CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
10180 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-RJ7M-2P3G-FJXG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-06 06:30 – Updated: 2025-03-25 21:48All versions of the package create-choo-app3 are vulnerable to Command Injection via the devInstall function due to improper user-input sanitization.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "create-choo-app3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.12.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-25855"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-02-07T20:06:02Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-06T05:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "All versions of the package create-choo-app3 are vulnerable to Command Injection via the devInstall function due to improper user-input sanitization.",
"id": "GHSA-rj7m-2p3g-fjxg",
"modified": "2025-03-25T21:48:03Z",
"published": "2023-02-06T06:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25855"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/choojs/create-choo-app"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-CREATECHOOAPP3-3157951"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "create-choo-app3 is vulnerable to Command Injection via the devInstall function"
}
GHSA-RJ7P-RQV5-RQMR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-03 03:30 – Updated: 2024-05-03 03:30D-Link DIR-2150 SetNTPServerSettings Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of D-Link DIR-2150 routers. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed.
The specific flaw exists within the SOAP API interface, which listens on TCP port 80 by default. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-20553.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-34275"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-03T02:15:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "D-Link DIR-2150 SetNTPServerSettings Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows network-adjacent attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of D-Link DIR-2150 routers. Although authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability, the existing authentication mechanism can be bypassed.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the SOAP API interface, which listens on TCP port 80 by default. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-20553.",
"id": "GHSA-rj7p-rqv5-rqmr",
"modified": "2024-05-03T03:30:51Z",
"published": "2024-05-03T03:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34275"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-23-631"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RJ9Q-9JX8-7G8F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:39 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:39Aterm WF1200CR and Aterm WG1200CR (Aterm WF1200CR firmware Ver1.1.1 and earlier, Aterm WG1200CR firmware Ver1.0.1 and earlier) allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via unspecified vectors.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-16194"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-01-09T23:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Aterm WF1200CR and Aterm WG1200CR (Aterm WF1200CR firmware Ver1.1.1 and earlier, Aterm WG1200CR firmware Ver1.0.1 and earlier) allows authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via unspecified vectors.",
"id": "GHSA-rj9q-9jx8-7g8f",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:39:53Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:39:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16194"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jpn.nec.com/security-info/secinfo/nv18-021.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://jvn.jp/en/jp/JVN87535892/index.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RJ9Q-C22C-QHXV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 09:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 09:30A low-privileged remote attacker can exploit a command injection vulnerability in the /index.php/ajax/parameterManage endpoint using user credentials allowing execution of commands with root privileges on the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27551"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T08:16:37Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A low-privileged remote attacker can exploit a command injection vulnerability in the /index.php/ajax/parameterManage endpoint using user credentials allowing execution of commands with root privileges on the device.",
"id": "GHSA-rj9q-c22c-qhxv",
"modified": "2026-09-16T09:30:25Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T09:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27551"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2026-014"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2026-027"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2026-028"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RJCX-952P-93GJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-23 06:31 – Updated: 2026-01-23 06:31ALGO 8180 IP Audio Alerter Web UI Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of ALGO 8180 IP Audio Alerter devices. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.
The specific flaw exists within the web-based user interface. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the device. Was ZDI-CAN-28290.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-0781"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-23T04:16:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ALGO 8180 IP Audio Alerter Web UI Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of ALGO 8180 IP Audio Alerter devices. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the web-based user interface. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the device. Was ZDI-CAN-28290.",
"id": "GHSA-rjcx-952p-93gj",
"modified": "2026-01-23T06:31:24Z",
"published": "2026-01-23T06:31:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-0781"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-26-003"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RJG2-QGV4-VQ3F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-11 21:31 – Updated: 2025-12-12 18:30OS Command Injection vulnerability in Ruijie M18 EW_3.0(1)B11P226_M18_10223116 allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted POST request to the module_set in file /usr/local/lua/dev_config/config_retain.lua.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-56114"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-11T19:15:57Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OS Command Injection vulnerability in Ruijie M18 EW_3.0(1)B11P226_M18_10223116 allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted POST request to the module_set in file /usr/local/lua/dev_config/config_retain.lua.",
"id": "GHSA-rjg2-qgv4-vq3f",
"modified": "2025-12-12T18:30:34Z",
"published": "2025-12-11T21:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-56114"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://1drv.ms/f/c/12406a392c92914b/EmXarTTNPwFHjk8lLwQIqj8Ba9nlq-owLMBtEKpBwMrn5A?e=vvi2dM"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://1drv.ms/t/c/12406a392c92914b/EWfEhLkTSblOur72XhaQ7W4BsxQ1IWXZ-Wkcv9WC7AYb-g?e=LpMdqT"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flegoity/Ruijie-Multiple-Devices-Vulnerability-Reports-for-CVE/blob/main/CVE-2025-56114.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RJH2-4XGW-P2HJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-27 21:04 – Updated: 2026-10-27 21:04Summary
Atlantis passes the Terraform workspace value from a pull request's atlantis.yaml into a shell command without quoting or escaping it.
