CWE-400
Weakness DiscouragedUncontrolled Resource Consumption
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Uncontrolled
- Behavior-Type: Consumption
- Resource-Type: Resource
Mapping guidance
CWE-400 is intended for incorrect behaviors in which the product is expected to track and restrict how many resources it consumes, but CWE-400 is often misused because it is conflated with the "technical impact" of vulnerabilities in which resource consumption occurs. It is sometimes used for low-information vulnerability reports. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).
Closely analyze the specific mistake that is causing resource consumption, and perform a CWE mapping for that mistake. Consider children/descendants.
Modes of introduction
The product could be operated in a system or environment with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.
The product could be configured with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.
The designer might not consider how to handle and throttle excessive resource requests, which typically requires careful planning to handle more gracefully than a crash or exit.
There are at least three distinct scenarios that can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources.
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage.
Not closing/returning a resource after processing.
Resource exhaustion problems often occur due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis typically has limited utility in recognizing resource exhaustion problems, except for program-independent system resources such as files, sockets, and processes. For system resources, automated static analysis may be able to detect circumstances in which resources are not released after they have expired. Automated analysis of configuration files may be able to detect settings that do not specify a maximum value.
Automated static analysis tools will not be appropriate for detecting exhaustion of custom resources, such as an intended security policy in which a bulletin board user is only allowed to make a limited number of posts per day.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Certain automated dynamic analysis techniques may be effective in spotting resource exhaustion problems, especially with resources such as processes, memory, and connections. The technique may involve generating a large number of requests to the product within a short time frame.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Fuzzing
While fuzzing is typically geared toward finding low-level implementation bugs, it can inadvertently find resource exhaustion problems. This can occur when the fuzzer generates a large number of test cases but does not restart the targeted product in between test cases. If an individual test case produces a crash, but it does not do so reliably, then an inability to handle resource exhaustion may be the cause.
Effectiveness: Opportunistic
Notes
Theoretical
Vulnerability theory is largely about how behaviors and resources interact. "Resource exhaustion" can be regarded as either a consequence or an attack, depending on the perspective. This entry is an attempt to reflect the underlying weaknesses that enable these attacks (or consequences) to take place.
Other
Database queries that take a long time to process are good DoS targets. An attacker would have to write a few lines of code to generate enough traffic to exceed the site's ability to keep up. This would effectively prevent authorized users from using the site at all. Resources can be exploited simply by ensuring that the target machine must do much more work and consume more resources in order to service a request than the attacker must do to initiate a request.
A prime example of this can be found in old switches that were vulnerable to "macof" attacks (so named for a tool developed by Dugsong). These attacks flooded a switch with random IP and MAC address combinations, therefore exhausting the switch's cache, which held the information of which port corresponded to which MAC addresses. Once this cache was exhausted, the switch would fail in an insecure way and would begin to act simply as a hub, broadcasting all traffic on all ports and allowing for basic sniffing attacks.
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, CPU, and others.
Content history
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability.
updated Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Description, Name, Relationships
updated Description
updated Name, Relationships
updated Description, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Description
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated References, Type
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Theoretical_Notes
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Description, Relationships
updated Description, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Modes_of_Introduction, Other_Notes, Time_of_Introduction
updated Observed_Examples, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes, Other_Notes
updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
7207 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-5379-R78W-42H2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-30 16:11 – Updated: 2024-02-10 00:55Impact
A malicious SAML payload can require transforms that consume significant system resources to process, thereby resulting in reduced or denied service. This would be an effective way to perform a denial-of-service attack.
Patches
This has been resolved in version 3.1.0. The resolution is to limit the number of allowable transforms to 2.
References
https://github.com/node-saml/passport-saml/pull/595
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "passport-saml"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-39171"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-08-27T23:25:28Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2021-08-27T22:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nA malicious SAML payload can require transforms that consume significant system resources to process, thereby resulting in reduced or denied service. This would be an effective way to perform a denial-of-service attack.\n\n### Patches\nThis has been resolved in version 3.1.0. The resolution is to limit the number of allowable transforms to 2.\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/node-saml/passport-saml/pull/595\n",
"id": "GHSA-5379-r78w-42h2",
"modified": "2024-02-10T00:55:45Z",
"published": "2021-08-30T16:11:57Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/node-saml/passport-saml/security/advisories/GHSA-5379-r78w-42h2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-39171"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/node-saml/passport-saml/pull/595"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/node-saml/passport-saml/commit/f1e00b64c21a725f545e675cd810bbaa435a3972"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/node-saml/passport-saml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Unlimited transforms allowed for signed nodes"
}
GHSA-538C-55JV-C5G9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-01 21:10 – Updated: 2026-04-01 21:10Summary
The ExternalDataInfo class in ONNX was using Python’s setattr() function to load metadata (like file paths or data lengths) directly from an ONNX model file. The problem? It didn’t check if the "keys" in the file were valid. Because it blindly trusted the file, an attacker could craft a malicious model that overwrites internal object properties.
