CWE-78
AllowedImproper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Stable
The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.
9916 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-C956-68GP-VRV2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-20 12:31 – Updated: 2024-08-20 21:30A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in Ruijie RG-UAC 1.0. Affected by this issue is the function get_ip_addr_details of the file /view/dhcp/dhcpConfig/commit.php. The manipulation of the argument ethname leads to os command injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-269156. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-6185"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-06-20T12:15:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability, which was classified as critical, has been found in Ruijie RG-UAC 1.0. Affected by this issue is the function get_ip_addr_details of the file /view/dhcp/dhcpConfig/commit.php. The manipulation of the argument ethname leads to os command injection. The attack may be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-269156. NOTE: The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-c956-68gp-vrv2",
"modified": "2024-08-20T21:30:31Z",
"published": "2024-06-20T12:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6185"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/L1OudFd8cl09/CVE/blob/main/11_06_2024_b.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.269156"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.269156"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.354121"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-C96M-HGV3-CHPF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-15 18:30 – Updated: 2025-01-21 18:31TOTOLINK X5000R V9.1.0cu.2350_B20230313 was discovered to contain an OS command injection vulnerability via the "week" parameter in setWiFiScheduleCfg.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-57023"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-15T17:15:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "TOTOLINK X5000R V9.1.0cu.2350_B20230313 was discovered to contain an OS command injection vulnerability via the \"week\" parameter in setWiFiScheduleCfg.",
"id": "GHSA-c96m-hgv3-chpf",
"modified": "2025-01-21T18:31:06Z",
"published": "2025-01-15T18:30:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57023"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/tiger5671/Vulnerabilities/blob/main/TOTOLINK%20X5000R/setWiFiScheduleCfg/setWiFiScheduleCfg.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.totolink.net"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C978-59M8-C77V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-21 21:30 – Updated: 2026-10-21 21:30Summary
A destination path supplied to virtualenv can be interpreted as shell syntax by a generated POSIX console launcher. The app-data seeder and pip delegate launcher generation to distlib but supply the interpreter path in a form that does not preserve it as literal data in the shell wrapper.
Affected area
POSIX console scripts generated by the app-data seeder or pip when the interpreter path requires a shell wrapper. Windows executable launchers are not affected by this path.
Attacker-controlled input
An attacker must influence the environment destination passed to virtualenv, and the user must subsequently run a generated launcher. The attacker does not need to modify an installed executable or control the user's app-data cache.
Affected code
The relevant 21.14.8 source is in ScriptMakerCustom.
Mechanism
The app-data seeder passes the environment's interpreter path through enquote_executable() to distlib's ScriptMaker.
It adds double quotes for a path with a space but does not escape shell expansions inside those quotes. When the path
has a space or the shebang exceeds 127 bytes, distlib emits a #!/bin/sh wrapper with a line shaped like
'''exec' "<path>" "$0" "$@". The shell expands $(...) and backticks in that path when the launcher is run. The same
wrapper must also parse as Python, which exposes additional quote and backslash cases. Environment creation and
activation do not trigger the shell payload.
Reproduction and evidence
The scanner created three environments: a control under my -touch PWNED- project, one under
my $(touch PWNED) project, and one under a path of more than 127 bytes ending in $(touch${IFS}PWNED). Each was
created without producing PWNED. Running the generated bin/pip --version created PWNED in both attack cases; the
control created none. The long-path case reached the shell wrapper without a space. This reproduces execution by the
generated launcher, with the user's privileges, rather than during seeding.
The report dates the app-data seeder's distlib launcher integration to #1579, first released in 20.0.2. PR #3417 quotes the raw interpreter path for the POSIX wrapper and repairs launchers written by the pip seeder. Pip's own distlib can write a vulnerable wrapper again during a later pip install or upgrade; the proposed virtualenv fix does not change pip's vendored code. The maintainer-provided follow-up review reports that later path separately.
