Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-862

Allowed-with-Review

Missing Authorization

Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not perform an authorization check when an actor attempts to access a resource or perform an action.

19710 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-5F3G-C8JF-RW88

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-18 12:30 – Updated: 2025-11-18 12:30
VLAI
Details

The Live sales notification for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 2.3.39. This is due to the "getOrders" function lacking proper authorization and capability checks when the plugin is configured to display recent order information. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to extract sensitive customer information including buyer first names, city, state, country, purchase time and date, and product details.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-12955"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-18T10:15:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Live sales notification for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Missing Authorization in all versions up to, and including, 2.3.39. This is due to the \"getOrders\" function lacking proper authorization and capability checks when the plugin is configured to display recent order information. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to extract sensitive customer information including buyer first names, city, state, country, purchase time and date, and product details.",
  "id": "GHSA-5f3g-c8jf-rw88",
  "modified": "2025-11-18T12:30:18Z",
  "published": "2025-11-18T12:30:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12955"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026new=3394241%40live-sales-notifications-for-woocommerce\u0026old=3389540%40live-sales-notifications-for-woocommerce\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1cebcf16-ae7f-45c4-8e1d-80ede4c32106?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5F3G-P55X-J456

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-12 18:30 – Updated: 2026-03-27 18:31
VLAI
Details

A Missing Authorization vulnerability in Trane Tracer SC, Tracer SC+, and Tracer Concierge could allow an unauthenticated attacker to access sensitive information through unprotected APIs.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
6.9 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-28254"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-12T18:16:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A Missing Authorization vulnerability in Trane Tracer SC, Tracer SC+, and Tracer Concierge could allow an unauthenticated attacker to access sensitive information through unprotected APIs.",
  "id": "GHSA-5f3g-p55x-j456",
  "modified": "2026-03-27T18:31:22Z",
  "published": "2026-03-12T18:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28254"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-26-071-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5F49-479F-FFRV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-22 18:30 – Updated: 2026-01-29 03:31
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in merkulove Audier For Elementor audier-elementor allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Audier For Elementor: from n/a through <= 1.0.9.

Severity
5.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-66139"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-22T17:16:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in merkulove Audier For Elementor audier-elementor allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Audier For Elementor: from n/a through \u003c= 1.0.9.",
  "id": "GHSA-5f49-479f-ffrv",
  "modified": "2026-01-29T03:31:26Z",
  "published": "2026-01-22T18:30:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66139"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/Wordpress/Plugin/audier-elementor/vulnerability/wordpress-audier-for-elementor-plugin-1-0-9-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5F62-53R8-QRQF

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 22:39 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:47
VLAI
Summary
free5GC's NEF 3gpp-pfd-management API is unauthenticated; forged bearer tokens can create, read, and delete PFD transactions
Details

Summary

free5GC's NEF mounts the 3gpp-pfd-management API without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can create, read, and delete PFD-management transaction state with a forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token). The route group is also reachable even when the running config's ServiceList does not declare it, so operators who think they disabled the service via config are still exposed.

Details

Validated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab. - Source repo tag: v4.2.1 - Running Docker image: free5gc/nef:v4.2.0 - Runtime NEF commit: 5ce35eab - Docker validation date: 2026-03-11

NEF advertises OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true, and its ServiceList only declares nnef-pfdmanagement and nnef-oam. Despite that, the 3gpp-pfd-management route group is mounted and reachable with no inbound auth middleware.

Code evidence (paths in free5gc/nef): - Route group mounted without auth middleware: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/server.go:52 - Transaction routes exposed at /:scsAsID/transactions and /:scsAsID/transactions/:transID: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/api_pfd.go:13 - Create handler still contains // TODO: Authorize the AF: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:70 - POST allocates a new PFD transaction and writes to UDR: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:63 - GET reads transaction state: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:189 - DELETE removes transaction state: NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:328 - NEF context only exposes outbound token acquisition (GetTokenCtx); there is no inbound authorization path: NFs/nef/internal/context/nef_context.go:153 - Config validation only allows nnef-pfdmanagement and nnef-oam: NFs/nef/pkg/factory/config.go:126

PoC

Reproduced end-to-end against the running NEF at http://10.100.200.19:8000 using a fabricated bearer token.