Why its Dangerous
Instant Crash DoS: An attacker can set the length property to a massive number like 9 petabytes. When the system tries to load the model, it attempts to allocate all that RAM at once, causing the server to crash or freeze Out of Memory.
Access Bypass: By setting a negative offset -1, an attacker can trick the system into reading parts of a file it wasn't supposed to touch.
Object Corruption: Attackers can even inject "dunder" attributes like class to change the object's type entirely, which could lead to more complex exploits.
Fixed: https://github.com/onnx/onnx/pull/7751 object state corruption and DoS via ExternalDataInfo attribute injection
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.20.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "onnx"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.21.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-34445"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-400",
"CWE-915"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-01T21:10:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-01T18:16:30Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe ExternalDataInfo class in ONNX was using Python\u2019s setattr() function to load metadata (like file paths or data lengths) directly from an ONNX model file. The problem? It didn\u2019t check if the \"keys\" in the file were valid. Because it blindly trusted the file, an attacker could craft a malicious model that overwrites internal object properties.\n\n### Why its Dangerous\n**Instant Crash DoS**: An attacker can set the length property to a massive number like 9 petabytes. When the system tries to load the model, it attempts to allocate all that RAM at once, causing the server to crash or freeze Out of Memory.\n\n**Access Bypass**: By setting a negative offset -1, an attacker can trick the system into reading parts of a file it wasn\u0027t supposed to touch.\n\n**Object Corruption**: Attackers can even inject \"dunder\" attributes like __class__ to change the object\u0027s type entirely, which could lead to more complex exploits.\n\n**Fixed**: https://github.com/onnx/onnx/pull/7751 object state corruption and DoS via ExternalDataInfo attribute injection",
"id": "GHSA-538c-55jv-c5g9",
"modified": "2026-04-01T21:10:52Z",
"published": "2026-04-01T21:10:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/onnx/onnx/security/advisories/GHSA-538c-55jv-c5g9"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34445"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/onnx/onnx/pull/7751"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/onnx/onnx/commit/e30c6935d67cc3eca2fa284e37248e7c0036c46b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/onnx/onnx"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ONNX: Malicious ONNX models can crash servers by exploiting unprotected object settings."
}
GHSA-53CQ-V8H5-F4V2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:29 – Updated: 2022-10-27 19:00A vulnerability in the Split DNS feature of Cisco IOS Software and Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause an affected device to reload, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. The vulnerability occurs because the regular expression (regex) engine that is used with the Split DNS feature of affected releases may time out when it processes the DNS name list configuration. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by trying to resolve an address or hostname that the affected device handles. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the device to reload, resulting in a DoS condition.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-3408"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-185",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-09-24T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the Split DNS feature of Cisco IOS Software and Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause an affected device to reload, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. The vulnerability occurs because the regular expression (regex) engine that is used with the Split DNS feature of affected releases may time out when it processes the DNS name list configuration. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by trying to resolve an address or hostname that the affected device handles. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the device to reload, resulting in a DoS condition.",
"id": "GHSA-53cq-v8h5-f4v2",
"modified": "2022-10-27T19:00:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:29:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-3408"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-splitdns-SPWqpdGW"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-53HP-JPWQ-2JGQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-09 23:01 – Updated: 2026-06-11 14:28A specially crafted sequence of HTTP/2 requests sent to Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M5, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.35 and 8.5.0 to 8.5.55 could trigger high CPU usage for several seconds. If a sufficient number of such requests were made on concurrent HTTP/2 connections, the server could become unresponsive.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.0-M4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.tomcat:tomcat"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0-M1"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.0-M5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
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"name": "org.apache.tomcat:tomcat"
},
"ranges": [
{
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}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.tomcat:tomcat"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.5.55"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 10.0.0-M4"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "10.0.0-M1"
},
{
"fixed": "10.0.0-M5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0.M1"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.35"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.tomcat.embed:tomcat-embed-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.5.55"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-11996"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-12T19:42:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-06-26T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A specially crafted sequence of HTTP/2 requests sent to Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M5, 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.35 and 8.5.0 to 8.5.55 could trigger high CPU usage for several seconds. If a sufficient number of such requests were made on concurrent HTTP/2 connections, the server could become unresponsive.",
"id": "GHSA-53hp-jpwq-2jgq",
"modified": "2026-06-11T14:28:00Z",
"published": "2022-02-09T23:01:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-11996"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/tomcat/commit/9434a44d3449d620b1be70206819f8275b4a7509"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/tomcat/commit/9a0231683a77e2957cea0fdee88b193b30b0c976"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/tomcat/commit/c8acd2ab7371e39aeca7c306f3b5380f00afe552"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rb820f1a2a02bf07414be12c653c2ab5321fd87b9bf6c5e635c53ff4b@%3Cnotifications.ofbiz.apache.org%3E"
