CWE-59
AllowedImproper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The product attempts to access a file based on the filename, but it does not properly prevent that filename from identifying a link or shortcut that resolves to an unintended resource.
2029 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-8W66-9HVH-6JFX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 01:05 – Updated: 2022-05-14 01:05In supportutils, before version 3.1-5.7.1 and if pacemaker is installed on the system, an unprivileged user could have overwritten arbitrary files in the directory that is used by supportutils to collect the log files.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-19638"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-03-05T16:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In supportutils, before version 3.1-5.7.1 and if pacemaker is installed on the system, an unprivileged user could have overwritten arbitrary files in the directory that is used by supportutils to collect the log files.",
"id": "GHSA-8w66-9hvh-6jfx",
"modified": "2022-05-14T01:05:26Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T01:05:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-19638"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.suse.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1118460"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2019-05/msg00018.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8W9V-CH8X-63JR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-07 21:31 – Updated: 2025-08-27 18:31A path collision and arbitrary code execution vulnerability was identified in GitHub Enterprise Server that allowed container escape and privilege escalation to root via the ghe-firejail path. This vulnerability affected all versions of GitHub Enterprise prior to 3.15 and was fixed in versions 3.14.3, 3.13.6, 3.12.11, and 3.11.17. This vulnerability was reported via the GitHub Bug Bounty program.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-10007"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-07T21:15:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A path collision and arbitrary code execution vulnerability was identified in GitHub Enterprise Server that allowed container escape and privilege escalation to root via the ghe-firejail path. This vulnerability affected all versions of GitHub Enterprise prior to 3.15 and was fixed in versions 3.14.3, 3.13.6, 3.12.11, and 3.11.17. This vulnerability was reported via the GitHub Bug Bounty program.",
"id": "GHSA-8w9v-ch8x-63jr",
"modified": "2025-08-27T18:31:50Z",
"published": "2024-11-07T21:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-10007"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-server@3.11/admin/release-notes#3.11.17"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-server@3.12/admin/release-notes#3.12.11"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-server@3.13/admin/release-notes#3.13.6"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.github.com/en/enterprise-server@3.14/admin/release-notes#3.14.3"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8WC8-HF36-MJH9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-20 21:17 – Updated: 2026-07-20 21:17Summary
ScopedFs confines every File Browser user to a scope directory. Its within() guard is meant to reject any operation that follows a symbolic link out of that scope. When the link target does not exist yet, the guard walks up to the nearest existing ancestor and validates that instead. For a dangling symlink (target does not exist), the nearest existing ancestor is the in-scope directory containing the link, so the guard returns "in scope" and the subsequent os.OpenFile(O_CREATE) follows the link and creates the file at its out-of-scope target.
A post-auth user with Create and Modify permission can write attacker-controlled content to any non-existent path outside their scope that the File Browser process can write to. The precondition is a dangling symlink present inside the user's scope, which is the same out-of-band precondition the rest of ScopedFs is built to defend against.
This is a patch-gap variant of the GHSA-239w-m3h6-ch8v symlink confinement issue, not a resubmission of the already-published vulnerable-version behavior: GHSA-239w-m3h6-ch8v marks <= 2.63.13 vulnerable and 2.63.14 patched, while this proof reproduces on current master / v2.63.15 (be23ab3a15bf957928ecfed88de5ab67850c1b9c). The escaping-symlink-to-an-existing-target case is defended and tested. The dangling case is neither, and the gap is acknowledged in a code comment as "best-effort".
