Common Weakness Enumeration

CWE-248

Allowed

Uncaught Exception

Abstraction: Base · Status: Draft

An exception is thrown from a function, but it is not caught.

651 vulnerabilities reference this CWE, most recent first.

GHSA-87FW-525C-9H5M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-29 00:31 – Updated: 2026-08-29 00:31
VLAI
Details

An unauthenticated party able to reach the port of a MongoDB Connector for BI (mongosqld) instance may generate enough routine connection log activity to exhaust the storage backing the configured log path. When a log write or log rotation operation subsequently fails, the resulting error is not handled and the shared mongosqld process ends, ending service for all connected SQL clients. The process continues to end on startup until an operator restores available storage, and the diagnostic message explaining the condition is not recorded.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-81517"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-28T22:16:54Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "An unauthenticated party able to reach the port of a MongoDB Connector for BI (mongosqld) instance may generate enough routine connection log activity to exhaust the storage backing the configured log path. When a log write or log rotation operation subsequently fails, the resulting error is not handled and the shared mongosqld process ends, ending service for all connected SQL clients. The process continues to end on startup until an operator restores available storage, and the diagnostic message explaining the condition is not recorded.",
  "id": "GHSA-87fw-525c-9h5m",
  "modified": "2026-08-29T00:31:03Z",
  "published": "2026-08-29T00:31:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-81517"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mongodb.com/docs/bi-connector/current/release-notes"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-87MF-GV2C-C62C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 06:31 – Updated: 2026-06-19 21:41
VLAI
Summary
ts-deepmerge: Prototype Method Override leads to DoS
Details

Versions of the package ts-deepmerge before 8.0.0 are vulnerable to Uncaught Exception due to the improper handling of built-in Object.prototype methods (such as toString, valueOf). When user-controlled input contains these keys with non-function values, the resulting merged object becomes broken — any string context operation throws a TypeError, crashing the application.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "ts-deepmerge"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.0.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-12644"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T21:41:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-19T06:17:01Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Versions of the package ts-deepmerge before 8.0.0 are vulnerable to Uncaught Exception due to the improper handling of built-in Object.prototype methods (such as toString, valueOf). When user-controlled input contains these keys with non-function values, the resulting merged object becomes broken \u2014 any string context operation throws a TypeError, crashing the application.",
  "id": "GHSA-87mf-gv2c-c62c",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T21:41:52Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T06:31:56Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12644"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/voodoocreation/ts-deepmerge/commit/305a05831a462fb2c353d3cbbff55a0733286f8c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://gist.github.com/igorg1312/775fa00114c4d47df6ae0551779ab407"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/voodoocreation/ts-deepmerge"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-TSDEEPMERGE-17339141"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "ts-deepmerge: Prototype Method Override leads to DoS"
}

GHSA-89V8-RHWQ-HF77

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-20 17:28 – Updated: 2026-08-20 17:28
VLAI
Summary
asteval has a Sandbox Escape via BaseException Subclasses
Details

Summary

An attacker who can supply expressions to asteval.Interpreter.eval() can raise SystemExit, KeyboardInterrupt, GeneratorExit, or BaseException from inside the sandbox. These exceptions are subclasses of BaseException but not Exception, so they bypass the except Exception: safety net in both run() and eval(). The exception propagates verbatim to the calling application, terminating the process or disrupting signal and cleanup handlers.

This is distinct from prior vulnerabilities CVE-2025-24359 (format string injection) and GHSA-vp47-9734-prjw (AST mutation TOCTOU), both fixed in 1.0.6. This vector is present in all versions including 1.0.6 and current HEAD.


