CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
9948 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-G6W7-RGJJ-7R73
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-28 15:31 – Updated: 2025-07-28 15:31OS Command Injection in iSTAR Ultra products web application allows an authenticated attacker to gain even more privileged access ('root' user) to the device firmware.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-53695"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-28T14:15:28Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "OS Command Injection in iSTAR Ultra products web application allows an authenticated attacker to gain even more privileged access (\u0027root\u0027 user) to the device firmware.",
"id": "GHSA-g6w7-rgjj-7r73",
"modified": "2025-07-28T15:31:40Z",
"published": "2025-07-28T15:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53695"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/reidmefirst/vuln-disclosure/refs/heads/main/2025-03.txt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-G6XC-44VW-9HJR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:45 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:45The /admin/admapi.php script of Invigo Automatic Device Management (ADM) through 5.0 allows remote authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands on the server as the user running the application.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-10583"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-03-25T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The /admin/admapi.php script of Invigo Automatic Device Management (ADM) through 5.0 allows remote authenticated attackers to execute arbitrary OS commands on the server as the user running the application.",
"id": "GHSA-g6xc-44vw-9hjr",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:45:20Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:45:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10583"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.on-x.com/sites/default/files/security_advisory_-_multiple_vulnerabilities_-_invigo_adm.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-G74G-RG72-J2P3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-15 20:16 – Updated: 2026-10-15 20:16Summary
Untrusted local .mise.toml [settings] can set the shell interpreter args (unix/windows default_inline / default_file shell_args), yielding arbitrary command execution, because those command-interpreter settings were not added to the global_only denylist the CVE-2026-55448 fix relies on. Code execution from an untrusted repository with no trust prompt for the malicious file, on par with the patched CVE. Confirmed at HEAD 7160170206782fdd3ef287c8302369e32152fb71.
The defect
CVE-2026-55448 and CVE-2026-35533 fixed the fact that a local project [settings] table is harvested by the settings preloader independent of the trust store (an untrusted .mise.toml sets settings without the user ever trusting it). The remediation is a per-field global_only denylist: settings marked global_only are stripped from non-global config. The maintainers marked the command-execution fields they knew about (the three forge credential_command values) but did not mark the four shell-interpreter-args settings, which are also command-execution settings because they choose the interpreter for every command mise spawns.
The global_only denylist and the gap. In settings.toml, the three credential_command sinks are global_only (forgejo.credential_command around line 775, github.credential_command around 828, gitlab.credential_command around 990). The four shell-args settings do not carry global_only:
- unix_default_file_shell_args (settings.toml around 2920)
- unix_default_inline_shell_args (around 2926)
- windows_default_file_shell_args (around 3004)
- windows_default_inline_shell_args (around 3010)
The strip logic only removes global_only keys. src/config/settings.rs strip_local_only_settings (line 409) filters by meta.global_only (line 416: filter_map(|(key, meta)| meta.global_only.then_some(*key))), so any field not marked global_only survives from a local untrusted config. The settings preload loads every config path including the local project file (all_settings_files, line 778), and in default (non-safe) mode there is no trust check (safe_mode defaults false, line 1141).
The sink. src/config/settings.rs default_inline_shell (line 1032) reads self.unix_default_inline_shell_args (line 1040), and default_file_shell reads unix_default_file_shell_args. Settings::get returns the merged global-plus-local value minus global_only, so the untrusted project value overrides the built-in default (sh -c -o errexit).
Injection semantics. The real command is appended after the attacker's args, so PAYLOAD runs and the real command is demoted to $0:
- tera inline exec builtin: src/tera.rs (tera1_exec around 1358, and around 1470) builds shell[1..] + [command] with program = shell[0]. An attacker unix_default_inline_shell_args = "sh -c 'PAYLOAD'" yields sh -c 'PAYLOAD' .
- postinstall runner: src/backend/mod.rs around 2405 calls cmd_body_args(shell_args, body); src/cmd.rs cmd_body_args (non-Windows, around 520) returns program flags... body, the same demotion.
- task execution: src/task/task_executor.rs (around 916, 939, 993) uses task.shell()?.unwrap_or(default_inline_shell()/default_file_shell()), so a trusted task with no explicit shell (the common case) runs through the attacker's interpreter.
- hooks: src/hooks.rs (around 540, 603) also fall back to default_inline_shell().
Attacker model and reachability
An untrusted repository the developer clones and cd's into. The attacker's .mise.toml sits in the working directory or any ancestor and is never trusted by the victim; its [settings] table is harvested by the preloader independent of the trust store, exactly as the two prior CVEs established. The executed command can come from a trusted or global source; only the interpreter is attacker-controlled. Any of these, run while the untrusted .mise.toml is in an ancestor directory, fires it: mise run for a task defined in the global config or a trusted parent repo (inline run, no explicit shell); mise install of any tool with a postinstall directive; any tera template that calls exec(...) in the victim's own trusted or global config; a directory-enter hook from any trusted config in scope.