Root cause
files/scoped.go (commit be23ab3). The guard, including the maintainer comment that already flags this exact gap:
// Note: a dangling symlink whose target does not yet exist resolves to its
// containing directory and is therefore allowed; writing through such a link
// could still create a file outside the scope. This is treated as best-effort
// and relies on rejecting existing escaping symlinks, which covers the
// disclosure and overwrite vectors.
func (s *ScopedFs) within(p string) (bool, error) {
root, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(afero.FullBaseFsPath(s.base, "/"))
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
target := afero.FullBaseFsPath(s.base, p)
resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(target)
for errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {
parent := filepath.Dir(target) // LEXICAL parent of the link path
if parent == target {
break
}
target = parent
resolved, err = filepath.EvalSymlinks(target)
}
if err != nil {
return false, err
}
// ...
return resolved == root || strings.HasPrefix(resolved, prefix), nil
}
When p is a symlink whose target does not exist, EvalSymlinks(target) returns fs.ErrNotExist. The loop takes the lexical parent of the link path (filepath.Dir), a real directory inside the scope, and EvalSymlinks of that resolves under the scope root. within() returns true and guard() permits the operation. The write then dereferences the link at the OS layer:
func (s *ScopedFs) OpenFile(name string, flag int, perm os.FileMode) (afero.File, error) {
if err := s.guard(name); err != nil { // returns nil for a dangling escaping symlink
return nil, err
}
return s.base.OpenFile(name, flag, perm) // os.OpenFile(O_CREATE) follows the link
}
The assumption that breaks: within() treats "target does not exist" as "brand-new in-scope file" and validates the containing directory. But the path component being created is itself a symlink pointing outside the scope. O_CREATE follows it and creates the file at the link target, not inside the validated directory. The existing-target case is correctly blocked, because the walk-up resolves the link itself to an out-of-scope path. Only the dangling case slips through.
For the layout below:
/tmp/root/scope/escape -> /tmp/root/outside/created-by-http.txt
/tmp/root/outside/ # exists
/tmp/root/outside/created-by-http.txt # does not exist yet
EvalSymlinks(/tmp/root/scope/escape) returns not-exist, and the fallback validates /tmp/root/scope. The final OpenFile still follows /tmp/root/scope/escape and creates /tmp/root/outside/created-by-http.txt.
Reachability over HTTP
Endpoint: POST /api/resources/<linkname>?override=true (also PUT, and POST/PATCH /api/tus/...). Verified trace against the audited source:
http/resource.goresourcePostHandlerrequiresd.user.Perm.Create(else 403).files.NewFileInfois called. For a dangling symlink,stat()infiles/file.godoesLstatIfPossible(sees the symlink,err == nil,IsSymlink = true), thenFs.Statfollows the link and fails with ENOENT, so the code returns the symlinkFileInfowitherr == nil. The handler therefore enters the "file exists" branch.- The branch requires
override == "true"andd.user.Perm.Modify, then proceeds. writeFile(d.user.Fs, r.URL.Path, r.Body, ...)callsafs.OpenFile(dst, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, fileMode).ScopedFs.OpenFilerunsguard(), which passes for the dangling link, thenos.OpenFilefollows the link and creates the file outside the scope with the request body as content.
The TUS path (http/tus_handlers.go tusPostHandler -> OpenFile, then tusPatchHandler) reaches the same sink.
Why existing defenses do not apply
afero.BasePathFslexical confinement only neutralizes... A plain link name passes it unchanged.ScopedFs.within()is the dedicated symlink defense, and it is the component that fails: the not-exist walk-up validates the link's parent directory instead of the link.- The project's symlink tests (
http/tus_symlink_test.goTestTusHandlersRejectSymlinkScopeEscape,files/file_test.go) only exercise escaping symlinks whose target exists. Those are blocked. The dangling variant is never tested, so the regression suite does not catch it.
