CWE-362
Allowed-with-ReviewConcurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product contains a concurrent code sequence that requires temporary, exclusive access to a shared resource, but a timing window exists in which the shared resource can be modified by another code sequence operating concurrently.
2921 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-H378-C87P-MG3H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:51 – Updated: 2022-05-17 04:51Race condition in the install_user_keyrings function in security/keys/process_keys.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.3 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via crafted keyctl system calls that trigger keyring operations in simultaneous threads.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2013-1792"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2013-03-22T11:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Race condition in the install_user_keyrings function in security/keys/process_keys.c in the Linux kernel before 3.8.3 allows local users to cause a denial of service (NULL pointer dereference and system crash) via crafted keyctl system calls that trigger keyring operations in simultaneous threads.",
"id": "GHSA-h378-c87p-mg3h",
"modified": "2022-05-17T04:51:08Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T04:51:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2013-1792"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/0da9dfdd2cd9889201bc6f6f43580c99165cd087"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=916646"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git%3Ba=commit%3Bh=0da9dfdd2cd9889201bc6f6f43580c99165cd087"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://git.kernel.org/?p=linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux-2.6.git;a=commit;h=0da9dfdd2cd9889201bc6f6f43580c99165cd087"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2013-07/msg00018.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://lists.opensuse.org/opensuse-security-announce/2014-02/msg00002.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2013-0744.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/v3.x/ChangeLog-3.8.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.mandriva.com/security/advisories?name=MDVSA-2013:176"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2013/03/07/1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1787-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1788-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1792-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1793-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1794-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1795-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1796-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1797-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/USN-1798-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-H38W-G4MP-RWV7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:35 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:35An Ubuntu-specific patch in PulseAudio created a race condition where the snap policy module would fail to identify a client connection from a snap as coming from a snap if SCM_CREDENTIALS were missing, allowing the snap to connect to PulseAudio without proper confinement. This could be exploited by an attacker to expose sensitive information. Fixed in 1:13.99.3-1ubuntu2, 1:13.99.2-1ubuntu2.1, 1:13.99.1-1ubuntu3.8, 1:11.1-1ubuntu7.11, and 1:8.0-0ubuntu3.15.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-16123"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-12-04T00:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An Ubuntu-specific patch in PulseAudio created a race condition where the snap policy module would fail to identify a client connection from a snap as coming from a snap if SCM_CREDENTIALS were missing, allowing the snap to connect to PulseAudio without proper confinement. This could be exploited by an attacker to expose sensitive information. Fixed in 1:13.99.3-1ubuntu2, 1:13.99.2-1ubuntu2.1, 1:13.99.1-1ubuntu3.8, 1:11.1-1ubuntu7.11, and 1:8.0-0ubuntu3.15.",
"id": "GHSA-h38w-g4mp-rwv7",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:35:22Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:35:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-16123"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://launchpad.net/bugs/1895928"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://ubuntu.com/USN-4640-1"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-H3HW-29FV-2X75
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-21 16:36 – Updated: 2026-01-29 03:50Summary
Context race condition when using useGraphQLModules plugin
Details
Related to: https://github.com/graphql-hive/graphql-modules/security/advisories/GHSA-53wg-r69p-v3r7
When 2 or more parallel requests are made which trigger the same service, the context of the requests is mixed up in the service when the context is injected via @ExecutionContext() and graphql-modules are used in Yoga with useGraphQLModules(application). This issue was fixed in graphql-modules in 2.4.1 and 3.1.1 but using useGraphQLModules will bypass the async_hooks fix that was implemented.