  1. Seed an AF context (also accepted with forged token):
curl -i \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data '{"afServiceId":"svc-seed2","afAppId":"app-seed2","dnn":"internet","snssai":{"sst":1,"sd":"010203"},"anyUeInd":true,"trafficFilters":[{"flowId":1,"flowDescriptions":["permit out ip from 192.0.2.31 to 198.51.100.0/24"]}],"trafficRoutes":[{"dnai":"mec-seed2","routeInfo":{"ipv4Addr":"10.60.0.1","portNumber":0}}]}' \
  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-pfd2/subscriptions
  1. CREATE PFD transaction with forged token -> 201 Created:
curl -i \
  -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  --data '{"pfdDatas":{"app-poc-pfd2":{"externalAppId":"app-poc-pfd2","pfds":{"pfd-poc":{"pfdId":"pfd-poc","urls":["^http://poc.example.com(/\\\\S*)?$"]}}}}}' \
  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions
  1. READ -> 200 OK:
curl -i -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1
  1. DELETE -> 204 No Content:
curl -i -X DELETE -H 'Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token' \
  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1
  1. READ again -> 404 PFD transaction not found, confirming state was actually deleted.

NEF container logs (docker logs nef) show the requests reaching business handlers and returning success codes:

[INFO][NEF][PFDMng] PostPFDManagementTransactions - scsAsID[af-poc-pfd2]
[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 201 | POST   | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions
[INFO][NEF][PFDMng] GetIndividualPFDManagementTransaction - scsAsID[af-poc-pfd2], transID[1]
[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 200 | GET    | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1
[INFO][NEF][PFDMng] DeleteIndividualPFDManagementTransaction - scsAsID[af-poc-pfd2], transID[1]
[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 204 | DELETE | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1

Impact

Missing inbound authentication (CWE-306) and authorization (CWE-862) on a critical SBI surface in NEF. Any party that can reach NEF on the SBI network can: - Create attacker-controlled PFD transactions (which are written to UDR), poisoning policy state used downstream by SMF/UPF for traffic classification. - Read existing PFD transactions, leaking AF-supplied policy data. - Delete PFD transactions, denying service to legitimately provisioned application detection rules.

The PFD-management route group is also reachable even when the runtime ServiceList does not declare it, so operators relying on ServiceList to disable the service do not actually get that protection.

Affected: free5gc <=v4.2.1.

Upstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/858 Upstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/23