Proof of concept
The PoC drives the real security boundary, files.NewScopedFs, with the same flags http.writeFile uses, and shows the write landing outside the scope. A control test shows the existing-target case is still blocked, proving the guard is real and the gap is specifically the dangling case.
const writeFlags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREATE | os.O_TRUNC // == http.writeFile
scope := filepath.Join(root, "user") // the low-priv user's jail
outside := filepath.Join(root, "outside") // sibling dir = another tenant / host path
// Precondition: a dangling escaping symlink inside the scope.
os.Symlink(filepath.Join(outside, "pwned.txt"), filepath.Join(scope, "evil")) // target does not exist yet
fs := files.NewScopedFs(afero.NewOsFs(), scope)
f, _ := fs.OpenFile("/evil", writeFlags, 0o644) // not rejected
f.WriteString("OWNED-OUTSIDE-SCOPE")
// assert: outside/pwned.txt must NOT exist
Observed result:
=== RUN TestDanglingSymlinkWriteEscapesScope
poc_test.go:49: VULNERABLE: write escaped the scope and created
/tmp/.../001/outside/pwned.txt with content "OWNED-OUTSIDE-SCOPE"
--- FAIL: TestDanglingSymlinkWriteEscapesScope (0.00s)
=== RUN TestExistingTargetSymlinkIsBlocked
poc_test.go:78: guard correctly blocked existing-target escape: permission denied
--- PASS: TestExistingTargetSymlinkIsBlocked (0.00s)
The dangling test "fails" by design: the assertion fires because the file escaped. The control test passes: an escape_link -> outside (existing dir) write to escape_link/injected.txt is rejected by OpenFile with permission denied and nothing is created in outside/. That is exactly the scenario the project's own tests cover.
End-to-end HTTP equivalent:
POST /api/resources/escape?override=true
X-Auth: <token for user scoped to /tmp/root/scope with Create+Modify>
body: http-outside
-> ScopedFs.OpenFile("/escape", O_CREATE|O_TRUNC) follows the dangling link
-> file created at the link's out-of-scope target with the request body
The handler returns 200 OK, and the outside file contains the uploaded body.
Impact
- Direct primitive (live-verified): arbitrary file creation with attacker-controlled content at any non-existent path outside the user's scope that the File Browser process user can write to.
- Cross-tenant integrity (source-reasoned): in multi-user deployments the scopes are sibling directories under one server root. A low-priv user can plant files into another user's home (a script, an HTML page later served, a config the victim trusts).
- Persistence / RCE on permissive deployments (source-reasoned): creating a not-yet-existent
~/.ssh/authorized_keysfor the service account, a file under a web-served or later-executed directory, a cron or profile fragment. The official Docker image runs as non-root UID 1000, which bounds this to whatever that user owns. Bare-metal/systemd deployments that run File Browser as root raise this to host-level file write and RCE. - Scope limit (honest): this is file creation, not overwrite. Overwriting an existing out-of-scope file is genuinely blocked, because an existing target makes the link "escaping" and
within()rejects it. The negative control confirms this.
Suggested remediation
For write/create/truncate operations, do not treat a dangling final symlink as safe merely because the nearest existing ancestor is inside the scope. The walk-up in within() should treat "the leaf is a symlink" as an escape candidate rather than validating its parent:
- In
guard()/within(),Lstatthe target. If it is a symlink,Readlinkit, resolve the link target lexically (join with the link's directory,Clean), and require that target to be within the scope root, regardless of whether it currently exists. - More robust: resolve path components one by one for the operation being attempted, or open the final component with
O_NOFOLLOW(unix.Openat(... O_NOFOLLOW)) so creating through a symlink fails withELOOP; orfstatthe descriptor after opening and verify it resolves within the scope before writing.
Add a regression test mirroring TestTusHandlersRejectSymlinkScopeEscape but with a dangling target (os.Symlink(filepath.Join(outside, "newfile"), ...)), asserting both a 4xx and that no file is created outside the scope.
References
- Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-54094 /
GHSA-239w-m3h6-ch8v. - Affected code:
files/scoped.go(ScopedFs.within,ScopedFs.OpenFile,ScopedFs.Create), reached fromhttp/resource.go(resourcePostHandler,writeFile) andhttp/tus_handlers.go. - Confirmed unpatched at
be23ab3a15bf957928ecfed88de5ab67850c1b9c(v2.63.15).