PoC
Create the following package.json and run npm i
{
"name": "poc",
"scripts": {
"compile": "tsc",
"start": "npm run compile && node ./dist/src/index.js",
"test": "npm run compile && node ./dist/test/bleedtest.js"
},
"dependencies": {
"@envelop/graphql-modules": "^9.0.0",
"graphql-yoga": "^5.0.0",
"graphql": "^16.10.0",
"graphql-modules": "3.1.1",
"reflect-metadata": "0.2.1",
"axios": "^1.8.4"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@types/node": "^22.14.1",
"typescript": "^5.8.3"
}
}
Define the app entrypoint: src/index.ts
import { module } from "./module.js";
import { useGraphQLModules } from '@envelop/graphql-modules'
import { createApplication } from "graphql-modules";
import { createServer } from 'node:http'
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
import { createYoga } from 'graphql-yoga';
const application = createApplication({
modules: [module]
})
const yoga = createYoga({
schema: application.schema,
plugins: [useGraphQLModules(application)],
context() {
return {
requestId: randomUUID(),
}
}
})
const server = createServer(yoga)
server.listen(4001, '127.0.0.1', undefined, () => {
console.info(
`[Server] Running on http://localhost:4001/graphql`
)
})
Create the test module: src/module.ts
import { createModule, gql } from "graphql-modules";
import Service from "./service.js";
const typeDefs = gql`
type Book {
id1: String
id2: String
}
type Query {
books: [Book]
}
`;
export const module = createModule({
id: 'book-module',
typeDefs: [typeDefs],
providers: [Service],
resolvers: {
Query: {
// return one empty book
books: () => [{}],
},
Book: {
// return the requestId from the context
id1: async (_root, _args, { injector } ) => {
return injector.get(Service).get();
},
// return the requestId from the context of the service 100 ms later
id2: async (_root, _args, { injector } ) => {
await new Promise(resolve => setTimeout(resolve, 100));
return injector.get(Service).get()
},
}
}
})
Add the Service that's to be injected src/service.ts
import { ExecutionContext, Injectable } from 'graphql-modules';
import 'reflect-metadata';
@Injectable()
export default class Service {
@ExecutionContext()
private context: ExecutionContext;
get() {
return this.context.requestId;
}
}
Add the test case test/bleedtest.js
import axios from 'axios';
const url = 'http://localhost:4001/graphql';
const query = `query { books { id1 id2 } }`;
const makeGraphQLRequest = async () => {
const response = await axios.post(url, { query });
const book = response.data.data.books[0]
if (book.id1 !== book.id2) {
throw new Error(`wrong response with ids ${(book.id1)} and ${(book.id2)}`)
}
}
const numberOfRequests = 2;
await Promise.all(Array.from(
{ length: numberOfRequests },
makeGraphQLRequest,
));
Then run the server with npm run start in one terminal and the testcase in another with npm run test.
The returned IDs should be identical as they are both read from the context within the same request.
However, there is a mismatch:
❯ npm run test
> poc@1.0.0 test
> npm run compile && node ./dist/test/bleedtest.js
> poc@1.0.0 compile
> tsc
file://<redacted>/dist/test/bleedtest.js:8
throw new Error(`wrong response with ids ${(book.id1)} and ${(book.id2)}`);
^
Error: wrong response with ids c2d83151-0922-4f25-a3e9-2f03acc1376a and e16c7335-0eaa-4386-b415-869ee4b05315
at makeGraphQLRequest (file://<redacted>/dist/test/bleedtest.js:8:15)
at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:95:5)
at async Promise.all (index 0)
at async file://<redacted>/dist/test/bleedtest.js:12:1
Impact
Any application that uses useGraphQLModules from @envelop/graphql-modules along with services that inject the context using @ExecutionContext() from a singleton provider are at risk. The more traffic an application has, the higher the chance for parallel requests, the higher the risk.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@envelop/graphql-modules"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-01-21T16:36:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nContext race condition when using `useGraphQLModules` plugin\n\n### Details\n\nRelated to: https://github.com/graphql-hive/graphql-modules/security/advisories/GHSA-53wg-r69p-v3r7\n\nWhen 2 or more parallel requests are made which trigger the same service, the context of the requests is mixed up in the service when the context is injected via @ExecutionContext() and graphql-modules are used in Yoga with `useGraphQLModules(application)`. This issue was fixed in `graphql-modules` in `2.4.1` and `3.1.1` but using `useGraphQLModules` will bypass the `async_hooks` fix that was implemented.