Severity
9.4 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/free5gc/nef"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.2.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44315"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-08T22:39:16Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T17:16:36Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nfree5GC\u0027s NEF mounts the `3gpp-pfd-management` API without inbound OAuth2/bearer-token authorization. A network attacker who can reach NEF on the SBI can create, read, and delete PFD-management transaction state with a forged or arbitrary bearer token (e.g. `Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token`). The route group is also reachable even when the running config\u0027s `ServiceList` does not declare it, so operators who think they disabled the service via config are still exposed.\n\n### Details\nValidated against the NEF container in the official Docker compose lab.\n- Source repo tag: `v4.2.1`\n- Running Docker image: `free5gc/nef:v4.2.0`\n- Runtime NEF commit: `5ce35eab`\n- Docker validation date: 2026-03-11\n\nNEF advertises `OAuth2 setting receive from NRF: true`, and its `ServiceList` only declares `nnef-pfdmanagement` and `nnef-oam`. Despite that, the `3gpp-pfd-management` route group is mounted and reachable with no inbound auth middleware.\n\nCode evidence (paths in `free5gc/nef`):\n- Route group mounted without auth middleware: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/server.go:52`\n- Transaction routes exposed at `/:scsAsID/transactions` and `/:scsAsID/transactions/:transID`: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/api_pfd.go:13`\n- Create handler still contains `// TODO: Authorize the AF`: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:70`\n- POST allocates a new PFD transaction and writes to UDR: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:63`\n- GET reads transaction state: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:189`\n- DELETE removes transaction state: `NFs/nef/internal/sbi/processor/pfd.go:328`\n- NEF context only exposes outbound token acquisition (`GetTokenCtx`); there is no inbound authorization path: `NFs/nef/internal/context/nef_context.go:153`\n- Config validation only allows `nnef-pfdmanagement` and `nnef-oam`: `NFs/nef/pkg/factory/config.go:126`\n\n### PoC\nReproduced end-to-end against the running NEF at `http://10.100.200.19:8000` using a fabricated bearer token.\n\n1. Seed an AF context (also accepted with forged token):\n```\ncurl -i \\\n  -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data \u0027{\"afServiceId\":\"svc-seed2\",\"afAppId\":\"app-seed2\",\"dnn\":\"internet\",\"snssai\":{\"sst\":1,\"sd\":\"010203\"},\"anyUeInd\":true,\"trafficFilters\":[{\"flowId\":1,\"flowDescriptions\":[\"permit out ip from 192.0.2.31 to 198.51.100.0/24\"]}],\"trafficRoutes\":[{\"dnai\":\"mec-seed2\",\"routeInfo\":{\"ipv4Addr\":\"10.60.0.1\",\"portNumber\":0}}]}\u0027 \\\n  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-traffic-influence/v1/af-poc-pfd2/subscriptions\n```\n\n2. CREATE PFD transaction with forged token -\u003e `201 Created`:\n```\ncurl -i \\\n  -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token\u0027 \\\n  -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n  --data \u0027{\"pfdDatas\":{\"app-poc-pfd2\":{\"externalAppId\":\"app-poc-pfd2\",\"pfds\":{\"pfd-poc\":{\"pfdId\":\"pfd-poc\",\"urls\":[\"^http://poc.example.com(/\\\\\\\\S*)?$\"]}}}}}\u0027 \\\n  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions\n```\n\n3. READ -\u003e `200 OK`:\n```\ncurl -i -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token\u0027 \\\n  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1\n```\n\n4. DELETE -\u003e `204 No Content`:\n```\ncurl -i -X DELETE -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer not-a-real-token\u0027 \\\n  http://10.100.200.19:8000/3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1\n```\n\n5. READ again -\u003e `404 PFD transaction not found`, confirming state was actually deleted.\n\nNEF container logs (`docker logs nef`) show the requests reaching business handlers and returning success codes:\n```\n[INFO][NEF][PFDMng] PostPFDManagementTransactions - scsAsID[af-poc-pfd2]\n[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 201 | POST   | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions\n[INFO][NEF][PFDMng] GetIndividualPFDManagementTransaction - scsAsID[af-poc-pfd2], transID[1]\n[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 200 | GET    | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1\n[INFO][NEF][PFDMng] DeleteIndividualPFDManagementTransaction - scsAsID[af-poc-pfd2], transID[1]\n[INFO][NEF][GIN] | 204 | DELETE | /3gpp-pfd-management/v1/af-poc-pfd2/transactions/1\n```\n\n### Impact\nMissing inbound authentication (CWE-306) and authorization (CWE-862) on a critical SBI surface in NEF. Any party that can reach NEF on the SBI network can:\n- Create attacker-controlled PFD transactions (which are written to UDR), poisoning policy state used downstream by SMF/UPF for traffic classification.\n- Read existing PFD transactions, leaking AF-supplied policy data.\n- Delete PFD transactions, denying service to legitimately provisioned application detection rules.\n\nThe PFD-management route group is also reachable even when the runtime `ServiceList` does not declare it, so operators relying on `ServiceList` to disable the service do not actually get that protection.\n\nAffected: free5gc \u003c=v4.2.1.\n\nUpstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/858\nUpstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/23",
  "id": "GHSA-5f62-53r8-qrqf",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T23:47:59Z",
  "published": "2026-05-08T22:39:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-5f62-53r8-qrqf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44315"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/858"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/free5gc/nef/pull/23"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "free5GC\u0027s NEF 3gpp-pfd-management API is unauthenticated; forged bearer tokens can create, read, and delete PFD transactions"
}

GHSA-5F7G-QP7C-JR44

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-02 09:31 – Updated: 2026-10-02 09:31
VLAI
Details