Affected Code

asteval/astutils.py, lines 89–108 — FROM_PY exposes dangerous classes to sandbox users:

FROM_PY = ('ArithmeticError', 'AssertionError', 'AttributeError',
           'BaseException',          # ← escapes except Exception:
           'BufferError', 'BytesWarning',
           ...
           'GeneratorExit',          # ← escapes except Exception:
           ...
           'KeyboardInterrupt',      # ← escapes except Exception:
           ...
           'SystemExit',             # ← escapes except Exception:
           ...)

asteval/asteval.py, line 322 — run() exception handler:

except Exception:                    # ← does NOT catch BaseException subclasses
    if with_raise and self.expr is not None:
        self.raise_exception(node, expr=self.expr)

asteval/asteval.py, line 370 — eval() exception handler:

except Exception:                    # ← same gap
    if show_errors and not raise_errors:
        ...

asteval/asteval.py, line 264 — raise_exception() raises the class directly:

raise exc(self.error_msg)            # ← when exc=SystemExit, escapes both handlers above

Root Cause

Python's exception hierarchy has two distinct branches under BaseException:

BaseException
├── SystemExit          ← NOT caught by except Exception:
├── KeyboardInterrupt   ← NOT caught by except Exception:
├── GeneratorExit       ← NOT caught by except Exception:
└── Exception           ← caught normally
    ├── RuntimeError
    ├── ValueError
    └── ...

FROM_PY exposes all four non-Exception classes to sandbox users. When a user writes raise SystemExit("msg"), the on_raise() handler calls:

self.raise_exception(None, exc=out.__class__, msg=msg, expr='')

which executes raise SystemExit(msg). This propagates through both except Exception: guards unchecked and surfaces in the calling application.


Proof of Concept

from asteval import Interpreter

# Variant 1: terminate the process
aeval = Interpreter()
try:
    aeval.eval('raise SystemExit("terminated by sandbox user")')
except SystemExit as e:
    print(f"[CONFIRMED] SystemExit escaped: {e.code!r}")

# Variant 2: disrupt signal/finally handling
aeval = Interpreter()
try:
    aeval.eval('raise KeyboardInterrupt("interrupt injected")')
except KeyboardInterrupt as e:
    print(f"[CONFIRMED] KeyboardInterrupt escaped: {str(e)!r}")

# Variant 3: GeneratorExit
aeval = Interpreter()
try:
    aeval.eval('raise GeneratorExit("gen escape")')
except GeneratorExit as e:
    print(f"[CONFIRMED] GeneratorExit escaped: {str(e)!r}")

# Variant 4: BaseException base class
aeval = Interpreter()
try:
    aeval.eval('raise BaseException("base escape")')
except BaseException as e:
    if not isinstance(e, Exception):
        print(f"[CONFIRMED] BaseException escaped: {str(e)!r}")

Output (tested on asteval 1.0.6, Python 3.11/3.12):

[CONFIRMED] SystemExit escaped: 'terminated by sandbox user'
[CONFIRMED] KeyboardInterrupt escaped: 'interrupt injected'
[CONFIRMED] GeneratorExit escaped: 'gen escape'
[CONFIRMED] BaseException escaped: 'base escape'

Real-world server scenario

from asteval import Interpreter

def handle_request(user_expression):
    aeval = Interpreter()
    return aeval.eval(user_expression)   # SystemExit propagates here

# Attacker sends: raise SystemExit(1)
# Application terminates. Top-level except Exception: handlers do not protect it.
try:
    handle_request('raise SystemExit(1)')
except Exception:
    pass  # <-- does NOT catch SystemExit; process exits

Impact

Variant Impact
SystemExit Process terminates; exit code and message attacker-controlled
KeyboardInterrupt Disrupts finally blocks, signal handlers, and KeyboardInterrupt-aware loops
GeneratorExit Disrupts generator cleanup in calling code
BaseException Generic escape, same propagation

Any application that: - Accepts user-supplied expressions via asteval - Relies on except Exception: at the top level (standard practice) - Does not wrap aeval.eval() in except BaseException: (non-standard, unexpected requirement)

...is vulnerable to attacker-triggered process termination (DoS).

CVSS breakdown: Network-reachable (AV:N), no special conditions (AC:L), no credentials (PR:N), no interaction (UI:N), scope unchanged (S:U), no confidentiality/integrity impact (C:N/I:N), high availability impact — process termination (A:H).


