CWE-305
AllowedAuthentication Bypass by Primary Weakness
Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft
The authentication algorithm is sound, but the implemented mechanism can be bypassed as the result of a separate weakness that is primary to the authentication error.
300 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-M82C-83JF-3J4V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-26 00:30 – Updated: 2026-08-26 21:31Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl accept another account's recovery code at the two-factor challenge because totp_use_recovery compares user identifiers numerically.
The helper searches the recovery model for the submitted code's digest alone, across every user's rows, so the ownership test that follows is the only thing binding a code to the account it was issued to. That test compares the row's user_id with the challenged user's id through Perl's integer coercion, and an identifier with no leading digits coerces to zero, so any two of them compare equal. User models keyed on a username, an email address or a UUID hit that case, and a numeric key compares as intended.
The challenge route feeds a submitted value to the helper once TOTP verification fails, so an attacker who knows a victim's password and holds a recovery code of their own passes the victim's second factor.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-78619"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-305"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-25T22:17:06Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Punk::Plugin::TOTP versions before 0.05 for Perl accept another account\u0027s recovery code at the two-factor challenge because totp_use_recovery compares user identifiers numerically.\n\nThe helper searches the recovery model for the submitted code\u0027s digest alone, across every user\u0027s rows, so the ownership test that follows is the only thing binding a code to the account it was issued to. That test compares the row\u0027s user_id with the challenged user\u0027s id through Perl\u0027s integer coercion, and an identifier with no leading digits coerces to zero, so any two of them compare equal. User models keyed on a username, an email address or a UUID hit that case, and a numeric key compares as intended.\n\nThe challenge route feeds a submitted value to the helper once TOTP verification fails, so an attacker who knows a victim\u0027s password and holds a recovery code of their own passes the victim\u0027s second factor.",
"id": "GHSA-m82c-83jf-3j4v",
"modified": "2026-08-26T21:31:39Z",
"published": "2026-08-26T00:30:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-78619"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.04/source/include/ptotp/ptotp_plugin.h#L801-827"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.04/view/lib/Punk/Plugin/TOTP.pm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.05/source/Changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/25/6"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-M9VC-392H-6MJX
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-04-14 15:30 – Updated: 2023-04-14 15:30Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness vulnerability in DTS Electronics Redline Router firmware allows Authentication Bypass.This issue affects Redline Router: before 7.17.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-1833"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-305"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-04-14T14:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness vulnerability in DTS Electronics Redline Router firmware allows Authentication Bypass.This issue affects Redline Router: before 7.17.\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-m9vc-392h-6mjx",
"modified": "2023-04-14T15:30:29Z",
"published": "2023-04-14T15:30:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-1833"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.usom.gov.tr/bildirim/tr-23-0227"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MG2F-G382-VVC6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-05 12:31 – Updated: 2024-09-05 12:31This vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote attackers to bypass authentication and gain partial data access to the vulnerable Trellix IPS Manager with garbage data in response mostly
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-5956"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287",
"CWE-305"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-05T11:15:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "This vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote attackers to bypass authentication and gain partial data access to the vulnerable Trellix IPS Manager with garbage data in response mostly",
"id": "GHSA-mg2f-g382-vvc6",
"modified": "2024-09-05T12:31:16Z",
"published": "2024-09-05T12:31:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-5956"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://thrive.trellix.com/s/article/000013870"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MP5P-GQ8Q-GCGG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-24 17:26 – Updated: 2025-11-04 21:30NCR SelfServ ATMs running APTRA XFS 05.01.00 do not properly validate softare updates for the bunch note acceptor (BNA), enabling an attacker with physical access to internal ATM components to restart the host computer and execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges because while booting, the update process looks for CAB archives on removable media and executes a specific file without first validating the signature of the CAB archive.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-10126"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-305",
"CWE-347"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2020-08-21T21:15:00Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "NCR SelfServ ATMs running APTRA XFS 05.01.00 do not properly validate softare updates for the bunch note acceptor (BNA), enabling an attacker with physical access to internal ATM components to restart the host computer and execute arbitrary code with SYSTEM privileges because while booting, the update process looks for CAB archives on removable media and executes a specific file without first validating the signature of the CAB archive.",
"id": "GHSA-mp5p-gq8q-gcgg",
"modified": "2025-11-04T21:30:24Z",
"published": "2022-05-24T17:26:17Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-10126"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://kb.cert.org/vuls/id/815655"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/815655"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.ncr.com/content/dam/ncrcom/content-type/documents/NCR_Security_Alert-2018-13_APTRA_XFS_"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MPR5-M5GH-62GW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-08-05 00:00 – Updated: 2022-08-11 00:00Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness in GitHub repository bookwyrm-social/bookwyrm prior to 0.4.5.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-2651"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-305"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2022-08-04T09:15:00Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness in GitHub repository bookwyrm-social/bookwyrm prior to 0.4.5.",
"id": "GHSA-mpr5-m5gh-62gw",
"modified": "2022-08-11T00:00:35Z",
"published": "2022-08-05T00:00:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-2651"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/bookwyrm-social/bookwyrm/commit/7bbe42fb30a79a26115524d18b697d895563c92f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/428eee94-f1a0-45d0-9e25-318641115550"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packetstormsecurity.com/files/168423/Bookwyrm-0.4.3-Authentication-Bypass.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-MQQJ-FX8H-437J
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-10 14:25 – Updated: 2024-07-12 13:22In v1.5 we introduced the YOURLS server-side proxy. The idea was to allow using the YOURLs URL shortener without running the YOURLs instance without authentication and/or exposing the authentication token to the public, allowing anyone to shorten any URL. With the proxy mechanism, anyone can shorten any URL pointing to the configured PrivateBin instance. The vulnerability allowed other URLs to be shortened, as long as they contain the PrivateBin instance, defeating the limit imposed by the proxy.
