CWE-862
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewMissing Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Missing
- Behavior-Type: Authorization
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.
A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.
Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic.
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.
Effectiveness: Moderate
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Host Application Interface Scanner
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Terminology
Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.
Content history
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Detection_Factors
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
updated References
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples
updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Relationships, Terminology_Notes
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
19863 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-8FXQ-M46W-RJRF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-19 06:31 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:32The TrueBooker WordPress plugin before 1.2.7 does not have proper authorisation checks in one of its AJAX actions, allowing unauthenticated users to change the status of arbitrary appointments, as well as to trigger notification emails to the affected customers.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-18777"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-19T06:17:38Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The TrueBooker WordPress plugin before 1.2.7 does not have proper authorisation checks in one of its AJAX actions, allowing unauthenticated users to change the status of arbitrary appointments, as well as to trigger notification emails to the affected customers.",
"id": "GHSA-8fxq-m46w-rjrf",
"modified": "2026-08-19T18:32:44Z",
"published": "2026-08-19T06:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-18777"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/05a09ba7-b781-4462-8c50-3a45f2757cb2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G2J-5XH3-R35M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-19 21:30 – Updated: 2026-02-20 18:31Missing Authorization vulnerability in SeedProd Coming Soon Page, Under Construction & Maintenance Mode by SeedProd coming-soon allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Coming Soon Page, Under Construction & Maintenance Mode by SeedProd: from n/a through <= 6.19.7.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27368"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-19T21:18:33Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in SeedProd Coming Soon Page, Under Construction \u0026 Maintenance Mode by SeedProd coming-soon allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Coming Soon Page, Under Construction \u0026 Maintenance Mode by SeedProd: from n/a through \u003c= 6.19.7.",
"id": "GHSA-8g2j-5xh3-r35m",
"modified": "2026-02-20T18:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-02-19T21:30:48Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27368"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/coming-soon/vulnerability/wordpress-coming-soon-page-under-construction-maintenance-mode-by-seedprod-plugin-6-19-7-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G2P-PQM3-FCFH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-01 14:23 – Updated: 2026-06-01 14:23Summary
Type: Privilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members endpoint is gated only by require_workspace_member(workspace_id) (default min_role="member") and forwards the request body's user_id and role straight into MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role), which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace.
File: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py, lines 92-101; services/member_service.py, lines 26-38.
Root cause: MemberService.add validates only that role is in VALID_ROLES = {"owner", "admin", "member"} — the value, not the caller's right to assign it. The route's Depends(require_workspace_member) resolves to the default min_role="member". So a member-level token plus one POST gives the attacker an alternate identity with owner role inside the same workspace, bypassing every owner-only operation that would otherwise gate them.
Affected Code
File 1: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py, lines 92-101.
@router.post("/{workspace_id}/members", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
async def add_member(
workspace_id: str,
body: MemberAdd,
user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # <-- BUG: defaults to min_role="member"
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
member_svc = MemberService(session)
member = await member_svc.add(workspace_id, body.user_id, body.role) # <-- writes any (user, role)
return MemberResponse.model_validate(member)
File 2: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py, lines 26-38.
async def add(
self,
workspace_id: str,
user_id: str,
role: str = "member",
) -> Member:
"""Add a user to a workspace."""
if role not in VALID_ROLES: # only validates the value
raise ValueError(f"Invalid role: {role}. Must be one of {VALID_ROLES}")
member = Member(workspace_id=workspace_id, user_id=user_id, role=role)
self._session.add(member) # <-- BUG: no caller-permission check
await self._session.flush()
return member
Why it's wrong: workspace member management is the textbook capability that must be gated on owner role. The role hierarchy is implemented (MemberService.has_role, member_service.py:80-96), the dependency-tunable min_role parameter exists (require_workspace_member(min_role), deps.py:58), but the POST .../members route uses neither. The VALID_ROLES enum check is purely cosmetic — it accepts "owner" from any caller because the route never asked whether the caller has the right to assign that role.
Exploit Chain
- Attacker registers two accounts (or recruits a member account on the target workspace
W). Account A is an existing member ofW; Account B is a fresh signup the attacker controls (any account on the platform —auth/registeris open by default). State: attacker holds tokens for both A and B. - Attacker authenticates as Account A and POSTs
Authorization: Bearer <A_jwt>toPOST /workspaces/W/memberswith body{"user_id": "<B_user_id>", "role": "owner"}. State: control flow entersadd_member. require_workspace_member(W, A)passes (A is a member).MemberService.add(W, B, "owner")writes a new rowMember(workspace_id=W, user_id=B, role="owner"). State: Account B is now a workspace-W owner.- Attacker switches to Account B and acts as workspace owner — change settings, add/remove members, delete the workspace, or pivot to the companion advisories' primitives. State: attacker holds owner of any workspace they had member access to, via a fresh attacker-controlled identity that the original workspace's audit logs cannot easily attribute to A.
