Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-327

Allowed-with-Review

Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm

Abstraction: Class · Status: Draft

The product uses a broken or risky cryptographic algorithm or protocol.

988 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-3FCQ-HFV4-XFG4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:44 – Updated: 2022-07-13 00:01
VLAI
Details

There is insecure algorithm vulnerability in Huawei products. A module uses less random input in a secure mechanism. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by brute forcing to obtain sensitive message. This can lead to information leak. Affected product versions include:USG9500 versions V500R001C30SPC200, V500R001C60SPC500,V500R005C00SPC200;USG9520 versions V500R005C00;USG9560 versions V500R005C00;USG9580 versions V500R005C00.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-22309"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-03-22T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "There is insecure algorithm vulnerability in Huawei products. A module uses less random input in a secure mechanism. Attackers can exploit this vulnerability by brute forcing to obtain sensitive message. This can lead to information leak. Affected product versions include:USG9500 versions V500R001C30SPC200, V500R001C60SPC500,V500R005C00SPC200;USG9520 versions V500R005C00;USG9560 versions V500R005C00;USG9580 versions V500R005C00.",
  "id": "GHSA-3fcq-hfv4-xfg4",
  "modified": "2022-07-13T00:01:09Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T17:44:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-22309"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.huawei.com/en/psirt/security-advisories/huawei-sa-20210202-01-fw-en"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3FPM-H3C3-72HQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-08-06 21:31 – Updated: 2025-08-06 21:31
VLAI
Details

poco v1.14.1-release was discovered to contain weak encryption.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-45766"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-08-06T20:15:28Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "poco v1.14.1-release was discovered to contain weak encryption.",
  "id": "GHSA-3fpm-h3c3-72hq",
  "modified": "2025-08-06T21:31:40Z",
  "published": "2025-08-06T21:31:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-45766"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/ZupeiNie/9de26f17a5e135b50fa388999e912c42"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pocoproject"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pocoproject/poco"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3FR9-8M46-R2MM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-01-09 12:30 – Updated: 2025-10-08 09:31
VLAI
Details

An Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in the update process of Korenix JetNet Series allows replacing the whole operating system including Trusted Executables. This issue affects JetNet devices older than firmware version 2024/01.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-5347"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327",
      "CWE-347"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-09T10:15:22Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature vulnerability in the update process of Korenix JetNet Series allows replacing the whole operating system including Trusted Executables.\u00a0This issue affects JetNet devices older than firmware version 2024/01.",
  "id": "GHSA-3fr9-8m46-r2mm",
  "modified": "2025-10-08T09:31:13Z",
  "published": "2024-01-09T12:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5347"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cyberdanube.com/en/en-multiple-vulnerabilities-in-korenix-jetnet-series"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.beijerelectronics.com/en/support/Help___online?docId=69947"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/176550/Korenix-JetNet-Series-Unauthenticated-Access.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2024/Jan/11"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3G75-Q268-R9R6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-18 18:50 – Updated: 2025-12-18 18:50
VLAI
Summary
Amazon S3 Encryption Client has a Key Commitment Issue
Details

Summary

S3 Encryption Client for Go is an open-source client-side encryption library used to facilitate writing and reading encrypted records to S3.

When the encrypted data key (EDK) is stored in an "Instruction File" instead of S3's metadata record, the EDK is exposed to an "Invisible Salamanders" attack (https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/016), which could allow the EDK to be replaced with a new key.

Impact

Background - Key Commitment

There is a cryptographic property whereby under certain conditions, a single ciphertext can be decrypted into 2 different plaintexts by using different encryption keys. To address this issue, strong encryption schemes use what is known as "key commitment", a process by which an encrypted message can only be decrypted by one key; the key used to originally encrypt the message.