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{
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},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2020/07/msg00010.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20200709-0002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tomcat.apache.org/security-10.html"
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"url": "https://tomcat.apache.org/security-8.html"
},
{
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"url": "https://tomcat.apache.org/security-9.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/4596-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2020/dsa-4727"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpujan2021.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuoct2020.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/rb4ee49ecc4c59620ffd5e66e84a17e526c2c3cfa95d0cd682d90d338@%3Cnotifications.ofbiz.apache.org%3E"
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{
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{
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},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r5541ef6b6b68b49f76fc4c45695940116da2bcbe0312ef204a00a2e0%40%3Cannounce.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r3ea96d8f36dd404acce83df8aeb22a9e807d6c13ca9c5dec72f872cd@%3Cnotifications.ofbiz.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/r2529016c311ce9485e6f173446d469600fdfbb94dccadfcd9dfdac79@%3Cusers.tomcat.apache.org%3E"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/tomcat"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-07/msg00064.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2020-07/msg00072.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Uncontrolled Resource Consumption in Apache Tomcat"
}
GHSA-53M5-VJVM-VWJJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-08 03:30 – Updated: 2026-11-08 03:30Vikunja from 1.0.0 before 2.7.1 contains an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability that allows authenticated users to bypass service.maxitemsperpage by sending page=0 to /api/v1 list endpoints. Attackers can self-register and repeatedly request page=0 to force unbounded SQL queries, memory materialisation, and per-row query fan-out, degrading availability for other users.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-123531"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-08T02:16:43Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vikunja from 1.0.0 before 2.7.1 contains an uncontrolled resource consumption vulnerability that allows authenticated users to bypass service.maxitemsperpage by sending page=0 to /api/v1 list endpoints. Attackers can self-register and repeatedly request page=0 to force unbounded SQL queries, memory materialisation, and per-row query fan-out, degrading availability for other users.",
"id": "GHSA-53m5-vjvm-vwjj",
"modified": "2026-11-08T03:30:30Z",
"published": "2026-11-08T03:30:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-v579-5fwc-gr28"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-123531"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/vikunja-1.0.0-before-2.7.1-pagination-limit-bypass-via-page-0-parameter"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-53PG-5QP8-MHVR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 23:49 – Updated: 2026-11-19 23:49Summary
Four hypernym-walking methods on the WordNet Synset class in nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py (max_depth, min_depth, hypernym_paths, and hypernym_distances) traverse the hypernym pointer graph by direct recursion with no visited-node set and no depth cap. WordNet data.<pos> file content is untrusted corpus input in NLTK, the same trust boundary the project already treats as attacker-controlled across its corpus-content hardening work. When the parsed hypernym graph contains a cycle, or a chain deeper than the interpreter recursion limit, these methods recurse without bound and raise an uncaught RecursionError, aborting the traversal and any worker that does not catch it. No special privileges are needed; the victim only has to load an attacker-supplied corpus and call any of several shipped public methods that reach these walkers.
Root Cause
Synset.max_depth computes 1 + max(h.max_depth() for h in hypernyms) and only assigns its _max_depth memo after that recursive expression fully returns. Because Python evaluates the right-hand side completely before binding the left-hand side, the memo is never set on a node that is still on the recursion stack, so a cyclic graph re-enters the same not-yet-memoized node indefinitely. min_depth, hypernym_paths, and hypernym_distances follow the same recursive descent with no cycle detection. The security invariant that graph traversal over untrusted corpus data must terminate is violated: the pointer offsets parsed from the data file are stored verbatim with no graph-shape validation, so the attacker controls the graph topology. The sibling walkers in the same class (closure, tree, _shortest_hypernym_paths) were hardened with acyclic/visited guards, which shows cyclic hypernym graphs are an in-scope threat that these four methods simply were not converted to handle.
Affected functions in nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:
Synset.max_depth (nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:550)
Synset.min_depth (nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:564)
Synset.hypernym_paths (nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:666)
Synset.hypernym_distances (nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:768)
Untrusted pointer stored at nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:1694
Re-entry edge: hypernyms() (:138) -> _related('@') (:1103) -> synset_from_pos_and_offset (:1104)
Impact
An attacker who can supply a WordNet data.<pos> corpus file that the victim loads (for example a downloaded, mirrored, or user-provided WordNet corpus) can construct a hypernym pointer graph that is cyclic or deeper than the recursion limit. When the application then calls any hypernym-depth or path method, the walker recurses without bound and raises an uncaught RecursionError, terminating the current traversal and any request or worker process that does not handle it. Under a raised or removed recursion limit, unbounded recursion can instead exhaust the native stack and abort the process. The impact is availability only; there is no confidentiality or integrity effect. Reachable public entry points include hypernym_paths and hypernym_distances directly, and max_depth/min_depth indirectly through lowest_common_hypernyms, wup_similarity, path_similarity, and lch_similarity.
Proof of Concept
Requires only the nltk package under test on PYTHONPATH; no network or WordNet data download. The reader is instantiated with __new__ to skip unrelated OMW/lexname loading, the same technique NLTK's own recursion-DoS hardening test uses; the parser and the walker under test are unmodified library code.
