Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-532

Allowed

Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File

Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product writes sensitive information to a log file.

1745 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-7XGW-6QF3-7W59

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 18:24 – Updated: 2026-05-14 18:24
VLAI
Summary
dbt MCP Server Logs Tool Arguments Including SQL Queries and Credentials in Plaintext Without Redaction When File Logging Is Enabled
Details

Discovered through manual source code review. Verified by PoC execution against a local dbt-mcp v1.15.1 installation.

Summary

DbtMCP.call_tool() in src/dbt_mcp/mcp/server.py logs the complete raw arguments dictionary at INFO level on every tool invocation (line 67) and again at ERROR level if the call raises an exception (lines 77–79). No field is redacted before logging. When the documented DBT_MCP_SERVER_FILE_LOGGING=true feature is enabled, these log records are written to dbt-mcp.log in the project root directory as plaintext. Sensitive data — raw SQL queries, --vars payloads carrying credentials, node selectors — persists on disk indefinitely with no automatic rotation or deletion.

Details

Vulnerable log statements (server.py):

# Line 67 — emitted before every tool execution
logger.info(f"Calling tool: {name} with arguments: {arguments}")

# Lines 77–79 — emitted if the tool raises an exception (double-logging on failure)
logger.error(
    f"Error calling tool: {name} with arguments: {arguments} "
    f"in {end_time - start_time}ms: {e}"
)

arguments is the raw Python dict received from the MCP client. It is string-interpolated directly into the log message. On a tool call that raises an exception, the same dict is logged twice — once at INFO and once at ERROR.

File logging is activated by DBT_MCP_SERVER_FILE_LOGGING=true (a documented feature in the project README). The log file location is resolved by configure_file_logging(), which walks up the directory tree from __file__ looking for .git or pyproject.toml, falling back to $HOME. Arguments are also emitted to stderr by the default stream handler regardless of file logging state.

PoC

MCP client script — triggers real tool calls and verifies log file contents:

#!/usr/bin/env python3
# poc4_tool_args_logged.py
# Vulnerable code: src/dbt_mcp/mcp/server.py line 67, 77-79
# configure_file_logging(): src/dbt_mcp/telemetry/logging.py

import logging
from pathlib import Path

LOG_FILENAME = "dbt-mcp.log"

def configure_file_logging(log_level: int = logging.INFO) -> Path:
    """Reproduction of configure_file_logging() from telemetry/logging.py."""
    module_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parent
    home = Path.home().resolve()
    for candidate in [module_path, *module_path.parents]:
        if (candidate / ".git").exists() or (candidate / "pyproject.toml").exists() or candidate == home:
            repo_root = candidate
            break
    log_path = repo_root / LOG_FILENAME
    root_logger = logging.getLogger()
    root_logger.setLevel(log_level)
    file_handler = logging.FileHandler(log_path, encoding="utf-8")
    file_handler.setLevel(log_level)
    file_handler.setFormatter(
        logging.Formatter("%(asctime)s %(levelname)s [%(name)s] %(message)s")
    )
    root_logger.addHandler(file_handler)
    return log_path

log_path = configure_file_logging()
server_logger = logging.getLogger("dbt_mcp.mcp.server")

# Exact log statements from server.py line 67 and line 77-79
name = "show"
arguments = {"sql_query": "SELECT ssn, credit_card_number, salary FROM customers WHERE id = 42", "limit": 5}
server_logger.info(f"Calling tool: {name} with arguments: {arguments}")

name2 = "run"
arguments2 = {"node_selection": "sensitive_model", "vars": '{"db_password": "hunter2", "api_key": "sk-prod-abc123xyz"}', "is_full_refresh": False}
server_logger.info(f"Calling tool: {name2} with arguments: {arguments2}")

# Verify file contents
lines = log_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8").splitlines()
poc_lines = [l for l in lines if "dbt_mcp.mcp.server" in l]
print(f"[log file: {log_path}]")
for line in poc_lines:
    print(f"  {line}")

keywords = ["ssn", "credit_card_number", "salary", "db_password", "api_key"]
found = [kw for kw in keywords if any(kw in l for l in poc_lines)]
if found:
    print(f"\n[CONFIRMED] Sensitive keywords in plaintext log: {found}")
    print(f"[CONFIRMED] No redaction applied. File persists at {log_path}")

Expected log file entries:

2026-04-27 ... INFO [dbt_mcp.mcp.server] Calling tool: show with arguments:
  {'sql_query': 'SELECT ssn, credit_card_number, salary FROM customers', 'limit': 5}