Neither the confidentially of existing pastes on the server nor the configuration options including the YOURLs token are affected.
Impact
This issue only affects non-standard configurations of PrivateBin. Instances are affected if all of the following conditions are met: 1. The PrivateBin instance enables URL shortening. 2. A YOURLs URL shortener is used and it is configured not to be public and require authentication to shorten URLs. 3. A basepath, the YOURLs proxy mechanism and an authentication token is configured in PrivateBin to use the non-public YOURLs instance. 4. A crafted URL is sent to PrivateBins' YOURLs proxy endpoint with a URL that contains the PrivateBin instance URL as a GET-parameter or as part of the URL-fragment, but doesn't start with the instance URL (a third-party URL)
The root cause is, that the guard clause checking whether the URL to be shortened belongs to your own PrivateBin domain only checks if the PrivateBin instance is contained in the URL but not if it starts with it.
This is a kind of authentication bypass due to incomplete filtering. This has a similar impact like an open redirect except it does not directly redirect, but allows a further hiding of the target URL as is common and known for URL shorteners. If the URL shortener domain used is trusted by it's users, this allows hiding a malicious URL.
The highest impact may be that this can be used for phishing campaigns, by routing users to some kind of fake site mimicking the trusted shortener or PrivateBin domain, which could then extract sensitive data from entered data or similar. That said, this is a general concern with URL shorteners and users are advised to follow general phishing prevention attempts like verifying the domain of the site they are using and using a trusted PrivateBin instance.
Indicators of exploitation
Check your YOURLs proxy for shortened domains that do not start with your own PrivateBin instance. Also note, that for this to be a result of an exploitation of this vulnerability, somewhere in the URL the base path + ? e.g. https://privatebin.example/? has to appear in the destination URL, as this is what the guard checked for.
Patches
The problem has been patched in version 1.7.4 of PrivateBin. In addition to upgrading, users of the YOURLs proxy feature should check for the indicators of exploitation, as outlined above.
Workarounds
- Disable URL shortening, if you have been using it.
- Only the YOURLs proxy is affected. Other URL shortening options either require a public, un-authenticated shortener, or expose the token to the client, which by design allows shortening any URL.
Proof of concept
See the unit test that got introduced to prevent similar regressions for an example of a URL that would circumvent the configured basepath.
Here is an example of how a manual exploitation would work:
In a PrivateBin instance hosted on https://privatebin.example/, with a valid URL YOURLs shortening proxy configuration using a token to prevent un-authenticated short-URL creation, send a URL shortening request for the domain https://attacker.example.com/?q=https://privatebin.example/?foo#bar. attacker.example.com is any attacker controlled, arbitrary domain.
You can do this by sending a GET request to https://privatebin.example/shortenviayourls?link=https%3A%2F%2Fattacker.example.com%2F%3Fq%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fprivatebin.example%2F%3Ffoo%23bar, without URL encoding this looks as follows: https://privatebin.example/shortenviayourls?link=https://attacker.example.com/?q=https://privatebin.example/?foo#bar.
On an affected setup, you will get a valid short URL, which when accessed, leads to https://attacker.example.com/?foo#bar, the attackers domain. On a patched system your request will get rejected and only URLs starting with https://privatebin.example/?[...] are allowed for shortening.