The WP User Frontend WordPress plugin before 4.3.12 does not enforce its subscription-purchase requirement in one of its post-creation handlers, allowing authenticated users with subscriber-level access and above to create and, depending on the form's configuration, immediately publish posts through forms restricted to paying subscribers.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-79618"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-02T07:16:37Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The WP User Frontend WordPress plugin before 4.3.12 does not enforce its subscription-purchase requirement in one of its post-creation handlers, allowing authenticated users with subscriber-level access and above to create and, depending on the form\u0027s configuration, immediately publish posts through forms restricted to paying subscribers.",
  "id": "GHSA-5f7g-qp7c-jr44",
  "modified": "2026-10-02T09:31:17Z",
  "published": "2026-10-02T09:31:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-79618"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/a11bf097-3829-4baa-878c-80b113c5a744"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5F86-C5FX-8MW6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-09 12:30 – Updated: 2026-07-09 12:30
VLAI
Details

The Colissimo Officiel : Méthodes de livraison pour WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the updateShippingMethod() function (registered to the wp_ajax_lpc_order_affect AJAX action) in versions up to, and including, 2.9.0. This is due to the handler performing no current_user_can() capability check and no nonce verification before reading an attacker-supplied order_id and modifying that order's shipping method, pickup-point meta, and shipping address. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to create or modify the shipment information (shipping method, pickup relay data, and shipping address) of arbitrary WooCommerce orders, including orders placed by other users.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-9240"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-09T11:16:42Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Colissimo Officiel : M\u00e9thodes de livraison pour WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized modification of data due to a missing capability check on the updateShippingMethod() function (registered to the wp_ajax_lpc_order_affect AJAX action) in versions up to, and including, 2.9.0. This is due to the handler performing no current_user_can() capability check and no nonce verification before reading an attacker-supplied order_id and modifying that order\u0027s shipping method, pickup-point meta, and shipping address. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to create or modify the shipment information (shipping method, pickup relay data, and shipping address) of arbitrary WooCommerce orders, including orders placed by other users.",
  "id": "GHSA-5f86-c5fx-8mw6",
  "modified": "2026-07-09T12:30:28Z",
  "published": "2026-07-09T12:30:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9240"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/colissimo-shipping-methods-for-woocommerce/tags/2.9.0/admin/orders/lpc_admin_order_affect.php#L52"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/colissimo-shipping-methods-for-woocommerce/tags/2.9.0/admin/orders/lpc_admin_order_affect.php#L84"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/colissimo-shipping-methods-for-woocommerce/tags/2.9.0/admin/orders/lpc_admin_order_affect.php#L85"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?reponame=\u0026old=3553367%40colissimo-shipping-methods-for-woocommerce\u0026new=3553367%40colissimo-shipping-methods-for-woocommerce"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/16041d22-51ff-4fa4-99fb-20a60b557634?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5FC9-Q89F-P74H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-27 15:30 – Updated: 2026-04-01 18:33
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in CodeSolz Better Find and Replace allows Privilege Escalation. This issue affects Better Find and Replace: from n/a through 1.6.7.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-24734"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-01-27T15:15:16Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in CodeSolz Better Find and Replace allows Privilege Escalation. This issue affects Better Find and Replace: from n/a through 1.6.7.",
  "id": "GHSA-5fc9-q89f-p74h",
  "modified": "2026-04-01T18:33:29Z",
  "published": "2025-01-27T15:30:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24734"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/plugin/real-time-auto-find-and-replace/vulnerability/wordpress-better-find-and-replace-plugin-1-6-7-privilege-escalation-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5FGM-JMV9-4H4R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-09 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-09 15:31
VLAI
Details

Missing Authorization vulnerability in ThemeHunk Th Shop Mania th-shop-mania allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Th Shop Mania: from n/a through 1.9.1.