Attack sequence
sequenceDiagram
participant A as Destination supplier
participant V as virtualenv seeder
participant D as distlib ScriptMaker
participant S as Generated bin/pip
participant U as User
A->>V: path contains $(touch PWNED)
V->>D: pass interpreter path with incomplete shell quoting
D->>S: write /bin/sh wrapper
Note over V,S: no payload runs during creation or activation
U->>S: pip --version
S->>S: shell expands path and runs touch
S-->>U: PWNED appears with user's privileges
Reproducer files
The following files are from the scanner report for ANT-2026-5DZVLGL1. They were tested against commit a857a7823c73
in the scanner image. The repro entrypoint expects companion files under /tmp/repro.d; cases that change user IDs
need a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is BUG when the reported behavior occurs. These files
are included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.
repro
#!/usr/bin/env python3
import shutil
import subprocess
from pathlib import Path
WORK = Path("/tmp/repro-console-script")
# The attacker's whole input: the name of a directory above the environment (a repository, a project folder).
DIRECTORY_NAMES = {
"CONTROL": "my -touch PWNED- project",
"OBSERVED": "my $(touch PWNED) project",
# no space: distlib also picks the /bin/sh launcher once "#!<dest>/bin/python" is longer than 127 bytes
"OBSERVED_LONG": "p" * 120 + "$(touch${IFS}PWNED)",
}
shutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)
pip_printed = {}
created_by_pip = {}
for label, name in DIRECTORY_NAMES.items():
# the payload can hold no "/", so it touches a relative PWNED: each case gets its own empty working directory
cwd = WORK / label / "cwd"
venv = WORK / label / name / "venv"
cwd.mkdir(parents=True)
# set up: the user creates an environment there with default options (--no-periodic-update keeps it offline)
subprocess.run(["virtualenv", "--quiet", "--no-periodic-update", str(venv)], cwd=cwd, check=True)
assert list(cwd.iterdir()) == [], "environment creation must not have created anything"
# trigger: the user runs the seeded pip; argv is a list, so the only shell that reads the name is bin/pip's own
pip = subprocess.run([venv / "bin" / "pip", "--version"], cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True)
pip_printed[label] = pip.stdout
created_by_pip[label] = sorted(p.name for p in cwd.iterdir())
launcher = (venv / "bin" / "pip").read_text().splitlines()
print(f"{label}: directory name {name!r}")
print(f" bin/pip line 1: {launcher[0]}")
print(f" bin/pip line 2: {launcher[1]}")
print(f" bin/pip --version printed: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}")
print(f" files bin/pip created in the working directory: {created_by_pip[label]}")
# check: a directory name is data; starting pip must run pip and nothing else
control_ok = pip_printed["CONTROL"].startswith("pip ") and created_by_pip["CONTROL"] == []
attack_ran = created_by_pip["OBSERVED"] == ["PWNED"] and created_by_pip["OBSERVED_LONG"] == ["PWNED"]
print("BUG" if control_ok and attack_ran else "OK")
Fix scope and remaining exposure
PR #3417 changes launcher generation by the app-data seeder and repairs POSIX shell wrappers after pip seeding. The pip-seeder repair uses the same quoting rule and updates the installed RECORD hashes and sizes. It does not modify pip's vendored distlib.
A later independent pip installation or upgrade can replace a corrected launcher with an affected one. Existing launchers are not repaired by upgrading virtualenv alone. Recreate environments with the corrected virtualenv to regenerate them, and use trusted destination paths. Recreation does not protect launchers subsequently rewritten by pip. The follow-up review reports reproduction through the previous pip seeder and after a pip upgrade; those results are attributed to the reviewer.
Impact
Running an affected launcher can execute commands with the calling user's privileges. Classification: high, CVSS 7.8,
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, following the project's
generated-script precedent. The vector
assumes attacker-controlled path data and a user invoking the resulting launcher. No prior victim privileges are
required; successful command execution can affect the user's data and processes.
Versions tested
The maintainer confirmed validation of the reported findings on release 21.14.8. The subsequent review records reproduction on unfixed upstream/main; the affected launcher integration and dependency declarations are unchanged from 21.14.8. The first affected release has not been established. Fixed in 21.14.9.