- Build a
WordNetCorpusReaderwithout its unrelated data-loading side effects. - Parse two synset records whose
@(hypernym) pointers reference each other, forming a 2-cycle. - Call
Synset.max_depth()on one of them.
import sys
sys.setrecursionlimit(1500)
from nltk.corpus.reader.wordnet import WordNetCorpusReader
reader = WordNetCorpusReader.__new__(WordNetCorpusReader)
reader._synset_offset_cache = {"n": {}}
reader._lexnames = ["adj.all"]
reader._lemma_pos_offset_map = {"w88": {"n": [88]}, "w99": {"n": [99]}}
def make(offset, partner):
line = f"{offset:08d} 00 n 01 w{offset} 0 001 @ {partner:08d} n 0000 | gloss"
s = reader._synset_from_pos_and_line("n", line)
reader._synset_offset_cache["n"][offset] = s
return s
a = make(88, 99)
b = make(99, 88)
print("hypernym pointers:", dict(a._pointers))
print("hypernyms():", a.hypernyms())
try:
a.max_depth()
print("returned normally")
except RecursionError:
print("VULNERABLE: max_depth() recursed without bound -> RecursionError")
hypernym pointers: {'@': {('n', 99)}}
hypernyms(): [Synset('w99.n.01')]
VULNERABLE: max_depth() recursed without bound -> RecursionError
Attack Chain
- Exposure: The victim application loads a WordNet
data.<pos>corpus file whose content is attacker-supplied. Corpus file content is untrusted input in NLTK, consistent with the project's existing corpus-content hardening. - Control: The attacker fully controls the
@hypernym pointer offset fields. They are parsed and stored verbatim atnltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:1694with no graph-shape validation, so the attacker chooses an arbitrary graph topology (a cycle or a chain deeper than the recursion limit). - Path: A shipped public method reaches a walker:
hypernym_paths/hypernym_distancesdirectly, orlowest_common_hypernyms/wup_similarity/path_similarity/lch_similarityviamax_depth/min_depth.hypernyms()(:138) resolves the partner synset through_related('@')(:1103) andsynset_from_pos_and_offset(:1104), which returns the same cached, still-unmemoized object. - Guard: The only candidate guard, the
_max_depth/_min_depthmemo, is assigned only after the recursive expression returns, so it never protects a node still on the stack. No visited set and no depth cap exist on any of the four methods. - Primitive: Unbounded recursion over the attacker-chosen graph.
- Result: Uncaught
RecursionErroraborts the traversal and any worker that does not catch it; native stack exhaustion and process abort are possible under a raised recursion limit. Availability impact only.
Bypass Evidence
The relevant candidate guard is the per-instance depth memo. It does not block the path: Python evaluates 1 + max(h.max_depth() for h in hypernyms) fully before binding self._max_depth, so during recursion the memo check "_max_depth" not in self.__dict__ is still true when the traversal re-enters a node already on the stack. The synset offset cache does not help either; it returns the same object whose memo is still unset, and even a hypothetical fresh object per lookup would also be unmemoized, so termination is unaffected. Attempts to disprove the finding all failed: the claim that the offset cache breaks the cycle is false (same unmemoized object), the claim that no shipped public API reaches the walkers is false (hypernym_paths, hypernym_distances, wup_similarity, lowest_common_hypernyms all reach them), and the claim that the reproduction is an artifact of skipping __init__ is false (only unrelated OMW/lexname loading is skipped; the parser and walker are unmodified). A non-cyclic hypernym chain longer than sys.getrecursionlimit() triggers the same failure, so a cycle is not even required. That the maintainers added acyclic/visited guards to the sibling walkers closure, tree, and _shortest_hypernym_paths confirms this is an unhardened gap rather than intended behavior.
Affected Versions
Ecosystem: PyPIPackage: nltkConfirmed affected range: <= 3.10.3Latest release checked: 3.10.3 (pypi.org/pypi/nltk/json, verified 2026-09-15)Fix status: not fixed
The four walkers and their missing guards are long-standing WordNet-reader code present in the current published artifact (3.10.3), and no fix has been released. The upper bound <= 3.10.3 is verified against the exact PyPI-published version. The lower bound is left open because the first affected release was not binary-searched; the vulnerable code predates recent releases.
Suggested Fix
Enforce bounded, cycle-safe traversal in max_depth, min_depth, hypernym_paths, and hypernym_distances. Thread a visited-node set through the recursion (skipping nodes already on the current path) and/or impose an explicit maximum depth, mirroring the acyclic helpers already used by closure, tree, and _shortest_hypernym_paths in the same class. As an interim mitigation, applications that must process untrusted corpora can wrap calls to these methods in a RecursionError handler and set a conservative sys.setrecursionlimit, though this only converts the crash into a handled error rather than removing the unbounded traversal.
Reported by zx (GitHub: @manus-pi).
Fix status (2026-09-28)
Status: IN PROGRESS (fix on an open pull request, not yet on develop).