2026-04-27 ... INFO [dbt_mcp.mcp.server] Calling tool: run with arguments:
  {'node_selection': 'sensitive_model',
   'vars': '{"db_password":"hunter2","api_key":"sk-prod-abc123"}',
   'is_full_refresh': False}

[CONFIRMED] Sensitive keywords in plaintext log: ['ssn', 'credit_card_number', 'salary', 'db_password', 'api_key']
[CONFIRMED] No redaction applied.

image

Impact

Directly proven by this PoC:

  • When DBT_MCP_SERVER_FILE_LOGGING=true, the full arguments dict of every tool call — including sql_query, vars, and node_selection — is written to dbt-mcp.log in plaintext on every invocation.
  • A tool call that raises an exception produces two log entries with the same sensitive content (INFO + ERROR double-logging).
  • The log file has no automatic rotation, expiry, or access restriction beyond filesystem permissions.

Combined with Advisory 3 (telemetry), a single show tool call containing PII produces one telemetry transmission to dbt Labs and one (or two, on failure) persistent log entries on disk.

Remediation

redact known-sensitive argument values before logging:

_LOG_REDACT = frozenset({"sql_query", "vars"})

def _safe_args(arguments: dict) -> dict:
    return {k: "***redacted***" if k in _LOG_REDACT else v
            for k, v in arguments.items()}

# server.py line 67:
logger.info(f"Calling tool: {name} with arguments: {_safe_args(arguments)}")

# server.py lines 77-79:
logger.error(
    f"Error calling tool: {name} with arguments: {_safe_args(arguments)} "
    f"in {end_time - start_time}ms: {e}"
)

log argument keys only:

logger.info(f"Calling tool: {name} with argument keys: {list(arguments.keys())}")

File logging: Consider reducing the default log level for the file handler to WARNING so that normal-operation INFO records (which include arguments) are not persisted. Sensitive content would only appear in file logs on error.