In older versions of S3EC, when customers are also using a feature called "Instruction File" to store EDKs, key commitment is not implemented because multiple EDKs could be associated to an underlying encrypted message object. For such customers an attack that leverages the lack of key commitment is possible. A bad actor would need two things to leverage this issue: (i) the ability to create a separate, rogue, EDK that will also decrypt the underlying object to produce desired plaintext, and (ii) permission to upload a new instruction file to the S3 bucket to replace the existing instruction file placed there by the user using the S3C. Any future attempt to decrypt the underlying encrypted message with the S3EC will unwittingly use the rogue EDK to produce a valid plaintext message.

Impacted versions: <= v3.1

Patches

Amazon S3 Encryption Client is introducing the concept of "key commitment" to S3EC where the EDK is cryptographically bound to the ciphertext in order to address this issue. In order to maintain compatibility for in-flight messages we are releasing the fix in two versions. A code-compatible minor version that can read messages with key-commitment but not write them, and a new major version that can both read and write messages with key-commitment. For maximum safety customers are asked to upgrade to the latest major version: v4.0.0 or later.

Workarounds

There are no workarounds, please upgrade to the suggested version of S3EC.

References

If customers have any questions or comments about this advisory, Amazon S3 Encryption Client asks that they contact AWS Security through the issue reporting page or directly via email to aws-security@amazon.com. Please do not create a public GitHub issue.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/aws/amazon-s3-encryption-client-go/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-14764"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-12-18T18:50:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-17T21:15:53Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nS3 Encryption Client for Go is an open-source client-side encryption library used to facilitate writing and reading encrypted records to S3.  \n\nWhen the encrypted data key (EDK) is stored in an \"Instruction File\" instead of S3\u0027s metadata record, the EDK is exposed to an \"Invisible Salamanders\" attack  (https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/016), which could allow the EDK to be replaced with a new key. \n\n\n\n## Impact\n\n### Background - Key Commitment\n\nThere is a cryptographic property whereby under certain conditions, a single ciphertext can be decrypted into 2 different plaintexts by using different encryption keys.  To address this issue, strong encryption schemes use what is known as \"key commitment\", a process by which an encrypted message can only be decrypted by one key; the key used to originally encrypt the message. \n\nIn older versions of S3EC, when customers are also using a feature called \"Instruction File\" to store EDKs, key commitment is not implemented because multiple EDKs could be associated to an underlying encrypted message object.  For such customers an attack that leverages the lack of key commitment is possible.  A bad actor would need two things to leverage this issue: (i) the ability to create a separate, rogue, EDK that will also decrypt the underlying object to produce desired plaintext, and (ii) permission to upload a new instruction file to the S3 bucket to replace the existing instruction file placed there by the user using the S3C.  Any future attempt to decrypt the underlying encrypted message with the S3EC will unwittingly use the rogue EDK to produce a valid plaintext message.\n\nImpacted versions: \u003c= v3.1\n\n\n### Patches\n\nAmazon S3 Encryption Client is introducing the concept of \"key commitment\" to S3EC where the EDK is cryptographically bound to the ciphertext in order to address this issue.  In order to maintain compatibility for in-flight messages we are releasing the fix in two versions.  A code-compatible minor version that can read messages with key-commitment but not write them, and a new major version that can both read and write messages with key-commitment.  For maximum safety customers are asked to upgrade to the latest major version: v4.0.0 or later.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nThere are no workarounds, please upgrade to the suggested version of S3EC.\n\n## References\n\nIf customers have any questions or comments about this advisory, Amazon S3 Encryption Client asks that they contact AWS Security through the issue reporting page or directly via email to [aws-security@amazon.com](mailto:aws-security@amazon.com). Please do not create a public GitHub issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-3g75-q268-r9r6",
  "modified": "2025-12-18T18:50:42Z",
  "published": "2025-12-18T18:50:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/amazon-s3-encryption-client-go/security/advisories/GHSA-3g75-q268-r9r6"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-14764"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/amazon-s3-encryption-client-go/commit/3e1740ec014e234e6d454291615011122e642b5d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://aws.amazon.com/security/security-bulletins/AWS-2025-032"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/amazon-s3-encryption-client-go"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/aws/amazon-s3-encryption-client-go/releases/tag/v4.0.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Amazon S3 Encryption Client has a Key Commitment Issue"
}