\n\n### PoC\n\nCreate the following `package.json` and run `npm i`\n\n```json\n{\n \"name\": \"poc\",\n \"scripts\": {\n \"compile\": \"tsc\",\n \"start\": \"npm run compile \u0026\u0026 node ./dist/src/index.js\",\n \"test\": \"npm run compile \u0026\u0026 node ./dist/test/bleedtest.js\"\n },\n \"dependencies\": {\n \"@envelop/graphql-modules\": \"^9.0.0\",\n \"graphql-yoga\": \"^5.0.0\",\n \"graphql\": \"^16.10.0\",\n \"graphql-modules\": \"3.1.1\",\n \"reflect-metadata\": \"0.2.1\",\n \"axios\": \"^1.8.4\"\n },\n \"devDependencies\": {\n \"@types/node\": \"^22.14.1\",\n \"typescript\": \"^5.8.3\"\n }\n}\n```\n\nDefine the app entrypoint: `src/index.ts`\n\n```ts\nimport { module } from \"./module.js\";\nimport { useGraphQLModules } from \u0027@envelop/graphql-modules\u0027\nimport { createApplication } from \"graphql-modules\";\nimport { createServer } from \u0027node:http\u0027\nimport { randomUUID } from \"node:crypto\";\nimport { createYoga } from \u0027graphql-yoga\u0027;\n\nconst application = createApplication({\n modules: [module]\n})\n\nconst yoga = createYoga({\n schema: application.schema,\n plugins: [useGraphQLModules(application)],\n context() {\n return {\n requestId: randomUUID(),\n }\n }\n})\n\nconst server = createServer(yoga)\nserver.listen(4001, \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027, undefined, () =\u003e {\n console.info(\n `[Server] Running on http://localhost:4001/graphql`\n )\n})\n```\n\nCreate the test module: `src/module.ts`\n\n```ts\nimport { createModule, gql } from \"graphql-modules\";\nimport Service from \"./service.js\";\n\nconst typeDefs = gql`\n type Book {\n id1: String\n id2: String\n }\n type Query {\n books: [Book]\n }\n`;\n\nexport const module = createModule({\n id: \u0027book-module\u0027,\n typeDefs: [typeDefs],\n providers: [Service],\n resolvers: {\n Query: {\n // return one empty book\n books: () =\u003e [{}],\n },\n Book: {\n // return the requestId from the context\n id1: async (_root, _args, { injector } ) =\u003e {\n return injector.get(Service).get();\n },\n // return the requestId from the context of the service 100 ms later\n id2: async (_root, _args, { injector } ) =\u003e {\n await new Promise(resolve =\u003e setTimeout(resolve, 100));\n return injector.get(Service).get()\n },\n }\n }\n})\n```\n\nAdd the Service that\u0027s to be injected `src/service.ts`\n\n```ts\nimport { ExecutionContext, Injectable } from \u0027graphql-modules\u0027;\nimport \u0027reflect-metadata\u0027;\n\n@Injectable()\nexport default class Service {\n @ExecutionContext()\n private context: ExecutionContext;\n\n get() {\n return this.context.requestId;\n }\n}\n```\n\nAdd the test case `test/bleedtest.js`\n\n```ts\nimport axios from \u0027axios\u0027;\n\nconst url = \u0027http://localhost:4001/graphql\u0027;\nconst query = `query { books { id1 id2 } }`;\n\nconst makeGraphQLRequest = async () =\u003e {\n const response = await axios.post(url, { query });\n\n const book = response.data.data.books[0]\n if (book.id1 !== book.id2) {\n throw new Error(`wrong response with ids ${(book.id1)} and ${(book.id2)}`)\n }\n}\n\nconst numberOfRequests = 2;\nawait Promise.all(Array.from(\n { length: numberOfRequests },\n makeGraphQLRequest,\n));\n```\n\nThen run the server with `npm run start` in one terminal and the testcase in another with `npm run test`.\nThe returned IDs should be identical as they are both read from the context within the same request.\nHowever, there is a mismatch:\n\n```\n\u276f npm run test\n\n\u003e poc@1.0.0 test\n\u003e npm run compile \u0026\u0026 node ./dist/test/bleedtest.js\n\n\n\u003e poc@1.0.0 compile\n\u003e tsc\n\nfile://\u003credacted\u003e/dist/test/bleedtest.js:8\n throw new Error(`wrong response with ids ${(book.id1)} and ${(book.id2)}`);\n ^\n\nError: wrong response with ids c2d83151-0922-4f25-a3e9-2f03acc1376a and e16c7335-0eaa-4386-b415-869ee4b05315\n at makeGraphQLRequest (file://\u003credacted\u003e/dist/test/bleedtest.js:8:15)\n at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:95:5)\n at async Promise.all (index 0)\n at async file://\u003credacted\u003e/dist/test/bleedtest.js:12:1\n```\n\n### Impact\nAny application that uses `useGraphQLModules` from `@envelop/graphql-modules` along with services that inject the context using @ExecutionContext() from a singleton provider are at risk. The more traffic an application has, the higher the chance for parallel requests, the higher the risk.",
