Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-78

Allowed

Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.

8271 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-VJRQ-M6QM-RJGR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-24 00:30 – Updated: 2025-12-24 00:30
VLAI
Details

DreamFactory saveZipFile Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of DreamFactory. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.

The specific flaw exists within the implementation of the saveZipFile method. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the service account. Was ZDI-CAN-26589.

Severity
7.2 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13700"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-23T22:15:44Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "DreamFactory saveZipFile Command Injection Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of DreamFactory. Authentication is required to exploit this vulnerability.\n\nThe specific flaw exists within the implementation of the saveZipFile method. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of a user-supplied string before using it to execute a system call. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of the service account. Was ZDI-CAN-26589.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjrq-m6qm-rjgr",
  "modified": "2025-12-24T00:30:14Z",
  "published": "2025-12-24T00:30:13Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13700"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dreamfactorysoftware/df-core/commit/404a1783927f95999c71a0ff8f14130d385087fb"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-1024"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VJV9-7M7J-H833

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-18 14:26 – Updated: 2026-06-18 14:26
VLAI
Summary
npm PraisonAI SandboxExecutor allowedCommands bypass via shell chaining
Details

Summary

The published npm package praisonai exports SandboxExecutor, CommandValidator, and sandboxExec as "safe command execution with restrictions." When allowedCommands is configured, CommandValidator checks only the first whitespace-delimited token of the command string. SandboxExecutor then passes the entire original string to spawn("sh", ["-c", command]).

With a policy that allows only echo, this direct command is correctly rejected:

cat /tmp/marker

but this chained command is accepted and executed:

echo allowed; cat /tmp/marker

The shell executes cat even though cat is not allowlisted. This bypasses the command allowlist and can execute arbitrary shell commands with the PraisonAI process privileges when an application, CLI workflow, or agent pipeline exposes sandbox command execution to lower-trust users, prompts, or model output.

The PoV is deterministic and local-only. It creates and reads only a temporary marker file.

Technical Details

In src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts, CommandValidator.validate() normalizes the command and authorizes only the first whitespace token:

const normalized = command.toLowerCase().trim();

if (this.allowedCommands) {
  const baseCmd = normalized.split(/\s+/)[0];
  if (!this.allowedCommands.includes(baseCmd)) {
    return { valid: false, reason: `Command '${baseCmd}' not in allowlist` };
  }
}

The denylist does not generally reject shell separators. It blocks a few specific patterns such as ; rm, but not ; cat, &&, ||, backticks, $(), or newline as a general policy boundary.

SandboxExecutor.spawn() then executes the unmodified command string through a shell:

const proc = spawn('sh', ['-c', command], {
  cwd: this.config.cwd,
  env,
  timeout: this.config.timeout,
  stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe']
});

That creates a mismatch: the allowlist authorizes one command token, but the shell interprets the whole string as a script.

The published npm:praisonai@1.7.1 dist files preserve the same behavior:

  • dist/cli/features/sandbox-executor.js checks only baseCmd.
  • dist/cli/features/sandbox-executor.js later invokes spawn("sh", ["-c", command]).
  • dist/index.js exports SandboxExecutor, CommandValidator, and sandboxExec.

Why This Is Not Intended Behavior

PraisonAI's sandbox docs describe sandbox execution as a security feature for AI-generated commands, with command validation, resource limits, path restrictions, network isolation, and execution isolation. The TypeScript source also describes this component as "Safe command execution with restrictions."

With allowedCommands: ["echo"], PraisonAI correctly rejects cat <marker> when submitted directly. That proves the intended policy is to block non-allowlisted executables. The same policy allowing echo allowed; cat <marker> is therefore an authorization bypass, not merely a permissive configuration.