PR: #3895 "[WIP] Bound algorithmic-DoS and uncontrolled-recursion vectors (CWE-400/407/674/1333)", open, head b22ebe144.
Fix commit: 34adf1ee4 "Bound WordNet hypernym recursion and linearize the lemma-marker regex".
No probe. The advisory PoC re-run (two synsets whose @ pointers form a 2-cycle): on the PR head max_depth, min_depth, hypernym_paths and hypernym_distances all raise ValueError; on develop 2fa3f48fe all four raise RecursionError, so develop is still VULNERABLE.
Release: none.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.10.3"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "nltk"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.10.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-129230"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-19T23:49:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T18:18:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nFour hypernym-walking methods on the WordNet `Synset` class in `nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py` (`max_depth`, `min_depth`, `hypernym_paths`, and `hypernym_distances`) traverse the hypernym pointer graph by direct recursion with no visited-node set and no depth cap. WordNet `data.\u003cpos\u003e` file content is untrusted corpus input in NLTK, the same trust boundary the project already treats as attacker-controlled across its corpus-content hardening work. When the parsed hypernym graph contains a cycle, or a chain deeper than the interpreter recursion limit, these methods recurse without bound and raise an uncaught `RecursionError`, aborting the traversal and any worker that does not catch it. No special privileges are needed; the victim only has to load an attacker-supplied corpus and call any of several shipped public methods that reach these walkers.\n\n## Root Cause\n\n`Synset.max_depth` computes `1 + max(h.max_depth() for h in hypernyms)` and only assigns its `_max_depth` memo after that recursive expression fully returns. Because Python evaluates the right-hand side completely before binding the left-hand side, the memo is never set on a node that is still on the recursion stack, so a cyclic graph re-enters the same not-yet-memoized node indefinitely. `min_depth`, `hypernym_paths`, and `hypernym_distances` follow the same recursive descent with no cycle detection. The security invariant that graph traversal over untrusted corpus data must terminate is violated: the pointer offsets parsed from the data file are stored verbatim with no graph-shape validation, so the attacker controls the graph topology. The sibling walkers in the same class (`closure`, `tree`, `_shortest_hypernym_paths`) were hardened with acyclic/visited guards, which shows cyclic hypernym graphs are an in-scope threat that these four methods simply were not converted to handle.\n\n```text\nAffected functions in nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:\n Synset.max_depth (nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:550)\n Synset.min_depth (nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:564)\n Synset.hypernym_paths (nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:666)\n Synset.hypernym_distances (nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:768)\nUntrusted pointer stored at nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:1694\nRe-entry edge: hypernyms() (:138) -\u003e _related(\u0027@\u0027) (:1103) -\u003e synset_from_pos_and_offset (:1104)\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can supply a WordNet `data.\u003cpos\u003e` corpus file that the victim loads (for example a downloaded, mirrored, or user-provided WordNet corpus) can construct a hypernym pointer graph that is cyclic or deeper than the recursion limit. When the application then calls any hypernym-depth or path method, the walker recurses without bound and raises an uncaught `RecursionError`, terminating the current traversal and any request or worker process that does not handle it. Under a raised or removed recursion limit, unbounded recursion can instead exhaust the native stack and abort the process. The impact is availability only; there is no confidentiality or integrity effect. Reachable public entry points include `hypernym_paths` and `hypernym_distances` directly, and `max_depth`/`min_depth` indirectly through `lowest_common_hypernyms`, `wup_similarity`, `path_similarity`, and `lch_similarity`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n`Requires only the nltk package under test on PYTHONPATH; no network or WordNet data download. The reader is instantiated with __new__ to skip unrelated OMW/lexname loading, the same technique NLTK\u0027s own recursion-DoS hardening test uses; the parser and the walker under test are unmodified library code.`\n\n1. Build a `WordNetCorpusReader` without its unrelated data-loading side effects.\n2. Parse two synset records whose `@` (hypernym) pointers reference each other, forming a 2-cycle.\n3. Call `Synset.max_depth()` on one of them.\n\n```python\nimport sys\nsys.setrecursionlimit(1500)\nfrom nltk.corpus.reader.wordnet import WordNetCorpusReader\n\nreader = WordNetCorpusReader.__new__(WordNetCorpusReader)\nreader._synset_offset_cache = {\"n\": {}}\nreader._lexnames = [\"adj.all\"]\nreader._lemma_pos_offset_map = {\"w88\": {\"n\": [88]}, \"w99\": {\"n\": [99]}}\n\ndef make(offset, partner):\n line = f\"{offset:08d} 00 n 01 w{offset} 0 001 @ {partner:08d} n 0000 | gloss\"\n s = reader._synset_from_pos_and_line(\"n\", line)\n reader._synset_offset_cache[\"n\"][offset] = s\n return s\n\na = make(88, 99)\nb = make(99, 88)\nprint(\"hypernym pointers:\", dict(a._pointers))\nprint(\"hypernyms():\", a.hypernyms())\ntry:\n a.max_depth()\n print(\"returned normally\")\nexcept RecursionError:\n print(\"VULNERABLE: max_depth() recursed without bound -\u003e RecursionError\")\n```\n\n```text\nhypernym pointers: {\u0027@\u0027: {(\u0027n\u0027, 99)}}\nhypernyms(): [Synset(\u0027w99.n.01\u0027)]\nVULNERABLE: max_depth() recursed without bound -\u003e RecursionError\n```\n\n## Attack Chain\n\n1. **Exposure:** The victim application loads a WordNet `data.