"id": "GHSA-h3hw-29fv-2x75",
"modified": "2026-01-29T03:50:11Z",
"published": "2026-01-21T16:36:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/graphql-hive/envelop/security/advisories/GHSA-h3hw-29fv-2x75"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/graphql-hive/graphql-modules/security/advisories/GHSA-53wg-r69p-v3r7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/graphql-hive/envelop/commit/ab49fa259a51d976c437e084114e070b99720ba9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/graphql-hive/envelop"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/graphql-hive/envelop/releases/tag/release-1768928934700"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@envelop/graphql-modules has a Race Condition vulnerability"
}
GHSA-H3JH-PFJG-56MV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-07 00:00 – Updated: 2022-07-14 00:00In MDP, there is a possible use after free due to a race condition. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS06545450; Issue ID: ALPS06545450.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-21776"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-07-06T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In MDP, there is a possible use after free due to a race condition. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with System execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: ALPS06545450; Issue ID: ALPS06545450.",
"id": "GHSA-h3jh-pfjg-56mv",
"modified": "2022-07-14T00:00:19Z",
"published": "2022-07-07T00:00:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-21776"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://corp.mediatek.com/product-security-bulletin/July-2022"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H3R9-XVWF-GC85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 03:01 – Updated: 2022-05-14 03:01Time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in org.onosproject.acl (aka the access control application) in ONOS v1.13 and earlier allows attackers to bypass network access control via data plane packet injection.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-12691"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-07-05T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) race condition in org.onosproject.acl (aka the access control application) in ONOS v1.13 and earlier allows attackers to bypass network access control via data plane packet injection.",
"id": "GHSA-h3r9-xvwf-gc85",
"modified": "2022-05-14T03:01:31Z",
"published": "2022-05-14T03:01:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-12691"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gerrit.onosproject.org/#/c/18867"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wiki.onosproject.org/display/ONOS/Security+advisories"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H3WW-Q6XX-W7X3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 20:28 – Updated: 2026-07-15 21:50Summary
The LDAP and OAuth authentication flows use a TOCTOU (Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use) pattern for first-user admin role assignment. The regular signup handler (signup_handler in auths.py, line 663) was explicitly patched to prevent this race with the comment "Insert with default role first to avoid TOCTOU race", but the LDAP and OAuth code paths were never updated with the same fix.
Vulnerable Code
LDAP (auths.py, lines 479-490)
# Line 482 - CHECK: is the user table empty?
role = 'admin' if not Users.has_users(db=db) else request.app.state.config.DEFAULT_USER_ROLE
# Lines 484-490 - USE: create user with the role determined above
user = Auths.insert_new_auth(
email=email,
password=str(uuid.uuid4()),
name=cn,
role=role, # <-- role was determined BEFORE insert, race window exists
db=db,
)
OAuth (oauth.py, lines 1103-1112, 1566-1574)
# Line 1104 - CHECK: count users
def get_user_role(self, user, user_data):
user_count = Users.get_num_users()
if not user and user_count == 0:
return 'admin' # Line 1112
# Lines 1566-1574 - USE: create user with pre-determined role
user = Auths.insert_new_auth(
...
role=self.get_user_role(None, user_data), # Line 1571
...