Proof of concept. In an untrusted repo, .mise.toml:
[settings]
unix_default_inline_shell_args = "sh -c 'id > /tmp/mise_pwned'"
The victim cd's in (does not trust the file) and later runs any global or trusted-parent task with no explicit shell, or mise install of a tool with a postinstall, or a config that renders {{ exec(...) }}. mise builds sh -c 'id > /tmp/mise_pwned' <realcommand>, so the payload runs.
Verification
Source-verified at HEAD: the four shell-args settings lack global_only while the credential_command sinks have it, strip_local_only_settings removes only global_only keys, default_inline_shell reads the setting, and the exec/postinstall/task paths append the real command after the attacker args. The load path is the same one two shipped CVEs already proved reachable. I did not run mise end to end.
Suggested fix
Mark all four default_shell_args settings global_only = true (the same treatment as credential_command), or flip the default-mode policy to an allowlist so any setting not explicitly known-safe is stripped from non-global config.
Secondary note (weaker, not the main finding): the CVE-2026-54557 path-sanitization fix added sanitize_install_version_name only inside the HTTP backend (src/backend/http.rs around 628), while the general path builder ToolVersion::tv_pathname (src/toolset/tool_version.rs around 292) still only replaces ':' and '/' and does not neutralize '..' or backslash. Impact is narrow (one level up, stays in the mise data dir on Unix), so this is a hardening note, not a primary finding.
Tooling
AI assistance was used while investigating, but the researcher read strip_local_only_settings (confirming it strips only global_only), the settings.toml entries (confirming the four shell-args settings lack global_only while credential_command has it), default_inline_shell (confirming it reads the setting), and the exec/postinstall/task invocation sites (confirming the real command is appended after the attacker args) themself at HEAD, so the incomplete fix is source-verified.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2026.7.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "mise"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.7.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-103929"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-15T20:16:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-14T16:17:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nUntrusted local .mise.toml [settings] can set the shell interpreter args (unix/windows default_inline / default_file shell_args), yielding arbitrary command execution, because those command-interpreter settings were not added to the global_only denylist the CVE-2026-55448 fix relies on. Code execution from an untrusted repository with no trust prompt for the malicious file, on par with the patched CVE. Confirmed at HEAD 7160170206782fdd3ef287c8302369e32152fb71.\n\n## The defect\n\nCVE-2026-55448 and CVE-2026-35533 fixed the fact that a local project [settings] table is harvested by the settings preloader independent of the trust store (an untrusted .mise.toml sets settings without the user ever trusting it). The remediation is a per-field global_only denylist: settings marked global_only are stripped from non-global config. The maintainers marked the command-execution fields they knew about (the three forge credential_command values) but did not mark the four shell-interpreter-args settings, which are also command-execution settings because they choose the interpreter for every command mise spawns.\n\nThe global_only denylist and the gap. In settings.toml, the three credential_command sinks are global_only (forgejo.credential_command around line 775, github.credential_command around 828, gitlab.credential_command around 990). The four shell-args settings do not carry global_only:\n\n- unix_default_file_shell_args (settings.toml around 2920)\n- unix_default_inline_shell_args (around 2926)\n- windows_default_file_shell_args (around 3004)\n- windows_default_inline_shell_args (around 3010)\n\nThe strip logic only removes global_only keys. src/config/settings.rs strip_local_only_settings (line 409) filters by meta.global_only (line 416: `filter_map(|(key, meta)| meta.global_only.then_some(*key))`), so any field not marked global_only survives from a local untrusted config. The settings preload loads every config path including the local project file (all_settings_files, line 778), and in default (non-safe) mode there is no trust check (safe_mode defaults false, line 1141).\n\nThe sink. src/config/settings.rs default_inline_shell (line 1032) reads self.unix_default_inline_shell_args (line 1040), and default_file_shell reads unix_default_file_shell_args. Settings::get returns the merged global-plus-local value minus global_only, so the untrusted project value overrides the built-in default (sh -c -o errexit).\n\nInjection semantics. The real command is appended after the attacker\u0027s args, so PAYLOAD runs and the real command is demoted to $0:\n\n- tera inline exec builtin: src/tera.rs (tera1_exec around 1358, and around 1470) builds shell[1..] + [command] with program = shell[0]. An attacker unix_default_inline_shell_args = \"sh -c \u0027PAYLOAD\u0027\" yields sh -c \u0027PAYLOAD\u0027 \u003ccommand\u003e.\n- postinstall runner: src/backend/mod.rs around 2405 calls cmd_body_args(shell_args, body); src/cmd.rs cmd_body_args (non-Windows, around 520) returns program flags... body, the same demotion.\n- task execution: src/task/task_executor.rs (around 916, 939, 993) uses task.shell()?.unwrap_or(default_inline_shell()/default_file_shell()), so a trusted task with no explicit shell (the common case) runs through the attacker\u0027s interpreter.\n- hooks: src/hooks.rs (around 540, 603) also fall back to default_inline_shell().\n\n## Attacker model and reachability\n\nAn untrusted repository the developer clones and cd\u0027s into. The attacker\u0027s .mise.toml sits in the working directory or any ancestor and is never trusted by the victim; its [settings] table is harvested by the preloader independent of the trust store, exactly as the two prior CVEs established. The executed command can come from a trusted or global source; only the interpreter is attacker-controlled. Any of these, run while the untrusted .mise.toml is in an ancestor directory, fires it: mise run \u003ctask\u003e for a task defined in the global config or a trusted parent repo (inline run, no explicit shell); mise install of any tool with a postinstall directive; any tera template that calls exec(...) in the victim\u0027s own trusted or global config; a directory-enter hook from any trusted config in scope.