CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
1092 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-FF4W-3R3W-H925
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-05-17 09:31 – Updated: 2024-05-17 09:31Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in Cozmoslabs Profile Builder allows Functionality Bypass.This issue affects Profile Builder: from n/a through 3.11.2.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-31341"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-05-17T09:15:35Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in Cozmoslabs Profile Builder allows Functionality Bypass.This issue affects Profile Builder: from n/a through 3.11.2.",
"id": "GHSA-ff4w-3r3w-h925",
"modified": "2024-05-17T09:31:02Z",
"published": "2024-05-17T09:31:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-31341"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://patchstack.com/database/vulnerability/profile-builder/wordpress-user-profile-builder-plugin-3-11-2-bypass-vulnerability-vulnerability?_s_id=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FFQJ-6RQC-8HR7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-09 21:30 – Updated: 2023-02-21 21:30Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in Routine prior to versions 2.6.30.6 in Android Q(10), 3.1.21.10 in Android R(11) and 3.5.2.23 in Android S(12) allows local attacker to access protected files via unused code.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-21441"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-02-09T19:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity vulnerability in Routine prior to versions 2.6.30.6 in Android Q(10), 3.1.21.10 in Android R(11) and 3.5.2.23 in Android S(12) allows local attacker to access protected files via unused code.",
"id": "GHSA-ffqj-6rqc-8hr7",
"modified": "2023-02-21T21:30:19Z",
"published": "2023-02-09T21:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-21441"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com/serviceWeb.smsb?year=2023\u0026month=02"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FHVM-J76F-QMJV
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-17 21:34 – Updated: 2026-03-06 00:58Summary
When Telegram webhook mode is enabled without a configured webhook secret, OpenClaw may accept unauthenticated HTTP POST requests at the Telegram webhook endpoint and trust attacker-controlled update JSON. This can allow forged Telegram updates that spoof message.from.id / chat.id, potentially bypassing sender allowlists and executing privileged bot commands.
Affected Packages / Versions
- Package:
openclaw(npm) - Affected:
<= 2026.1.30 - Patched:
>= 2026.2.1
Impact
An attacker who can reach the webhook endpoint can forge Telegram updates and impersonate allowlisted/paired senders by spoofing fields in the webhook payload (for example message.from.id). Impact depends on enabled commands/tools and the deployment’s network exposure.
Mitigations / Workarounds
- Configure a strong
channels.telegram.webhookSecretand ensure your reverse proxy forwards theX-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Tokenheader unchanged.
Fix Commit(s)
- ca92597e1f9593236ad86810b66633144b69314d (config validation:
webhookUrlrequireswebhookSecret)
Defense-in-depth / supporting fixes:
- 5643a934799dc523ec2ef18c007e1aa2c386b670 (default webhook listener bind host to loopback)
- 3cbcba10cf30c2ffb898f0d8c7dfb929f15f8930 (bound webhook request body size/time)
- 633fe8b9c17f02fcc68ecdb5ec212a5ace932f09 (runtime guard: reject webhook startup when secret is missing/empty)
Release Process Note
patched_versions is set to the first fixed release (2026.2.1).