Known mitigation
Use an environment destination chosen by a trusted user. For older releases, avoid generating environments at destinations derived from untrusted input.
Affected release
- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.
Credits
Reported by Anthropic's OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-5DZVLGL1.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "virtualenv"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "21.14.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-113722"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-21T21:30:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-20T20:17:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nA destination path supplied to virtualenv can be interpreted as shell syntax by a generated POSIX console launcher. The\napp-data seeder and pip delegate launcher generation to distlib but supply the interpreter path in a form that does not\npreserve it as literal data in the shell wrapper.\n\n## Affected area\n\nPOSIX console scripts generated by the app-data seeder or pip when the interpreter path requires a shell wrapper.\nWindows executable launchers are not affected by this path.\n\n## Attacker-controlled input\n\nAn attacker must influence the environment destination passed to virtualenv, and the user must subsequently run a\ngenerated launcher. The attacker does not need to modify an installed executable or control the user\u0027s app-data cache.\n\n## Affected code\n\nThe relevant 21.14.8 source is in\n[ScriptMakerCustom](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/blob/a795ab116356afde11039cf2763d77e8a06da738/src/virtualenv/seed/embed/via_app_data/pip_install/base.py).\n\n## Mechanism\n\nThe app-data seeder passes the environment\u0027s interpreter path through `enquote_executable()` to distlib\u0027s `ScriptMaker`.\nIt adds double quotes for a path with a space but does not escape shell expansions inside those quotes. When the path\nhas a space or the shebang exceeds 127 bytes, distlib emits a `#!/bin/sh` wrapper with a line shaped like\n`\u0027\u0027\u0027exec\u0027 \"\u003cpath\u003e\" \"$0\" \"$@\"`. The shell expands `$(...)` and backticks in that path when the launcher is run. The same\nwrapper must also parse as Python, which exposes additional quote and backslash cases. Environment creation and\nactivation do not trigger the shell payload.\n\n## Reproduction and evidence\n\nThe scanner created three environments: a control under `my -touch PWNED- project`, one under\n`my $(touch PWNED) project`, and one under a path of more than 127 bytes ending in `$(touch${IFS}PWNED)`. Each was\ncreated without producing `PWNED`. Running the generated `bin/pip --version` created `PWNED` in both attack cases; the\ncontrol created none. The long-path case reached the shell wrapper without a space. This reproduces execution by the\ngenerated launcher, with the user\u0027s privileges, rather than during seeding.\n\nThe report dates the app-data seeder\u0027s distlib launcher integration to #1579, first released in 20.0.2.\n[PR #3417](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3417) quotes the raw interpreter path for the POSIX wrapper and\nrepairs launchers written by the pip seeder. Pip\u0027s own distlib can write a vulnerable wrapper again during a later pip\ninstall or upgrade; the proposed virtualenv fix does not change pip\u0027s vendored code. The maintainer-provided follow-up\nreview reports that later path separately.\n\n## Attack sequence\n\n```mermaid\nsequenceDiagram\n participant A as Destination supplier\n participant V as virtualenv seeder\n participant D as distlib ScriptMaker\n participant S as Generated bin/pip\n participant U as User\n A-\u003e\u003eV: path contains $(touch PWNED)\n V-\u003e\u003eD: pass interpreter path with incomplete shell quoting\n D-\u003e\u003eS: write /bin/sh wrapper\n Note over V,S: no payload runs during creation or activation\n U-\u003e\u003eS: pip --version\n S-\u003e\u003eS: shell expands path and runs touch\n S--\u003e\u003eU: PWNED appears with user\u0027s privileges\n```\n\n## Reproducer files\n\nThe following files are from the scanner report for `ANT-2026-5DZVLGL1`. They were tested against commit `a857a7823c73`\nin the scanner image. The `repro` entrypoint expects companion files under `/tmp/repro.d`; cases that change user IDs\nneed a disposable root-capable container. The last output line is `BUG` when the reported behavior occurs. These files\nare included as evidence and were not rerun for this advisory update.