Severity
2.5 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.17.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "dbt-mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.17.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-44969"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T18:24:44Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "*Discovered through manual source code review. Verified by PoC execution against a local dbt-mcp v1.15.1 installation.*\n\n### Summary\n\n`DbtMCP.call_tool()` in `src/dbt_mcp/mcp/server.py` logs the complete raw `arguments` dictionary at `INFO` level on every tool invocation (line 67) and again at `ERROR` level if the call raises an exception (lines 77\u201379). No field is redacted before logging. When the documented `DBT_MCP_SERVER_FILE_LOGGING=true` feature is enabled, these log records are written to `dbt-mcp.log` in the project root directory as plaintext. Sensitive data \u2014 raw SQL queries, `--vars` payloads carrying credentials, node selectors \u2014 persists on disk indefinitely with no automatic rotation or deletion.\n\n### Details\n\n**Vulnerable log statements (`server.py`):**\n\n```python\n# Line 67 \u2014 emitted before every tool execution\nlogger.info(f\"Calling tool: {name} with arguments: {arguments}\")\n\n# Lines 77\u201379 \u2014 emitted if the tool raises an exception (double-logging on failure)\nlogger.error(\n    f\"Error calling tool: {name} with arguments: {arguments} \"\n    f\"in {end_time - start_time}ms: {e}\"\n)\n```\n\n`arguments` is the raw Python dict received from the MCP client. It is string-interpolated directly into the log message. On a tool call that raises an exception, the same dict is logged twice \u2014 once at INFO and once at ERROR.\n\nFile logging is activated by `DBT_MCP_SERVER_FILE_LOGGING=true` (a documented feature in the project README). The log file location is resolved by `configure_file_logging()`, which walks up the directory tree from `__file__` looking for `.git` or `pyproject.toml`, falling back to `$HOME`. Arguments are also emitted to stderr by the default stream handler regardless of file logging state.\n\n### PoC\n\n**MCP client script \u2014 triggers real tool calls and verifies log file contents:**\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n# poc4_tool_args_logged.py\n# Vulnerable code: src/dbt_mcp/mcp/server.py line 67, 77-79\n# configure_file_logging(): src/dbt_mcp/telemetry/logging.py\n\nimport logging\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nLOG_FILENAME = \"dbt-mcp.log\"\n\ndef configure_file_logging(log_level: int = logging.INFO) -\u003e Path:\n    \"\"\"Reproduction of configure_file_logging() from telemetry/logging.py.\"\"\"\n    module_path = Path(__file__).resolve().parent\n    home = Path.home().resolve()\n    for candidate in [module_path, *module_path.parents]:\n        if (candidate / \".git\").exists() or (candidate / \"pyproject.toml\").exists() or candidate == home:\n            repo_root = candidate\n            break\n    log_path = repo_root / LOG_FILENAME\n    root_logger = logging.getLogger()\n    root_logger.setLevel(log_level)\n    file_handler = logging.FileHandler(log_path, encoding=\"utf-8\")\n    file_handler.setLevel(log_level)\n    file_handler.setFormatter(\n        logging.Formatter(\"%(asctime)s %(levelname)s [%(name)s] %(message)s\")\n    )\n    root_logger.addHandler(file_handler)\n    return log_path\n\nlog_path = configure_file_logging()\nserver_logger = logging.getLogger(\"dbt_mcp.mcp.server\")\n\n# Exact log statements from server.py line 67 and line 77-79\nname = \"show\"\narguments = {\"sql_query\": \"SELECT ssn, credit_card_number, salary FROM customers WHERE id = 42\", \"limit\": 5}\nserver_logger.info(f\"Calling tool: {name} with arguments: {arguments}\")\n\nname2 = \"run\"\narguments2 = {\"node_selection\": \"sensitive_model\", \"vars\": \u0027{\"db_password\": \"hunter2\", \"api_key\": \"sk-prod-abc123xyz\"}\u0027, \"is_full_refresh\": False}\nserver_logger.info(f\"Calling tool: {name2} with arguments: {arguments2}\")\n\n# Verify file contents\nlines = log_path.read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\").splitlines()\npoc_lines = [l for l in lines if \"dbt_mcp.mcp.server\" in l]\nprint(f\"[log file: {log_path}]\")\nfor line in poc_lines:\n    print(f\"  {line}\")\n\nkeywords = [\"ssn\", \"credit_card_number\", \"salary\", \"db_password\", \"api_key\"]\nfound = [kw for kw in keywords if any(kw in l for l in poc_lines)]\nif found:\n    print(f\"\\n[CONFIRMED] Sensitive keywords in plaintext log: {found}\")\n    print(f\"[CONFIRMED] No redaction applied. File persists at {log_path}\")\n```\n\n**Expected log file entries:**\n\n````\n2026-04-27 ... INFO [dbt_mcp.mcp.server] Calling tool: show with arguments:\n  {\u0027sql_query\u0027: \u0027SELECT ssn, credit_card_number, salary FROM customers\u0027, \u0027limit\u0027: 5}\n\n2026-04-27 ... INFO [dbt_mcp.mcp.server] Calling tool: run with arguments:\n  {\u0027node_selection\u0027: \u0027sensitive_model\u0027,\n   \u0027vars\u0027: \u0027{\"db_password\":\"hunter2\",\"api_key\":\"sk-prod-abc123\"}\u0027,\n   \u0027is_full_refresh\u0027: False}\n\n[CONFIRMED] Sensitive keywords in plaintext log: [\u0027ssn\u0027, \u0027credit_card_number\u0027, \u0027salary\u0027, \u0027db_password\u0027, \u0027api_key\u0027]\n[CONFIRMED] No redaction applied.\n````\n\n\u003cimg width=\"3798\" height=\"462\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b4c23a93-b3d3-4b7f-ba46-3d4a324d609f\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\n**Directly proven by this PoC:**\n\n- When `DBT_MCP_SERVER_FILE_LOGGING=true`, the full `arguments` dict of every tool call \u2014 including `sql_query`, `vars`, and `node_selection` \u2014 is written to `dbt-mcp.log` in plaintext on every invocation.\n- A tool call that raises an exception produces **two** log entries with the same sensitive content (INFO + ERROR double-logging).\n- The log file has no automatic rotation, expiry, or access restriction beyond filesystem permissions.\n\nCombined with Advisory 3 (telemetry), a single `show` tool call containing PII produces one telemetry transmission to dbt Labs **and** one (or two, on failure) persistent log entries on disk.\n\n### Remediation\n\n**redact known-sensitive argument values before logging:**\n\n```python\n_LOG_REDACT = frozenset({\"sql_query\", \"vars\"})\n\ndef _safe_args(arguments: dict) -\u003e dict:\n    return {k: \"***redacted***\" if k in _LOG_REDACT else v\n            for k, v in arguments.items()}\n\n# server.py line 67:\nlogger.info(f\"Calling tool: {name} with arguments: {_safe_args(arguments)}\")\n\n# server.py lines 77-79:\nlogger.error(\n    f\"Error calling tool: {name} with arguments: {_safe_args(arguments)} \"\n    f\"in {end_time - start_time}ms: {e}\"\n)\n```\n\n**log argument keys only:**\n\n```python\nlogger.info(f\"Calling tool: {name} with argument keys: {list(arguments.keys())}\")\n```\n\n**File logging:** Consider reducing the default log level for the file handler to `WARNING` so that normal-operation INFO records (which include arguments) are not persisted. Sensitive content would only appear in file logs on error.",
  "id": "GHSA-7xgw-6qf3-7w59",
  "modified": "2026-05-14T18:24:44Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T18:24:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-7xgw-6qf3-7w59"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-mcp"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-mcp/releases/tag/v1.17.1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "dbt MCP Server Logs Tool Arguments Including SQL Queries and Credentials in Plaintext Without Redaction When File Logging Is Enabled"
}