A contributor whose pull request is eligible for an Atlantis plan can include shell metacharacters in the workspace name and execute arbitrary commands as the Atlantis service account. This does not require custom workflows, allow_custom_workflows, or permission to run terraform apply.
The executed command inherits the Atlantis process environment, which commonly contains cloud-provider, Terraform, and VCS credentials.
Details
Verified against current upstream/main commit 92ce5c51d1a050357e44df3535483425e59fa984 on August 13, 2026.
The vulnerable data flow is:
- The PR-controlled project workspace is validated in
server/core/config/raw/project.go.
Validation rejects only .., /, and \. Shell metacharacters such as ;, #, $, redirections, and whitespace remain permitted.
- The workspace is passed directly as a Terraform command argument in
server/core/runtime/workspace_step_runner_delegate.go:
go
[]string{workspaceCmd, "select", ctx.Workspace}
- Terraform arguments are concatenated into a single string using
strings.Join(args, " ")inserver/core/terraform/tfclient/terraform_client.go:
go
tfCmd := fmt.Sprintf("%s %s", binPath, strings.Join(args, " "))
- The resulting string is executed through
sh -cinserver/core/terraform/tfclient/terraform_client.go:
go
cmd := exec.Command("sh", "-c", tfCmd)
Consequently, a workspace such as:
poc;id;false;#
produces commands equivalent to:
terraform workspace select poc;id;false;#
terraform workspace new poc;id;false;#
raw.Project.Validate() was confirmed to return no error for this workspace value.
Atlantis documents that planning untrusted Terraform can already be dangerous because providers and external data sources execute code. The distinct issue here is that an ordinary project configuration field becomes shell source, bypassing the explicit allow_custom_workflows control and requiring no malicious provider, external data source, custom workflow, or apply operation.
The primary remediation should be to execute Terraform using an argument vector rather than constructing shell source—for example, exec.Command(binaryPath, args...). Any required environment-variable expansion should be performed without invoking a shell. Strict workspace-name validation would also provide defense in depth.
PoC
Only reproduce this against a disposable Atlantis instance and test repository.
Preconditions
- Atlantis processes
atlantis.yamlfrom the pull request branch. - The pull request is eligible to run
atlantis plan. - For a fork pull request, the server must have
--allow-fork-prsenabled. A same-repository branch does not require this flag. - No custom workflows or apply permissions are required.
Repository contents
Create main.tf:
terraform {
required_version = ">= 1.0"
}
Create atlantis.yaml:
version: 3
projects:
- name: workspace-rce-poc
dir: .
workspace: "poc;id;false;#"
autoplan:
enabled: false
Open a pull request containing these files and comment:
atlantis plan -p workspace-rce-poc
Expected result
Atlantis first runs terraform workspace select. The injected false causes that command invocation to return an error, so Atlantis retries using terraform workspace new.
On both attempts, the shell executes id as a separate command. The second failure includes the combined command output in the Atlantis error response, exposing output similar to:
uid=1000(atlantis) gid=1000(atlantis) groups=1000(atlantis)
This demonstrates arbitrary shell-command execution without creating a custom workflow or reaching the apply phase.
The payload uses only id and false and does not access credentials, make network requests, or modify the host beyond Terraform potentially creating the disposable poc workspace.
Impact
This is an OS command injection vulnerability resulting in remote code execution as the Atlantis service account.
Affected deployments are those that:
- Process pull-request-controlled
atlantis.yamlproject configuration; and - Permit the attacker-controlled pull request to trigger an Atlantis plan.
Potential consequences include:
- Reading and exfiltrating cloud-provider, Terraform, and VCS credentials inherited from the Atlantis process.
- Accessing Terraform state, plan files, repository checkouts, caches, and other data available to the Atlantis user.