Post-mortem
From our limited analysis, the issue has been introduced in commit 0dc9ab7 while refactoring. The use of substr got replaced by strpos. The initial contribution contained no tests, but an implementation without this flaw. All these changes got introduced in a single pull request. This follows many best practices, as tests were added and the refactoring was done in close collaboration with the original author.
In the future, we plan to switch to the more obvious, readable and understandable str_starts_with, which is available since PHP v8. Such a better function naming and insisting on using modern functions would not only result in a better code quality, but would possibly have prevented the issue, but for backwards-compatibility with PHP 7.3, we stay on the old function for now.
Final Thoughts
The project maintainers have always discouraged the use of URL shorteners and users are always safer sharing the complete, long URL to a paste, see our FAQ.
If you need or want to provide a URL shortener option as a PrivateBin instance administrator, YOURLs is the best option available to use with PrivateBin, because it is the only shortener supported, through the proxy mechanism, preventing arbitrarily shortening any URLs. Running a public URL shortener instance and allowing anonymous users shortening arbitrary domains invites the shortener getting abused.
References
- PR to fix the vulnerability: https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/pull/1370
Timeline
- 2024-06-28 Issue report by @nbxiglk via email
- 2024-06-29 Vulnerability reproduced by @elrido, mitigation created and shared with maintainers and issue reporter for review
- 2024-07-06 Pull request with mitigation raised
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "privatebin/privatebin"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.5.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.7.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39899"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-305",
"CWE-791"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-10T14:25:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-09T19:15:13Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In [v1.5](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md#15-2022-12-11) we introduced the YOURLS server-side proxy. The idea was to allow using the YOURLs URL shortener without running the YOURLs instance without authentication and/or exposing the authentication token to the public, allowing anyone to shorten any URL. With the proxy mechanism, anyone can shorten any URL pointing to the configured PrivateBin instance. The vulnerability allowed other URLs to be shortened, as long as they contain the PrivateBin instance, defeating the limit imposed by the proxy.\n\nNeither the confidentially of existing pastes on the server nor the configuration options including the YOURLs token are affected.\n\n### Impact\n\nThis issue only affects non-standard configurations of PrivateBin. Instances are affected if all of the following conditions are met:\n1. The PrivateBin instance enables URL shortening.\n2. A YOURLs URL shortener is used and it is configured not to be public and require authentication to shorten URLs.\n3. A basepath, the YOURLs proxy mechanism and an authentication token is configured in PrivateBin to use the non-public YOURLs instance.\n4. A crafted URL is sent to PrivateBins\u0027 YOURLs proxy endpoint with a URL that contains the PrivateBin instance URL as a GET-parameter or as part of the URL-fragment, but doesn\u0027t start with the instance URL (a third-party URL)\n\nThe root cause is, [that the guard clause checking whether the URL to be shortened belongs to your own PrivateBin domain only checks if the PrivateBin instance is contained in the URL](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/blob/3cba170f3255de21bbebb77f6c565519ef33e8c1/lib/YourlsProxy.php#L50-L53) but not if it starts with it.\n\nThis is a kind of authentication bypass due to incomplete filtering. This [has a similar impact like an open redirect](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/601.html) except it does not directly redirect, but allows a further hiding of the target URL as is common and known for URL shorteners. If the URL shortener domain used is trusted by it\u0027s users, this allows hiding a malicious URL. \n\nThe highest impact may be that this can be used for phishing campaigns, by routing users to some kind of fake site mimicking the trusted shortener or PrivateBin domain, which could then extract sensitive data from entered data or similar. That said, this is a general concern with URL shorteners and users are advised to follow general phishing prevention attempts like verifying the domain of the site they are using and [using a trusted PrivateBin instance](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin?tab=readme-ov-file#what-it-doesnt-provide).\n\n### Indicators of exploitation\n\nCheck your YOURLs proxy for shortened domains that do not start with your own PrivateBin instance. Also note, that for this to be a result of an exploitation of this vulnerability, somewhere in the URL the `base path + ?` e.g. `https://privatebin.example/?` has to appear in the destination URL, as this is what the guard checked for.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe problem has been patched in version 1.7.4 of PrivateBin. In addition to upgrading, users of the YOURLs proxy feature should check for the indicators of exploitation, as outlined above.\n\n### Workarounds\n\n* Disable URL shortening, if you have been using it.\n* Only the YOURLs proxy is affected. Other URL shortening options either require a public, un-authenticated shortener, or expose the token to the client, which by design allows shortening any URL.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nSee [the unit test that got introduced](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/blob/2c711e9d3ca21230fc68f5b4dba2a7a0592b963b/tst/YourlsProxyTest.php#L57-L62) to prevent similar regressions for an example of a URL that would circumvent the configured basepath.