Severity
7.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-105883"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-09T13:17:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Missing Authorization vulnerability in ThemeHunk Th Shop Mania th-shop-mania allows Exploiting Incorrectly Configured Access Control Security Levels.This issue affects Th Shop Mania: from n/a through 1.9.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-5fgm-jmv9-4h4r",
  "modified": "2026-10-09T15:31:29Z",
  "published": "2026-10-09T15:31:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-105883"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://patchstack.com/database/wordpress/theme/th-shop-mania/vulnerability/wordpress-th-shop-mania-theme-1-9-1-broken-access-control-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5FHG-5P5J-FPC6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-22 21:30 – Updated: 2025-09-22 21:30
VLAI
Details

The Secure Passkeys plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to a missing capability check on the delete_passkey() and passkeys_list() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to view and delete passkeys.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-10305"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-09-20T05:15:35Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Secure Passkeys plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access due to a missing capability check on the delete_passkey() and passkeys_list() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.2.1. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to view and delete passkeys.",
  "id": "GHSA-5fhg-5p5j-fpc6",
  "modified": "2025-09-22T21:30:18Z",
  "published": "2025-09-22T21:30:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10305"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3363280%40secure-passkeys\u0026new=3363280%40secure-passkeys\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=#file2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/c41651ce-ee9b-408f-a25f-113d71beb935?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-5FHR-F75J-8WR9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 23:04 – Updated: 2026-09-03 23:04
VLAI
Summary
SiYuan: Missing publish-access filter on getAttributeViewKeysByID discloses database column schema, plus two unscoped block-ID enumeration oracles (publish mode)
Details

CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72800.

Summary

POST /api/av/getAttributeViewKeysByID returns a database's full column schema with no publish-access filtering, while its sibling getAttributeViewKeys applies the filter for reader sessions. Two further endpoints, getBlockDefIDsByRefText and getBlockRelevantIDs return workspace-wide block IDs with no publish scoping. All three are CheckAuth-only, so they are reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false.

Details

(a) getAttributeViewKeysByID: ungated column-schema disclosure

The entire handler (kernel/api/av.go, router line 548):

ret.Data = model.GetAttributeViewKeysByID(avID, keyIDs...)   // no publish gate

With an empty keyIDs, GetAttributeViewKeysByID calls av.ParseAttributeView(avID) and returns every column's *av.Key:

Field Discloses
Name, Desc column title and user-authored description
Options the full single/multi-select vocabulary and colours (e.g. status labels such as "Fired", "Confidential")
Template the column's Sprig template expression — logic and field references
Relation the target avID, allowing pivot to another database
Rollup, NumberFormat, date config further schema

Guarded-sibling asymmetry, same file: getAttributeViewKeys (router line 526) runs FilterBlockAttributeViewKeysByPublishAccess(...) when IsReadOnlyRoleContext. getAttributeViewKeysByID applies nothing. A reader who knows an avID — trivially harvested from the data-av-id attribute of any published document embedding a database obtains the schema of any database in the workspace, including those whose host documents are hidden, password-protected, or publish-forbidden. Relation targets allow walking to sibling databases.

(b) Two unscoped block-ID enumeration oracles

Both CheckAuth-only with no publish gate. Neither returns content of its own, but both yield valid block IDs that other endpoints turn into content:

  • getBlockDefIDsByRefText (router line 237) → GetBlockDefIDsByRefText(anchor) returns the block IDs, workspace-wide and including private documents, whose reference/anchor text equals a caller-supplied string: a ref-text → ID oracle.
  • getBlockRelevantIDs (router line 274) → GetBlockRelevantIDsInBox(id, <notebook from request>) returns parent/previous/next block IDs and traverses decrypted encrypted-notebook structure while the notebook is unlocked, a tree-walk oracle.

Verified at origin/master (eef105683): all three handler bodies contain no publish-access, publish-ignore, or readonly-role check; all three routes are registered CheckAuth without CheckAdminRole.

Proof of Concept

Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false, otherwise any publish reader account. A database exists whose host document is publish-forbidden or password-protected.

(a) Column schema of any database:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/av/getAttributeViewKeysByID
{"avID":"<AV_ID>"}

Returns every column's key object names, descriptions, select vocabularies, template expressions, and Relation target avIDs for a database whose host document the reader may not access.

Control: the sibling getAttributeViewKeys with the same avID returns filtered results for the same reader session, confirming the boundary is enforced there and omitted here.