PoV

Run from a local reproduction checkout:

node poc/pov_poc.js 1.7.1

Expected output includes:

{
  "version": "1.7.1",
  "package": "npm:praisonai",
  "allowedCommands": ["echo"],
  "controls": {
    "directCatRejected": true,
    "benignEchoAllowed": true,
    "patchedControlRejectsChainedShell": true
  },
  "observed": {
    "directPolicy": {
      "allowed": false,
      "reason": "Command 'cat' not in allowlist"
    },
    "benignPolicy": {
      "allowed": true
    },
    "chainedPolicy": {
      "allowed": true
    },
    "chainedRun": {
      "success": true,
      "stdout": "allowed\npoc.7.1",
      "stderr": "",
      "exitCode": 0
    },
    "patchedControl": {
      "benign": {
        "allowed": true
      },
      "direct": {
        "allowed": false,
        "reason": "Command 'cat' not in allowlist"
      },
      "chained": {
        "allowed": false,
        "reason": "shell metacharacter rejected before execution"
      }
    }
  },
  "vulnerable": true
}

Interpretation:

  • Direct cat <marker> is rejected by the allowlist.
  • Benign echo allowed is accepted.
  • echo allowed; cat <marker> is accepted by the same allowlist and executes the non-allowlisted cat.
  • A patched-control validator that rejects shell metacharacters before execution blocks the chained command while still allowing benign echo.

The PoV installs npm:praisonai@1.7.1 into a temporary project, creates a temporary marker file, and reads only that file. It does not contact any live service or execute destructive commands.

PoC

The PoV section above contains the local reproduction command, input, and decisive output.

Impact

If lower-trust users, prompts, or model output can influence a command string sent to SandboxExecutor or sandboxExec, allowedCommands does not enforce the intended command boundary. An attacker can append arbitrary shell commands after an allowed first token and run them with the privileges of the PraisonAI process.

Concrete consequences depend on the hosting application and configured process privileges, but can include reading or modifying files, invoking local tools, using available credentials, or causing denial of service.

This report does not claim that npm PraisonAI exposes this as a default network service. It is a library-level sandbox/allowlist bypass in an exported TypeScript API that is explicitly designed for safe command execution.

Severity

Suggested severity: High.

Rationale:

  • AV: common deployment pattern is an application exposing agent prompts or command automation over a network.
  • AC: attacker only needs to induce or submit a command string that starts with an allowed command.
  • PR: conservative base score assumes the attacker can submit prompts or command requests to the application.
  • UI: no operator action is needed once the command reaches the executor.
  • S: impact is in the PraisonAI-hosting process.
  • C/I/A: arbitrary shell commands can affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability depending on process privileges.

If maintainers score only local CLI use, AV:L may be reasonable. If they score public unauthenticated prompt or command endpoints built on this API, PR:N may be reasonable.

Suggested Fix

Avoid passing policy-checked user strings to a shell.

Recommended:

  1. Require callers to pass { command, args }, or parse command strings into argv with a shell-aware parser.
  2. Execute with spawn(command, args, { shell: false }) / execFile() instead of sh -c.
  3. Apply allowedCommands to the exact executable after normalization.
  4. Reject shell metacharacters (;, &&, ||, |, backticks, $(), newline, redirects) when a shell string API must be kept for compatibility.
  5. Add regression tests proving allowedCommands: ["echo"] allows echo ok but rejects cat marker, echo ok; cat marker, echo ok && cat marker, and echo ok | cat marker.

Affected Package/Versions

  • Repository: MervinPraison/PraisonAI
  • Package: npm:praisonai
  • Component: TypeScript CLI feature SandboxExecutor
  • Current head validated: 1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e
  • Current tag validated: v4.6.58
  • Latest npm package validated: 1.7.1

Suggested affected range:

npm:praisonai >= 1.2.3, <= 1.7.1

Selected version sweep:

  • 1.0.0: package main cannot be required in the selected test environment.
  • 1.2.0, 1.2.1, 1.2.2: SandboxExecutor is not exported.
  • 1.2.3: vulnerable.
  • 1.2.4: vulnerable.
  • 1.3.0: vulnerable.
  • 1.3.6: vulnerable.
  • 1.4.0: vulnerable.
  • 1.5.0: vulnerable.
  • 1.5.4: vulnerable.
  • 1.6.0: vulnerable.
  • 1.7.0: vulnerable.
  • 1.7.1: vulnerable.