)
Both paths determine the role BEFORE inserting the user, creating a race window where multiple concurrent requests on a fresh instance can all observe an empty database and all receive the admin role.
Comparison with Patched Signup
The signup_handler (auths.py, line 663) was explicitly fixed:
# Insert with default role first to avoid TOCTOU race
user = Auths.insert_new_auth(..., role=DEFAULT_USER_ROLE, ...)
# Then check if this is the only user and upgrade
if Users.get_num_users() == 1:
Users.update_user_role_by_id(user.id, 'admin')
The LDAP and OAuth paths did NOT receive this fix.
Exploitation
- Deploy Open WebUI with LDAP or OAuth enabled on a fresh instance (no existing users)
- Send multiple concurrent authentication requests from different users
- Multiple requests pass the
has_users()/get_num_users() == 0check simultaneously - All concurrent users become administrators
DATABASE_ENABLE_SESSION_SHARING defaults to False (env.py:387), so each call uses its own database session, widening the race window.
Impact
Any LDAP/OAuth user who times their first login concurrently with the legitimate first admin can escalate to full admin privileges, gaining access to all user data, system configuration, API keys, and connected LLM backends.
Suggested Fix
Apply the same insert-then-check pattern used in signup_handler: insert the user with DEFAULT_USER_ROLE first, then atomically check if this is the only user and upgrade to admin only if so.
Resolution
Fixed in PR #23626 (commit 96a0b3239), first released in v0.9.0 (Apr 2026). Both LDAP (routers/auths.py) and OAuth (utils/oauth.py) registration paths now use the same insert-first-check-after pattern that signup_handler already had:
- Insert the new user with
DEFAULT_USER_ROLEunconditionally — no pre-insert role decision based on user count. - After the insert commits, atomically call
Users.get_num_users() == 1to check whether this is the sole user. - Only the sole user gets promoted to
adminviaUsers.update_user_role_by_id.
OAuthManager.get_user_role was also updated to return DEFAULT_USER_ROLE (not admin) for first-user bootstrap; admin promotion is deferred to the post-insert check above. With this ordering, two concurrent first-user registrations that both observe an empty table can both insert, but only one will see get_num_users() == 1 afterward — the other will see == 2 and not be promoted.
Users on >= 0.9.0 are not affected.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.12"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45675"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269",
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T20:28:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T20:16:49Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe LDAP and OAuth authentication flows use a TOCTOU (Time-of-Check-Time-of-Use) pattern for first-user admin role assignment. The regular signup handler (`signup_handler` in auths.py, line 663) was explicitly patched to prevent this race with the comment *\"Insert with default role first to avoid TOCTOU race\"*, but the LDAP and OAuth code paths were never updated with the same fix.\n\n## Vulnerable Code\n\n### LDAP (auths.py, lines 479-490)\n```python\n# Line 482 - CHECK: is the user table empty?\nrole = \u0027admin\u0027 if not Users.has_users(db=db) else request.app.state.config.DEFAULT_USER_ROLE\n\n# Lines 484-490 - USE: create user with the role determined above\nuser = Auths.insert_new_auth(\n email=email,\n password=str(uuid.uuid4()),\n name=cn,\n role=role, # \u003c-- role was determined BEFORE insert, race window exists\n db=db,\n)\n```\n\n### OAuth (oauth.py, lines 1103-1112, 1566-1574)\n```python\n# Line 1104 - CHECK: count users\ndef get_user_role(self, user, user_data):\n user_count = Users.get_num_users()\n if not user and user_count == 0:\n return \u0027admin\u0027 # Line 1112\n\n# Lines 1566-1574 - USE: create user with pre-determined role\nuser = Auths.insert_new_auth(\n ...\n role=self.get_user_role(None, user_data), # Line 1571\n ...\n)\n```\n\nBoth paths determine the role BEFORE inserting the user, creating a race window where multiple concurrent requests on a fresh instance can all observe an empty database and all receive the `admin` role.\n\n## Comparison with Patched Signup\n\nThe `signup_handler` (auths.py, line 663) was explicitly fixed:\n```python\n# Insert with default role first to avoid TOCTOU race\nuser = Auths.insert_new_auth(..., role=DEFAULT_USER_ROLE, ...)\n# Then check if this is the only user and upgrade\nif Users.get_num_users() == 1:\n Users.update_user_role_by_id(user.id, \u0027admin\u0027)\n```\n\nThe LDAP and OAuth paths did NOT receive this fix.