Additional Note: File Read Capability (Acknowledged Limitation)

Independently of this vulnerability, asteval exposes a read-only open() wrapper (_open in astutils.py) that allows reading arbitrary files with the permissions of the calling process:

aeval.eval("open('/etc/passwd').read()")   # returns /etc/passwd contents

This is documented in doc/motivation.rst as a known design choice ("If reading from disk must be forbidden, you will want to overwrite the open() function from the symbol table"). It is included here for completeness, not as a separate advisory claim.


Recommended Fix

Option A — Remove dangerous classes from FROM_PY (minimal, preferred):

# asteval/astutils.py

FROM_PY = ('ArithmeticError', 'AssertionError', 'AttributeError',
           # Remove: 'BaseException',
           'BufferError', 'BytesWarning',
           'DeprecationWarning', 'EOFError', 'EnvironmentError',
           'Exception', 'False', 'FloatingPointError',
           # Remove: 'GeneratorExit',
           'IOError', 'ImportError', 'ImportWarning', 'IndentationError',
           'IndexError', 'KeyError',
           # Remove: 'KeyboardInterrupt',
           'LookupError',
           'MemoryError', 'NameError', 'None',
           'NotImplementedError', 'OSError', 'OverflowError',
           'ReferenceError', 'RuntimeError', 'RuntimeWarning',
           'StopIteration', 'SyntaxError', 'SyntaxWarning', 'SystemError',
           # Remove: 'SystemExit',
           'True', 'TypeError', ...)

Option B — Block non-Exception raises in on_raise():

# asteval/asteval.py

def on_raise(self, node):
    excnode = node.exc
    msgnode = node.cause
    out = self.run(excnode)
    # Prevent BaseException subclasses from escaping the sandbox
    if not issubclass(out.__class__, Exception):
        self.raise_exception(node, exc=RuntimeError,
                             msg=f"raising {out.__class__.__name__!r} is not permitted")
        return
    msg = ' '.join(str(a) for a in out.args)
    msg2 = self.run(msgnode)
    if msg2 not in (None, 'None'):
        msg = f"{msg}: {msg2}"
    self.raise_exception(None, exc=out.__class__, msg=msg, expr='')

Note: Option B also fixes a secondary bug on the same line — ' '.join(out.args) crashes with TypeError when args contain non-strings (e.g., raise SystemExit(0) with integer code). The fix uses str(a) for a in out.args.

Option C — Catch BaseException in run() and eval() (broadest, requires care):

except BaseException as exc:
    if isinstance(exc, (SystemExit, KeyboardInterrupt, GeneratorExit)):
        # Re-raise as RuntimeError to contain within sandbox
        self.raise_exception(node, exc=RuntimeError,
                             msg=f"{type(exc).__name__} raised in sandbox")
    elif with_raise and self.expr is not None:
        self.raise_exception(node, expr=self.expr)

Option A is the simplest and least likely to introduce regressions. Option B additionally addresses the str.join crash on integer args.


Disclosure Timeline

Date Event
2026-06-09 Vulnerability discovered during code review
2026-06-09 Report submitted via GitHub Security Advisory
TBD Maintainer acknowledgment
TBD + 90 days Public disclosure deadline

Researcher

Independent security researcher. No bug bounty program exists for this project. CVE assignment requested via GitHub Security Advisory submission.