Advisory History

This is distinct from known and previously submitted PraisonAI issues:

  • GHSA-r4f2-3m54-pp7q covers PyPI SubprocessSandbox shell=True and blocklist bypass.
  • GHSA-2763-cj5r-c79m covers PyPI praisonai OS command injection.
  • GHSA-v7px-3835-7gjx covers PyPI memory/hooks.py shell injection.
  • GHSA-4wr3-f4p3-5wjh covers Python agent tool approval allow-list manipulation.
  • GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh covers PyPI/Python execute_code sandbox escape.
  • GHSA-9qhq-v63v-fv3j covers an incomplete fix for a Python command injection.
  • GHSA-vmmj-pfw7-fjwp covers npm codeMode host-process new Function sandbox escape.

No visible local or GitHub advisory covers npm TypeScript SandboxExecutor, CommandValidator, allowedCommands, or the first-token allowlist followed by sh -c shell-chaining root cause.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.7.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "praisonai"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "1.2.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.7.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-693",
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T14:26:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe published npm package `praisonai` exports `SandboxExecutor`, `CommandValidator`, and `sandboxExec` as \"safe command execution with restrictions.\" When `allowedCommands` is configured, `CommandValidator` checks only the first whitespace-delimited token of the command string. `SandboxExecutor` then passes the entire original string to `spawn(\"sh\", [\"-c\", command])`.\n\nWith a policy that allows only `echo`, this direct command is correctly rejected:\n\n```sh\ncat /tmp/marker\n```\n\nbut this chained command is accepted and executed:\n\n```sh\necho allowed; cat /tmp/marker\n```\n\nThe shell executes `cat` even though `cat` is not allowlisted. This bypasses the command allowlist and can execute arbitrary shell commands with the PraisonAI process privileges when an application, CLI workflow, or agent pipeline exposes sandbox command execution to lower-trust users, prompts, or model output.\n\nThe PoV is deterministic and local-only. It creates and reads only a temporary marker file.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nIn `src/praisonai-ts/src/cli/features/sandbox-executor.ts`, `CommandValidator.validate()` normalizes the command and authorizes only the first whitespace token:\n\n```ts\nconst normalized = command.toLowerCase().trim();\n\nif (this.allowedCommands) {\n  const baseCmd = normalized.split(/\\s+/)[0];\n  if (!this.allowedCommands.includes(baseCmd)) {\n    return { valid: false, reason: `Command \u0027${baseCmd}\u0027 not in allowlist` };\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe denylist does not generally reject shell separators. It blocks a few specific patterns such as `; rm`, but not `; cat`, `\u0026\u0026`, `||`, backticks, `$()`, or newline as a general policy boundary.\n\n`SandboxExecutor.spawn()` then executes the unmodified command string through a shell:\n\n```ts\nconst proc = spawn(\u0027sh\u0027, [\u0027-c\u0027, command], {\n  cwd: this.config.cwd,\n  env,\n  timeout: this.config.timeout,\n  stdio: [\u0027pipe\u0027, \u0027pipe\u0027, \u0027pipe\u0027]\n});\n```\n\nThat creates a mismatch: the allowlist authorizes one command token, but the shell interprets the whole string as a script.\n\nThe published `npm:praisonai@1.7.1` dist files preserve the same behavior:\n\n- `dist/cli/features/sandbox-executor.js` checks only `baseCmd`.