GHSA-3GV2-2XXR-9JGQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-30 00:00 – Updated: 2024-03-21 03:34
VLAI
Details

HireVue Hiring Platform V1.0 suffers from Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-37177"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-08-29T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "HireVue Hiring Platform V1.0 suffers from Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm.",
  "id": "GHSA-3gv2-2xxr-9jgq",
  "modified": "2024-03-21T03:34:18Z",
  "published": "2022-08-30T00:00:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-37177"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/JC175/CVE-2022-37177"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.hirevue.com"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3HH9-752G-5G22

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-04 18:30 – Updated: 2026-07-15 22:10
VLAI
Summary
LMCache: 16-bit multimodal hash collision can poison KV cache entries
Details

A flaw has been found in LMCache up to 0.4.6. This affects the function hex_hash_to_int16 of the file lmcache/integration/vllm/utils.py of the component KV Cache Handler. Executing a manipulation can lead to use of weak hash. The attack needs to be launched locally. The attack requires a high level of complexity. It is indicated that the exploitability is difficult. The exploit has been published and may be used. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "lmcache"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.4.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-10813"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-15T22:10:24Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-04T16:16:32Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "A flaw has been found in LMCache up to 0.4.6. This affects the function hex_hash_to_int16 of the file lmcache/integration/vllm/utils.py of the component KV Cache Handler. Executing a manipulation can lead to use of weak hash. The attack needs to be launched locally. The attack requires a high level of complexity. It is indicated that the exploitability is difficult. The exploit has been published and may be used. The pull request to fix this issue awaits acceptance.",
  "id": "GHSA-3hh9-752g-5g22",
  "modified": "2026-07-15T22:10:24Z",
  "published": "2026-06-04T18:30:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10813"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/LMCache/LMCache/issues/3301"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/LMCache/LMCache/pull/2932"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/LMCache/LMCache"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/cve/CVE-2026-10813"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/submit/831641"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/368261"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vuldb.com/vuln/368261/cti"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "LMCache: 16-bit multimodal hash collision can poison KV cache entries"
}

GHSA-3M2V-MXM7-8JJM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-08 12:31 – Updated: 2025-07-08 12:31
VLAI
Details

A vulnerability has been identified in RUGGEDCOM i800 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM i801 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM i802 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM i803 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM M2100 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM M2200 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM M969 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RMC30 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RMC8388 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RMC8388 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RP110 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS1600 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS1600F (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS1600T (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS400 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS401 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416P (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416Pv2 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416Pv2 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS416v2 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416v2 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS8000 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS8000A (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS8000H (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS8000T (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900 (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900 (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS900G (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900G (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900G (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS900GP (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-GETS-C01 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-GETS-XX (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-STND-C01 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-STND-XX (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS910 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS910L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS910W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS920L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS920W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS930L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS930W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS940G (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS969 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100 (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100 (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100P (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100P (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100P (32M) V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2200 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2288 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2288 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300P V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300P V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2488 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2488 V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG907R (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG908C (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG909R (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG910C (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG920P V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG920P V5.X (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSL910 (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST2228 (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST2228P (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST916C (All versions < V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST916P (All versions < V5.10.0). The affected devices support the TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 cipher suite, which uses CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode that is known to be vulnerable to timing attacks. This could allow an attacker to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of encrypted communications.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-41223"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-08T11:15:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability has been identified in RUGGEDCOM i800 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM i801 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM i802 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM i803 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM M2100 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM M2200 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM M969 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RMC30 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RMC8388 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RMC8388 V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RP110 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS1600 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS1600F (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS1600T (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS400 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS401 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416P (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416Pv2 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416Pv2 V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS416v2 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS416v2 V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS8000 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS8000A (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS8000H (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS8000T (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900 (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900 (32M) V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS900G (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900G (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900G (32M) V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RS900GP (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-GETS-C01 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-GETS-XX (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-STND-C01 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900M-STND-XX (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS900W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS910 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS910L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS910W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS920L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS920W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS930L (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS930W (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS940G (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RS969 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100 (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100 (32M) V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100P (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100P (32M) V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2100P (32M) V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2200 (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2288 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2288 V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300 V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300P V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2300P V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG2488 V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG2488 V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG907R (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG908C (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG909R (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG910C (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSG920P V4.X (All versions), RUGGEDCOM RSG920P V5.X (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RSL910 (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST2228 (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST2228P (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST916C (All versions \u003c V5.10.0), RUGGEDCOM RST916P (All versions \u003c V5.10.0). The affected devices support the TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 cipher suite, which uses CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode that is known to be vulnerable to timing attacks. This could allow an attacker to compromise the integrity and confidentiality of encrypted communications.",
  "id": "GHSA-3m2v-mxm7-8jjm",
  "modified": "2025-07-08T12:31:03Z",
  "published": "2025-07-08T12:31:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-41223"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cert-portal.siemens.com/productcert/html/ssa-083019.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-3M6Q-H5GJ-7MRW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-22 20:37 – Updated: 2026-04-22 20:37
VLAI
Summary
Gitea has insecure default SSH settings
Details