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.63.15"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/v2"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.63.16"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55668"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22",
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T21:17:43Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T15:16:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\n`ScopedFs` confines every File Browser user to a scope directory. Its `within()` guard is meant to reject any operation that follows a symbolic link out of that scope. When the link target does not exist yet, the guard walks up to the nearest existing ancestor and validates that instead. For a dangling symlink (target does not exist), the nearest existing ancestor is the in-scope directory containing the link, so the guard returns \"in scope\" and the subsequent `os.OpenFile(O_CREATE)` follows the link and creates the file at its out-of-scope target.\n\nA post-auth user with `Create` and `Modify` permission can write attacker-controlled content to any non-existent path outside their scope that the File Browser process can write to. The precondition is a dangling symlink present inside the user\u0027s scope, which is the same out-of-band precondition the rest of `ScopedFs` is built to defend against.\n\nThis is a patch-gap variant of the GHSA-239w-m3h6-ch8v symlink confinement issue, not a resubmission of the already-published vulnerable-version behavior: GHSA-239w-m3h6-ch8v marks `\u003c= 2.63.13` vulnerable and `2.63.14` patched, while this proof reproduces on current `master` / `v2.63.15` (`be23ab3a15bf957928ecfed88de5ab67850c1b9c`). The escaping-symlink-to-an-existing-target case is defended and tested. The dangling case is neither, and the gap is acknowledged in a code comment as \"best-effort\".\n\n## Root cause\n\n`files/scoped.go` (commit `be23ab3`). The guard, including the maintainer comment that already flags this exact gap:\n\n```go\n// Note: a dangling symlink whose target does not yet exist resolves to its\n// containing directory and is therefore allowed; writing through such a link\n// could still create a file outside the scope. This is treated as best-effort\n// and relies on rejecting existing escaping symlinks, which covers the\n// disclosure and overwrite vectors.\nfunc (s *ScopedFs) within(p string) (bool, error) {\n root, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(afero.FullBaseFsPath(s.base, \"/\"))\n if err != nil {\n return false, err\n }\n\n target := afero.FullBaseFsPath(s.base, p)\n resolved, err := filepath.EvalSymlinks(target)\n for errors.Is(err, fs.ErrNotExist) {\n parent := filepath.Dir(target) // LEXICAL parent of the link path\n if parent == target {\n break\n }\n target = parent\n resolved, err = filepath.EvalSymlinks(target)\n }\n if err != nil {\n return false, err\n }\n // ...\n return resolved == root || strings.HasPrefix(resolved, prefix), nil\n}\n```\n\nWhen `p` is a symlink whose target does not exist, `EvalSymlinks(target)` returns `fs.ErrNotExist`. The loop takes the lexical parent of the link path (`filepath.Dir`), a real directory inside the scope, and `EvalSymlinks` of that resolves under the scope root. `within()` returns `true` and `guard()` permits the operation. The write then dereferences the link at the OS layer:\n\n```go\nfunc (s *ScopedFs) OpenFile(name string, flag int, perm os.FileMode) (afero.File, error) {\n if err := s.guard(name); err != nil { // returns nil for a dangling escaping symlink\n return nil, err\n }\n return s.base.OpenFile(name, flag, perm) // os.OpenFile(O_CREATE) follows the link\n}\n```\n\nThe assumption that breaks: `within()` treats \"target does not exist\" as \"brand-new in-scope file\" and validates the containing directory. But the path component being created is itself a symlink pointing outside the scope. `O_CREATE` follows it and creates the file at the link target, not inside the validated directory. The existing-target case is correctly blocked, because the walk-up resolves the link itself to an out-of-scope path. Only the dangling case slips through.