- Modifying files or binaries accessible to the service account.
- Making network requests using the Atlantis server's network identity.
- Pivoting into infrastructure accessible through the server's credentials or network placement.
For public repositories, arbitrary external contributors are directly exposed when --allow-fork-prs is enabled. Without fork PR support, the vulnerable population includes users able to create eligible same-repository pull requests and attackers controlling such accounts.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.47.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/runatlantis/atlantis"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.47.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-116676"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-27T21:04:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-27T18:17:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAtlantis passes the Terraform `workspace` value from a pull request\u0027s `atlantis.yaml` into a shell command without quoting or escaping it.\n\nA contributor whose pull request is eligible for an Atlantis plan can include shell metacharacters in the workspace name and execute arbitrary commands as the Atlantis service account. This does not require custom workflows, `allow_custom_workflows`, or permission to run `terraform apply`.\n\nThe executed command inherits the Atlantis process environment, which commonly contains cloud-provider, Terraform, and VCS credentials.\n\n### Details\n\nVerified against current `upstream/main` commit `92ce5c51d1a050357e44df3535483425e59fa984` on August 13, 2026.\n\nThe vulnerable data flow is:\n\n1. The PR-controlled project workspace is validated in [`server/core/config/raw/project.go`](https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/blob/92ce5c51d1a050357e44df3535483425e59fa984/server/core/config/raw/project.go#L139-L149).\n\n Validation rejects only `..`, `/`, and `\\`. Shell metacharacters such as `;`, `#`, `$`, redirections, and whitespace remain permitted.\n\n2. The workspace is passed directly as a Terraform command argument in [`server/core/runtime/workspace_step_runner_delegate.go`](https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/blob/92ce5c51d1a050357e44df3535483425e59fa984/server/core/runtime/workspace_step_runner_delegate.go#L86-L96):\n\n ```go\n []string{workspaceCmd, \"select\", ctx.Workspace}\n ```\n\n3. Terraform arguments are concatenated into a single string using `strings.Join(args, \" \")` in [`server/core/terraform/tfclient/terraform_client.go`](https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/blob/92ce5c51d1a050357e44df3535483425e59fa984/server/core/terraform/tfclient/terraform_client.go#L451-L468):\n\n ```go\n tfCmd := fmt.Sprintf(\"%s %s\", binPath, strings.Join(args, \" \"))\n ```\n\n4. The resulting string is executed through `sh -c` in [`server/core/terraform/tfclient/terraform_client.go`](https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/blob/92ce5c51d1a050357e44df3535483425e59fa984/server/core/terraform/tfclient/terraform_client.go#L416-L427):\n\n ```go\n cmd := exec.Command(\"sh\", \"-c\", tfCmd)\n ```\n\nConsequently, a workspace such as:\n\n```text\npoc;id;false;#\n```\n\nproduces commands equivalent to:\n\n```sh\nterraform workspace select poc;id;false;#\nterraform workspace new poc;id;false;#\n```\n\n`raw.Project.Validate()` was confirmed to return no error for this workspace value.\n\nAtlantis documents that planning untrusted Terraform can already be dangerous because providers and external data sources execute code. The distinct issue here is that an ordinary project configuration field becomes shell source, bypassing the explicit `allow_custom_workflows` control and requiring no malicious provider, external data source, custom workflow, or apply operation.\n\nThe primary remediation should be to execute Terraform using an argument vector rather than constructing shell source\u2014for example, `exec.Command(binaryPath, args...)`. Any required environment-variable expansion should be performed without invoking a shell. Strict workspace-name validation would also provide defense in depth.\n\n### PoC\n\nOnly reproduce this against a disposable Atlantis instance and test repository.\n\n#### Preconditions\n\n- Atlantis processes `atlantis.yaml` from the pull request branch.\n- The pull request is eligible to run `atlantis plan`.\n- For a fork pull request, the server must have `--allow-fork-prs` enabled. A same-repository branch does not require this flag.\n- No custom workflows or apply permissions are required.\n\n#### Repository contents\n\nCreate `main.tf`:\n\n```hcl\nterraform {\n required_version = \"\u003e= 1.0\"\n}\n```\n\nCreate `atlantis.yaml`:\n\n```yaml\nversion: 3\nprojects:\n - name: workspace-rce-poc\n dir: .\n workspace: \"poc;id;false;#\"\n autoplan:\n enabled: false\n```\n\nOpen a pull request containing these files and comment:\n\n```text\natlantis plan -p workspace-rce-poc\n```\n\n#### Expected result\n\nAtlantis first runs `terraform workspace select`. The injected `false` causes that command invocation to return an error, so Atlantis retries using `terraform workspace new`.\n\nOn both attempts, the shell executes `id` as a separate command. The second failure includes the combined command output in the Atlantis error response, exposing output similar to:\n\n```text\nuid=1000(atlantis) gid=1000(atlantis) groups=1000(atlantis)\n```\n\nThis demonstrates arbitrary shell-command execution without creating a custom workflow or reaching the apply phase.