\n\n## Exploitation\n\n1. Deploy Open WebUI with LDAP or OAuth enabled on a fresh instance (no existing users)\n2. Send multiple concurrent authentication requests from different users\n3. Multiple requests pass the `has_users()` / `get_num_users() == 0` check simultaneously\n4. All concurrent users become administrators\n\n`DATABASE_ENABLE_SESSION_SHARING` defaults to `False` (env.py:387), so each call uses its own database session, widening the race window.\n\n## Impact\n\nAny LDAP/OAuth user who times their first login concurrently with the legitimate first admin can escalate to full admin privileges, gaining access to all user data, system configuration, API keys, and connected LLM backends.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nApply the same insert-then-check pattern used in `signup_handler`: insert the user with `DEFAULT_USER_ROLE` first, then atomically check if this is the only user and upgrade to admin only if so.\n\n## Resolution\n\nFixed in PR [#23626](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/23626) (commit [96a0b3239](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/96a0b3239b1aadb23fc359bf10849c9ba12fd6ec)), first released in **v0.9.0** (Apr 2026). Both LDAP (`routers/auths.py`) and OAuth (`utils/oauth.py`) registration paths now use the same insert-first-check-after pattern that `signup_handler` already had:\n\n1. Insert the new user with `DEFAULT_USER_ROLE` unconditionally \u2014 no pre-insert role decision based on user count.\n2. After the insert commits, atomically call `Users.get_num_users() == 1` to check whether this is the sole user.\n3. Only the sole user gets promoted to `admin` via `Users.update_user_role_by_id`.\n\n`OAuthManager.get_user_role` was also updated to return `DEFAULT_USER_ROLE` (not `admin`) for first-user bootstrap; admin promotion is deferred to the post-insert check above. With this ordering, two concurrent first-user registrations that both observe an empty table can both insert, but only one will see `get_num_users() == 1` afterward \u2014 the other will see `== 2` and not be promoted.\n\nUsers on `\u003e= 0.9.0` are not affected.",
"id": "GHSA-h3ww-q6xx-w7x3",
"modified": "2026-07-15T21:50:58Z",
"published": "2026-05-14T20:28:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-h3ww-q6xx-w7x3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45675"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/23626"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/96a0b3239b1aadb23fc359bf10849c9ba12fd6ec"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.9.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/open-webui/PYSEC-2026-2730.yaml"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI: LDAP and OAuth First-User Race Condition Allows Multiple Admin Accounts"
}
GHSA-H3XQ-RCRH-9XC3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-12-06 09:30 – Updated: 2022-12-07 18:30In wlan driver, there is a race condition, This could lead to local denial of service in wlan services.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-42771"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-12-06T07:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In wlan driver, there is a race condition, This could lead to local denial of service in wlan services.",
"id": "GHSA-h3xq-rcrh-9xc3",
"modified": "2022-12-07T18:30:27Z",
"published": "2022-12-06T09:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-42771"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.unisoc.com/en_us/secy/announcementDetail/1599588060988411006"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H43G-M94V-WFPV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-10-01 00:00 – Updated: 2025-05-20 21:30drivers/char/pcmcia/synclink_cs.c in the Linux kernel through 5.19.12 has a race condition and resultant use-after-free if a physically proximate attacker removes a PCMCIA device while calling ioctl, aka a race condition between mgslpc_ioctl and mgslpc_detach.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-41848"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-09-30T06:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "drivers/char/pcmcia/synclink_cs.c in the Linux kernel through 5.19.12 has a race condition and resultant use-after-free if a physically proximate attacker removes a PCMCIA device while calling ioctl, aka a race condition between mgslpc_ioctl and mgslpc_detach.",
"id": "GHSA-h43g-m94v-wfpv",
"modified": "2025-05-20T21:30:27Z",