Summary

The built-in SSH server currently advertises a number of key exchange, MAC, and host key algorithms that are considered weak or broken. The defaults should be tightened so a fresh installation passes a baseline SSH security audit out of the box.

Details

Running ssh-audit against a default deployment flags the following as fail:

  • Key exchange
  • ecdh-sha2-nistp256
  • ecdh-sha2-nistp384
  • ecdh-sha2-nistp521
  • MAC
  • hmac-sha1
  • Host key
  • ssh-rsa

Reproduction

docker run -it --rm positronsecurity/ssh-audit -p 2222 gitea.local

Impact

Default deployments expose algorithms that are known-weak or deprecated upstream. The current workaround requires manually setting several GITEA__server__SSH_SERVER_* variables, which most users will never do.

Workaround

[server]
SSH_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGES = curve25519-sha256, diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
SSH_SERVER_CIPHERS       = chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, aes128-ctr, aes192-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-gcm@openssh.com
SSH_SERVER_MACS          = hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256

There is no exposed option to restrict host key algorithms, so ssh-rsa remains advertised.

Acceptance criteria

  • [ ] Default SSH_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGES, SSH_SERVER_CIPHERS, and SSH_SERVER_MACS updated to the secure list above.
  • [ ] New SSH_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGORITHMS option added, with a default that excludes ssh-rsa.
  • [ ] Documentation updated to reflect the new defaults.
  • [ ] ssh-audit against a fresh install reports no [fail] entries.
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.gitea.io/gitea"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.25.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1188",
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-22T20:37:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe built-in SSH server currently advertises a number of key exchange, MAC, and host key algorithms that are considered weak or broken. The defaults should be tightened so a fresh installation passes a baseline SSH security audit out of the box.\n\n## Details\n\nRunning `ssh-audit` against a default deployment flags the following as `fail`:\n\n- **Key exchange**\n  - `ecdh-sha2-nistp256`\n  - `ecdh-sha2-nistp384`\n  - `ecdh-sha2-nistp521`\n- **MAC**\n  - `hmac-sha1`\n- **Host key**\n  - `ssh-rsa`\n\n## Reproduction\n\n```sh\ndocker run -it --rm positronsecurity/ssh-audit -p 2222 gitea.local\n```\n\n## Impact\n\nDefault deployments expose algorithms that are known-weak or deprecated upstream. The current workaround requires manually setting several `GITEA__server__SSH_SERVER_*` variables, which most users will never do.\n\n### Workaround\n\n```ini\n[server]\nSSH_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGES = curve25519-sha256, diffie-hellman-group14-sha256\nSSH_SERVER_CIPHERS       = chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com, aes128-ctr, aes192-ctr, aes256-ctr, aes128-gcm@openssh.com, aes256-gcm@openssh.com\nSSH_SERVER_MACS          = hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com, hmac-sha2-256\n```\n\nThere is no exposed option to restrict host key algorithms, so `ssh-rsa` remains advertised.\n\n## Acceptance criteria\n\n- [ ] Default `SSH_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGES`, `SSH_SERVER_CIPHERS`, and `SSH_SERVER_MACS` updated to the secure list above.\n- [ ] New `SSH_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGORITHMS` option added, with a default that excludes `ssh-rsa`.\n- [ ] Documentation updated to reflect the new defaults.\n- [ ] `ssh-audit` against a fresh install reports no `[fail]` entries.",
  "id": "GHSA-3m6q-h5gj-7mrw",
  "modified": "2026-04-22T20:37:21Z",
  "published": "2026-04-22T20:37:21Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-3m6q-h5gj-7mrw"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Gitea has insecure default SSH settings"
}