\n\n**`repro`**\n\n```text\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport shutil\nimport subprocess\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nWORK = Path(\"/tmp/repro-console-script\")\n\n# The attacker\u0027s whole input: the name of a directory above the environment (a repository, a project folder).\nDIRECTORY_NAMES = {\n \"CONTROL\": \"my -touch PWNED- project\",\n \"OBSERVED\": \"my $(touch PWNED) project\",\n # no space: distlib also picks the /bin/sh launcher once \"#!\u003cdest\u003e/bin/python\" is longer than 127 bytes\n \"OBSERVED_LONG\": \"p\" * 120 + \"$(touch${IFS}PWNED)\",\n}\n\nshutil.rmtree(WORK, ignore_errors=True)\npip_printed = {}\ncreated_by_pip = {}\nfor label, name in DIRECTORY_NAMES.items():\n # the payload can hold no \"/\", so it touches a relative PWNED: each case gets its own empty working directory\n cwd = WORK / label / \"cwd\"\n venv = WORK / label / name / \"venv\"\n cwd.mkdir(parents=True)\n\n # set up: the user creates an environment there with default options (--no-periodic-update keeps it offline)\n subprocess.run([\"virtualenv\", \"--quiet\", \"--no-periodic-update\", str(venv)], cwd=cwd, check=True)\n assert list(cwd.iterdir()) == [], \"environment creation must not have created anything\"\n\n # trigger: the user runs the seeded pip; argv is a list, so the only shell that reads the name is bin/pip\u0027s own\n pip = subprocess.run([venv / \"bin\" / \"pip\", \"--version\"], cwd=cwd, capture_output=True, text=True)\n pip_printed[label] = pip.stdout\n created_by_pip[label] = sorted(p.name for p in cwd.iterdir())\n\n launcher = (venv / \"bin\" / \"pip\").read_text().splitlines()\n print(f\"{label}: directory name {name!r}\")\n print(f\" bin/pip line 1: {launcher[0]}\")\n print(f\" bin/pip line 2: {launcher[1]}\")\n print(f\" bin/pip --version printed: {(pip.stdout + pip.stderr).strip()}\")\n print(f\" files bin/pip created in the working directory: {created_by_pip[label]}\")\n\n# check: a directory name is data; starting pip must run pip and nothing else\ncontrol_ok = pip_printed[\"CONTROL\"].startswith(\"pip \") and created_by_pip[\"CONTROL\"] == []\nattack_ran = created_by_pip[\"OBSERVED\"] == [\"PWNED\"] and created_by_pip[\"OBSERVED_LONG\"] == [\"PWNED\"]\nprint(\"BUG\" if control_ok and attack_ran else \"OK\")\n```\n\n## Fix scope and remaining exposure\n\nPR #3417 changes launcher generation by the app-data seeder and repairs POSIX shell wrappers after pip seeding. The\npip-seeder repair uses the same quoting rule and updates the installed RECORD hashes and sizes. It does not modify pip\u0027s\nvendored distlib.\n\nA later independent pip installation or upgrade can replace a corrected launcher with an affected one. Existing\nlaunchers are not repaired by upgrading virtualenv alone. Recreate environments with the corrected virtualenv to\nregenerate them, and use trusted destination paths. Recreation does not protect launchers subsequently rewritten by pip.\nThe follow-up review reports reproduction through the previous pip seeder and after a pip upgrade; those results are\nattributed to the reviewer.\n\n## Impact\n\nRunning an affected launcher can execute commands with the calling user\u0027s privileges. Classification: high, CVSS 7.8,\n`CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H`, following the project\u0027s\n[generated-script precedent](https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-p58f-9548-mpm2). The vector\nassumes attacker-controlled path data and a user invoking the resulting launcher. No prior victim privileges are\nrequired; successful command execution can affect the user\u0027s data and processes.\n\n## Versions tested\n\nThe maintainer confirmed validation of the reported findings on release 21.14.8. The subsequent review\nrecords reproduction on unfixed upstream/main; the affected launcher integration and dependency declarations are\nunchanged from 21.14.8. The first affected release has not been established. Fixed in 21.14.9.\n\n## Known mitigation\n\nUse an environment destination chosen by a trusted user. For older releases, avoid generating\nenvironments at destinations derived from untrusted input.\n\n## Affected release\n\n- [x] The problem reproduces on virtualenv 21.14.8.\n\n## Credits\n\nReported by Anthropic\u0027s OSS Scanner as ANT-2026-5DZVLGL1.",
"id": "GHSA-c978-59m8-c77v",
"modified": "2026-10-21T21:30:12Z",
"published": "2026-10-21T21:30:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/security/advisories/GHSA-c978-59m8-c77v"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-113722"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/pull/3417"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/commit/2519941bed33ee0d3ac99277f67913e439e476a9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/virtualenv/releases/tag/21.14.9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "virtualenv: Generated POSIX console launchers interpret destination paths as shell syntax"