\n- `dist/cli/features/sandbox-executor.js` later invokes `spawn(\"sh\", [\"-c\", command])`.\n- `dist/index.js` exports `SandboxExecutor`, `CommandValidator`, and `sandboxExec`.\n\n### Why This Is Not Intended Behavior\n\nPraisonAI\u0027s sandbox docs describe sandbox execution as a security feature for AI-generated commands, with command validation, resource limits, path restrictions, network isolation, and execution isolation. The TypeScript source also describes this component as \"Safe command execution with restrictions.\"\n\nWith `allowedCommands: [\"echo\"]`, PraisonAI correctly rejects `cat \u003cmarker\u003e` when submitted directly. That proves the intended policy is to block non-allowlisted executables. The same policy allowing `echo allowed; cat \u003cmarker\u003e` is therefore an authorization bypass, not merely a permissive configuration.\n\n## PoV\n\nRun from a local reproduction checkout:\n\n```bash\nnode poc/pov_poc.js 1.7.1\n```\n\nExpected output includes:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"version\": \"1.7.1\",\n  \"package\": \"npm:praisonai\",\n  \"allowedCommands\": [\"echo\"],\n  \"controls\": {\n    \"directCatRejected\": true,\n    \"benignEchoAllowed\": true,\n    \"patchedControlRejectsChainedShell\": true\n  },\n  \"observed\": {\n    \"directPolicy\": {\n      \"allowed\": false,\n      \"reason\": \"Command \u0027cat\u0027 not in allowlist\"\n    },\n    \"benignPolicy\": {\n      \"allowed\": true\n    },\n    \"chainedPolicy\": {\n      \"allowed\": true\n    },\n    \"chainedRun\": {\n      \"success\": true,\n      \"stdout\": \"allowed\\npoc.7.1\",\n      \"stderr\": \"\",\n      \"exitCode\": 0\n    },\n    \"patchedControl\": {\n      \"benign\": {\n        \"allowed\": true\n      },\n      \"direct\": {\n        \"allowed\": false,\n        \"reason\": \"Command \u0027cat\u0027 not in allowlist\"\n      },\n      \"chained\": {\n        \"allowed\": false,\n        \"reason\": \"shell metacharacter rejected before execution\"\n      }\n    }\n  },\n  \"vulnerable\": true\n}\n```\n\nInterpretation:\n\n- Direct `cat \u003cmarker\u003e` is rejected by the allowlist.\n- Benign `echo allowed` is accepted.\n- `echo allowed; cat \u003cmarker\u003e` is accepted by the same allowlist and executes the non-allowlisted `cat`.\n- A patched-control validator that rejects shell metacharacters before execution blocks the chained command while still allowing benign `echo`.\n\nThe PoV installs `npm:praisonai@1.7.1` into a temporary project, creates a temporary marker file, and reads only that file. It does not contact any live service or execute destructive commands.\n\n## PoC\n\nThe PoV section above contains the local reproduction command, input, and decisive output.\n\n## Impact\n\nIf lower-trust users, prompts, or model output can influence a command string sent to `SandboxExecutor` or `sandboxExec`, `allowedCommands` does not enforce the intended command boundary. An attacker can append arbitrary shell commands after an allowed first token and run them with the privileges of the PraisonAI process.\n\nConcrete consequences depend on the hosting application and configured process privileges, but can include reading or modifying files, invoking local tools, using available credentials, or causing denial of service.\n\nThis report does not claim that npm PraisonAI exposes this as a default network service. It is a library-level sandbox/allowlist bypass in an exported TypeScript API that is explicitly designed for safe command execution.\n\n### Severity\n\nSuggested severity: High.