\n\nFor the layout below:\n\n```text\n/tmp/root/scope/escape -\u003e /tmp/root/outside/created-by-http.txt\n/tmp/root/outside/ # exists\n/tmp/root/outside/created-by-http.txt # does not exist yet\n```\n\n`EvalSymlinks(/tmp/root/scope/escape)` returns not-exist, and the fallback validates `/tmp/root/scope`. The final `OpenFile` still follows `/tmp/root/scope/escape` and creates `/tmp/root/outside/created-by-http.txt`.\n\n## Reachability over HTTP\n\nEndpoint: `POST /api/resources/\u003clinkname\u003e?override=true` (also `PUT`, and `POST/PATCH /api/tus/...`). Verified trace against the audited source:\n\n1. `http/resource.go` `resourcePostHandler` requires `d.user.Perm.Create` (else 403).\n2. `files.NewFileInfo` is called. For a dangling symlink, `stat()` in `files/file.go` does `LstatIfPossible` (sees the symlink, `err == nil`, `IsSymlink = true`), then `Fs.Stat` follows the link and fails with ENOENT, so the code returns the symlink `FileInfo` with `err == nil`. The handler therefore enters the \"file exists\" branch.\n3. The branch requires `override == \"true\"` and `d.user.Perm.Modify`, then proceeds.\n4. `writeFile(d.user.Fs, r.URL.Path, r.Body, ...)` calls `afs.OpenFile(dst, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, fileMode)`.\n5. `ScopedFs.OpenFile` runs `guard()`, which passes for the dangling link, then `os.OpenFile` follows the link and creates the file outside the scope with the request body as content.\n\nThe TUS path (`http/tus_handlers.go` `tusPostHandler` -\u003e `OpenFile`, then `tusPatchHandler`) reaches the same sink.\n\n### Why existing defenses do not apply\n\n- `afero.BasePathFs` lexical confinement only neutralizes `..`. A plain link name passes it unchanged.\n- `ScopedFs.within()` is the dedicated symlink defense, and it is the component that fails: the not-exist walk-up validates the link\u0027s parent directory instead of the link.\n- The project\u0027s symlink tests (`http/tus_symlink_test.go` `TestTusHandlersRejectSymlinkScopeEscape`, `files/file_test.go`) only exercise escaping symlinks whose target exists. Those are blocked. The dangling variant is never tested, so the regression suite does not catch it.\n\n## Proof of concept\n\nThe PoC drives the real security boundary, `files.NewScopedFs`, with the same flags `http.writeFile` uses, and shows the write landing outside the scope. A control test shows the existing-target case is still blocked, proving the guard is real and the gap is specifically the dangling case.\n\n```go\nconst writeFlags = os.O_RDWR | os.O_CREATE | os.O_TRUNC // == http.writeFile\n\nscope := filepath.Join(root, \"user\") // the low-priv user\u0027s jail\noutside := filepath.Join(root, \"outside\") // sibling dir = another tenant / host path\n\n// Precondition: a dangling escaping symlink inside the scope.\nos.Symlink(filepath.Join(outside, \"pwned.txt\"), filepath.Join(scope, \"evil\")) // target does not exist yet\n\nfs := files.NewScopedFs(afero.NewOsFs(), scope)\nf, _ := fs.OpenFile(\"/evil\", writeFlags, 0o644) // not rejected\nf.WriteString(\"OWNED-OUTSIDE-SCOPE\")\n// assert: outside/pwned.txt must NOT exist\n```\n\nObserved result:\n\n```text\n=== RUN TestDanglingSymlinkWriteEscapesScope\n poc_test.go:49: VULNERABLE: write escaped the scope and created\n /tmp/.../001/outside/pwned.txt with content \"OWNED-OUTSIDE-SCOPE\"\n--- FAIL: TestDanglingSymlinkWriteEscapesScope (0.00s)\n=== RUN TestExistingTargetSymlinkIsBlocked\n poc_test.go:78: guard correctly blocked existing-target escape: permission denied\n--- PASS: TestExistingTargetSymlinkIsBlocked (0.00s)\n```\n\nThe dangling test \"fails\" by design: the assertion fires because the file escaped. The control test passes: an `escape_link -\u003e outside` (existing dir) write to `escape_link/injected.txt` is rejected by `OpenFile` with `permission denied` and nothing is created in `outside/`. That is exactly the scenario the project\u0027s own tests cover.\n\nEnd-to-end HTTP equivalent:\n\n```text\nPOST /api/resources/escape?override=true\nX-Auth: \u003ctoken for user scoped to /tmp/root/scope with Create+Modify\u003e\nbody: http-outside\n\n-\u003e ScopedFs.OpenFile(\"/escape\", O_CREATE|O_TRUNC) follows the dangling link\n-\u003e file created at the link\u0027s out-of-scope target with the request body\n```\n\nThe handler returns `200 OK`, and the outside file contains the uploaded body.