}
GHSA-C989-6J3H-W4C3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-21 15:31 – Updated: 2024-07-03 18:42ILIAS 7 before 7.30 and ILIAS 8 before 8.11 as well as ILIAS 9.0 allow remote authenticated attackers with administrative privileges to execute operating system commands via file uploads with dangerous types.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-33529"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-21T15:15:29Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "ILIAS 7 before 7.30 and ILIAS 8 before 8.11 as well as ILIAS 9.0 allow remote authenticated attackers with administrative privileges to execute operating system commands via file uploads with dangerous types.",
"id": "GHSA-c989-6j3h-w4c3",
"modified": "2024-07-03T18:42:51Z",
"published": "2024-05-21T15:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-33529"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docu.ilias.de/ilias.php?baseClass=illmpresentationgui\u0026cmd=layout\u0026ref_id=1719\u0026obj_id=170040"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://insinuator.net/2024/05/security-advisory-achieving-php-code-execution-in-ilias-elearning-lms-before-v7-30-v8-11-v9-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C98R-W87R-FGFV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:35 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:35A vulnerability in the CLI of the Cisco StarOS operating system for Cisco ASR 5000 Series routers could allow an authenticated, local attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on an affected host operating system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by injecting malicious command arguments into a vulnerable CLI command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker would need to authenticate to the affected system by using valid administrator credentials. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvf93332.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-0115"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-01-18T06:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the CLI of the Cisco StarOS operating system for Cisco ASR 5000 Series routers could allow an authenticated, local attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges on an affected host operating system. The vulnerability is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied input. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by injecting malicious command arguments into a vulnerable CLI command. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker would need to authenticate to the affected system by using valid administrator credentials. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCvf93332.",
"id": "GHSA-c98r-w87r-fgfv",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:35:47Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:35:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-0115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-20180117-staros"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/102788"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1040239"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C9G2-8C6G-4WHG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-08 00:32 – Updated: 2025-02-08 00:32An issue in TPLINK TL-WPA 8630 TL-WPA8630(US)_V2_2.0.4 Build 20230427 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via function sub_4256CC, which allows command injection by injecting 'devpwd'.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-57357"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-07T22:15:13Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue in TPLINK TL-WPA 8630 TL-WPA8630(US)_V2_2.0.4 Build 20230427 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via function sub_4256CC, which allows command injection by injecting \u0027devpwd\u0027.",
"id": "GHSA-c9g2-8c6g-4whg",
"modified": "2025-02-08T00:32:18Z",
"published": "2025-02-08T00:32:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57357"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/c10uds/tplink-wpa8630-rce-vulnerability"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C9GW-HVQQ-F33R
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-16 21:18 – Updated: 2026-04-16 21:18Summary
Due to unsafe serialization of stdio commands in the MCP adapter, an authenticated attacker can add an MCP stdio server with an arbitrary command, achieving command execution.