\n\nRationale:\n\n- `AV`: common deployment pattern is an application exposing agent prompts or command automation over a network.\n- `AC`: attacker only needs to induce or submit a command string that starts with an allowed command.\n- `PR`: conservative base score assumes the attacker can submit prompts or command requests to the application.\n- `UI`: no operator action is needed once the command reaches the executor.\n- `S`: impact is in the PraisonAI-hosting process.\n- `C/I/A`: arbitrary shell commands can affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability depending on process privileges.\n\nIf maintainers score only local CLI use, `AV:L` may be reasonable. If they score public unauthenticated prompt or command endpoints built on this API, `PR:N` may be reasonable.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nAvoid passing policy-checked user strings to a shell.\n\nRecommended:\n\n1. Require callers to pass `{ command, args }`, or parse command strings into argv with a shell-aware parser.\n2. Execute with `spawn(command, args, { shell: false })` / `execFile()` instead of `sh -c`.\n3. Apply `allowedCommands` to the exact executable after normalization.\n4. Reject shell metacharacters (`;`, `\u0026\u0026`, `||`, `|`, backticks, `$()`, newline, redirects) when a shell string API must be kept for compatibility.\n5. Add regression tests proving `allowedCommands: [\"echo\"]` allows `echo ok` but rejects `cat marker`, `echo ok; cat marker`, `echo ok \u0026\u0026 cat marker`, and `echo ok | cat marker`.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\n- Repository: `MervinPraison/PraisonAI`\n- Package: `npm:praisonai`\n- Component: TypeScript CLI feature `SandboxExecutor`\n- Current head validated: `1ad58ca02975ff1398efeda694ea2ab78f20cf3e`\n- Current tag validated: `v4.6.58`\n- Latest npm package validated: `1.7.1`\n\nSuggested affected range:\n\n```text\nnpm:praisonai \u003e= 1.2.3, \u003c= 1.7.1\n```\n\nSelected version sweep:\n\n- `1.0.0`: package main cannot be required in the selected test environment.\n- `1.2.0`, `1.2.1`, `1.2.2`: `SandboxExecutor` is not exported.\n- `1.2.3`: vulnerable.\n- `1.2.4`: vulnerable.\n- `1.3.0`: vulnerable.\n- `1.3.6`: vulnerable.\n- `1.4.0`: vulnerable.\n- `1.5.0`: vulnerable.\n- `1.5.4`: vulnerable.\n- `1.6.0`: vulnerable.\n- `1.7.0`: vulnerable.\n- `1.7.1`: vulnerable.\n\n## Advisory History\n\nThis is distinct from known and previously submitted PraisonAI issues:\n\n- `GHSA-r4f2-3m54-pp7q` covers PyPI `SubprocessSandbox` `shell=True` and blocklist bypass.\n- `GHSA-2763-cj5r-c79m` covers PyPI `praisonai` OS command injection.\n- `GHSA-v7px-3835-7gjx` covers PyPI `memory/hooks.py` shell injection.\n- `GHSA-4wr3-f4p3-5wjh` covers Python agent tool approval allow-list manipulation.\n- `GHSA-4mr5-g6f9-cfrh` covers PyPI/Python `execute_code` sandbox escape.\n- `GHSA-9qhq-v63v-fv3j` covers an incomplete fix for a Python command injection.\n- `GHSA-vmmj-pfw7-fjwp` covers npm `codeMode` host-process `new Function` sandbox escape.\n\nNo visible local or GitHub advisory covers npm TypeScript `SandboxExecutor`, `CommandValidator`, `allowedCommands`, or the first-token allowlist followed by `sh -c` shell-chaining root cause.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833",
  "modified": "2026-06-18T14:26:35Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T14:26:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-vjv9-7m7j-h833"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "npm PraisonAI SandboxExecutor allowedCommands bypass via shell chaining"
}