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Direct primitive (live-verified):** arbitrary file creation with attacker-controlled content at any non-existent path outside the user\u0027s scope that the File Browser process user can write to.\n- **Cross-tenant integrity (source-reasoned):** in multi-user deployments the scopes are sibling directories under one server root. A low-priv user can plant files into another user\u0027s home (a script, an HTML page later served, a config the victim trusts).\n- **Persistence / RCE on permissive deployments (source-reasoned):** creating a not-yet-existent `~/.ssh/authorized_keys` for the service account, a file under a web-served or later-executed directory, a cron or profile fragment. The official Docker image runs as non-root UID 1000, which bounds this to whatever that user owns. Bare-metal/systemd deployments that run File Browser as root raise this to host-level file write and RCE.\n- **Scope limit (honest):** this is file creation, not overwrite. Overwriting an existing out-of-scope file is genuinely blocked, because an existing target makes the link \"escaping\" and `within()` rejects it. The negative control confirms this.\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\nFor write/create/truncate operations, do not treat a dangling final symlink as safe merely because the nearest existing ancestor is inside the scope. The walk-up in `within()` should treat \"the leaf is a symlink\" as an escape candidate rather than validating its parent:\n\n- In `guard()` / `within()`, `Lstat` the target. If it is a symlink, `Readlink` it, resolve the link target lexically (join with the link\u0027s directory, `Clean`), and require that target to be within the scope root, regardless of whether it currently exists.\n- More robust: resolve path components one by one for the operation being attempted, or open the final component with `O_NOFOLLOW` (`unix.Openat(... O_NOFOLLOW)`) so creating through a symlink fails with `ELOOP`; or `fstat` the descriptor after opening and verify it resolves within the scope before writing.\n\nAdd a regression test mirroring `TestTusHandlersRejectSymlinkScopeEscape` but with a dangling target (`os.Symlink(filepath.Join(outside, \"newfile\"), ...)`), asserting both a 4xx and that no file is created outside the scope.\n\n## References\n\n- Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-54094 / `GHSA-239w-m3h6-ch8v`.\n- Affected code: `files/scoped.go` (`ScopedFs.within`, `ScopedFs.OpenFile`, `ScopedFs.Create`), reached from `http/resource.go` (`resourcePostHandler`, `writeFile`) and `http/tus_handlers.go`.\n- Confirmed unpatched at `be23ab3a15bf957928ecfed88de5ab67850c1b9c` (`v2.63.15`).",
"id": "GHSA-8wc8-hf36-mjh9",
"modified": "2026-07-20T21:17:43Z",
"published": "2026-07-20T21:17:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/security/advisories/GHSA-8wc8-hf36-mjh9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55668"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/commit/64511ce45e3be379e965f7f4fb0929a068d5bb81"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/filebrowser/filebrowser/releases/tag/v2.63.16"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "File Browser: ScopedFs follows a dangling symlink on write, letting a scoped user create files outside their scope"
}
GHSA-8WCV-4H46-66MG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-18 09:31 – Updated: 2025-08-18 09:31CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following') vulnerability exists that could cause arbitrary data to be written to protected locations, potentially leading to escalation of privilege, arbitrary file corruption, exposure of application and system information or persistent denial of service when a low-privileged attacker tampers with the installation folder.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-5296"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-08-18T08:15:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access (\u0027Link Following\u0027) vulnerability exists that could cause \narbitrary data to be written to protected locations, potentially leading to escalation of privilege, arbitrary file \ncorruption, exposure of application and system information or persistent denial of service when a low-privileged \nattacker tampers with the installation folder.",