Details
The vulnerability lies in a bug in the input sanitization from the “Custom MCP” configuration in http://localhost:3000/canvas - where any user can add a new MCP, when doing so - adding a new MCP using stdio, the user can add any command, even though your code have input sanitization checks such as validateCommandInjection and validateArgsForLocalFileAccess, and a list of predefined specific safe commands - these commands, for example "npx" can be combined with code execution arguments ("-c touch /tmp/pwn") that enable direct code execution on the underlying OS.
https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/d848baeb6bd9737a1e7fc912349c45fbdcc7bb38/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts#L223
https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/d848baeb6bd9737a1e7fc912349c45fbdcc7bb38/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts#L177
https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/d848baeb6bd9737a1e7fc912349c45fbdcc7bb38/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts#L269
PoC
Create a new Custom MCP and add an "npx -c" command.
{
"command": "npx",
"args": [
"-c",
"touch /tmp/pwn"
]
}
Impact
This is an authenticated arbitrary command execution due to unsanitized input, even though the input is sanitized, more protections should be added in order to close ways for attackers to execute arbitrary commands.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "flowise-components"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40933"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-16T21:18:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nDue to unsafe serialization of stdio commands in the MCP adapter, an authenticated attacker can add an MCP stdio server with an arbitrary command, achieving command execution.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerability lies in a bug in the input sanitization from the \u201cCustom MCP\u201d configuration in http://localhost:3000/canvas - where any user can add a new MCP, when doing so - adding a new MCP using stdio, the user can add any command, even though your code have input sanitization checks such as validateCommandInjection and validateArgsForLocalFileAccess, and a list of predefined specific safe commands - these commands, for example \"npx\" can be combined with code execution arguments (\"-c touch /tmp/pwn\") that enable direct code execution on the underlying OS.\n\nhttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/d848baeb6bd9737a1e7fc912349c45fbdcc7bb38/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts#L223\n\nhttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/d848baeb6bd9737a1e7fc912349c45fbdcc7bb38/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts#L177\n\nhttps://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/blob/d848baeb6bd9737a1e7fc912349c45fbdcc7bb38/packages/components/nodes/tools/MCP/core.ts#L269\n\n\n### PoC\nCreate a new Custom MCP and add an \"npx -c\" command.\n```\n{\n \"command\": \"npx\",\n \"args\": [\n \"-c\",\n \"touch /tmp/pwn\"\n ]\n}\n```\n\u003cimg width=\"358\" height=\"628\" alt=\"Screenshot 2026-01-12 at 18 32 37\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d95c1ae2-23a7-4afe-b586-722003baf50e\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\nThis is an authenticated arbitrary command execution due to unsanitized input, even though the input is sanitized, more protections should be added in order to close ways for attackers to execute arbitrary commands.",
"id": "GHSA-c9gw-hvqq-f33r",
"modified": "2026-04-16T21:18:17Z",
"published": "2026-04-16T21:18:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-c9gw-hvqq-f33r"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ox.security/blog/mcp-supply-chain-advisory-rce-vulnerabilities-across-the-ai-ecosystem"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ox.security/blog/the-mother-of-all-ai-supply-chains-critical-systemic-vulnerability-at-the-core-of-the-mcp"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Flowise: Authenticated RCE Via MCP Adapters"
}
GHSA-C9HQ-MRWX-5WHP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-31 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-31 18:31NVIDIA Jetson Linux has vulnerability in initrd, where an unprivileged attacker with physical access coul inject incorrect command line arguments. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, denial of service, data tampering, and information disclosure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-24154"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T17:16:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "NVIDIA Jetson Linux has vulnerability in initrd, where an unprivileged attacker with physical access coul inject incorrect command line arguments. A successful exploit of this vulnerability might lead to code execution, escalation of privileges, denial of service, data tampering, and information disclosure.",
"id": "GHSA-c9hq-mrwx-5whp",
"modified": "2026-03-31T18:31:31Z",
"published": "2026-03-31T18:31:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24154"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/5797"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-24154"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C9J3-WQPH-5XX9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-09-17 20:43 – Updated: 2023-02-03 20:45Versions of egg-scripts before 2.8.1 are vulnerable to command injection. This is only exploitable if a malicious argument is provided on the command line.