(b) ID oracles:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockDefIDsByRefText
{"anchor":"<known ref text>"}
→ block IDs workspace-wide, including blocks in private documents

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockRelevantIDs
{"id":"<BLOCK_ID>","notebook":"<BOX_ID>"}
→ parent/previous/next block IDs; traverses encrypted-notebook structure when unlocked

Impact

An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader can read the complete column schema of any database in the workspace, including column descriptions, select-option vocabularies (which frequently encode sensitive category labels), template logic, and relation targets that permit pivoting to further databases regardless of whether the host document is hidden, password-protected, or excluded from publishing.

The two enumeration endpoints additionally supply valid block IDs across the publish boundary, including from encrypted notebooks while unlocked. This removes the "attacker must already know a valid ID" precondition from other block-read endpoints, converting ID knowledge into content disclosure. Confidentiality-only.

Note

getAttributeViewKeysByID is a distinct handler from getAttributeView; although column definitions also appear within the latter's response payload, a fix applied to one handler does not remediate the other, and getAttributeViewKeysByID has its own filtered sibling (getAttributeViewKeys) demonstrating the intended treatment.

Suggested fix

  • Gate getAttributeViewKeysByID with FilterBlockAttributeViewKeysByPublishAccess, mirroring getAttributeViewKeys.
  • Scope getBlockDefIDsByRefText and getBlockRelevantIDs to publish-accessible blocks for reader sessions, and ensure the *InBox traversal path applies the same check before walking encrypted-notebook structure.
Severity
5.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260724103335-f36331956ae9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72800"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-03T23:04:13Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72800](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72800).\n\n### Summary\n\n`POST /api/av/getAttributeViewKeysByID` returns a database\u0027s full column schema with no publish-access filtering, while its sibling `getAttributeViewKeys` applies the filter for reader sessions. Two further endpoints, `getBlockDefIDsByRefText` and `getBlockRelevantIDs` return workspace-wide block IDs with no publish scoping. All three are `CheckAuth`-only, so they are reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`.\n\n### Details\n\n**(a) `getAttributeViewKeysByID`: ungated column-schema disclosure**\n\nThe entire handler (`kernel/api/av.go`, router line 548):\n```go\nret.Data = model.GetAttributeViewKeysByID(avID, keyIDs...)   // no publish gate\n```\n\nWith an empty `keyIDs`, `GetAttributeViewKeysByID` calls `av.ParseAttributeView(avID)` and returns every column\u0027s `*av.Key`:\n\n| Field | Discloses |\n|---|---|\n| `Name`, `Desc` | column title and user-authored description |\n| `Options` | the full single/multi-select vocabulary and colours (e.g. status labels such as \"Fired\", \"Confidential\") |\n| `Template` | the column\u0027s Sprig template expression \u2014 logic and field references |\n| `Relation` | the target `avID`, allowing pivot to another database |\n| `Rollup`, `NumberFormat`, date config | further schema |\n\n**Guarded-sibling asymmetry, same file:** `getAttributeViewKeys` (router line 526) runs `FilterBlockAttributeViewKeysByPublishAccess(...)` when `IsReadOnlyRoleContext`. `getAttributeViewKeysByID` applies nothing. A reader who knows an `avID` \u2014 trivially harvested from the `data-av-id` attribute of any published document embedding a database obtains the schema of any database in the workspace, including those whose host documents are hidden, password-protected, or publish-forbidden. `Relation` targets allow walking to sibling databases.\n\n**(b) Two unscoped block-ID enumeration oracles**\n\nBoth `CheckAuth`-only with no publish gate. Neither returns content of its own, but both yield valid block IDs that other endpoints turn into content:\n\n- `getBlockDefIDsByRefText` (router line 237) \u2192 `GetBlockDefIDsByRefText(anchor)` returns the block IDs, workspace-wide and including private documents, whose reference/anchor text equals a caller-supplied string: a ref-text \u2192 ID oracle.\n- `getBlockRelevantIDs` (router line 274) \u2192 `GetBlockRelevantIDsInBox(id, \u003cnotebook from request\u003e)` returns parent/previous/next block IDs and traverses decrypted encrypted-notebook structure while the notebook is unlocked, a tree-walk oracle.\n\nVerified at `origin/master` (`eef105683`): all three handler bodies contain no publish-access, publish-ignore, or readonly-role check; all three routes are registered `CheckAuth` without `CheckAdminRole`.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nPrecondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`, otherwise any publish reader account. A database exists whose host document is publish-forbidden or password-protected.