\n\nProof of concept. In an untrusted repo, .mise.toml:\n\n```toml\n[settings]\nunix_default_inline_shell_args = \"sh -c \u0027id \u003e /tmp/mise_pwned\u0027\"\n```\n\nThe victim cd\u0027s in (does not trust the file) and later runs any global or trusted-parent task with no explicit shell, or mise install of a tool with a postinstall, or a config that renders {{ exec(...) }}. mise builds `sh -c \u0027id \u003e /tmp/mise_pwned\u0027 \u003crealcommand\u003e`, so the payload runs.\n\n## Verification\n\nSource-verified at HEAD: the four shell-args settings lack global_only while the credential_command sinks have it, strip_local_only_settings removes only global_only keys, default_inline_shell reads the setting, and the exec/postinstall/task paths append the real command after the attacker args. The load path is the same one two shipped CVEs already proved reachable. I did not run mise end to end.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nMark all four *_default_*_shell_args settings global_only = true (the same treatment as credential_command), or flip the default-mode policy to an allowlist so any setting not explicitly known-safe is stripped from non-global config.\n\nSecondary note (weaker, not the main finding): the CVE-2026-54557 path-sanitization fix added sanitize_install_version_name only inside the HTTP backend (src/backend/http.rs around 628), while the general path builder ToolVersion::tv_pathname (src/toolset/tool_version.rs around 292) still only replaces \u0027:\u0027 and \u0027/\u0027 and does not neutralize \u0027..\u0027 or backslash. Impact is narrow (one level up, stays in the mise data dir on Unix), so this is a hardening note, not a primary finding.\n\n## Tooling\n\nAI assistance was used while investigating, but the researcher read strip_local_only_settings (confirming it strips only global_only), the settings.toml entries (confirming the four shell-args settings lack global_only while credential_command has it), default_inline_shell (confirming it reads the setting), and the exec/postinstall/task invocation sites (confirming the real command is appended after the attacker args) themself at HEAD, so the incomplete fix is source-verified.",
"id": "GHSA-g74g-rg72-j2p3",
"modified": "2026-10-15T20:16:09Z",
"published": "2026-10-15T20:16:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jdx/mise/security/advisories/GHSA-g74g-rg72-j2p3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-103929"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jdx/mise/pull/11293"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jdx/mise/commit/c6cd7a9a2ca580918562566126646e5d04317895"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jdx/mise"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jdx/mise/releases/tag/v2026.7.14"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mise permits untrusted local configuration to override default shell arguments"
}
GHSA-G74Q-8PHG-6Q8X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-08 21:30 – Updated: 2026-02-08 21:30A weakness has been identified in D-Link DIR-823X 250416. This vulnerability affects the function sub_420618 of the file /goform/set_upnp. This manipulation of the argument upnp_enable causes os command injection. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-2175"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-08T19:16:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A weakness has been identified in D-Link DIR-823X 250416. This vulnerability affects the function sub_420618 of the file /goform/set_upnp. This manipulation of the argument upnp_enable causes os command injection. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be used for attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-g74q-8phg-6q8x",
"modified": "2026-02-08T21:30:18Z",
"published": "2026-02-08T21:30:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-2175"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/master-abc/cve/issues/31"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.344876"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.344876"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.749263"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dlink.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-G7GF-96CX-RQ88
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-05-23 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:18An OS Command Injection vulnerability in Parks Fiberlink 210 firmware version V2.1.14_X000 was found via the /boaform/admin/formPing target_addr parameter.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-33617"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-23T15:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An OS Command Injection vulnerability in Parks Fiberlink 210 firmware version V2.1.14_X000 was found via the /boaform/admin/formPing target_addr parameter.",
"id": "GHSA-g7gf-96cx-rq88",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:18:52Z",
"published": "2023-05-23T15:30:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-33617"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/gbrls/58a5032bc58510abb908386124d1b4d2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G7GR-43MM-GR6Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-29 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 21:31An issue in Infotel Conseil GLPI v.10.X.X and after allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the insufficient validation of user-supplied input.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-31705"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-29T18:15:07Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An issue in Infotel Conseil GLPI v.10.X.X and after allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the insufficient validation of user-supplied input.",
"id": "GHSA-g7gr-43mm-gr6q",
"modified": "2025-11-04T21:31:29Z",
"published": "2024-04-29T18:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31705"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/V3locidad/GLPI_POC_Plugins_Shell"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Apr/23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Apr/23"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G7HF-VV6M-6F8Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-02 18:30 – Updated: 2024-02-02 18:30An OS command injection vulnerability has been reported to affect several QNAP operating system versions. If exploited, the vulnerability could allow authenticated administrators to execute commands via a network.