Example:
eggctl start --daemon --stderr='/tmp/eggctl_stderr.log; touch /tmp/malicious'
Recommendation
Update to version 2.8.1 or later.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "egg-scripts"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-3786"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-77",
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:30:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2018-08-24T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Versions of `egg-scripts` before 2.8.1 are vulnerable to command injection. This is only exploitable if a malicious argument is provided on the command line.\n\n\nExample:\n`eggctl start --daemon --stderr=\u0027/tmp/eggctl_stderr.log; touch /tmp/malicious\u0027`\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpdate to version 2.8.1 or later.",
"id": "GHSA-c9j3-wqph-5xx9",
"modified": "2023-02-03T20:45:07Z",
"published": "2018-09-17T20:43:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-3786"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/eggjs/egg-scripts/pull/26"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/eggjs/egg-scripts/commit/b98fd03d1e3aaed68004b881f0b3d42fe47341dd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/388936"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c9j3-wqph-5xx9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/eggjs/egg-scripts/blob/2.8.1/History.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/694"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Command Injection in egg-scripts"
}
GHSA-C9M5-977F-RFFV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-02 00:00 – Updated: 2022-04-10 00:01Hitron CHITA 7.2.2.0.3b6-CD devices contain a command injection vulnerability via the Device/DDNS ddnsUsername field.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-25017"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-01T06:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Hitron CHITA 7.2.2.0.3b6-CD devices contain a command injection vulnerability via the Device/DDNS ddnsUsername field.",
"id": "GHSA-c9m5-977f-rffv",
"modified": "2022-04-10T00:01:07Z",
"published": "2022-04-02T00:00:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25017"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/zaee-k/390b2f8e50407e4b199df806baa7e4ef"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
If at all possible, use library calls rather than external processes to recreate the desired functionality.
Mitigation MIT-22
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
- Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software.
- OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
For any data that will be used to generate a command to be executed, keep as much of that data out of external control as possible. For example, in web applications, this may require storing the data locally in the session's state instead of sending it out to the client in a hidden form field.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-4.3
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
- For example, consider using the ESAPI Encoding control [REF-45] or a similar tool, library, or framework. These will help the programmer encode outputs in a manner less prone to error.
Mitigation MIT-28
Strategy: Output Encoding
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).
Mitigation
If the program to be executed allows arguments to be specified within an input file or from standard input, then consider using that mode to pass arguments instead of the command line.
Mitigation MIT-27
Strategy: Parameterization
- If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.
- Some languages offer multiple functions that can be used to invoke commands. Where possible, identify any function that invokes a command shell using a single string, and replace it with a function that requires individual arguments. These functions typically perform appropriate quoting and filtering of arguments. For example, in C, the system() function accepts a string that contains the entire command to be executed, whereas execl(), execve(), and others require an array of strings, one for each argument. In Windows, CreateProcess() only accepts one command at a time. In Perl, if system() is provided with an array of arguments, then it will quote each of the arguments.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When constructing OS command strings, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set based on the expected value of the parameter in the request. This will indirectly limit the scope of an attack, but this technique is less important than proper output encoding and escaping.
- Note that proper output encoding, escaping, and quoting is the most effective solution for preventing OS command injection, although input validation may provide some defense-in-depth. This is because it effectively limits what will appear in output. Input validation will not always prevent OS command injection, especially if you are required to support free-form text fields that could contain arbitrary characters. For example, when invoking a mail program, you might need to allow the subject field to contain otherwise-dangerous inputs like ";" and ">" characters, which would need to be escaped or otherwise handled. In this case, stripping the character might reduce the risk of OS command injection, but it would produce incorrect behavior because the subject field would not be recorded as the user intended. This might seem to be a minor inconvenience, but it could be more important when the program relies on well-structured subject lines in order to pass messages to other components.