References

  • Prior CVE: CVE-2025-24359 (format string injection, fixed 1.0.6)
  • Prior advisory: GHSA-vp47-9734-prjw (AST mutation TOCTOU, fixed 1.0.6)
  • Python exception hierarchy: https://docs.python.org/3/library/exceptions.html#exception-hierarchy
  • asteval documentation: https://lmfit.github.io/asteval/
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "asteval"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55244"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-20T17:28:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nAn attacker who can supply expressions to `asteval.Interpreter.eval()` can raise `SystemExit`,\n`KeyboardInterrupt`, `GeneratorExit`, or `BaseException` from inside the sandbox. These\nexceptions are subclasses of `BaseException` but not `Exception`, so they bypass the\n`except Exception:` safety net in both `run()` and `eval()`. The exception propagates\nverbatim to the calling application, terminating the process or disrupting signal and\ncleanup handlers.\n\nThis is distinct from prior vulnerabilities CVE-2025-24359 (format string injection) and\nGHSA-vp47-9734-prjw (AST mutation TOCTOU), both fixed in 1.0.6. This vector is present in\nall versions including 1.0.6 and current HEAD.\n\n---\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**`asteval/astutils.py`, lines 89\u2013108** \u2014 `FROM_PY` exposes dangerous classes to sandbox users:\n\n```python\nFROM_PY = (\u0027ArithmeticError\u0027, \u0027AssertionError\u0027, \u0027AttributeError\u0027,\n           \u0027BaseException\u0027,          # \u2190 escapes except Exception:\n           \u0027BufferError\u0027, \u0027BytesWarning\u0027,\n           ...\n           \u0027GeneratorExit\u0027,          # \u2190 escapes except Exception:\n           ...\n           \u0027KeyboardInterrupt\u0027,      # \u2190 escapes except Exception:\n           ...\n           \u0027SystemExit\u0027,             # \u2190 escapes except Exception:\n           ...)\n```\n\n**`asteval/asteval.py`, line 322** \u2014 `run()` exception handler:\n\n```python\nexcept Exception:                    # \u2190 does NOT catch BaseException subclasses\n    if with_raise and self.expr is not None:\n        self.raise_exception(node, expr=self.expr)\n```\n\n**`asteval/asteval.py`, line 370** \u2014 `eval()` exception handler:\n\n```python\nexcept Exception:                    # \u2190 same gap\n    if show_errors and not raise_errors:\n        ...\n```\n\n**`asteval/asteval.py`, line 264** \u2014 `raise_exception()` raises the class directly:\n\n```python\nraise exc(self.error_msg)            # \u2190 when exc=SystemExit, escapes both handlers above\n```\n\n---\n\n## Root Cause\n\nPython\u0027s exception hierarchy has two distinct branches under `BaseException`:\n\n```\nBaseException\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 SystemExit          \u2190 NOT caught by except Exception:\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 KeyboardInterrupt   \u2190 NOT caught by except Exception:\n\u251c\u2500\u2500 GeneratorExit       \u2190 NOT caught by except Exception:\n\u2514\u2500\u2500 Exception           \u2190 caught normally\n    \u251c\u2500\u2500 RuntimeError\n    \u251c\u2500\u2500 ValueError\n    \u2514\u2500\u2500 ...\n```\n\n`FROM_PY` exposes all four non-`Exception` classes to sandbox users. When a user writes\n`raise SystemExit(\"msg\")`, the `on_raise()` handler calls:\n\n```python\nself.raise_exception(None, exc=out.__class__, msg=msg, expr=\u0027\u0027)\n```\n\nwhich executes `raise SystemExit(msg)`. This propagates through both `except Exception:`\nguards unchecked and surfaces in the calling application.