Thanks @yueyueL for reporting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.2.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-28454"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-17T21:34:36Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-05T22:16:17Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nWhen Telegram webhook mode is enabled without a configured webhook secret, OpenClaw may accept unauthenticated HTTP POST requests at the Telegram webhook endpoint and trust attacker-controlled update JSON. This can allow forged Telegram updates that spoof `message.from.id` / `chat.id`, potentially bypassing sender allowlists and executing privileged bot commands.\n\n## Affected Packages / Versions\n\n- Package: `openclaw` (npm)\n- Affected: `\u003c= 2026.1.30`\n- Patched: `\u003e= 2026.2.1`\n\n## Impact\n\nAn attacker who can reach the webhook endpoint can forge Telegram updates and impersonate allowlisted/paired senders by spoofing fields in the webhook payload (for example `message.from.id`). Impact depends on enabled commands/tools and the deployment\u2019s network exposure.\n\n## Mitigations / Workarounds\n\n- Configure a strong `channels.telegram.webhookSecret` and ensure your reverse proxy forwards the `X-Telegram-Bot-Api-Secret-Token` header unchanged.\n\n## Fix Commit(s)\n\n- ca92597e1f9593236ad86810b66633144b69314d (config validation: `webhookUrl` requires `webhookSecret`)\n\nDefense-in-depth / supporting fixes:\n\n- 5643a934799dc523ec2ef18c007e1aa2c386b670 (default webhook listener bind host to loopback)\n- 3cbcba10cf30c2ffb898f0d8c7dfb929f15f8930 (bound webhook request body size/time)\n- 633fe8b9c17f02fcc68ecdb5ec212a5ace932f09 (runtime guard: reject webhook startup when secret is missing/empty)\n\n## Release Process Note\n\n`patched_versions` is set to the first fixed release (`2026.2.1`).\n\nThanks @yueyueL for reporting.",
"id": "GHSA-fhvm-j76f-qmjv",
"modified": "2026-03-06T00:58:46Z",
"published": "2026-02-17T21:34:36Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-fhvm-j76f-qmjv"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-28454"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/3cbcba10cf30c2ffb898f0d8c7dfb929f15f8930"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/5643a934799dc523ec2ef18c007e1aa2c386b670"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/633fe8b9c17f02fcc68ecdb5ec212a5ace932f09"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/commit/ca92597e1f9593236ad86810b66633144b69314d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/releases/tag/v2026.2.1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-authorization-bypass-via-unauthenticated-telegram-webhook"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw has a potential access-group authorization bypass if channel type lookup fails"
}
GHSA-FMH4-WCC4-5JM3
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-07 20:54 – Updated: 2026-07-20 19:24Am I affected?
Users are affected if all of the following are true:
- Their application uses
better-authwith theorganizationplugin (import { organization } from "better-auth/plugins/organization"). - Their application enables a sign-up surface that allows arbitrary unverified email registration. Most commonly
emailAndPassword: { enabled: true }withoutrequireEmailVerification: true. - Their application has not set
requireEmailVerificationOnInvitation: trueon theorganization()options. - Their application invitation distribution flow allows anyone other than the invited mailbox owner to obtain the
invitationId. Examples: admin UI surfacing the link, copy-paste into chat, forwarded email, mail-forwarding rules at the recipient's domain, link previews logging the URL, or a customsendInvitationEmailintegration that sends to a non-owner channel.
If their application set emailAndPassword: { enabled: true, requireEmailVerification: true } so unverified rows cannot reach a usable session, they are not affected. Setting requireEmailVerificationOnInvitation: true closes acceptInvitation and rejectInvitation, but getInvitation and listUserInvitations remain ungated even with that flag.
Fix:
- Upgrade to
better-auth@1.6.11or later. - If developers cannot upgrade their application, see workarounds below.
Summary
The organization plugin's acceptInvitation endpoint trusts an email-string equality check as proof that the session user owns the invited address. With Better Auth's stock emailAndPassword: { enabled: true } configuration, requireEmailVerification defaults to false, so an attacker can sign up a row keyed to victim@target.example (auto-signed-in, emailVerified: false) before the legitimate owner. When an organization admin invites that address, the attacker presents the invitationId and accepts the invitation, joining the organization at the invited role.
Details
The recipient gate compares invitation.email.toLowerCase() to session.user.email.toLowerCase() and returns 403 on mismatch. The opt-in requireEmailVerificationOnInvitation flag adds an emailVerified check, but it defaults to false and only fires on acceptInvitation and rejectInvitation; getInvitation and listUserInvitations have no emailVerified gate at all.
The bearer token (invitationId) is by default 32 chars over [a-zA-Z0-9] (~190 bits), so the realistic attack vector is leakage of the invitation link rather than brute force.
The fix shape defaults the emailVerified gate to on and extends it across all four invitation endpoints (acceptInvitation, rejectInvitation, getInvitation, listUserInvitations). This is the same trust-primitive class as GHSA-g38m-r43w-p2q7 (OAuth auto-link); both ship the rule "email equality is not ownership proof; both sides must prove ownership".
Patches
Fixed in better-auth@1.6.11. All four invitation recipient endpoints (acceptInvitation, rejectInvitation, getInvitation, listUserInvitations) now require the session user's emailVerified to be true in addition to the email-string match. The requireEmailVerificationOnInvitation option default flips from false to true, so applications are secure out of the box.
getInvitation and listUserInvitations use the new EMAIL_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_FOR_INVITATION error code so the wording matches the operation; acceptInvitation and rejectInvitation keep the existing EMAIL_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_BEFORE_ACCEPTING_OR_REJECTING_INVITATION code. Server-side calls to listUserInvitations that pass ctx.query.email without an authenticated session continue to bypass the gate; the gate is specific to session-authenticated recipient calls.