\n\nHere is an example of how a manual exploitation would work:\n\nIn a PrivateBin instance hosted on `https://privatebin.example/`, with a valid URL YOURLs shortening proxy configuration using a token to prevent un-authenticated short-URL creation, send a URL shortening request for the domain `https://attacker.example.com/?q=https://privatebin.example/?foo#bar`. `attacker.example.com` is any attacker controlled, arbitrary domain.\n\nYou can do this by sending a GET request to `https://privatebin.example/shortenviayourls?link=https%3A%2F%2Fattacker.example.com%2F%3Fq%3Dhttps%3A%2F%2Fprivatebin.example%2F%3Ffoo%23bar`, without URL encoding this looks as follows: `https://privatebin.example/shortenviayourls?link=https://attacker.example.com/?q=https://privatebin.example/?foo#bar`.\n\nOn an affected setup, you will get a valid short URL, which when accessed, leads to `https://attacker.example.com/?foo#bar`, the attackers domain. On a patched system your request will get rejected and only URLs starting with `https://privatebin.example/?[...]` are allowed for shortening.\n\n### Post-mortem\n\nFrom our limited analysis, the issue [has been introduced in commit `0dc9ab7` while refactoring](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/commit/0dc9ab7576d5a1296debeb788afb2ae9c72d137c). The use of [`substr`](http://php.net/manual/function.substr.php) got replaced by [`strpos`](https://www.php.net/manual/function.strpos). The [initial contribution](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/commit/b0f17f0a91cdebbfd6732781943f1e04ce3311f7) contained no tests, but an implementation without this flaw. All these changes got introduced [in a single pull request](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/pull/997). This follows many best practices, as tests were added and the refactoring was done in close collaboration with the original author.\n\nIn the future, [we plan to switch to the more obvious, readable and understandable](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/issues/1373) [`str_starts_with`](https://www.php.net/manual/function.str-starts-with.php), which is available since PHP v8. Such a better function naming and insisting on using modern functions would not only result in a better code quality, but would possibly have prevented the issue, but for backwards-compatibility with PHP 7.3, we stay on the old function for now.\n\n### Final Thoughts\n\nThe project maintainers have always discouraged the use of URL shorteners and **users are always safer sharing the complete, long URL to a paste**, see [our FAQ](https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/wiki/FAQ#the-url-is-so-long-cant-i-just-use-an-url-shortener).\n\nIf you need or want to provide a URL shortener option as a PrivateBin instance administrator, YOURLs is the _best option_ available to use with PrivateBin, because it is the only shortener supported, through the proxy mechanism, preventing arbitrarily shortening any URLs. Running a public URL shortener instance and allowing anonymous users shortening arbitrary domains invites the shortener getting abused.\n\n### References\n\n* PR to fix the vulnerability: https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/pull/1370\n\n### Timeline\n\n- 2024-06-28 Issue report by @nbxiglk via email\n- 2024-06-29 Vulnerability reproduced by @elrido, mitigation created and shared with maintainers and issue reporter for review\n- 2024-07-06 Pull request with mitigation raised",
"id": "GHSA-mqqj-fx8h-437j",
"modified": "2024-07-12T13:22:14Z",
"published": "2024-07-10T14:25:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/security/advisories/GHSA-mqqj-fx8h-437j"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39899"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/pull/1370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin/commit/0c4e810e6728f67d678458838d8430dfba4fcca4"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/PrivateBin/PrivateBin"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "PrivateBin allows shortening of URLs for other domains"
}
GHSA-MV7W-J26M-H74P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-02 15:31 – Updated: 2025-05-02 15:31KUNBUS Revolution Pi OS Bookworm 01/2025 is vulnerable because authentication is not configured by default for the Node-RED server. This can give an unauthenticated remote attacker full access to the Node-RED server where they can run arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-24522"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-305"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-01T19:15:57Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "KUNBUS Revolution Pi OS Bookworm 01/2025 is vulnerable because authentication is not configured by default for the Node-RED server. This can give an unauthenticated remote attacker full access to the Node-RED server where they can run arbitrary commands on the underlying operating system.",
"id": "GHSA-mv7w-j26m-h74p",
"modified": "2025-05-02T15:31:45Z",
"published": "2025-05-02T15:31:45Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-24522"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-advisories/icsa-25-121-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://packages.revolutionpi.de/pool/main/p/pictory"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
GHSA-P2R3-58QH-PHF8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-10 18:30 – Updated: 2026-02-10 18:30An Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness vulnerability [CWE-305] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiOS 7.6.0 through 7.6.4 may allow an unauthenticated attacker to bypass LDAP authentication of Agentless VPN or FSSO policy, when the remote LDAP server is configured in a specific way.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-22153"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-305"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-10T16:16:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "An Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness vulnerability [CWE-305] vulnerability in Fortinet FortiOS 7.6.0 through 7.6.4 may allow an unauthenticated attacker to bypass LDAP authentication of Agentless VPN or FSSO policy, when the remote LDAP server is configured in a specific way.",