GHSA-8234-4CCX-5XMR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-23 00:30 – Updated: 2025-10-02 18:30
VLAI
Details

A potential security vulnerability has been identified in the Poly Clariti Manager for versions prior to 10.12.2. The vulnerability could potentially allow a privileged user to retrieve credentials from the log files. HP has addressed the issue in the latest software update.

Severity
4.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
5.7 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-43485"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-23T00:15:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A potential security\nvulnerability has been identified in the Poly Clariti Manager for versions\nprior to 10.12.2. The vulnerability could potentially allow a privileged\nuser to retrieve credentials from the log files. HP has addressed the issue in\nthe latest software update.",
  "id": "GHSA-8234-4ccx-5xmr",
  "modified": "2025-10-02T18:30:56Z",
  "published": "2025-07-23T00:30:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-43485"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.hp.com/us-en/document/ish_12781425-12781447-16/hbsbpy04037"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-824R-MJCW-Q34M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-07 09:30 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:33
VLAI
Details

The WP Reset plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 2.05 via the WF_Licensing::log() method when debugging is enabled (default). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to extract sensitive license key and site data.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-10645"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-07T09:15:32Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The WP Reset plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Sensitive Information Exposure in all versions up to, and including, 2.05 via the WF_Licensing::log() method when debugging is enabled (default). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to extract sensitive license key and site data.",
  "id": "GHSA-824r-mjcw-q34m",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T18:33:56Z",
  "published": "2025-10-07T09:30:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-10645"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3364169"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://research.cleantalk.org/cve-2025-10645"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/86741f4a-8700-45dd-8998-b3f0387c27ed?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-829V-PH86-CW55

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:33 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:33
VLAI
Details

Cloud Foundry Log Cache, versions prior to 1.1.1, logs its UAA client secret on startup as part of its envstruct report. A remote attacker who has gained access to the Log Cache VM can read this secret, gaining all privileges held by the Log Cache UAA client. In the worst case, if this client is an admin, the attacker would gain complete control over the Foundation.

Severity
9.8 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-1264"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2018-10-05T21:29:00Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Cloud Foundry Log Cache, versions prior to 1.1.1, logs its UAA client secret on startup as part of its envstruct report. A remote attacker who has gained access to the Log Cache VM can read this secret, gaining all privileges held by the Log Cache UAA client. In the worst case, if this client is an admin, the attacker would gain complete control over the Foundation.",
  "id": "GHSA-829v-ph86-cw55",
  "modified": "2022-05-13T01:33:25Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:33:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1264"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cloudfoundry.org/blog/cve-2018-1264"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-82QM-MFM4-GF87

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:57 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:04
VLAI
Details

In the proc filesystem, there is a possible information disclosure due to log information disclosure. This could lead to local disclosure of app and browser activity with User execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: AndroidVersions: Android-10Android ID: A-68016944

Severity
3.3 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-9277"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-09-27T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "In the proc filesystem, there is a possible information disclosure due to log information disclosure. This could lead to local disclosure of app and browser activity with User execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Product: AndroidVersions: Android-10Android ID: A-68016944",
  "id": "GHSA-82qm-mfm4-gf87",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T02:04:57Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T16:57:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9277"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/android-10"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8429-HRPG-37P6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-06-26 09:37 – Updated: 2024-06-26 09:37
VLAI
Details

Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File in Checkmk GmbH's Checkmk versions <2.3.0p7, <2.2.0p28, <2.1.0p45 and <=2.0.0p39 (EOL) causes automation user secrets to be written to audit log files accessible to administrators.