- Final state: with one member-level token plus one POST, the attacker plants an owner-role identity on any workspace they can reach. The same primitive lets the attacker invite a competitor or external-vendor account into the workspace as owner, exfiltrating the workspace's content under that competitor's name.
Security Impact
Severity: sec-critical. CVSS 9.1: network attack, low complexity, low privileges (member tier), no user interaction, scope changed (the new owner is a different security principal), high confidentiality and integrity, no availability claim.
Attacker capability: with one workspace-member token plus one POST request, the attacker grants owner-tier access to any user_id on the platform. From there, full workspace control via the Account B token, plus indirect attribution: the original workspace's audit logs see "user A added user B as owner" but the audit trail cannot tell that B is attacker-controlled.
Preconditions: praisonai-platform is deployed multi-tenant; the attacker has any membership token in the target workspace; the attacker can register or knows any other user_id on the platform.
Differential: source-inspection-verified. The asymmetry between MemberService.has_role (clearly tiered) and add_member's default min_role="member" confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, the gate refuses the member-tier token, the elevated POST returns 403, and the second-identity owner is never created.
Suggested Fix
--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py
@@ -90,11 +90,15 @@
+def _require_workspace_owner(workspace_id: str, user, session):
+ return require_workspace_member(workspace_id, user, session, min_role="owner")
+
@router.post("/{workspace_id}/members", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)
async def add_member(
workspace_id: str,
body: MemberAdd,
- user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
+ user: AuthIdentity = Depends(_require_workspace_owner),
session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
member_svc = MemberService(session)
+ if body.role == "owner" and not await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, "owner"):
+ raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Only owners can add other owners")
member = await member_svc.add(workspace_id, body.user_id, body.role)
The four other workspace mutation endpoints (update_workspace, delete_workspace, update_member_role, remove_member) exhibit the same default-min-role gap and are filed as their own advisories.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonai-platform"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47413"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-01T14:23:39Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n**Type:** Privilege escalation / cross-tenant member injection. The `POST /workspaces/{workspace_id}/members` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=\"member\"`) and forwards the request body\u0027s `user_id` and `role` straight into `MemberService.add(workspace_id, user_id, role)`, which has no caller-permission check. A user with the lowest workspace privilege can add any user (including a new attacker-controlled second account, or an existing account they want to grief) as owner of the workspace.\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 92-101; `services/member_service.py`, lines 26-38.\n**Root cause:** `MemberService.add` validates only that `role` is in `VALID_ROLES = {\"owner\", \"admin\", \"member\"}` \u2014 the value, not the caller\u0027s right to assign it. The route\u0027s `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to the default `min_role=\"member\"`. So a member-level token plus one POST gives the attacker an alternate identity with owner role inside the same workspace, bypassing every owner-only operation that *would* otherwise gate them.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File 1:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 92-101.\n\n```python\n@router.post(\"/{workspace_id}/members\", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)\nasync def add_member(\n workspace_id: str,\n body: MemberAdd,\n user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member), # \u003c-- BUG: defaults to min_role=\"member\"\n session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n member_svc = MemberService(session)\n member = await member_svc.add(workspace_id, body.user_id, body.role) # \u003c-- writes any (user, role)\n return MemberResponse.model_validate(member)\n```\n\n**File 2:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/services/member_service.py`, lines 26-38.\n\n```python\nasync def add(\n self,\n workspace_id: str,\n user_id: str,\n role: str = \"member\",\n) -\u003e Member:\n \"\"\"Add a user to a workspace.\"\"\"\n if role not in VALID_ROLES: # only validates the value\n raise ValueError(f\"Invalid role: {role}. Must be one of {VALID_ROLES}\")\n member = Member(workspace_id=workspace_id, user_id=user_id, role=role)\n self._session.add(member) # \u003c-- BUG: no caller-permission check\n await self._session.flush()\n return member\n```\n\n**Why it\u0027s wrong:** workspace member management is the textbook capability that must be gated on owner role. The role hierarchy is implemented (`MemberService.has_role`, member_service.py:80-96), the dependency-tunable `min_role` parameter exists (`require_workspace_member(min_role)`, deps.py:58), but the `POST .../members` route uses neither. The `VALID_ROLES` enum check is purely cosmetic \u2014 it accepts `\"owner\"` from any caller because the route never asked whether the caller has the right to assign that role.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker registers two accounts (or recruits a member account on the target workspace `W`). Account A is an existing member of `W`; Account B is a fresh signup the attacker controls (any account on the platform \u2014 `auth/register` is open by default). State: attacker holds tokens for both A and B.\n2. Attacker authenticates as Account A and POSTs `Authorization: Bearer \u003cA_jwt\u003e` to `POST /workspaces/W/members` with body `{\"user_id\": \"\u003cB_user_id\u003e\", \"role\": \"owner\"}`. State: control flow enters `add_member`.