Integrators who intentionally accept invitations on unverified sessions can preserve the legacy permissive behavior with organization({ requireEmailVerificationOnInvitation: false }). The option is marked @deprecated; the gate at each call site carries a FIXME pointing at the next-minor follow-up that drops the option and makes the check unconditional. Operators that take this opt-out should understand the takeover risk before doing so.
Workarounds
If developers cannot upgrade their applications immediately:
- Set
organization({ requireEmailVerificationOnInvitation: true }). ClosesacceptInvitationandrejectInvitationagainst unverified sessions. Does not closegetInvitationorlistUserInvitations. - Set
emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification: true(or remove email/password sign-up entirely). Closes the pre-registration step itself. - Layer middleware on the organization invitation routes that asserts
session.user.emailVerified === trueand rejects otherwise.
Impact
- Account takeover via pre-account hijacking on the org invitation surface: the attacker, holding only an unverified self-issued session and the leaked
invitationId, joins the organization as a member at the invited role. - Organization membership reach: the attacker reads invitation contents and any organization-scoped data the joined role can see, and acts as a member of the victim organization.
Credit
Reported by @widavies.
Resources
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "better-auth"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.11"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53514"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-345",
"CWE-441",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-07T20:54:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-15T18:16:47Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Am I affected?\n\nUsers are affected if all of the following are true:\n\n- Their application uses `better-auth` with the `organization` plugin (`import { organization } from \"better-auth/plugins/organization\"`).\n- Their application enables a sign-up surface that allows arbitrary unverified email registration. Most commonly `emailAndPassword: { enabled: true }` without `requireEmailVerification: true`.\n- Their application has not set `requireEmailVerificationOnInvitation: true` on the `organization()` options.\n- Their application invitation distribution flow allows anyone other than the invited mailbox owner to obtain the `invitationId`. Examples: admin UI surfacing the link, copy-paste into chat, forwarded email, mail-forwarding rules at the recipient\u0027s domain, link previews logging the URL, or a custom `sendInvitationEmail` integration that sends to a non-owner channel.\n\nIf their application set `emailAndPassword: { enabled: true, requireEmailVerification: true }` so unverified rows cannot reach a usable session, they are not affected. Setting `requireEmailVerificationOnInvitation: true` closes `acceptInvitation` and `rejectInvitation`, but `getInvitation` and `listUserInvitations` remain ungated even with that flag.\n\nFix:\n\n1. Upgrade to `better-auth@1.6.11` or later.\n2. If developers cannot upgrade their application, see workarounds below.\n\n### Summary\n\nThe organization plugin\u0027s `acceptInvitation` endpoint trusts an email-string equality check as proof that the session user owns the invited address. With Better Auth\u0027s stock `emailAndPassword: { enabled: true }` configuration, `requireEmailVerification` defaults to `false`, so an attacker can sign up a row keyed to `victim@target.example` (auto-signed-in, `emailVerified: false`) before the legitimate owner. When an organization admin invites that address, the attacker presents the `invitationId` and accepts the invitation, joining the organization at the invited role.\n\n### Details\n\nThe recipient gate compares `invitation.email.toLowerCase()` to `session.user.email.toLowerCase()` and returns 403 on mismatch. The opt-in `requireEmailVerificationOnInvitation` flag adds an `emailVerified` check, but it defaults to `false` and only fires on `acceptInvitation` and `rejectInvitation`; `getInvitation` and `listUserInvitations` have no `emailVerified` gate at all.\n\nThe bearer token (`invitationId`) is by default 32 chars over `[a-zA-Z0-9]` (~190 bits), so the realistic attack vector is leakage of the invitation link rather than brute force.\n\nThe fix shape defaults the `emailVerified` gate to on and extends it across all four invitation endpoints (`acceptInvitation`, `rejectInvitation`, `getInvitation`, `listUserInvitations`). This is the same trust-primitive class as GHSA-g38m-r43w-p2q7 (OAuth auto-link); both ship the rule \"email equality is not ownership proof; both sides must prove ownership\".\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `better-auth@1.6.11`. All four invitation recipient endpoints (`acceptInvitation`, `rejectInvitation`, `getInvitation`, `listUserInvitations`) now require the session user\u0027s `emailVerified` to be `true` in addition to the email-string match. The `requireEmailVerificationOnInvitation` option default flips from `false` to `true`, so applications are secure out of the box.\n\n`getInvitation` and `listUserInvitations` use the new `EMAIL_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_FOR_INVITATION` error code so the wording matches the operation; `acceptInvitation` and `rejectInvitation` keep the existing `EMAIL_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED_BEFORE_ACCEPTING_OR_REJECTING_INVITATION` code. Server-side calls to `listUserInvitations` that pass `ctx.query.email` without an authenticated session continue to bypass the gate; the gate is specific to session-authenticated recipient calls.\n\nIntegrators who intentionally accept invitations on unverified sessions can preserve the legacy permissive behavior with `organization({ requireEmailVerificationOnInvitation: false })`. The option is marked `@deprecated`; the gate at each call site carries a `FIXME` pointing at the next-minor follow-up that drops the option and makes the check unconditional. Operators that take this opt-out should understand the takeover risk before doing so.