\u003cpos\u003e` corpus file whose content is attacker-supplied. Corpus file content is untrusted input in NLTK, consistent with the project\u0027s existing corpus-content hardening.\n2. **Control:** The attacker fully controls the `@` hypernym pointer offset fields. They are parsed and stored verbatim at `nltk/corpus/reader/wordnet.py:1694` with no graph-shape validation, so the attacker chooses an arbitrary graph topology (a cycle or a chain deeper than the recursion limit).\n3. **Path:** A shipped public method reaches a walker: `hypernym_paths`/`hypernym_distances` directly, or `lowest_common_hypernyms`/`wup_similarity`/`path_similarity`/`lch_similarity` via `max_depth`/`min_depth`. `hypernyms()` (`:138`) resolves the partner synset through `_related(\u0027@\u0027)` (`:1103`) and `synset_from_pos_and_offset` (`:1104`), which returns the same cached, still-unmemoized object.\n4. **Guard:** The only candidate guard, the `_max_depth`/`_min_depth` memo, is assigned only after the recursive expression returns, so it never protects a node still on the stack. No visited set and no depth cap exist on any of the four methods.\n5. **Primitive:** Unbounded recursion over the attacker-chosen graph.\n6. **Result:** Uncaught `RecursionError` aborts the traversal and any worker that does not catch it; native stack exhaustion and process abort are possible under a raised recursion limit. Availability impact only.\n\n## Bypass Evidence\n\nThe relevant candidate guard is the per-instance depth memo. It does not block the path: Python evaluates `1 + max(h.max_depth() for h in hypernyms)` fully before binding `self._max_depth`, so during recursion the memo check `\"_max_depth\" not in self.__dict__` is still true when the traversal re-enters a node already on the stack. The synset offset cache does not help either; it returns the same object whose memo is still unset, and even a hypothetical fresh object per lookup would also be unmemoized, so termination is unaffected. Attempts to disprove the finding all failed: the claim that the offset cache breaks the cycle is false (same unmemoized object), the claim that no shipped public API reaches the walkers is false (`hypernym_paths`, `hypernym_distances`, `wup_similarity`, `lowest_common_hypernyms` all reach them), and the claim that the reproduction is an artifact of skipping `__init__` is false (only unrelated OMW/lexname loading is skipped; the parser and walker are unmodified). A non-cyclic hypernym chain longer than `sys.getrecursionlimit()` triggers the same failure, so a cycle is not even required. That the maintainers added acyclic/visited guards to the sibling walkers `closure`, `tree`, and `_shortest_hypernym_paths` confirms this is an unhardened gap rather than intended behavior.\n\n## Affected Versions\n\n- `Ecosystem: PyPI`\n- `Package: nltk`\n- `Confirmed affected range: \u003c= 3.10.3`\n- `Latest release checked: 3.10.3 (pypi.org/pypi/nltk/json, verified 2026-09-15)`\n- `Fix status: not fixed`\n\nThe four walkers and their missing guards are long-standing WordNet-reader code present in the current published artifact (3.10.3), and no fix has been released. The upper bound `\u003c= 3.10.3` is verified against the exact PyPI-published version. The lower bound is left open because the first affected release was not binary-searched; the vulnerable code predates recent releases.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nEnforce bounded, cycle-safe traversal in `max_depth`, `min_depth`, `hypernym_paths`, and `hypernym_distances`. Thread a visited-node set through the recursion (skipping nodes already on the current path) and/or impose an explicit maximum depth, mirroring the acyclic helpers already used by `closure`, `tree`, and `_shortest_hypernym_paths` in the same class. As an interim mitigation, applications that must process untrusted corpora can wrap calls to these methods in a `RecursionError` handler and set a conservative `sys.setrecursionlimit`, though this only converts the crash into a handled error rather than removing the unbounded traversal.\n\n---\n\nReported by zx (GitHub: @manus-pi).\n\n\n## Fix status (2026-09-28)\n\nStatus: IN PROGRESS (fix on an open pull request, not yet on develop).\n\nPR: #3895 \"[WIP] Bound algorithmic-DoS and uncontrolled-recursion vectors (CWE-400/407/674/1333)\", open, head b22ebe144.\n\nFix commit: 34adf1ee4 \"Bound WordNet hypernym recursion and linearize the lemma-marker regex\".\n\nNo probe. The advisory PoC re-run (two synsets whose @ pointers form a 2-cycle): on the PR head max_depth, min_depth, hypernym_paths and hypernym_distances all raise ValueError; on develop 2fa3f48fe all four raise RecursionError, so develop is still VULNERABLE.\n\nRelease: none.",
"id": "GHSA-53pg-5qp8-mhvr",
"modified": "2026-11-19T23:49:16Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T23:49:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/security/advisories/GHSA-53pg-5qp8-mhvr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129230"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/pull/3895"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/34adf1ee425b5c817d2a88c674bac68672e3ab26"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "NLTK: Uncontrolled recursion in WordNet Synset hypernym walkers (max_depth/min_depth/hypernym_paths/hypernym_distances) causes DoS"
}