"id": "GHSA-8wcv-4h46-66mg",
"modified": "2025-08-18T09:31:44Z",
"published": "2025-08-18T09:31:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-5296"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://download.schneider-electric.com/files?p_Doc_Ref=SEVD-2025-224-03\u0026p_enDocType=Security+and+Safety+Notice\u0026p_File_Name=SEVD-2025-224-03.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-8WQ8-5C8G-WX7G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 23:49 – Updated: 2022-05-01 23:49opensuse-updater in openSUSE 10.2 allows local users to access arbitrary files via a symlink attack.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-2389"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-06-06T22:32:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "opensuse-updater in openSUSE 10.2 allows local users to access arbitrary files via a symlink attack.",
"id": "GHSA-8wq8-5c8g-wx7g",
"modified": "2022-05-01T23:49:36Z",
"published": "2022-05-01T23:49:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-2389"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2008-06/msg00001.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://secunia.com/advisories/30581"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/29608"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-8WRQ-C77W-9J2F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:53 – Updated: 2022-05-17 05:53noip2 in noip2 2.1.7 allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink attack on the /tmp/noip2 temporary file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2008-5369"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2008-12-08T23:30:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "noip2 in noip2 2.1.7 allows local users to overwrite arbitrary files via a symlink attack on the /tmp/noip2 temporary file.",
"id": "GHSA-8wrq-c77w-9j2f",
"modified": "2022-05-17T05:53:18Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T05:53:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2008-5369"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2008/08/msg00283.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-8XGX-M7F9-XJ3Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-04 03:30 – Updated: 2025-12-17 21:30This issue was addressed with improved validation of symlinks. This issue is fixed in visionOS 26.1, macOS Sonoma 14.8.2, macOS Sequoia 15.7.2, watchOS 26.1, iOS 26.1 and iPadOS 26.1, tvOS 26.1. An app may be able to access protected user data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-43379"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-04T02:15:45Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "This issue was addressed with improved validation of symlinks. This issue is fixed in visionOS 26.1, macOS Sonoma 14.8.2, macOS Sequoia 15.7.2, watchOS 26.1, iOS 26.1 and iPadOS 26.1, tvOS 26.1. An app may be able to access protected user data.",
"id": "GHSA-8xgx-m7f9-xj3q",
"modified": "2025-12-17T21:30:32Z",
"published": "2025-11-04T03:30:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43379"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125632"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125634"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125635"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125636"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125637"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125638"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.apple.com/en-us/125639"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-8XR7-6JGF-M2RQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 21:32 – Updated: 2026-07-21 21:32Data::NDArray::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.
The segment is created in ndarray.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.