GHSA-3MQF-X495-XQRW

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-01 18:46 – Updated: 2025-04-11 04:14
VLAI
Details

The NIST SP 800-90A default statement of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm contains point Q constants with a possible relationship to certain "skeleton key" values, which might allow context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of those values. NOTE: this is a preliminary CVE for Dual_EC_DRBG; future research may provide additional details about point Q and associated attacks, and could potentially lead to a RECAST or REJECT of this CVE.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2007-6755"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2013-10-11T22:55:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The NIST SP 800-90A default statement of the Dual Elliptic Curve Deterministic Random Bit Generation (Dual_EC_DRBG) algorithm contains point Q constants with a possible relationship to certain \"skeleton key\" values, which might allow context-dependent attackers to defeat cryptographic protection mechanisms by leveraging knowledge of those values.  NOTE: this is a preliminary CVE for Dual_EC_DRBG; future research may provide additional details about point Q and associated attacks, and could potentially lead to a RECAST or REJECT of this CVE.",
  "id": "GHSA-3mqf-x495-xqrw",
  "modified": "2025-04-11T04:14:47Z",
  "published": "2022-05-01T18:46:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2007-6755"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/11/the_strange_sto.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/09/stop-using-nsa-influence-code-in-our-product-rsa-tells-customers"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/rsa-warns-developers-against-its-own.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2013/09/the-many-flaws-of-dualecdrbg.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://rump2007.cr.yp.to/15-shumow.pdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://stream.wsj.com/story/latest-headlines/SS-2-63399/SS-2-332655"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://threatpost.com/in-wake-of-latest-crypto-revelations-everything-is-suspect"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/63657"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-3PJ2-RVJ5-6646

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:06 – Updated: 2023-08-08 15:31
VLAI
Details

An attacker may perform a DoS attack to prevent a user from sending encrypted email to a correspondent. If an attacker creates a crafted OpenPGP key with a subkey that has an invalid self signature, and the Thunderbird user imports the crafted key, then Thunderbird may try to use the invalid subkey, but the RNP library rejects it from being used, causing encryption to fail. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird < 78.9.1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-23993"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-327"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-06-24T14:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "An attacker may perform a DoS attack to prevent a user from sending encrypted email to a correspondent. If an attacker creates a crafted OpenPGP key with a subkey that has an invalid self signature, and the Thunderbird user imports the crafted key, then Thunderbird may try to use the invalid subkey, but the RNP library rejects it from being used, causing encryption to fail. This vulnerability affects Thunderbird \u003c 78.9.1.",
  "id": "GHSA-3pj2-rvj5-6646",
  "modified": "2023-08-08T15:31:18Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:06:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23993"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1666360"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2021-13"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

Mitigation MIT-24
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis.
  • For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification [REF-1192].
  • Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak.
  • Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]
Mitigation MIT-52
Architecture and Design

Ensure that the design allows one cryptographic algorithm to be replaced with another in the next generation or version. Where possible, use wrappers to make the interfaces uniform. This will make it easier to upgrade to stronger algorithms. With hardware, design the product at the Intellectual Property (IP) level so that one cryptographic algorithm can be replaced with another in the next generation of the hardware product.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design

Carefully manage and protect cryptographic keys (see CWE-320). If the keys can be guessed or stolen, then the strength of the cryptography itself is irrelevant.