GHSA-53QW-Q765-4FWW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-01-12 19:20 – Updated: 2024-09-20 16:04An issue was discovered in Django 2.2 before 2.2.26, 3.2 before 3.2.11, and 4.0 before 4.0.1. UserAttributeSimilarityValidator incurred significant overhead in evaluating a submitted password that was artificially large in relation to the comparison values. In a situation where access to user registration was unrestricted, this provided a potential vector for a denial-of-service attack.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Django"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.2a1"
},
{
"fixed": "2.2.26"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Django"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.2a1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.2.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Django"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0a1"
},
{
"fixed": "4.0.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-45115"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2022-01-12T19:18:33Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2022-01-05T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered in Django 2.2 before 2.2.26, 3.2 before 3.2.11, and 4.0 before 4.0.1. `UserAttributeSimilarityValidator` incurred significant overhead in evaluating a submitted password that was artificially large in relation to the comparison values. In a situation where access to user registration was unrestricted, this provided a potential vector for a denial-of-service attack.",
"id": "GHSA-53qw-q765-4fww",
"modified": "2024-09-20T16:04:22Z",
"published": "2022-01-12T19:20:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-45115"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/2135637fdd5ce994de110affef9e67dffdf77277"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/a8b32fe13bcaed1c0b772fdc53de84abc224fb20"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django/commit/df79ef03ac867c93caaa6be56bc69e66abfeef8f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://docs.djangoproject.com/en/4.0/releases/security"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-53qw-q765-4fww"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/django/django"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/django/PYSEC-2022-1.yaml"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://groups.google.com/forum/#!forum/django-announce"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce@lists.fedoraproject.org/message/B4SQG2EAF4WCI2SLRL6XRDJ3RPK3ZRDV"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20220121-0005"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.djangoproject.com/weblog/2022/jan/04/security-releases"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Denial-of-service in Django"
}
GHSA-53RP-33P8-4HM8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-06 06:31 – Updated: 2025-02-06 15:32A prototype pollution in the lib.merge function of xe-utils v3.5.31 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted payload.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-57074"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321",
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-05T22:15:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A prototype pollution in the lib.merge function of xe-utils v3.5.31 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted payload.",
"id": "GHSA-53rp-33p8-4hm8",
"modified": "2025-02-06T15:32:52Z",
"published": "2025-02-06T06:31:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-57074"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/tariqhawis/82e3eb472d03273a74e40242e8356297"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-53VQ-MHJH-RC84
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:43 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:43libgedit.a in GNOME gedit through 3.22.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a file that begins with many '\0' characters.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2017-14108"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-09-05T06:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "libgedit.a in GNOME gedit through 3.22.1 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (CPU consumption) via a file that begins with many \u0027\\0\u0027 characters.",
"id": "GHSA-53vq-mhjh-rc84",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:43:19Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:43:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14108"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=791037"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cxsecurity.com/issue/WLB-2017090008"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://packetstormsecurity.com/files/143983/libgedit.a-3.22.1-Denial-Of-Service.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-53XC-49M8-P798
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 20:45 – Updated: 2026-10-23 20:45Summary
An unbounded-buffer vulnerability (CWE-770) in the Twisted words IRC server lets any unauthenticated remote client exhaust server memory. twisted.words.protocols.irc.IRC.dataReceived appends every received byte to a per-connection buffer and only removes data at a line feed, with no maximum length. Because IRC is a plain Protocol and not a LineReceiver, one connection that streams bytes without a line feed grows the buffer without bound and drives the whole single-threaded process to out-of-memory, dropping every user at once. The twistd words server inherits the method unchanged through IRCUser, and the data is buffered before any authentication.
Details
IRC.dataReceived keeps everything up to the last line feed in self.buffer:
# twisted/words/protocols/irc.py
class IRC(protocol.Protocol): # not a LineReceiver, so no MAX_LENGTH
buffer = ""
def dataReceived(self, data):
if isinstance(data, bytes):
data = data.decode("utf-8")
lines = (self.buffer + data).split(LF)
self.buffer = lines.pop() # no 3line feed -> whole input stays buffered
...
