy Certificate.replaces append listener then immediately sets victim.notify = False and populates victim.replaced. From that point the victim certificate is excluded from auto-reissue, its expiration notifications are silenced, and the periodic certificate_rotate Celery task deploys the attacker's certificate (endpoint.certificate.replaced[0]) onto every endpoint serving the victim certificate.
Any authenticated non-read-only user can therefore silently substitute their own certificate onto production load balancers and Kubernetes secrets they hold no role on, while suppressing the legitimate certificate's lifecycle automation.
Affected route
POST /api/1/certificates
POST /api/1/certificates/upload
PUT /api/1/certificates/<id>
Affected code
lemur/certificates/schemas.py:402—replaces = fields.Nested(AssociatedCertificateSchema, missing=[], many=True)accepted on create/upload/editlemur/schemas.py:152—AssociatedCertificateSchemaresolves any certificate by id/name viafetch_objects(Certificate, data)with no permission checklemur/certificates/views.py:651— onlyStrictRolePermission().can()gates/certificates/upload; no check ondata['replaces']lemur/certificates/models.py:506—@event.listens_for(Certificate.replaces, 'append')setsvalue.notify = Falseon the victimlemur/certificates/service.py:277—get_all_pending_reissue()filtersnot_(Certificate.replaced.any()), excluding the victimlemur/certificates/cli.py:347—request_rotation(endpoint, endpoint.certificate.replaced[0], message, commit)deploys the attacker certlemur/common/celery.py:638— periodiccertificate_rotatetask runscli_certificate.rotate(..., commit=True)lemur/deployment/service.py:17—endpoint.source.plugin.update_endpoint(endpoint, new_cert)pushes to ELB/CloudFront/ACM/K8s
Impact
An authenticated insider or holder of a stolen low-privilege token can, without holding any role on a target certificate:
- Upload a self-signed or attacker-minted certificate listing arbitrary high-value production certificate IDs in
replaces. - Immediately disable expiration notifications and auto-reissue for those production certificates.
- On the next scheduled
certificate_rotateCelery run, have the attacker's certificate pushed to every endpoint (AWS ELB/CloudFront/ACM, Kubernetes, SFTP, etc.) currently serving the victim certificate, while the legitimate certificate is detached.
Minimum impact is fleet-wide TLS denial of service equivalent to mass revocation. Where internal clients trust the substituted chain (or combined with the sub-CA finding LEMUR-BUG-07), it escalates to TLS interception. This directly violates the invariant that a user may only modify or revoke a certificate if they are its owner, a member of an owning role, or an administrator.
Root cause
AssociatedCertificateSchema.get_object calls fetch_objects(Certificate, data) and returns the ORM rows verbatim. No caller on the create/upload/edit path iterates the resolved replaces list to enforce CertificatePermission before the model assigns them, and the Certificate.replaces append event listener mutates the victim row (notify = False) as a side effect of ORM collection assignment. The direct revoke endpoint does enforce CertificatePermission, but this replaces path achieves an equivalent or worse outcome while bypassing it entirely.
Validated evidence
Static trace, confirmed by code inspection (validation status: CONFIRMED):
replacesis accepted inCertificateInputSchema/CertificateUploadInputSchemaand resolved viafetch_objects(Certificate, ...)with no per-object authorization.grep -n CertificatePermission lemur/certificates/views.pyshows the check is applied toPUT/DELETE/revoke/exportpaths but never to thereplacespayload ofPOST /certificatesorPOST /certificates/upload.- The Celery
certificate_rotatetask andcli.rotate()consumeEndpoint.replaced.any()unconditionally and deployreplaced[0]withcommit=True.
Proof of concept / reproducer
Status: reconstructed from source report (static control-flow trace; not executed against a live CA).
Preconditions: attacker is an authenticated Lemur user holding any role other than read-only (default StrictRolePermission config). <VICTIM_CERT_ID> is any certificate id readable via GET /api/1/certificates.