GHSA-VJW2-5FJM-HHR4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-11 06:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:52
VLAI
Details

Improper Authentication vulnerability in Genians Genian NAC V4.0, Genians Genian NAC V5.0, Genians Genian NAC Suite V5.0, Genians Genian ZTNA allows Functionality Misuse.This issue affects Genian NAC V4.0: from V4.0.0 through V4.0.155; Genian NAC V5.0: from V5.0.0 through V5.0.42 (Revision 117460); Genian NAC Suite V5.0: from V5.0.0 through V5.0.54; Genian ZTNA: from V6.0.0 through V6.0.15.

Severity
4.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-40253"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287",
      "CWE-78",
      "CWE-94"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-11T06:15:10Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Improper Authentication vulnerability in Genians Genian NAC V4.0, Genians Genian NAC V5.0, Genians Genian NAC Suite V5.0, Genians Genian ZTNA allows Functionality Misuse.This issue affects Genian NAC V4.0: from V4.0.0 through V4.0.155; Genian NAC V5.0: from V5.0.0 through V5.0.42 (Revision 117460); Genian NAC Suite V5.0: from V5.0.0 through V5.0.54; Genian ZTNA: from V6.0.0 through V6.0.15.\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-vjw2-5fjm-hhr4",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T06:52:18Z",
  "published": "2023-08-11T06:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40253"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://docs.genians.com/nac/5.0/release/ko/advisories/GN-SA-2023-001.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.genians.co.kr/notice/2023"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VJX7-957F-W3QG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-30 18:31 – Updated: 2023-12-06 21:30
VLAI
Details

In TOTOLINK X6000R V9.4.0cu.852_B20230719, the shttpd file, sub_4119A0 function obtains fields from the front-end through Uci_ Set_ The Str function when passed to the CsteSystem function creates a command execution vulnerability.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-48803"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-11-30T18:15:07Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In TOTOLINK X6000R V9.4.0cu.852_B20230719, the shttpd file, sub_4119A0 function obtains fields from the front-end through Uci_ Set_ The Str function when passed to the CsteSystem function creates a command execution vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-vjx7-957f-w3qg",
  "modified": "2023-12-06T21:30:57Z",
  "published": "2023-11-30T18:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48803"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.notion.so/X6000R-sub_4119A0-4-aead0a851416422ea2e282409eec3351?pvs=4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VM37-J55J-8655

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-12 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-28 15:23
VLAI
Summary
OS Command Injection in Microweber
Details

Microweber is a content management system with drag and drop. Prior to version 1.2.11, Microweber is vulnerable to OS Command Injection.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "microweber/microweber"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-0557"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-02-22T19:17:10Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-02-11T09:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Microweber is a content management system with drag and drop. Prior to version 1.2.11, Microweber is vulnerable to OS Command Injection.",
  "id": "GHSA-vm37-j55j-8655",
  "modified": "2022-03-28T15:23:37Z",
  "published": "2022-02-12T00:00:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0557"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/microweber/microweber/commit/0a7e5f1d81de884861ca677ee1aaac31f188d632"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/microweber/microweber"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/660c89af-2de5-41bc-aada-9e4e78142db8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/50768"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/166077/Microweber-1.2.11-Shell-Upload.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OS Command Injection in Microweber"
}

GHSA-VM48-97CM-Q78P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:44 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:44
VLAI
Details

TP-Link TL-WVR, TL-WAR, TL-ER, and TL-R devices allow remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the t_bindif field of an admin/interface command to cgi-bin/luci, related to the get_device_byif function in /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/interface.lua in uhttpd.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-16960"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-11-27T10:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "TP-Link TL-WVR, TL-WAR, TL-ER, and TL-R devices allow remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands via shell metacharacters in the t_bindif field of an admin/interface command to cgi-bin/luci, related to the get_device_byif function in /usr/lib/lua/luci/controller/admin/interface.lua in uhttpd.",
  "id": "GHSA-vm48-97cm-q78p",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:44:17Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:44:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-16960"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/coincoin7/Wireless-Router-Vulnerability/blob/master/TplinkInterfaceAuthenticatedRCE.txt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VM5J-VQR6-V7V8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-10 20:04 – Updated: 2021-05-25 20:40
VLAI
Summary
OS Command Injection in pixl-class
Details

pixl-class prior to 1.0.3 allows execution of arbitrary commands. The members argument of the create function can be controlled by users without any sanitization.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "pixl-class"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-7640"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-25T20:40:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2020-04-27T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "pixl-class prior to 1.0.3 allows execution of arbitrary commands. The members argument of the create function can be controlled by users without any sanitization.",
  "id": "GHSA-vm5j-vqr6-v7v8",
  "modified": "2021-05-25T20:40:19Z",
  "published": "2021-12-10T20:04:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7640"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhuckaby/pixl-class/commit/47677a3638e3583e42f3a05cc7f0b30293d2acc8"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jhuckaby/pixl-class/commit/47677a3638e3583e42f3a05cc7f0b30293d2acc8,"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-PIXLCLASS-564968"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OS Command Injection in pixl-class"
}

GHSA-VM67-7VMG-66VM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-04-06 17:24 – Updated: 2021-03-31 17:50
VLAI
Summary
Arbitrary Command Injection in portprocesses
Details

Impact

An Arbitrary Command Injection vulnerability was reported in portprocesses impacting versions <= 1.0.4.