\n\nThe payload uses only `id` and `false` and does not access credentials, make network requests, or modify the host beyond Terraform potentially creating the disposable `poc` workspace.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is an OS command injection vulnerability resulting in remote code execution as the Atlantis service account.\n\nAffected deployments are those that:\n\n- Process pull-request-controlled `atlantis.yaml` project configuration; and\n- Permit the attacker-controlled pull request to trigger an Atlantis plan.\n\nPotential consequences include:\n\n- Reading and exfiltrating cloud-provider, Terraform, and VCS credentials inherited from the Atlantis process.\n- Accessing Terraform state, plan files, repository checkouts, caches, and other data available to the Atlantis user.\n- Modifying files or binaries accessible to the service account.\n- Making network requests using the Atlantis server\u0027s network identity.\n- Pivoting into infrastructure accessible through the server\u0027s credentials or network placement.\n\nFor public repositories, arbitrary external contributors are directly exposed when `--allow-fork-prs` is enabled. Without fork PR support, the vulnerable population includes users able to create eligible same-repository pull requests and attackers controlling such accounts.",
"id": "GHSA-rjh2-4xgw-p2hj",
"modified": "2026-10-27T21:04:50Z",
"published": "2026-10-27T21:04:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security/advisories/GHSA-rjh2-4xgw-p2hj"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116676"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/6792"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/commit/8dd22b4d0a9d7c129fdbf6a3398dd1c4cf8c3a59"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/commit/f04df0d53f0544d9eb6f5026dd8b74fbefd82ac8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/releases/tag/v0.47.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Atlantis: OS command injection through PR-controlled Terraform workspace enables RCE during plan"
}
GHSA-RJHG-P5WH-JHMF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-08 09:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:37In PHOENIX CONTACTs WP 6xxx series web panels in versions prior to 4.0.10 a remote attacker with low privileges may use an attribute of a specific HTTP POST request releated to date/time operations to gain full access to the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-3572"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-08T07:15:10Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In PHOENIX CONTACTs WP 6xxx series web panels in versions prior to 4.0.10 a remote attacker with low privileges may use an attribute of a specific HTTP POST request releated to date/time operations to gain full access to the device.",
"id": "GHSA-rjhg-p5wh-jhmf",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:37:50Z",
"published": "2023-08-08T09:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3572"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2023-018"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RJHQ-Q858-QC66
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 18:32 – Updated: 2026-08-30 00:30Adobe Campaign Classic (ACC) is affected by an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection') vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction. Scope is changed.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-76195"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T18:18:04Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Adobe Campaign Classic (ACC) is affected by an Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027) vulnerability that could result in arbitrary code execution in the context of the current user. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to execute arbitrary code. Exploitation of this issue does not require user interaction. Scope is changed.",
"id": "GHSA-rjhq-q858-qc66",
"modified": "2026-08-30T00:30:21Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T18:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-76195"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx-internal.corp.adobe.com/content/help/en/security/products/campaign/apsb26-134.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://helpx.adobe.com/security/products/campaign/apsb26-134.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RJM4-59W8-7R6F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-16 03:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 03:29Linksys AX3200 1.1.00 is vulnerable to OS command injection by authenticated users via shell metacharacters to the diagnostics traceroute page.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-38841"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-16T02:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Linksys AX3200 1.1.00 is vulnerable to OS command injection by authenticated users via shell metacharacters to the diagnostics traceroute page.",
"id": "GHSA-rjm4-59w8-7r6f",
"modified": "2024-04-04T03:29:54Z",
"published": "2023-04-16T03:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-38841"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1rAa4zzJPwMop0AEMiI2NKqUaZno7Ccqb?usp=sharing"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/171433/Linksys-AX3200-1.1.00-Command-Injection.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.