With no line feed in the data, lines.pop() returns the entire accumulated content to self.buffer, so it grows by every chunk and is never bounded; IRC defines no MAX_LENGTH, no lineLengthExceeded, and no timeout, so the connection is never closed. The twistd words server protocol IRCUser subclasses IRC without overriding dataReceived, and the buffer is filled before any PASS, NICK, or USER, so no credentials are required.
Affected product: Twisted (twisted.words), twisted.words.protocols.irc.IRC and its subclass twisted.words.service.IRCUser
Affected versions: 26.4.0 and earlier
PoC
On a standard Twisted words IRC server (the server twistd words runs, using IRCUser), an unauthenticated client opens a single TCP connection and continuously sends data that contains no line feed, never completing a line. Every chunk is appended to the connection's line buffer, and because no complete line is ever formed none of it is consumed, so the buffer grows by the full volume sent.
In a measured run against a real IRCFactory server, one unauthenticated connection sending 60 MB of line-feed-free data raised the server process resident memory from about 47 MB to 2966 MB (roughly 49 MB per MB sent) with the connection still open and no limit triggered. Sending the same volume as normal line-feed-terminated commands leaves memory flat, which isolates the cause to the missing line-length bound.
Impact
An unauthenticated remote denial of service from allocation without limits (CWE-770) leading to uncontrolled resource consumption (CWE-400). A single credential-free connection exhausts the memory of the whole twistd words process, and because one process serves every user, the crash drops all connections at once and the service stays down until it is restarted. The quadratic buffer copy reaches the same effect faster. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact and no code execution.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 26.4.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Twisted"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "26.10.0rc1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-115776"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-23T20:45:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nAn unbounded-buffer vulnerability (CWE-770) in the Twisted words IRC server lets any unauthenticated remote client exhaust server memory. `twisted.words.protocols.irc.IRC.dataReceived` appends every received byte to a per-connection buffer and only removes data at a line feed, with no maximum length. Because `IRC` is a plain `Protocol` and not a `LineReceiver`, one connection that streams bytes without a line feed grows the buffer without bound and drives the whole single-threaded process to out-of-memory, dropping every user at once. The `twistd words` server inherits the method unchanged through `IRCUser`, and the data is buffered before any authentication.\n\n## Details\n\n`IRC.dataReceived` keeps everything up to the last line feed in `self.buffer`:\n\n```python\n# twisted/words/protocols/irc.py\nclass IRC(protocol.Protocol): # not a LineReceiver, so no MAX_LENGTH\n buffer = \"\"\n def dataReceived(self, data):\n if isinstance(data, bytes):\n data = data.decode(\"utf-8\")\n lines = (self.buffer + data).split(LF)\n self.buffer = lines.pop() # no 3line feed -\u003e whole input stays buffered\n ...\n```\n\nWith no line feed in the data, `lines.pop()` returns the entire accumulated content to `self.buffer`, so it grows by every chunk and is never bounded; `IRC` defines no `MAX_LENGTH`, no `lineLengthExceeded`, and no timeout, so the connection is never closed. The `twistd words` server protocol `IRCUser` subclasses `IRC` without overriding `dataReceived`, and the buffer is filled before any `PASS`, `NICK`, or `USER`, so no credentials are required.\n\nAffected product: Twisted (`twisted.words`), `twisted.words.protocols.irc.IRC` and its subclass `twisted.words.service.IRCUser`\nAffected versions: 26.4.0 and earlier\n\n## PoC\n\nOn a standard Twisted words IRC server (the server `twistd words` runs, using `IRCUser`), an unauthenticated client opens a single TCP connection and continuously sends data that contains no line feed, never completing a line. Every chunk is appended to the connection\u0027s line buffer, and because no complete line is ever formed none of it is consumed, so the buffer grows by the full volume sent.\n\nIn a measured run against a real `IRCFactory` server, one unauthenticated connection sending 60 MB of line-feed-free data raised the server process resident memory from about 47 MB to 2966 MB (roughly 49 MB per MB sent) with the connection still open and no limit triggered. Sending the same volume as normal line-feed-terminated commands leaves memory flat, which isolates the cause to the missing line-length bound.\n\n## Impact\n\nAn unauthenticated remote denial of service from allocation without limits (CWE-770) leading to uncontrolled resource consumption (CWE-400). A single credential-free connection exhausts the memory of the whole `twistd words` process, and because one process serves every user, the crash drops all connections at once and the service stays down until it is restarted. The quadratic buffer copy reaches the same effect faster. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact and no code execution.",
"id": "GHSA-53xc-49m8-p798",
"modified": "2026-10-23T20:45:35Z",
"published": "2026-10-23T20:45:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/security/advisories/GHSA-53xc-49m8-p798"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/pull/12771"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/commit/01f8cff7753c1edac132380b2ea939fa6bdbab30"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/commit/ac90fb7b0ab73688a581fcd9a7c0577ec8ca3059"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/releases/tag/twisted-26.10.0rc1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Twisted: Unauthenticated Remote Denial of Service in the Twisted IRC Server via an Unbounded Line Buffer"
}
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation
Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement
An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.
CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.