"published": "2022-10-01T00:00:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-41848"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/log/drivers/char/pcmcia/synclink_cs.c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220919040251.GA302541%40ubuntu/T/#rc85e751f467b3e6f9ccef92cfa7fb8a6cc50c270"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20220919040251.GA302541@ubuntu/T/#rc85e751f467b3e6f9ccef92cfa7fb8a6cc50c270"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H494-X7P4-QCW3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-09 18:30 – Updated: 2026-06-09 18:30Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization ('race condition') in UI Automation Manager (uiamanager.dll) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45597"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-09T17:17:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Concurrent execution using shared resource with improper synchronization (\u0027race condition\u0027) in UI Automation Manager (uiamanager.dll) allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally.",
"id": "GHSA-h494-x7p4-qcw3",
"modified": "2026-06-09T18:30:51Z",
"published": "2026-06-09T18:30:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45597"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2026-45597"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-H49R-VQ54-F89J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-12 03:33 – Updated: 2024-12-12 03:33Windows Remote Desktop Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-49128"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362",
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-12T02:04:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Windows Remote Desktop Services Remote Code Execution Vulnerability",
"id": "GHSA-h49r-vq54-f89j",
"modified": "2024-12-12T03:33:05Z",
"published": "2024-12-12T03:33:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49128"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2024-49128"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation
In languages that support it, use synchronization primitives. Only wrap these around critical code to minimize the impact on performance.
Mitigation
Use thread-safe capabilities such as the data access abstraction in Spring.
Mitigation
- Minimize the usage of shared resources in order to remove as much complexity as possible from the control flow and to reduce the likelihood of unexpected conditions occurring.
- Additionally, this will minimize the amount of synchronization necessary and may even help to reduce the likelihood of a denial of service where an attacker may be able to repeatedly trigger a critical section (CWE-400).
Mitigation
When using multithreading and operating on shared variables, only use thread-safe functions.
Mitigation
Use atomic operations on shared variables. Be wary of innocent-looking constructs such as "x++". This may appear atomic at the code layer, but it is actually non-atomic at the instruction layer, since it involves a read, followed by a computation, followed by a write.
Mitigation
Use a mutex if available, but be sure to avoid related weaknesses such as CWE-412.
Mitigation
Avoid double-checked locking (CWE-609) and other implementation errors that arise when trying to avoid the overhead of synchronization.
Mitigation
Disable interrupts or signals over critical parts of the code, but also make sure that the code does not go into a large or infinite loop.
Mitigation
Use the volatile type modifier for critical variables to avoid unexpected compiler optimization or reordering. This does not necessarily solve the synchronization problem, but it can help.
Mitigation MIT-17
Strategy: Environment Hardening
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.
CAPEC-26: Leveraging Race Conditions
The adversary targets a race condition occurring when multiple processes access and manipulate the same resource concurrently, and the outcome of the execution depends on the particular order in which the access takes place. The adversary can leverage a race condition by "running the race", modifying the resource and modifying the normal execution flow. For instance, a race condition can occur while accessing a file: the adversary can trick the system by replacing the original file with their version and cause the system to read the malicious file.
CAPEC-29: Leveraging Time-of-Check and Time-of-Use (TOCTOU) Race Conditions
This attack targets a race condition occurring between the time of check (state) for a resource and the time of use of a resource. A typical example is file access. The adversary can leverage a file access race condition by "running the race", meaning that they would modify the resource between the first time the target program accesses the file and the time the target program uses the file. During that period of time, the adversary could replace or modify the file, causing the application to behave unexpectedly.