# 1. Upload an attacker-controlled cert that "replaces" the victim
curl -sS -X POST "<TARGET_BASE_URL>/api/1/certificates/upload" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <AUTH_TOKEN>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"name": "attacker-replacement",
"owner": "attacker@example.com",
"body": "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n<ATTACKER_CERT_PEM>\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----",
"privateKey": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n<ATTACKER_KEY_PEM>\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----",
"replaces": [{"id": <VICTIM_CERT_ID>}]
}'
# 2. Observe victim.notify is now false and victim is queued for rotation
curl -sS "<TARGET_BASE_URL>/api/1/certificates/<VICTIM_CERT_ID>" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <AUTH_TOKEN>" | jq '.notify, .replaced'
# 3. On the next certificate_rotate Celery beat tick, the attacker cert is
# deployed to every endpoint that was serving <VICTIM_CERT_ID>.
Static-trace validation command from the source report:
grep -n 'replaces' lemur/certificates/schemas.py lemur/certificates/views.py lemur/schemas.py \
&& grep -n 'CertificatePermission' lemur/certificates/views.py
Source artifact: audit/harnesses/public-repo-threat-model-harness/results/netflix-lemur-100run-mythos-20260627T051129Z/findings.jsonl (run_083, finding cluster lemur-replaces-unauth, 7/100 runs).
Suggested fix
Before persisting replaces/replacements on certificate create, upload, and edit, iterate each referenced certificate and enforce the same CertificatePermission(owner_role, cert.roles) check used by the revoke endpoint (views.py:1677-1685); reject with 403 if the caller is not creator/owner/role-member/admin for any target. Additionally, move the value.notify = False side effect out of the SQLAlchemy append listener so an authorization failure cannot leave a victim certificate partially mutated, and emit an audit_log entry whenever a certificate is marked as replaced.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.9.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "lemur"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.9.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-71308"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-18T20:51:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nRepo under test: https://github.com/Netflix/lemur\n\nThe certificate create and upload endpoints accept a `replaces[]` (alias `replacements`) array that is resolved to live `Certificate` ORM objects with no ownership or `CertificatePermission` check on the referenced certificates. The SQLAlchemy `Certificate.replaces` append listener then immediately sets `victim.notify = False` and populates `victim.replaced`. From that point the victim certificate is excluded from auto-reissue, its expiration notifications are silenced, and the periodic `certificate_rotate` Celery task deploys the attacker\u0027s certificate (`endpoint.certificate.replaced[0]`) onto every endpoint serving the victim certificate.\n\nAny authenticated non-read-only user can therefore silently substitute their own certificate onto production load balancers and Kubernetes secrets they hold no role on, while suppressing the legitimate certificate\u0027s lifecycle automation.\n\n## Affected route\n\n`POST /api/1/certificates`\n`POST /api/1/certificates/upload`\n`PUT /api/1/certificates/\u003cid\u003e`\n\n## Affected code\n\n- [`lemur/certificates/schemas.py:402`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/certificates/schemas.py#L402) \u2014 `replaces = fields.Nested(AssociatedCertificateSchema, missing=[], many=True)` accepted on create/upload/edit\n- [`lemur/schemas.py:152`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/schemas.py#L152) \u2014 `AssociatedCertificateSchema` resolves any certificate by id/name via `fetch_objects(Certificate, data)` with no permission check\n- [`lemur/certificates/views.py:651`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/certificates/views.py#L651) \u2014 only `StrictRolePermission().can()` gates `/certificates/upload`; no check on `data[\u0027replaces\u0027]`\n- [`lemur/certificates/models.py:506`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/certificates/models.py#L506) \u2014 `@event.listens_for(Certificate.replaces, \u0027append\u0027)` sets `value.notify = False` on the victim\n- [`lemur/certificates/service.py:277`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/certificates/service.py#L277) \u2014 `get_all_pending_reissue()` filters `not_(Certificate.replaced.any())`, excluding the victim\n- [`lemur/certificates/cli.py:347`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/certificates/cli.py#L347) \u2014 `request_rotation(endpoint, endpoint.certificate.replaced[0], message, commit)` deploys the attacker cert\n- [`lemur/common/celery.py:638`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/common/celery.py#L638) \u2014 periodic `certificate_rotate` task runs `cli_certificate.rotate(..., commit=True)`\n- [`lemur/deployment/service.py:17`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/deployment/service.py#L17) \u2014 `endpoint.source.plugin.update_endpoint(endpoint, new_cert)` pushes to ELB/CloudFront/ACM/K8s\n\n## Impact\n\nAn authenticated insider or holder of a stolen low-privilege token can, without holding any role on a target certificate:\n\n1. Upload a self-signed or attacker-minted certificate listing arbitrary high-value production certificate IDs in `replaces`.\n2. Immediately disable expiration notifications and auto-reissue for those production certificates.