Mitigation MIT-4
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482].
  • Industry-standard implementations will save development time and may be more likely to avoid errors that can occur during implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Consider the ESAPI Encryption feature.
Mitigation MIT-25
Implementation Architecture and Design

When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.

CAPEC-20: Encryption Brute Forcing

An attacker, armed with the cipher text and the encryption algorithm used, performs an exhaustive (brute force) search on the key space to determine the key that decrypts the cipher text to obtain the plaintext.

CAPEC-459: Creating a Rogue Certification Authority Certificate

An adversary exploits a weakness resulting from using a hashing algorithm with weak collision resistance to generate certificate signing requests (CSR) that contain collision blocks in their "to be signed" parts. The adversary submits one CSR to be signed by a trusted certificate authority then uses the signed blob to make a second certificate appear signed by said certificate authority. Due to the hash collision, both certificates, though different, hash to the same value and so the signed blob works just as well in the second certificate. The net effect is that the adversary's second X.509 certificate, which the Certification Authority has never seen, is now signed and validated by that Certification Authority.

CAPEC-473: Signature Spoof

An attacker generates a message or datablock that causes the recipient to believe that the message or datablock was generated and cryptographically signed by an authoritative or reputable source, misleading a victim or victim operating system into performing malicious actions.

CAPEC-475: Signature Spoofing by Improper Validation

An adversary exploits a cryptographic weakness in the signature verification algorithm implementation to generate a valid signature without knowing the key.

CAPEC-608: Cryptanalysis of Cellular Encryption

The use of cryptanalytic techniques to derive cryptographic keys or otherwise effectively defeat cellular encryption to reveal traffic content. Some cellular encryption algorithms such as A5/1 and A5/2 (specified for GSM use) are known to be vulnerable to such attacks and commercial tools are available to execute these attacks and decrypt mobile phone conversations in real-time. Newer encryption algorithms in use by UMTS and LTE are stronger and currently believed to be less vulnerable to these types of attacks. Note, however, that an attacker with a Cellular Rogue Base Station can force the use of weak cellular encryption even by newer mobile devices.

CAPEC-614: Rooting SIM Cards

SIM cards are the de facto trust anchor of mobile devices worldwide. The cards protect the mobile identity of subscribers, associate devices with phone numbers, and increasingly store payment credentials, for example in NFC-enabled phones with mobile wallets. This attack leverages over-the-air (OTA) updates deployed via cryptographically-secured SMS messages to deliver executable code to the SIM. By cracking the DES key, an attacker can send properly signed binary SMS messages to a device, which are treated as Java applets and are executed on the SIM. These applets are allowed to send SMS, change voicemail numbers, and query the phone location, among many other predefined functions. These capabilities alone provide plenty of potential for abuse.

CAPEC-97: Cryptanalysis

Cryptanalysis is a process of finding weaknesses in cryptographic algorithms and using these weaknesses to decipher the ciphertext without knowing the secret key (instance deduction). Sometimes the weakness is not in the cryptographic algorithm itself, but rather in how it is applied that makes cryptanalysis successful. An attacker may have other goals as well, such as: Total Break (finding the secret key), Global Deduction (finding a functionally equivalent algorithm for encryption and decryption that does not require knowledge of the secret key), Information Deduction (gaining some information about plaintexts or ciphertexts that was not previously known) and Distinguishing Algorithm (the attacker has the ability to distinguish the output of the encryption (ciphertext) from a random permutation of bits).