- Even if you make a mistake in your validation (such as forgetting one out of 100 input fields), appropriate encoding is still likely to protect you from injection-based attacks. As long as it is not done in isolation, input validation is still a useful technique, since it may significantly reduce your attack surface, allow you to detect some attacks, and provide other security benefits that proper encoding does not address.
Mitigation MIT-21
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Compilation or Build Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-32
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run the code in an environment that performs automatic taint propagation and prevents any command execution that uses tainted variables, such as Perl's "-T" switch. This will force the program to perform validation steps that remove the taint, although you must be careful to correctly validate your inputs so that you do not accidentally mark dangerous inputs as untainted (see CWE-183 and CWE-184).
Mitigation MIT-39
- Ensure that error messages only contain minimal details that are useful to the intended audience and no one else. The messages need to strike the balance between being too cryptic (which can confuse users) or being too detailed (which may reveal more than intended). The messages should not reveal the methods that were used to determine the error. Attackers can use detailed information to refine or optimize their original attack, thereby increasing their chances of success.
- If errors must be captured in some detail, record them in log messages, but consider what could occur if the log messages can be viewed by attackers. Highly sensitive information such as passwords should never be saved to log files.
- Avoid inconsistent messaging that might accidentally tip off an attacker about internal state, such as whether a user account exists or not.
- In the context of OS Command Injection, error information passed back to the user might reveal whether an OS command is being executed and possibly which command is being used.
Mitigation
Strategy: Sandbox or Jail
Use runtime policy enforcement to create an allowlist of allowable commands, then prevent use of any command that does not appear in the allowlist. Technologies such as AppArmor are available to do this.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
Mitigation MIT-16
Strategy: Environment Hardening
When using PHP, configure the application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop the application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
CAPEC-108: Command Line Execution through SQL Injection
An attacker uses standard SQL injection methods to inject data into the command line for execution. This could be done directly through misuse of directives such as MSSQL_xp_cmdshell or indirectly through injection of data into the database that would be interpreted as shell commands. Sometime later, an unscrupulous backend application (or could be part of the functionality of the same application) fetches the injected data stored in the database and uses this data as command line arguments without performing proper validation. The malicious data escapes that data plane by spawning new commands to be executed on the host.
CAPEC-15: Command Delimiters
An attack of this type exploits a programs' vulnerabilities that allows an attacker's commands to be concatenated onto a legitimate command with the intent of targeting other resources such as the file system or database. The system that uses a filter or denylist input validation, as opposed to allowlist validation is vulnerable to an attacker who predicts delimiters (or combinations of delimiters) not present in the filter or denylist. As with other injection attacks, the attacker uses the command delimiter payload as an entry point to tunnel through the application and activate additional attacks through SQL queries, shell commands, network scanning, and so on.
CAPEC-43: Exploiting Multiple Input Interpretation Layers
An attacker supplies the target software with input data that contains sequences of special characters designed to bypass input validation logic. This exploit relies on the target making multiples passes over the input data and processing a "layer" of special characters with each pass. In this manner, the attacker can disguise input that would otherwise be rejected as invalid by concealing it with layers of special/escape characters that are stripped off by subsequent processing steps. The goal is to first discover cases where the input validation layer executes before one or more parsing layers. That is, user input may go through the following logic in an application: <parser1> --> <input validator> --> <parser2>. In such cases, the attacker will need to provide input that will pass through the input validator, but after passing through parser2, will be converted into something that the input validator was supposed to stop.
CAPEC-6: Argument Injection
An attacker changes the behavior or state of a targeted application through injecting data or command syntax through the targets use of non-validated and non-filtered arguments of exposed services or methods.
CAPEC-88: OS Command Injection
In this type of an attack, an adversary injects operating system commands into existing application functions. An application that uses untrusted input to build command strings is vulnerable. An adversary can leverage OS command injection in an application to elevate privileges, execute arbitrary commands and compromise the underlying operating system.