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nIf developers cannot upgrade their applications immediately:\n\n- **Set `organization({ requireEmailVerificationOnInvitation: true })`**. Closes `acceptInvitation` and `rejectInvitation` against unverified sessions. Does not close `getInvitation` or `listUserInvitations`.\n- **Set `emailAndPassword.requireEmailVerification: true`** (or remove email/password sign-up entirely). Closes the pre-registration step itself.\n- **Layer middleware** on the organization invitation routes that asserts `session.user.emailVerified === true` and rejects otherwise.\n\n### Impact\n\n- **Account takeover via pre-account hijacking on the org invitation surface**: the attacker, holding only an unverified self-issued session and the leaked `invitationId`, joins the organization as a member at the invited role.\n- **Organization membership reach**: the attacker reads invitation contents and any organization-scoped data the joined role can see, and acts as a member of the victim organization.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by @widavies.\n\n### Resources\n\n- [CWE-287: Improper Authentication](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/287.html)\n- [CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/345.html)\n- [CWE-862: Missing Authorization](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/862.html)\n- [CWE-441: Unintended Proxy or Intermediary](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/441.html)",
"id": "GHSA-fmh4-wcc4-5jm3",
"modified": "2026-07-20T19:24:41Z",
"published": "2026-07-07T20:54:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/security/advisories/GHSA-fmh4-wcc4-5jm3"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53514"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/pull/9577"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/commit/23094a628f007f801be6d26e5b15dc5fc6fc4eb8"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/releases/tag/v1.6.11"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Better Auth vulnerable to unauthorized invitation acceptance via unverified email match in organization plugin"
}
GHSA-FMQ6-M827-77JC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 16:57 – Updated: 2024-04-04 02:01If a wildcard ('*') is specified for the host in Content Security Policy (CSP) directives, any port or path restriction of the directive will be ignored, leading to CSP directives not being properly applied to content. This vulnerability affects Firefox < 69.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-11737"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-09-27T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "If a wildcard (\u0027*\u0027) is specified for the host in Content Security Policy (CSP) directives, any port or path restriction of the directive will be ignored, leading to CSP directives not being properly applied to content. This vulnerability affects Firefox \u003c 69.",
"id": "GHSA-fmq6-m827-77jc",
"modified": "2024-04-04T02:01:34Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T16:57:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-11737"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1388015"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2019-25"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FMW9-C6HW-79VG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-10-27 18:31 – Updated: 2025-10-27 18:31A weakness has been identified in D-Link DAP-2695 2.00RC13. The affected element is the function sub_40C6B8 of the component Firmware Update Handler. Executing manipulation can lead to improper verification of cryptographic signature. The attack can be launched remotely. Attacks of this nature are highly complex. The exploitability is described as difficult. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited. This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-12295"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-10-27T17:15:36Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "A weakness has been identified in D-Link DAP-2695 2.00RC13. The affected element is the function sub_40C6B8 of the component Firmware Update Handler. Executing manipulation can lead to improper verification of cryptographic signature. The attack can be launched remotely. Attacks of this nature are highly complex. The exploitability is described as difficult. The exploit has been made available to the public and could be exploited. This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer.",
"id": "GHSA-fmw9-c6hw-79vg",
"modified": "2025-10-27T18:31:11Z",
"published": "2025-10-27T18:31:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-12295"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/IOTRes/IOT_Firmware_Update/blob/main/Dlink/DAP-2695_Inte.md"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?ctiid.329963"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?id.329963"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://vuldb.com/?submit.675854"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dlink.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-FP43-VJ7G-PG92
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 22:35 – Updated: 2026-07-24 22:351. Forged combined-resource IDs
CombinedResourceInfo accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,
inflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource
identifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded
tests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;
about 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache
entries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed
input was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and
an attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.
The minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID root:
- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and wildcard-CDN configuration.
- A forged inner
.xhtmlresource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and returned its raw content. - A forged
omnifaces.graphicinner resource plus a canaryHostheader caused an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent; I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme or arbitrary-destination SSRF.
These behaviors reproduce after the fix for CVE-2026-41883 / GHSA-vp6r-9m58-5xv8. That advisory concerned EL evaluation order in the wildcard CDN path. This report has a different root: unsigned combined IDs and missing decode/cache bounds, with separately demonstrated residual sink behavior.
2. Source-map cache
With the documented optional source-map handler above a synthetic resource handler, 40 unique missing combined-resource requests grew the process-wide source-map cache from 13 to 92 entries. It has no size or eviction bound. This has a separate cache, configuration prerequisite, and fix from family 1.
3. HashParam callback output
A URL-fragment value containing a single-quote JavaScript payload was stored by
o:hashParam and later written unescaped into the Ajax callback script. On the
follow-up Ajax render, real Chrome executed the canary
window.__omniXss=1337. This requires a page using o:hashParam and the
follow-up Ajax render.
4. Session/view push-channel replay
A fresh WebSocket client with no HTTP cookie connected using a victim's session-scoped channel ID and received the victim's subsequent push. The code checks application-wide ID existence but does not bind the handshake to the current HTTP session, despite the documented current-session guarantee. The UUID remains an unguessable bearer-token prerequisite; this is replay after token exposure, not brute force.
5. Push idle-connection and fanout behavior
Twelve independent clients joined one application-scoped channel and all 12 received the same push. Current code sets every accepted session's maximum idle timeout to zero, retains sessions in an unbounded per-channel queue, and walks the full queue on each push. I am reporting the demonstrated mechanism as a bounded design weakness: container connection limits remain an outer bound, and I am not claiming unbounded heap growth from the 12-client test.
Intentionally excluded leads
- A duplicate-Range response-amplification lead was disproved. Twenty-four ranges produced only one response body because the stream wrapper closes after the first range. I am not reporting it as a security issue.
- The older
Servlets.facesRedirectXML issue is fixed on the current branch. I am not reporting it as a new current-upstream issue.
Expected invariants
- Only server-issued combined IDs should be accepted; decoding and caches should be bounded; excluded resources and dynamic handlers should not become attacker-selected inner resources.
- Dynamic URLs should not derive an outbound destination from an untrusted
Hostheader. - Source-map lookups should not create unbounded process-lifetime state.
HashParamvalues must be escaped for a JavaScript string inside an XML CDATA callback.- Session/view push subscriptions should be bound to the owning HTTP session or authenticated principal; idle limits and per-channel caps should remain operator-controllable.
Suggested fixes and available evidence
- Authenticate generated combined IDs with a per-deployment secret, cap inflated output, bound the combined cache, and avoid caching failed loads.
- Require an existing/registered inner resource before wildcard remapping and reject excluded resource types at serve time.
- Derive dynamic-resource origins from trusted configuration rather than the
request
Hostvalue. - Bound or evict the source-map cache.
- Apply JavaScript-string plus CDATA-safe encoding to
HashParamcallback values. - Capture and verify HTTP-session or principal ownership during the WebSocket handshake; retain a finite idle timeout and configurable per-channel limits.