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n```python\nfrom asteval import Interpreter\n\n# Variant 1: terminate the process\naeval = Interpreter()\ntry:\n    aeval.eval(\u0027raise SystemExit(\"terminated by sandbox user\")\u0027)\nexcept SystemExit as e:\n    print(f\"[CONFIRMED] SystemExit escaped: {e.code!r}\")\n\n# Variant 2: disrupt signal/finally handling\naeval = Interpreter()\ntry:\n    aeval.eval(\u0027raise KeyboardInterrupt(\"interrupt injected\")\u0027)\nexcept KeyboardInterrupt as e:\n    print(f\"[CONFIRMED] KeyboardInterrupt escaped: {str(e)!r}\")\n\n# Variant 3: GeneratorExit\naeval = Interpreter()\ntry:\n    aeval.eval(\u0027raise GeneratorExit(\"gen escape\")\u0027)\nexcept GeneratorExit as e:\n    print(f\"[CONFIRMED] GeneratorExit escaped: {str(e)!r}\")\n\n# Variant 4: BaseException base class\naeval = Interpreter()\ntry:\n    aeval.eval(\u0027raise BaseException(\"base escape\")\u0027)\nexcept BaseException as e:\n    if not isinstance(e, Exception):\n        print(f\"[CONFIRMED] BaseException escaped: {str(e)!r}\")\n```\n\n**Output (tested on asteval 1.0.6, Python 3.11/3.12):**\n\n```\n[CONFIRMED] SystemExit escaped: \u0027terminated by sandbox user\u0027\n[CONFIRMED] KeyboardInterrupt escaped: \u0027interrupt injected\u0027\n[CONFIRMED] GeneratorExit escaped: \u0027gen escape\u0027\n[CONFIRMED] BaseException escaped: \u0027base escape\u0027\n```\n\n### Real-world server scenario\n\n```python\nfrom asteval import Interpreter\n\ndef handle_request(user_expression):\n    aeval = Interpreter()\n    return aeval.eval(user_expression)   # SystemExit propagates here\n\n# Attacker sends: raise SystemExit(1)\n# Application terminates. Top-level except Exception: handlers do not protect it.\ntry:\n    handle_request(\u0027raise SystemExit(1)\u0027)\nexcept Exception:\n    pass  # \u003c-- does NOT catch SystemExit; process exits\n```\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n| Variant | Impact |\n|---------|--------|\n| `SystemExit` | Process terminates; exit code and message attacker-controlled |\n| `KeyboardInterrupt` | Disrupts `finally` blocks, signal handlers, and `KeyboardInterrupt`-aware loops |\n| `GeneratorExit` | Disrupts generator cleanup in calling code |\n| `BaseException` | Generic escape, same propagation |\n\nAny application that:\n- Accepts user-supplied expressions via `asteval`\n- Relies on `except Exception:` at the top level (standard practice)\n- Does not wrap `aeval.eval()` in `except BaseException:` (non-standard, unexpected requirement)\n\n...is vulnerable to attacker-triggered process termination (DoS).\n\nCVSS breakdown: Network-reachable (AV:N), no special conditions (AC:L), no credentials (PR:N),\nno interaction (UI:N), scope unchanged (S:U), no confidentiality/integrity impact (C:N/I:N),\nhigh availability impact \u2014 process termination (A:H).\n\n---\n\n## Additional Note: File Read Capability (Acknowledged Limitation)\n\nIndependently of this vulnerability, `asteval` exposes a read-only `open()` wrapper\n(`_open` in `astutils.py`) that allows reading arbitrary files with the permissions of the\ncalling process:\n\n```python\naeval.eval(\"open(\u0027/etc/passwd\u0027).read()\")   # returns /etc/passwd contents\n```\n\nThis is documented in `doc/motivation.rst` as a known design choice (\"If reading from disk\nmust be forbidden, you will want to overwrite the `open()` function from the symbol table\").\nIt is included here for completeness, not as a separate advisory claim.\n\n---\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\n**Option A \u2014 Remove dangerous classes from `FROM_PY` (minimal, preferred):**\n\n```python\n# asteval/astutils.py\n\nFROM_PY = (\u0027ArithmeticError\u0027, \u0027AssertionError\u0027, \u0027AttributeError\u0027,\n           # Remove: \u0027BaseException\u0027,\n           \u0027BufferError\u0027, \u0027BytesWarning\u0027,\n           \u0027DeprecationWarning\u0027, \u0027EOFError\u0027, \u0027EnvironmentError\u0027,\n           \u0027Exception\u0027, \u0027False\u0027, \u0027FloatingPointError\u0027,\n           # Remove: \u0027GeneratorExit\u0027,\n           \u0027IOError\u0027, \u0027ImportError\u0027, \u0027ImportWarning\u0027, \u0027IndentationError\u0027,\n           \u0027IndexError\u0027, \u0027KeyError\u0027,\n           # Remove: \u0027KeyboardInterrupt\u0027,\n           \u0027LookupError\u0027,\n           \u0027MemoryError\u0027, \u0027NameError\u0027, \u0027None\u0027,\n           \u0027NotImplementedError\u0027, \u0027OSError\u0027, \u0027OverflowError\u0027,\n           \u0027ReferenceError\u0027, \u0027RuntimeError\u0027, \u0027RuntimeWarning\u0027,\n           \u0027StopIteration\u0027, \u0027SyntaxError\u0027, \u0027SyntaxWarning\u0027, \u0027SystemError\u0027,\n           # Remove: \u0027SystemExit\u0027,\n           \u0027True\u0027, \u0027TypeError\u0027, ...)\n```\n\n**Option B \u2014 Block non-`Exception` raises in `on_raise()`:**\n\n```python\n# asteval/asteval.py\n\ndef on_raise(self, node):\n    excnode = node.exc\n    msgnode = node.cause\n    out = self.run(excnode)\n    # Prevent BaseException subclasses from escaping the sandbox\n    if not issubclass(out.__class__, Exception):\n        self.raise_exception(node, exc=RuntimeError,\n                             msg=f\"raising {out.__class__.__name__!r} is not permitted\")\n        return\n    msg = \u0027 \u0027.join(str(a) for a in out.args)\n    msg2 = self.run(msgnode)\n    if msg2 not in (None, \u0027None\u0027):\n        msg = f\"{msg}: {msg2}\"\n    self.raise_exception(None, exc=out.__class__, msg=msg, expr=\u0027\u0027)\n```\n\nNote: Option B also fixes a secondary bug on the same line \u2014 `\u0027 \u0027.join(out.args)` crashes\nwith `TypeError` when args contain non-strings (e.g., `raise SystemExit(0)` with integer\ncode). The fix uses `str(a) for a in out.args`.\n\n**Option C \u2014 Catch `BaseException` in `run()` and `eval()` (broadest, requires care):**\n\n```python\nexcept BaseException as exc:\n    if isinstance(exc, (SystemExit, KeyboardInterrupt, GeneratorExit)):\n        # Re-raise as RuntimeError to contain within sandbox\n        self.raise_exception(node, exc=RuntimeError,\n                             msg=f\"{type(exc).__name__} raised in sandbox\")\n    elif with_raise and self.expr is not None:\n        self.raise_exception(node, expr=self.expr)\n```\n\nOption A is the simplest and least likely to introduce regressions. Option B additionally\naddresses the `str.join` crash on integer args.\n\n---\n\n## Disclosure Timeline\n\n| Date | Event |\n|------|-------|\n| 2026-06-09 | Vulnerability discovered during code review |\n| 2026-06-09 | Report submitted via GitHub Security Advisory |\n| TBD | Maintainer acknowledgment |\n| TBD + 90 days | Public disclosure deadline |\n\n---\n\n## Researcher\n\nIndependent security researcher. No bug bounty program exists for this project.\nCVE assignment requested via GitHub Security Advisory submission.\n\n---\n\n## References\n\n- Prior CVE: CVE-2025-24359 (format string injection, fixed 1.0.6)\n- Prior advisory: GHSA-vp47-9734-prjw (AST mutation TOCTOU, fixed 1.0.6)\n- Python exception hierarchy: https://docs.python.org/3/library/exceptions.html#exception-hierarchy\n- `asteval` documentation: https://lmfit.github.io/asteval/",
  "id": "GHSA-89v8-rhwq-hf77",
  "modified": "2026-08-20T17:28:52Z",
  "published": "2026-08-20T17:28:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lmfit/asteval/security/advisories/GHSA-89v8-rhwq-hf77"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lmfit/asteval/pull/153"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lmfit/asteval/commit/a3e56e7f8ed567a4817684d94213b290359077b4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/lmfit/asteval"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/lmfit/asteval/releases/tag/1.0.9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "asteval has a Sandbox Escape via BaseException Subclasses"
}