\n\n**(a) Column schema of any database:**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/av/getAttributeViewKeysByID\n{\"avID\":\"\u003cAV_ID\u003e\"}\n```\nReturns every column\u0027s key object names, descriptions, select vocabularies, template expressions, and `Relation` target `avID`s for a database whose host document the reader may not access.\n\n**Control:** the sibling `getAttributeViewKeys` with the same `avID` returns filtered results for the same reader session, confirming the boundary is enforced there and omitted here.\n\n**(b) ID oracles:**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockDefIDsByRefText\n{\"anchor\":\"\u003cknown ref text\u003e\"}\n\u2192 block IDs workspace-wide, including blocks in private documents\n\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockRelevantIDs\n{\"id\":\"\u003cBLOCK_ID\u003e\",\"notebook\":\"\u003cBOX_ID\u003e\"}\n\u2192 parent/previous/next block IDs; traverses encrypted-notebook structure when unlocked\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` can read the complete column schema of any database in the workspace, including column descriptions, select-option vocabularies (which frequently encode sensitive category labels), template logic, and relation targets that permit pivoting to further databases regardless of whether the host document is hidden, password-protected, or excluded from publishing.\n\nThe two enumeration endpoints additionally supply valid block IDs across the publish boundary, including from encrypted notebooks while unlocked. This removes the \"attacker must already know a valid ID\" precondition from other block-read endpoints, converting ID knowledge into content disclosure. Confidentiality-only.\n\n### Note\n\ngetAttributeViewKeysByID is a distinct handler from getAttributeView; although column definitions also appear within the latter\u0027s response payload, a fix applied to one handler does not remediate the other, and getAttributeViewKeysByID has its own filtered sibling (getAttributeViewKeys) demonstrating the intended treatment.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\n- Gate `getAttributeViewKeysByID` with `FilterBlockAttributeViewKeysByPublishAccess`, mirroring `getAttributeViewKeys`.\n- Scope `getBlockDefIDsByRefText` and `getBlockRelevantIDs` to publish-accessible blocks for reader sessions, and ensure the `*InBox` traversal path applies the same check before walking encrypted-notebook structure.",
  "id": "GHSA-5fhr-f75j-8wr9",
  "modified": "2026-09-03T23:04:13Z",
  "published": "2026-09-03T23:04:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-5fhr-f75j-8wr9"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72800"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/931ba693375ea9877b2ef74f9bfb632fad5bab3f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/f36331956ae98fc5358f8f93bf1da3427221edf3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-information-disclosure-via-unfiltered-api"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan: Missing publish-access filter on getAttributeViewKeysByID discloses database column schema, plus two unscoped block-ID enumeration oracles (publish mode)"
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the product into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Reduce the attack surface by carefully mapping roles with data and functionality. Use role-based access control (RBAC) [REF-229] to enforce the roles at the appropriate boundaries.
  • Note that this approach may not protect against horizontal authorization, i.e., it will not protect a user from attacking others with the same role.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that access control checks are performed related to the business logic. These checks may be different than the access control checks that are applied to more generic resources such as files, connections, processes, memory, and database records. For example, a database may restrict access for medical records to a specific database user, but each record might only be intended to be accessible to the patient and the patient's doctor [REF-7].

Mitigation MIT-4.4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using authorization frameworks such as the JAAS Authorization Framework [REF-233] and the OWASP ESAPI Access Control feature [REF-45].
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • For web applications, make sure that the access control mechanism is enforced correctly at the server side on every page. Users should not be able to access any unauthorized functionality or information by simply requesting direct access to that page.
  • One way to do this is to ensure that all pages containing sensitive information are not cached, and that all such pages restrict access to requests that are accompanied by an active and authenticated session token associated with a user who has the required permissions to access that page.
Mitigation
System Configuration Installation

Use the access control capabilities of your operating system and server environment and define your access control lists accordingly. Use a "default deny" policy when defining these ACLs.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.

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