Daniel Birtwhistle
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.omnifaces:omnifaces"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.14.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.omnifaces:omnifaces"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.7.33"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.omnifaces:omnifaces"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.14.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.omnifaces:omnifaces"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.7.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.omnifaces:omnifaces"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "5.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-770",
"CWE-79",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T22:35:27Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## 1. Forged combined-resource IDs\n`CombinedResourceInfo` accepts a path-derived ID without an authenticity check,\ninflates it without an output limit, converts it to attacker-selected resource\nidentifiers, and retains unique IDs in an unbounded static cache. In bounded\ntests, 20,754 encoded bytes inflated to 16,000,000 characters (about 770:1;\nabout 49 MB observed heap delta), and 200 unique IDs added 200 permanent cache\nentries. A legitimately shaped short ID remained about 1:1, while malformed\ninput was rejected; the missing distinction is between a server-issued ID and\nan attacker-minted but structurally valid ID.\n\nThe minimal application also confirmed three sink tails from the same forged-ID\nroot:\n\n- A wildcard CDN mapping performed a server-side fetch and relayed the exact\n loopback-canary body. This requires the documented combined-resource and\n wildcard-CDN configuration.\n- A forged inner `.xhtml` resource bypassed the excluded-resource boundary and\n returned its raw content.\n- A forged `omnifaces.graphic` inner resource plus a canary `Host` header caused\n an outbound GET to that host. This result is blind and deployment-dependent;\n I am not claiming arbitrary-scheme or arbitrary-destination SSRF.\n\nThese behaviors reproduce after the fix for CVE-2026-41883 /\nGHSA-vp6r-9m58-5xv8. That advisory concerned EL evaluation order in the wildcard\nCDN path. This report has a different root: unsigned combined IDs and missing\ndecode/cache bounds, with separately demonstrated residual sink behavior.\n\n## 2. Source-map cache \n\nWith the documented optional source-map handler above a synthetic resource\nhandler, 40 unique missing combined-resource requests grew the process-wide\nsource-map cache from 13 to 92 entries. It has no size or eviction bound. This\nhas a separate cache, configuration prerequisite, and fix from family 1.\n\n## 3. HashParam callback output\n\nA URL-fragment value containing a single-quote JavaScript payload was stored by\n`o:hashParam` and later written unescaped into the Ajax callback script. On the\nfollow-up Ajax render, real Chrome executed the canary\n`window.__omniXss=1337`. This requires a page using `o:hashParam` and the\nfollow-up Ajax render.\n\n## 4. Session/view push-channel replay \n\nA fresh WebSocket client with no HTTP cookie connected using a victim\u0027s\nsession-scoped channel ID and received the victim\u0027s subsequent push. The code\nchecks application-wide ID existence but does not bind the handshake to the\ncurrent HTTP session, despite the documented current-session guarantee. The\nUUID remains an unguessable bearer-token prerequisite; this is replay after\ntoken exposure, not brute force.\n\n## 5. Push idle-connection and fanout behavior \n\nTwelve independent clients joined one application-scoped channel and all 12\nreceived the same push. Current code sets every accepted session\u0027s maximum idle\ntimeout to zero, retains sessions in an unbounded per-channel queue, and walks\nthe full queue on each push. I am reporting the demonstrated mechanism as a\nbounded design weakness: container connection limits remain an outer bound,\nand I am not claiming unbounded heap growth from the 12-client test.\n\n## Intentionally excluded leads\n\n- A duplicate-Range response-amplification lead was disproved. Twenty-four\n ranges produced only one response body because the stream wrapper closes\n after the first range. I am not reporting it as a security issue.\n- The older `Servlets.facesRedirect` XML issue is fixed on the current branch.\n I am not reporting it as a new current-upstream issue.\n\n## Expected invariants\n\n- Only server-issued combined IDs should be accepted; decoding and caches\n should be bounded; excluded resources and dynamic handlers should not become\n attacker-selected inner resources.\n- Dynamic URLs should not derive an outbound destination from an untrusted\n `Host` header.\n- Source-map lookups should not create unbounded process-lifetime state.\n- `HashParam` values must be escaped for a JavaScript string inside an XML\n CDATA callback.\n- Session/view push subscriptions should be bound to the owning HTTP session or\n authenticated principal; idle limits and per-channel caps should remain\n operator-controllable.\n\n## Suggested fixes and available evidence\n\n- Authenticate generated combined IDs with a per-deployment secret, cap\n inflated output, bound the combined cache, and avoid caching failed loads.\n- Require an existing/registered inner resource before wildcard remapping and\n reject excluded resource types at serve time.\n- Derive dynamic-resource origins from trusted configuration rather than the\n request `Host` value.\n- Bound or evict the source-map cache.\n- Apply JavaScript-string plus CDATA-safe encoding to `HashParam` callback\n values.\n- Capture and verify HTTP-session or principal ownership during the WebSocket\n handshake; retain a finite idle timeout and configurable per-channel limits.\n\nDaniel Birtwhistle",
"id": "GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92",