Severity
2.7 (Low)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-28830"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-06-26T08:15:09Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File in Checkmk GmbH\u0027s Checkmk versions \u003c2.3.0p7, \u003c2.2.0p28, \u003c2.1.0p45 and \u003c=2.0.0p39 (EOL) causes automation user secrets to be written to audit log files accessible to administrators.",
  "id": "GHSA-8429-hrpg-37p6",
  "modified": "2024-06-26T09:37:03Z",
  "published": "2024-06-26T09:37:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-28830"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://checkmk.com/werk/17056"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8449-7GC2-PWRP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-18 00:00 – Updated: 2024-05-20 21:32
VLAI
Summary
HashiCorp Consul Template could reveal Vault secret contents in error messages
Details

In HashiCorp Consul Template through version 0.29.1, invalid templates could inadvertently reveal the contents of Vault secret in errors returned by the *template.Template.Execute 5 method, when given a template using Vault secret contents incorrectly. This method has been updated to redact Vault secrets when creating an error string, making it safe to log the error.. This issue was fixed in version 0.29.2.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/hashicorp/consul-template"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.27.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/hashicorp/consul-template"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.28.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.28.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/hashicorp/consul-template"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.29.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.29.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-38149"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-08-30T20:17:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-08-17T15:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In HashiCorp Consul Template through version 0.29.1, invalid templates could inadvertently reveal the contents of Vault secret in errors returned by the `*template.Template.Execute 5` method, when given a template using Vault secret contents incorrectly. This method has been updated to redact Vault secrets when creating an error string, making it safe to log the error.. This issue was fixed in version 0.29.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-8449-7gc2-pwrp",
  "modified": "2024-05-20T21:32:47Z",
  "published": "2022-08-18T00:00:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-38149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul-template/commit/d6a6f4af219c28e67d847ba0e0b2bea8f5bb9076"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hsec-2022-16-consul-template-may-expose-vault-secrets-when-processing-invalid-input/43215"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/consul"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2022-0980"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "HashiCorp Consul Template could reveal Vault secret contents in error messages"
}

GHSA-85G9-M9J2-HCX2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-19 09:30 – Updated: 2024-12-20 18:31
VLAI
Details

Disclosure of sensitive information in HikVision camera driver's log file in XProtect Device Pack allows an attacker to read camera credentials stored in the Recording Server under specific conditions.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
5.2 (Medium)
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-12569"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-19T09:16:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Disclosure of sensitive information in HikVision camera driver\u0027s log file in XProtect Device Pack allows an attacker to read camera credentials stored in the Recording Server under specific conditions.",
  "id": "GHSA-85g9-m9j2-hcx2",
  "modified": "2024-12-20T18:31:31Z",
  "published": "2024-12-19T09:30:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-12569"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://supportcommunity.milestonesys.com/KBRedir?art=000067740\u0026lang=en_US"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-85PR-X7HH-4JW2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-23 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:09
VLAI
Details

IBM Robotic Process Automation 21.0.0 through 21.0.7.1 and 23.0.0 through 23.0.1 server could allow an authenticated user to view sensitive information from installation logs. IBM X-Force Id: 262293.

Severity
4.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-38733"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-22T22:15:08Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "\nIBM Robotic Process Automation 21.0.0 through 21.0.7.1 and 23.0.0 through 23.0.1 server could allow an authenticated user to view sensitive information from installation logs.  IBM X-Force Id:  262293.\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-85pr-x7hh-4jw2",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T07:09:26Z",
  "published": "2023-08-23T00:30:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38733"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/262293"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7028223"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-85Q5-VWQG-RM58

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-10 15:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 08:29
VLAI
Details

When on BIG-IP DNS or BIG-IP LTM enabled with DNS Services License, and a TSIG key is created, it is logged in plaintext in the audit log.  Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-41253"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-532"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-10T13:15:21Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "\nWhen on BIG-IP DNS or BIG-IP LTM enabled with DNS Services License, and a TSIG key is created, it is logged in plaintext in the audit log.\u00a0 Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.",
  "id": "GHSA-85q5-vwqg-rm58",
  "modified": "2024-04-04T08:29:01Z",
  "published": "2023-10-10T15:30:50Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-41253"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K98334513"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design Implementation

Consider seriously the sensitivity of the information written into log files. Do not write secrets into the log files.

Mitigation
Distribution

Remove debug log files before deploying the application into production.

Mitigation
Operation

Protect log files against unauthorized read/write.

Mitigation
Implementation

Adjust configurations appropriately when software is transitioned from a debug state to production.

CAPEC-215: Fuzzing for application mapping

An attacker sends random, malformed, or otherwise unexpected messages to a target application and observes the application's log or error messages returned. The attacker does not initially know how a target will respond to individual messages but by attempting a large number of message variants they may find a variant that trigger's desired behavior. In this attack, the purpose of the fuzzing is to observe the application's log and error messages, although fuzzing a target can also sometimes cause the target to enter an unstable state, causing a crash.

← Back to the CWE list