A "Shared" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-64616"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-21T20:17:04Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "Data::NDArray::Shared versions before 0.02 for Perl create a world-readable mmap backing file and open it without O_EXCL or O_NOFOLLOW.\n\nThe segment is created in ndarray.h with open(path, O_RDWR|O_CREAT, 0666). The mode is 0666, so under the default umask 022 the file is created mode 0644 (world-readable). O_NOFOLLOW is absent, so a symlink planted at the path is followed, and O_EXCL is absent, so the open silently uses a pre-planted file instead of failing.\n\nA \"Shared\" segment naturally lives in a shared directory such as /tmp or /dev/shm, where any local user can read the IPC payloads stored in the world-readable segment, and a pre-planted file or symlink at the path lets a local attacker win a pre-creation race or redirect the open.",
"id": "GHSA-8xr7-6jgf-m2rq",
"modified": "2026-07-21T21:32:41Z",
"published": "2026-07-21T21:32:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64616"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/EGOR/Data-NDArray-Shared-0.02/changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/EGOR/Data-NDArray-Shared-0.02/diff/EGOR/Data-NDArray-Shared-0.01#ndarray.h"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-9247-4234-VWRQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-10 12:31 – Updated: 2026-03-31 12:31A local privilege escalation vulnerability in Bitdefender Total Security 27.0.46.231 allows low-privileged attackers to elevate privileges. The issue arises from bdservicehost.exe deleting files from a user-writable directory (C:\ProgramData\Atc\Feedback) without proper symbolic link validation, enabling arbitrary file deletion. This issue is chained with a file copy operation during network events and a filter driver bypass via DLL injection to achieve arbitrary file copy and code execution as elevated user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-7073"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-12-10T10:16:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A local privilege escalation vulnerability in Bitdefender Total Security 27.0.46.231 allows low-privileged attackers to elevate privileges. The issue arises from bdservicehost.exe\u00a0deleting files from a user-writable directory (C:\\ProgramData\\Atc\\Feedback) without proper symbolic link validation, enabling arbitrary file deletion. This issue is chained with a file copy operation during network events and a filter driver bypass via DLL injection to achieve arbitrary file copy and code execution as elevated user.",
"id": "GHSA-9247-4234-vwrq",
"modified": "2026-03-31T12:31:34Z",
"published": "2025-12-10T12:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-7073"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.bitdefender.com/support/security-advisories/local-privilege-escalation-via-arbitrary-file-operation-in-bitdefender-atc-va-12590"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-927G-CFPC-W2J4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:41 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:41The IPTables-Parse module before 1.6 for Perl allows local users to write to arbitrary files owned by the current user.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-8326"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-59"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-06-07T14:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The IPTables-Parse module before 1.6 for Perl allows local users to write to arbitrary files owned by the current user.",
"id": "GHSA-927g-cfpc-w2j4",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:41:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:41:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-8326"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mtrmac/IPTables-Parse/commit/b400b976d81140f6971132e94eb7657b5b0a2b87"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1267962"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/source/MRASH/IPTables-Parse-1.6/Changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/11/24/10"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-48.1
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
- Follow the principle of least privilege when assigning access rights to entities in a software system.
- Denying access to a file can prevent an attacker from replacing that file with a link to a sensitive file. Ensure good compartmentalization in the system to provide protected areas that can be trusted.
CAPEC-132: Symlink Attack
An adversary positions a symbolic link in such a manner that the targeted user or application accesses the link's endpoint, assuming that it is accessing a file with the link's name.
CAPEC-17: Using Malicious Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's configuration that allows an adversary to either directly access an executable file, for example through shell access; or in a possible worst case allows an adversary to upload a file and then execute it. Web servers, ftp servers, and message oriented middleware systems which have many integration points are particularly vulnerable, because both the programmers and the administrators must be in synch regarding the interfaces and the correct privileges for each interface.
CAPEC-35: Leverage Executable Code in Non-Executable Files
An attack of this type exploits a system's trust in configuration and resource files. When the executable loads the resource (such as an image file or configuration file) the attacker has modified the file to either execute malicious code directly or manipulate the target process (e.g. application server) to execute based on the malicious configuration parameters. Since systems are increasingly interrelated mashing up resources from local and remote sources the possibility of this attack occurring is high.
CAPEC-76: Manipulating Web Input to File System Calls
An attacker manipulates inputs to the target software which the target software passes to file system calls in the OS. The goal is to gain access to, and perhaps modify, areas of the file system that the target software did not intend to be accessible.