We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following versions: QTS 5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later QuTS hero h5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later QuTScloud c5.1.5.2651 and later
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-39302"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-02T16:15:47Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An OS command injection vulnerability has been reported to affect several QNAP operating system versions. If exploited, the vulnerability could allow authenticated administrators to execute commands via a network.\n\nWe have already fixed the vulnerability in the following versions:\nQTS 5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later\nQuTS hero h5.1.3.2578 build 20231110 and later\nQuTScloud c5.1.5.2651 and later\n",
"id": "GHSA-g7hf-vv6m-6f8q",
"modified": "2024-02-02T18:30:30Z",
"published": "2024-02-02T18:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-39302"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-23-33"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G7J6-5RWP-HRCP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-07 00:01 – Updated: 2022-09-14 00:00OS Command Injection vulnerability in Hitachi RAID Manager Storage Replication Adapter allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary OS commands. This issue affects: Hitachi RAID Manager Storage Replication Adapter 02.01.04 versions prior to 02.03.02 on Windows; 02.05.00 versions prior to 02.05.01 on Windows and Docker.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-34883"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-06T07:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "OS Command Injection vulnerability in Hitachi RAID Manager Storage Replication Adapter allows remote authenticated users to execute arbitrary OS commands. This issue affects: Hitachi RAID Manager Storage Replication Adapter 02.01.04 versions prior to 02.03.02 on Windows; 02.05.00 versions prior to 02.05.01 on Windows and Docker.",
"id": "GHSA-g7j6-5rwp-hrcp",
"modified": "2022-09-14T00:00:51Z",
"published": "2022-09-07T00:01:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34883"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.hitachi.co.jp/products/it/storage-solutions/global/sec_info/2022/2022_307.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.hitachi.com/products/it/storage-solutions/sec_info/2022/2022_307.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G7X5-7RWJ-VQCC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-20 21:31 – Updated: 2026-10-20 21:31An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the boa formPasswordSetup functionality of X2000R (version(s): TOTOLINK-X2000R-Gh-V1.0.0-B20250421.1327). A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary code execution. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-10131"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T21:17:15Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An OS command injection vulnerability exists in the boa formPasswordSetup functionality of X2000R (version(s): TOTOLINK-X2000R-Gh-V1.0.0-B20250421.1327). A specially crafted HTTP request can lead to arbitrary code execution. An attacker can make an authenticated HTTP request to trigger this vulnerability.",
"id": "GHSA-g7x5-7rwj-vqcc",
"modified": "2026-10-20T21:31:06Z",
"published": "2026-10-20T21:31:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10131"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talosintelligence.com/vulnerability_reports/TALOS-2026-2432"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-G7X9-34MW-RVCV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:41 – Updated: 2022-08-06 00:00Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV016, RV042, RV042G, RV082, RV320, and RV325 Routers could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to inject arbitrary commands that are executed with root privileges. These vulnerabilities are due to improper validation of user-supplied input in the web-based management interface. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending crafted HTTP requests to a targeted device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code as the root user on the underlying operating system. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker would need to have valid administrator credentials on an affected device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-1318"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-04T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Multiple vulnerabilities in the web-based management interface of Cisco Small Business RV016, RV042, RV042G, RV082, RV320, and RV325 Routers could allow an authenticated, remote attacker to inject arbitrary commands that are executed with root privileges. These vulnerabilities are due to improper validation of user-supplied input in the web-based management interface. An attacker could exploit these vulnerabilities by sending crafted HTTP requests to a targeted device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code as the root user on the underlying operating system. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker would need to have valid administrator credentials on an affected device.",
"id": "GHSA-g7x9-34mw-rvcv",
"modified": "2022-08-06T00:00:38Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:41:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1318"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-rv-command-inject-BY4c5zd"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.