"id": "GHSA-p2r3-58qh-phf8",
"modified": "2026-02-10T18:30:39Z",
"published": "2026-02-10T18:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22153"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://fortiguard.fortinet.com/psirt/FG-IR-25-1052"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PCJ4-9FCJ-56C8
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-03 18:31 – Updated: 2025-04-25 15:31OpenID Connect Core through 1.0 errata set 2 allows audience injection in certain situations. When the private_key_jwt authentication mechanism is used, a malicious Authorization Server could trick a Client into writing attacker-controlled values into the audience, including token endpoints or issuer identifiers of other Authorization Servers. The malicious Authorization Server could then use these private key JWTs to impersonate the Client.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-27370"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-305",
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-03-03T18:15:40Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "OpenID Connect Core through 1.0 errata set 2 allows audience injection in certain situations. When the private_key_jwt authentication mechanism is used, a malicious Authorization Server could trick a Client into writing attacker-controlled values into the audience, including token endpoints or issuer identifiers of other Authorization Servers. The malicious Authorization Server could then use these private key JWTs to impersonate the Client.",
"id": "GHSA-pcj4-9fcj-56c8",
"modified": "2025-04-25T15:31:20Z",
"published": "2025-03-03T18:31:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-27370"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/OWASP/ASVS/issues/2678"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/629"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://openid.net/notice-of-a-security-vulnerability"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://openid.net/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/OIDF-Responsible-Disclosure-Notice-on-Security-Vulnerability-for-private_key_jwt.pdf"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://talks.secworkshop.events/osw2025/talk/R8D9BS"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-PHRQ-PC6R-F6GH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-03-23 20:28 – Updated: 2026-03-25 20:44Mantis Bug Tracker instances running on MySQL and compatible databases are affected by an authentication bypass vulnerability in the SOAP API, as a result of improper type checking on the password parameter.
Other database backends are not affected, as they do not perform implicit type conversion from string to integer.
Impact
Using a crafted SOAP envelope, an attacker knowing the victim's username is able to login to the SOAP API with their account without knowledge of the actual password, and execute any API function they have access to.
Patches
- b349e5c890eeda9bd82e7c7e14479853f8a30d9f
Workarounds
- Disabling the SOAP API significantly reduces the risk, but still allows the attacker to retrieve user account information including email address and real name.
Resources
- https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=36902
Credits
MantisBT thanks Alexander Philiotis of SynerComm for discovering and responsibly reporting the issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "mantisbt/mantisbt"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.28.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-30849"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-305"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-03-23T20:28:52Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-03-23T20:16:25Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Mantis Bug Tracker instances running on MySQL and compatible databases are affected by an authentication bypass vulnerability in the SOAP API, as a result of improper type checking on the password parameter.\n\nOther database backends are not affected, as they do not perform implicit type conversion from string to integer.\n\n### Impact\nUsing a crafted SOAP envelope, an attacker knowing the victim\u0027s username is able to login to the SOAP API with their account without knowledge of the actual password, and execute any API function they have access to.\n\n### Patches\n* b349e5c890eeda9bd82e7c7e14479853f8a30d9f\n\n### Workarounds\n- [Disabling the SOAP API](https://mantisbt.org/docs/master/en-US/Admin_Guide/html-desktop/#admin.config.api.disable) significantly reduces the risk, but still allows the attacker to retrieve user account information including email address and real name.\n\n### Resources\n- https://mantisbt.org/bugs/view.php?id=36902\n\n### Credits\nMantisBT thanks Alexander Philiotis of SynerComm for discovering and responsibly reporting the issue.",
"id": "GHSA-phrq-pc6r-f6gh",
"modified": "2026-03-25T20:44:16Z",
"published": "2026-03-23T20:28:52Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/security/advisories/GHSA-phrq-pc6r-f6gh"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-30849"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt/commit/b349e5c890eeda9bd82e7c7e14479853f8a30d9f"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/mantisbt/mantisbt"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "MantisBT is vulnerable to authentication bypass through the SOAP API on MySQL"
}
No mitigation information available for this CWE.
No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.