\n3. `require_workspace_member(W, A)` passes (A is a member). `MemberService.add(W, B, \"owner\")` writes a new row `Member(workspace_id=W, user_id=B, role=\"owner\")`. State: Account B is now a workspace-W owner.\n4. Attacker switches to Account B and acts as workspace owner \u2014 change settings, add/remove members, delete the workspace, or pivot to the companion advisories\u0027 primitives. State: attacker holds owner of any workspace they had member access to, via a fresh attacker-controlled identity that the original workspace\u0027s audit logs cannot easily attribute to A.\n5. Final state: with one member-level token plus one POST, the attacker plants an owner-role identity on any workspace they can reach. The same primitive lets the attacker invite a competitor or external-vendor account into the workspace as owner, exfiltrating the workspace\u0027s content under that competitor\u0027s name.\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** sec-critical. CVSS 9.1: network attack, low complexity, low privileges (member tier), no user interaction, scope changed (the new owner is a different security principal), high confidentiality and integrity, no availability claim.\n**Attacker capability:** with one workspace-member token plus one POST request, the attacker grants owner-tier access to any user_id on the platform. From there, full workspace control via the Account B token, plus indirect attribution: the original workspace\u0027s audit logs see \"user A added user B as owner\" but the audit trail cannot tell that B is attacker-controlled.\n**Preconditions:** `praisonai-platform` is deployed multi-tenant; the attacker has any membership token in the target workspace; the attacker can register or knows any other user_id on the platform.\n**Differential:** source-inspection-verified. The asymmetry between `MemberService.has_role` (clearly tiered) and `add_member`\u0027s default `min_role=\"member\"` confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, the gate refuses the member-tier token, the elevated POST returns 403, and the second-identity owner is never created.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n@@ -90,11 +90,15 @@\n+def _require_workspace_owner(workspace_id: str, user, session):\n+ return require_workspace_member(workspace_id, user, session, min_role=\"owner\")\n+\n @router.post(\"/{workspace_id}/members\", response_model=MemberResponse, status_code=status.HTTP_201_CREATED)\n async def add_member(\n workspace_id: str,\n body: MemberAdd,\n- user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n+ user: AuthIdentity = Depends(_require_workspace_owner),\n session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n ):\n member_svc = MemberService(session)\n+ if body.role == \"owner\" and not await member_svc.has_role(workspace_id, user.id, \"owner\"):\n+ raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail=\"Only owners can add other owners\")\n member = await member_svc.add(workspace_id, body.user_id, body.role)\n```\n\nThe four other workspace mutation endpoints (`update_workspace`, `delete_workspace`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`) exhibit the same default-min-role gap and are filed as their own advisories.",
"id": "GHSA-8g2p-pqm3-fcfh",
"modified": "2026-06-01T14:23:39Z",
"published": "2026-06-01T14:23:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-8g2p-pqm3-fcfh"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can add arbitrary user as owner via POST /workspaces/{id}/members"
}
GHSA-8G3G-H53Q-CF7J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-26 03:30 – Updated: 2024-09-26 03:30The Download Monitor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the enable_shop() function in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.9. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to enable shop functionality.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-8552"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-26T03:15:03Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Download Monitor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the enable_shop() function in all versions up to, and including, 5.0.9. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to enable shop functionality.",
"id": "GHSA-8g3g-h53q-cf7j",
"modified": "2024-09-26T03:30:40Z",
"published": "2024-09-26T03:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8552"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/download-monitor/tags/5.0.8/src/AjaxHandler.php#L317"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3157424/#file17"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/3acaedff-f616-4b66-9208-f7e6a4df920d?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G44-6RRM-MF2W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-23 12:32 – Updated: 2026-07-23 12:32The MountDev AI MCP Connector for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 1.6.1. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to obtain an administrator-bound OAuth Bearer token via a self-registered client, granting full administrator-equivalent access to the plugin's MCP tool surface and all exposed WordPress content, users, and options. This is exploitable by combining the publicly accessible Dynamic Client Registration endpoint, which allows unauthenticated callers to register arbitrary OAuth clients with an attacker-controlled redirect_uri, with the unprotected authorization endpoint to complete the full OAuth flow without any administrator interaction.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-15015"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-23T10:16:50Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The MountDev AI MCP Connector for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authorization bypass in all versions up to, and including, 1.6.1. This is due to the plugin not properly verifying that a user is authorized to perform an action. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to obtain an administrator-bound OAuth Bearer token via a self-registered client, granting full administrator-equivalent access to the plugin\u0027s MCP tool surface and all exposed WordPress content, users, and options. This is exploitable by combining the publicly accessible Dynamic Client Registration endpoint, which allows unauthenticated callers to register arbitrary OAuth clients with an attacker-controlled redirect_uri, with the unprotected authorization endpoint to complete the full OAuth flow without any administrator interaction.",