"modified": "2026-07-24T22:35:27Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T22:35:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/security/advisories/GHSA-fp43-vj7g-pg92"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/59d6c5188c39418546fe500d05036645987a77d1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/a52b92461cf39d983f51ce8724fe7e6b944073e4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/aa42da361821ddfbb85b126564e71587347d2786"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/c43eef01174a4dc09cec44eff553ff6284150af7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces/commit/d5cae243c4692555efaa4ba774e0f8f60e3f4db5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/omnifaces/omnifaces"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "OmniFaces: Forged combined-resource IDs and related output/push boundaries"
}
GHSA-FP52-QW33-MFMW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-08-02 17:11 – Updated: 2023-08-29 22:39HashiCorp Vault and Vault Enterprise versions 0.7.1 and newer, when configured with the AWS IAM auth method, may be vulnerable to authentication bypass. Fixed in 1.2.5, 1.3.8, 1.4.4, and 1.5.1..
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/hashicorp/vault"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.8.1"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.5"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/hashicorp/vault"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.3.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.3.8"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/hashicorp/vault"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.4.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.4.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/hashicorp/vault"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.5.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-16250"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-290",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-07-26T18:55:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2020-08-26T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "HashiCorp Vault and Vault Enterprise versions 0.7.1 and newer, when configured with the AWS IAM auth method, may be vulnerable to authentication bypass. Fixed in 1.2.5, 1.3.8, 1.4.4, and 1.5.1..",
"id": "GHSA-fp52-qw33-mfmw",
"modified": "2023-08-29T22:39:27Z",
"published": "2021-08-02T17:11:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-16250"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/vault"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md#151"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.hashicorp.com/blog/category/vault"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/159478/Hashicorp-Vault-AWS-IAM-Integration-Authentication-Bypass.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Authentication Bypass by Spoofing and Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity in Hashicorp Vault"
}
GHSA-FP87-JFRM-4F3F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-03 18:31 – Updated: 2024-12-04 00:31An attacker who can execute arbitrary Operating Systems commands, can bypass code signing enforcements in the kernel, and execute arbitrary native code. This vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 2.800.0000000.8.R.20241111.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-52548"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-03T18:15:16Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An attacker who can execute arbitrary Operating Systems commands, can bypass code signing enforcements in the kernel, and execute arbitrary native code. This vulnerability has been resolved in firmware version 2.800.0000000.8.R.20241111.",
"id": "GHSA-fp87-jfrm-4f3f",
"modified": "2024-12-04T00:31:31Z",
"published": "2024-12-03T18:31:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52548"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sfewer-r7/LorexExploit"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.rapid7.com/blog/post/2024/12/03/lorex-2k-indoor-wi-fi-security-camera-multiple-vulnerabilities-fixed"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-FPG8-7664-JC5Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-10 21:43 – Updated: 2026-07-10 21:43Previously, Apko verified the control section hash (.PKGINFO etc.) against the signed APKINDEX, but never verified the data section hash (the actual package files that get installed). An attacker who could compromise a mirror, poison a cache, or MITM a package fetch could substitute arbitrary file contents while the control hash check still passed.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "chainguard.dev/apko"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.2.9"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "chainguard.dev/melange"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.50.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54174"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-10T21:43:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Previously, Apko verified the control section hash (`.PKGINFO` etc.) against the signed `APKINDEX`, but never verified the data section hash (the actual package files that get installed). An attacker who could compromise a mirror, poison a cache, or MITM a package fetch could substitute arbitrary file contents while the control hash check still passed.",
"id": "GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q",
"modified": "2026-07-10T21:43:05Z",
"published": "2026-07-10T21:43:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange/security/advisories/GHSA-fpg8-7664-jc5q"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/chainguard-dev/melange"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "melange: Incomplete package integrity verification allows data section substitution"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.