Example (Proof of Concept)

The following example demonstrates the vulnerability and will run touch success therefore creating a file named success.

const portprocesses = require("portprocesses");

portprocesses.killProcess("$(touch success)");
Severity
6.4 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "portprocesses"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-23348"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-77",
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-03-31T17:50:32Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-03-31T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nAn Arbitrary Command Injection vulnerability was reported in `portprocesses` impacting versions \u003c= 1.0.4.\n\n### Example (Proof of Concept)\n\nThe following example demonstrates the vulnerability and will run `touch success` therefore creating a file named `success`.\n\n```js\nconst portprocesses = require(\"portprocesses\");\n\nportprocesses.killProcess(\"$(touch success)\");\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-vm67-7vmg-66vm",
  "modified": "2021-03-31T17:50:32Z",
  "published": "2021-04-06T17:24:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rrainn/PortProcesses/security/advisories/GHSA-vm67-7vmg-66vm"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23348"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rrainn/PortProcesses/commit/86811216c9b97b01b5722f879f8c88a7aa4214e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rrainn/PortProcesses/blob/fffceb09aff7180afbd0bd172e820404b33c8299/index.js%23L23"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-PORTPROCESSES-1078536"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Arbitrary Command Injection in portprocesses"
}

GHSA-VM8C-8FWM-8H4M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:46 – Updated: 2026-07-05 03:30
VLAI
Details

Unibox U-50 2.4 and UniBox Enterprise Series 2.4 and UniBox Campus Series 2.4 contain a OS command injection vulnerability in /tools/ping, which can leads to complete device takeover.

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-21883"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-04-09T13:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Unibox U-50 2.4 and UniBox Enterprise Series 2.4 and UniBox Campus Series 2.4 contain a OS command injection vulnerability in /tools/ping, which can leads to complete device takeover.",
  "id": "GHSA-vm8c-8fwm-8h4m",
  "modified": "2026-07-05T03:30:39Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:46:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-21883"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://s3curityb3ast.github.io/KSA-Dev-009.txt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mail-archive.com/fulldisclosure%40seclists.org/msg07140.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mail-archive.com/fulldisclosure@seclists.org/msg07140.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://wifi-soft.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VM99-6CFF-JPCQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:40 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:40
VLAI
Details

UCOPIA Wi-Fi appliances 6.0.5 allow authenticated remote attackers to escape the restricted administration shell CLI, and access a shell with admin user rights, via an unprotected less command.

Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2020-25036"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-02-02T06:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "UCOPIA Wi-Fi appliances 6.0.5 allow authenticated remote attackers to escape the restricted administration shell CLI, and access a shell with admin user rights, via an unprotected less command.",
  "id": "GHSA-vm99-6cff-jpcq",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T17:40:45Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:40:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-25036"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.globadis.com/blog/ucopia-v6-multiple-cves-root"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://ucopia.com/en/solutions/product-line-wifi"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.

Mitigation MIT-22
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

  • Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
  • OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
  • This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
  • Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction

For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.

Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-4.3
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Implementation

Strategy: Output Encoding

While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).

Mitigation
Implementation

If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.

Mitigation MIT-27
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Parameterization

  • If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
  • Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

  • Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
  • When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
  • Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
  • When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
  • Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
  • Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion

When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-32
Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).

Mitigation MIT-39
Implementation
  • Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
  • If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
  • Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
  • In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Operation

Strategy: Sandbox or Jail

Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.

Mitigation MIT-29
Operation

Strategy: Firewall

Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].

Mitigation MIT-17
Architecture and Design Operation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Mitigation MIT-16
Operation Implementation

Strategy: Environment Hardening

When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection

An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.

CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters

An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.

CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers

An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.

CAPEC-6: Argument Injection

An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.

CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection

In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.

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