GHSA-8C5G-69WP-X3WV

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-06 09:30 – Updated: 2025-06-06 09:30
VLAI
Details

Deserialization vulnerability in the IPC module Impact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect availability.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-48907"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-06-06T07:15:26Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Deserialization vulnerability in the IPC module\nImpact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect availability.",
  "id": "GHSA-8c5g-69wp-x3wv",
  "modified": "2025-06-06T09:30:24Z",
  "published": "2025-06-06T09:30:24Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-48907"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2025/6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8GV7-MMCH-W6H8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-13 21:30 – Updated: 2024-11-13 21:30
VLAI
Details

Uncaught exception for some Intel(R) CST software before version 8.7.10803 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable denial of service via local access.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-29076"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-11-13T21:15:15Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Uncaught exception for some Intel(R) CST software before version 8.7.10803 may allow an authenticated user to potentially enable denial of service via local access.",
  "id": "GHSA-8gv7-mmch-w6h8",
  "modified": "2024-11-13T21:30:36Z",
  "published": "2024-11-13T21:30:36Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-29076"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/security-center/advisory/intel-sa-01024.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8J4C-6X6G-RQ3J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 19:40 – Updated: 2026-10-08 19:40
VLAI
Summary
music-metadata: uncatchable process crash parsing a crafted `.dsf` (residual of GHSA-v6c2-xwv6-8xf7)
Details

Summary

DsfParser.parseChunks skips an unrecognised chunk's payload with an un-awaited call:

this.tokenizer.ignore(Number(chunkHeader.size) - ChunkHeader.len);   // lib/dsf/DsfParser.js:51 — no await

ChunkHeader.len is 12. A crafted .dsf chunk with id != 'fmt ' and size in 0..11 makes the argument negative; strtok3 (≥ 10.3.5) throws RangeError on a negative ignore. Because the call is fire-and-forget, the rejection is detached from the parseBuffer() promise chain → unhandled rejection → Node's default (≥ 15) crashes the process — after parseBuffer() already resolved, so a caller's try/catch catches nothing and is still taken down.

Residual of GHSA-v6c2-xwv6-8xf7: the ASF site was fixed in 11.12.3 (size validation) and strtok3 now throws on negative ignore; the DSF site was never validated, and its missing await escalates that throw into an uncatchable crash.

Root cause (lib/dsf/DsfParser.js:34-56)

while (bytesRemaining >= ChunkHeader.len) {               // ChunkHeader.len = 12
  const chunkHeader = await this.tokenizer.readToken(ChunkHeader);   // { id, size }
  switch (chunkHeader.id) {
    case 'fmt ': { ...; return; }
    default: this.tokenizer.ignore(Number(chunkHeader.size) - ChunkHeader.len); break;  // size<12 -> negative, no await
  }
  bytesRemaining -= chunkHeader.size;
}

strtok3 AbstractTokenizer.ignore (L78-79): if (length < 0) throw new RangeError('ignore length must be ≥ 0 bytes');

Steps to reproduce

repro/ — public API only, Node's default unhandled-rejection mode, try/catch around the parse:

npm install && node poc.mjs

Confirmed on 11.14.0:

[app] parseBuffer() RESOLVED — the caller saw no error to catch.
RangeError: ignore length must be ≥ 0 bytes
    at DsfParser.parseChunks (.../lib/dsf/DsfParser.js:51)
   <process exits non-zero — the "process survived" line never prints>

Impact

DoS: a single crafted .dsf (or any file with the DSD magic) crashes the Node process of any app parsing untrusted audio with music-metadata (2.2M weekly downloads). The crash bypasses the caller's error handling, so even apps that correctly try/catch per-file parsing are killed — one malicious upload can take down a shared server/worker.

Remediation

Add await on line 51 (makes the RangeError a catchable parse error), and validate chunkHeader.size >= ChunkHeader.len before the skip (as the ASF fix did; also guards the loop counter). Audit other parsers for un-awaited tokenizer.ignore()/readToken().

Scope / honesty

Requires the DSF path (a DSD-magic file — normal auto-detection). Relies on Node's default unhandled-rejection mode (throw, default since Node 15); the point is that the standard defensive per-parse try/catch does not protect against it. Crash (availability), not disclosure/RCE. Negatives confirmed alongside: ASF infinite loop fixed; negative-ignore infinite-loop class closed at strtok3; unbounded allocation bounded by strtok3's read bound-check.