"id": "GHSA-8g44-6rrm-mf2w",
"modified": "2026-07-23T12:32:21Z",
"published": "2026-07-23T12:32:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15015"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mountdev-ai-mcp-connector/tags/1.6.0/includes/class-oauth-controller.php#L188"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mountdev-ai-mcp-connector/tags/1.6.0/includes/class-oauth-controller.php#L370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mountdev-ai-mcp-connector/tags/1.6.0/includes/class-oauth-controller.php#L474"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/mountdev-ai-mcp-connector/tags/1.6.0/includes/class-oauth-controller.php#L571"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3601448%40mountdev-ai-mcp-connector\u0026new=3601448%40mountdev-ai-mcp-connector"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ce8ec66f-5efc-4354-8871-8e35ab4e51fc?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G53-M82P-XQF5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-29 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-29 12:31Apache Karaf's shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl..cfg). SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity() resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open: ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH sets passCheck = true. The safety valve for this, karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.
The shipped org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no install entry. It restricts delete to admin, restricts edit/property-/update on the jmx.acl., org.apache.karaf.command.acl.* and org.apache.karaf.service.acl.* PIDs to admin, and allows manager for everything else, but config:install was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the viewer role.
config:install fetches url and writes it into ${karaf.etc} as finalname. It calls PathUtils.checkWithin() to block .. traversal outside karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships: users.properties, keys.properties, host.key, and all org.apache.karaf..acl. files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With -o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.
Because felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc} (etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any .cfg file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.
By contrast, bundle:install, feature:install and kar:install are all admin-only in their own ACLs, and config:delete is admin in this same ACL, config:install was the outlier.
MitigationAdd install = admin in etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg (create the file is absent), and/or set karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin in etc/system.properties (and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-91085"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-29T09:17:10Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "Apache Karaf\u0027s shell/SSH command security is enforced by per-scope ACL configuration files (etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.\u003cscope\u003e.cfg).\u00a0SecuredSessionFactoryImpl.checkSecurity()\u00a0resolves the roles required for an invocation and, when no ACL rule matches the command, fails open:\u00a0ACLConfigurationParser.Specificity.NO_MATCH\u00a0sets\u00a0passCheck = true. The safety valve for this,\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles, ships commented out in\u00a0etc/system.properties, so an unmatched command is allowed for any authenticated user.\n\n\nThe shipped\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config\u00a0ACL (assemblies/features/standard/src/main/feature/feature.xml, mirrored into\u00a0instance/.../etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg) has no\u00a0install\u00a0entry. It restricts\u00a0delete\u00a0to\u00a0admin, restricts\u00a0edit/property-*/update\u00a0on the\u00a0jmx.acl.*,\u00a0org.apache.karaf.command.acl.*\u00a0and\u00a0org.apache.karaf.service.acl.*\u00a0PIDs to\u00a0admin, and allows\u00a0manager\u00a0for everything else, but\u00a0config:install\u00a0was simply unmatched, and therefore allowed for any authenticated user, including one holding only the\u00a0viewer\u00a0role.\n\n\n\n\nconfig:install \u003curl\u003e \u003cfinalname\u003e\u00a0fetches\u00a0url\u00a0and writes it into\u00a0${karaf.etc}\u00a0as\u00a0finalname. It calls\u00a0PathUtils.checkWithin()\u00a0to block\u00a0..\u00a0traversal outside\u00a0karaf.etc, but that folder holds every security-relevant file Karaf ships:\u00a0users.properties,\u00a0keys.properties,\u00a0host.key, and all\u00a0org.apache.karaf.*.acl.*\u00a0files, including the very ACL file that (mis)governs this command. With\u00a0-o/--override, an existing file is overwritten with attacker-controlled bytes fetched from an arbitrary URL.\n\n\n\n\nBecause\u00a0felix.fileinstall.dir = ${karaf.etc}\u00a0(etc/config.properties), Felix FileInstall also watches and reloads any\u00a0.cfg\u00a0file dropped there, closing the loop without requiring a restart.\n\n\n\n\nBy contrast,\u00a0bundle:install,\u00a0feature:install\u00a0and\u00a0kar:install\u00a0are all\u00a0admin-only in their own ACLs, and\u00a0config:delete\u00a0is\u00a0admin\u00a0in this same ACL,\u00a0config:install\u00a0was the outlier.\n\nMitigationAdd\u00a0install = admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/org.apache.karaf.command.acl.config.cfg\u00a0(create the file is absent), and/or set\u00a0karaf.secured.command.compulsory.roles=admin\u00a0in\u00a0etc/system.properties\u00a0(and restart) to make unmatched commands fail closed by default.",
"id": "GHSA-8g53-m82p-xqf5",