\n3. On the next scheduled `certificate_rotate` Celery run, have the attacker\u0027s certificate pushed to every endpoint (AWS ELB/CloudFront/ACM, Kubernetes, SFTP, etc.) currently serving the victim certificate, while the legitimate certificate is detached.\n\nMinimum impact is fleet-wide TLS denial of service equivalent to mass revocation. Where internal clients trust the substituted chain (or combined with the sub-CA finding LEMUR-BUG-07), it escalates to TLS interception. This directly violates the invariant that a user may only modify or revoke a certificate if they are its owner, a member of an owning role, or an administrator.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`AssociatedCertificateSchema.get_object` calls `fetch_objects(Certificate, data)` and returns the ORM rows verbatim. No caller on the create/upload/edit path iterates the resolved `replaces` list to enforce `CertificatePermission` before the model assigns them, and the `Certificate.replaces` append event listener mutates the victim row (`notify = False`) as a side effect of ORM collection assignment. The direct revoke endpoint *does* enforce `CertificatePermission`, but this `replaces` path achieves an equivalent or worse outcome while bypassing it entirely.\n\n## Validated evidence\n\nStatic trace, confirmed by code inspection (validation status: `CONFIRMED`):\n\n- `replaces` is accepted in `CertificateInputSchema` / `CertificateUploadInputSchema` and resolved via `fetch_objects(Certificate, ...)` with no per-object authorization.\n- `grep -n CertificatePermission lemur/certificates/views.py` shows the check is applied to `PUT`/`DELETE`/`revoke`/`export` paths but never to the `replaces` payload of `POST /certificates` or `POST /certificates/upload`.\n- The Celery `certificate_rotate` task and `cli.rotate()` consume `Endpoint.replaced.any()` unconditionally and deploy `replaced[0]` with `commit=True`.\n\n## Proof of concept / reproducer\n\nStatus: reconstructed from source report (static control-flow trace; not executed against a live CA).\n\nPreconditions: attacker is an authenticated Lemur user holding any role other than `read-only` (default `StrictRolePermission` config). `\u003cVICTIM_CERT_ID\u003e` is any certificate id readable via `GET /api/1/certificates`.\n\n```bash\n# 1. Upload an attacker-controlled cert that \"replaces\" the victim\ncurl -sS -X POST \"\u003cTARGET_BASE_URL\u003e/api/1/certificates/upload\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cAUTH_TOKEN\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"name\": \"attacker-replacement\",\n \"owner\": \"attacker@example.com\",\n \"body\": \"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\\n\u003cATTACKER_CERT_PEM\u003e\\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----\",\n \"privateKey\": \"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\\n\u003cATTACKER_KEY_PEM\u003e\\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\",\n \"replaces\": [{\"id\": \u003cVICTIM_CERT_ID\u003e}]\n }\u0027\n\n# 2. Observe victim.notify is now false and victim is queued for rotation\ncurl -sS \"\u003cTARGET_BASE_URL\u003e/api/1/certificates/\u003cVICTIM_CERT_ID\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cAUTH_TOKEN\u003e\" | jq \u0027.notify, .replaced\u0027\n\n# 3. On the next certificate_rotate Celery beat tick, the attacker cert is\n# deployed to every endpoint that was serving \u003cVICTIM_CERT_ID\u003e.\n```\n\nStatic-trace validation command from the source report:\n\n```bash\ngrep -n \u0027replaces\u0027 lemur/certificates/schemas.py lemur/certificates/views.py lemur/schemas.py \\\n \u0026\u0026 grep -n \u0027CertificatePermission\u0027 lemur/certificates/views.py\n```\n\nSource artifact: `audit/harnesses/public-repo-threat-model-harness/results/netflix-lemur-100run-mythos-20260627T051129Z/findings.jsonl` (run_083, finding cluster `lemur-replaces-unauth`, 7/100 runs).\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nBefore persisting `replaces`/`replacements` on certificate create, upload, and edit, iterate each referenced certificate and enforce the same `CertificatePermission(owner_role, cert.roles)` check used by the revoke endpoint ([`views.py:1677-1685`](https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/blob/main/lemur/certificates/views.py#L1677)); reject with 403 if the caller is not creator/owner/role-member/admin for any target. Additionally, move the `value.notify = False` side effect out of the SQLAlchemy append listener so an authorization failure cannot leave a victim certificate partially mutated, and emit an `audit_log` entry whenever a certificate is marked as replaced.",
"id": "GHSA-cfh6-pv5c-38jv",
"modified": "2026-08-18T20:51:33Z",
"published": "2026-08-18T20:51:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/security/advisories/GHSA-cfh6-pv5c-38jv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/commit/286874535160952143b0afe2d356642669f9d4c6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Netflix/lemur/releases/tag/v1.9.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Lemur: Unchecked `replaces[]` lets any user silence notifications and hijack auto-rotation for arbitrary certificates"
}
GHSA-CFHF-6366-C7PF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-06 21:30 – Updated: 2026-04-23 15:32Missing Authorization vulnerability in Hamid Alinia – idehweb Login with phone number.This issue affects Login with phone number: from n/a through 1.7.18.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-34371"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-06T19:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Hamid Alinia \u2013 idehweb Login with phone number.This issue affects Login with phone number: from n/a through 1.7.18.",