"modified": "2026-09-29T12:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-09-29T09:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-91085"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://karaf.apache.org/security/cve-2026-91085.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/28/10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-8G56-R329-Q772
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-09 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33The Cliengo – Chatbot plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the 'update_session' function in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to update the session token of the chatbot.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5993"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-09T09:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Cliengo \u2013 Chatbot plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027update_session\u0027 function in all versions up to, and including, 3.0.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to update the session token of the chatbot.",
"id": "GHSA-8g56-r329-q772",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:32Z",
"published": "2024-07-09T09:30:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5993"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/cliengo/trunk/admin/class-cliengo-form.php#L109"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3118688"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/0a13e87d-51cd-43b0-a658-900a174738fc?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G65-3569-FX34
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-03 00:30 – Updated: 2024-01-09 18:30There is a possible information disclosure due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local information disclosure of health data with no additional execution privileges needed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-4164"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-01-02T22:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "There is a possible information\u00a0disclosure due to a missing permission check. This could lead to local\u00a0information disclosure of health data with no additional execution\u00a0privileges needed.\n",
"id": "GHSA-8g65-3569-fx34",
"modified": "2024-01-09T18:30:26Z",
"published": "2024-01-03T00:30:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-4164"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/pixel-watch/2023/2023-12-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G69-6RGJ-V638
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-08 03:31 – Updated: 2026-04-02 21:31This issue was addressed with improved file handling. This issue is fixed in macOS Sonoma 14.4, macOS Monterey 12.7.4, macOS Ventura 13.6.5. An app may be able to access sensitive user data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-23230"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-08T02:15:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "This issue was addressed with improved file handling. This issue is fixed in macOS Sonoma 14.4, macOS Monterey 12.7.4, macOS Ventura 13.6.5. An app may be able to access sensitive user data.",
"id": "GHSA-8g69-6rgj-v638",
"modified": "2026-04-02T21:31:36Z",
"published": "2024-03-08T03:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-23230"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/120884"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/120886"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/120895"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT214083"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT214084"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT214085"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/kb/HT214083"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/kb/HT214084"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/kb/HT214085"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Mar/21"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Mar/22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Mar/23"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8G6G-5XV6-GW9W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-13 18:30 – Updated: 2026-10-13 18:30B3log Symphony through 3.6.4 contains a missing authorization vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to reach admin routes because PermissionMidware.check permits routes lacking permission.rule.url entries. Attackers can request /admin/report/ignore/{reportId}, /admin/tags/remove-unused, or /admin/user/{userId}/init-point to ignore reports, delete unused tags, or grant points without audit logging.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-110105"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-13T17:17:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "B3log Symphony through 3.6.4 contains a missing authorization vulnerability that allows unauthenticated attackers to reach admin routes because PermissionMidware.check permits routes lacking permission.rule.url entries. Attackers can request /admin/report/ignore/{reportId}, /admin/tags/remove-unused, or /admin/user/{userId}/init-point to ignore reports, delete unused tags, or grant points without audit logging.",
"id": "GHSA-8g6g-5xv6-gw9w",
"modified": "2026-10-13T18:30:54Z",
"published": "2026-10-13T18:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-110105"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/88250/symphony"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/88250/symphony/blob/827a7dd8b74316aa62f370f893a8382a8b45ba0f/src/main/java/org/b3log/symphony/processor/AdminProcessor.java#L316-L386"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/88250/symphony/blob/827a7dd8b74316aa62f370f893a8382a8b45ba0f/src/main/java/org/b3log/symphony/processor/middleware/PermissionMidware.java#L94-L97"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackmd.io/@1ExmmukzRMWN7B4gQ4W-4Q/b3log-symphony-admin-endpoints-missing-authorization"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/b3log-symphony-through-3.6.4-missing-authorization-in-admin-console-routes"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.