"id": "GHSA-cfhf-6366-c7pf",
"modified": "2026-04-23T15:32:18Z",
"published": "2024-05-06T21:30:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-34371"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/login-with-phone-number/vulnerability/wordpress-login-with-phone-number-plugin-1-7-18-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/login-with-phone-number/wordpress-login-with-phone-number-plugin-1-7-18-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CFHJ-895C-686J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-06 06:31 – Updated: 2026-05-06 06:31The Mercado Pago payments for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the 'mp_pix_image' WooCommerce API endpoint in all versions up to, and including, 8.7.11. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to retrieve PIX payment QR code images for arbitrary orders. PIX QR codes contain sensitive merchant information including PIX keys (which may be CPF/CNPJ personal identifiers), transaction amounts, merchant name and city, and MercadoPago transaction references.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-3208"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-06T04:16:06Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Mercado Pago payments for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027mp_pix_image\u0027 WooCommerce API endpoint in all versions up to, and including, 8.7.11. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to retrieve PIX payment QR code images for arbitrary orders. PIX QR codes contain sensitive merchant information including PIX keys (which may be CPF/CNPJ personal identifiers), transaction amounts, merchant name and city, and MercadoPago transaction references.",
"id": "GHSA-cfhj-895c-686j",
"modified": "2026-05-06T06:31:47Z",
"published": "2026-05-06T06:31:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3208"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/woocommerce-mercadopago/tags/8.7.10/src/Gateways/PixGateway.php#L358"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/woocommerce-mercadopago/tags/8.7.10/src/Gateways/PixGateway.php#L92"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?old_path=%2Fwoocommerce-mercadopago/tags/8.7.11\u0026new_path=%2Fwoocommerce-mercadopago/tags/8.7.12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/986e0252-b94d-4ac8-9083-0218fa8a651e?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CFJ6-QJ55-X4R4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-01 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:32Missing Authorization vulnerability in Atarim allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.This issue affects Atarim: from n/a through 4.0.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-38771"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-01T15:15:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in Atarim allows Accessing Functionality Not Properly Constrained by ACLs.This issue affects Atarim: from n/a through 4.0.",
"id": "GHSA-cfj6-qj55-x4r4",
"modified": "2026-04-01T18:32:15Z",
"published": "2024-11-01T15:31:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38771"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/atarim-visual-collaboration/vulnerability/wordpress-atarim-plugin-4-0-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/atarim-visual-collaboration/wordpress-atarim-plugin-4-0-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CFJV-XCJ3-8429
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-29 12:33 – Updated: 2026-04-29 12:33Missing Authorization vulnerability in StellarWP GiveWP give allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects GiveWP: from n/a through <= 4.14.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42642"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-29T12:16:19Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in StellarWP GiveWP give allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects GiveWP: from n/a through \u003c= 4.14.5.",
"id": "GHSA-cfjv-xcj3-8429",
"modified": "2026-04-29T12:33:08Z",
"published": "2026-04-29T12:33:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42642"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/give/vulnerability/wordpress-givewp-plugin-4-14-5-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CFM5-MPFV-P4VJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-09 03:30 – Updated: 2026-09-10 21:31Missing authorization in WebView in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 153.0.8010.36 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to potentially bypass system access restrictions via crafted network traffic. (Chromium security severity: Low)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-87522"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-09T01:17:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing authorization in WebView in Google Chrome on on Android prior to 153.0.8010.36 allowed a remote attacker leveraging social engineering to potentially bypass system access restrictions via crafted network traffic. (Chromium security severity: Low)",
"id": "GHSA-cfm5-mpfv-p4vj",
"modified": "2026-09-10T21:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-09-09T03:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-87522"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/09/stable-channel-update-for-desktop_0808145027.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/507219126"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.