Credits

Issue also reported by @ryu7eroo

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 11.14.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "music-metadata"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "11.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-107392"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T19:40:45Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n`DsfParser.parseChunks` skips an unrecognised chunk\u0027s payload with an **un-awaited** call:\n```js\nthis.tokenizer.ignore(Number(chunkHeader.size) - ChunkHeader.len);   // lib/dsf/DsfParser.js:51 \u2014 no await\n```\n`ChunkHeader.len` is 12. A crafted `.dsf` chunk with `id != \u0027fmt \u0027` and `size` in `0..11` makes the\nargument negative; strtok3 (\u2265 10.3.5) throws `RangeError` on a negative `ignore`. Because the call\nis fire-and-forget, the rejection is **detached from the `parseBuffer()` promise chain** \u2192 unhandled\nrejection \u2192 Node\u0027s default (\u2265 15) **crashes the process** \u2014 **after** `parseBuffer()` already\nresolved, so a caller\u0027s `try/catch` catches nothing and is still taken down.\n\nResidual of GHSA-v6c2-xwv6-8xf7: the ASF site was fixed in 11.12.3 (size validation) and strtok3\nnow throws on negative `ignore`; the DSF site was never validated, and its missing `await`\nescalates that throw into an **uncatchable** crash.\n\n## Root cause (`lib/dsf/DsfParser.js:34-56`)\n```js\nwhile (bytesRemaining \u003e= ChunkHeader.len) {               // ChunkHeader.len = 12\n  const chunkHeader = await this.tokenizer.readToken(ChunkHeader);   // { id, size }\n  switch (chunkHeader.id) {\n    case \u0027fmt \u0027: { ...; return; }\n    default: this.tokenizer.ignore(Number(chunkHeader.size) - ChunkHeader.len); break;  // size\u003c12 -\u003e negative, no await\n  }\n  bytesRemaining -= chunkHeader.size;\n}\n```\nstrtok3 `AbstractTokenizer.ignore` (L78-79): `if (length \u003c 0) throw new RangeError(\u0027ignore length must be \u2265 0 bytes\u0027);`\n\n## Steps to reproduce\n`repro/` \u2014 public API only, Node\u0027s default unhandled-rejection mode, `try/catch` around the parse:\n```\nnpm install \u0026\u0026 node poc.mjs\n```\nConfirmed on 11.14.0:\n```\n[app] parseBuffer() RESOLVED \u2014 the caller saw no error to catch.\nRangeError: ignore length must be \u2265 0 bytes\n    at DsfParser.parseChunks (.../lib/dsf/DsfParser.js:51)\n   \u003cprocess exits non-zero \u2014 the \"process survived\" line never prints\u003e\n```\n\n## Impact\nDoS: a single crafted `.dsf` (or any file with the `DSD ` magic) crashes the Node process of any\napp parsing untrusted audio with music-metadata (2.2M weekly downloads). The crash bypasses the\ncaller\u0027s error handling, so even apps that correctly `try/catch` per-file parsing are killed \u2014 one\nmalicious upload can take down a shared server/worker.\n\n## Remediation\nAdd `await` on line 51 (makes the `RangeError` a catchable parse error), and validate\n`chunkHeader.size \u003e= ChunkHeader.len` before the skip (as the ASF fix did; also guards the loop\ncounter). Audit other parsers for un-awaited `tokenizer.ignore()`/`readToken()`.\n\n## Scope / honesty\nRequires the DSF path (a `DSD `-magic file \u2014 normal auto-detection). Relies on Node\u0027s default\nunhandled-rejection mode (`throw`, default since Node 15); the point is that the standard defensive\nper-parse `try/catch` does not protect against it. Crash (availability), not disclosure/RCE.\nNegatives confirmed alongside: ASF infinite loop fixed; negative-`ignore` infinite-loop class\nclosed at strtok3; unbounded allocation bounded by strtok3\u0027s read bound-check.\n\n## Credits\nIssue also reported by @ryu7eroo",
  "id": "GHSA-8j4c-6x6g-rq3j",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T19:40:45Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T19:40:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata/security/advisories/GHSA-8j4c-6x6g-rq3j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata/pull/2700"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata/commit/e7fc27a96e789d41ece41fdac590fc7618274a41"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/Borewit/music-metadata/releases/tag/v11.15.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "music-metadata: uncatchable process crash parsing a crafted `.dsf` (residual of GHSA-v6c2-xwv6-8xf7)"
}

GHSA-8R4G-CG4M-X23C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-09-22 18:22 – Updated: 2025-10-03 18:27
VLAI
Summary
Denial of Service in node-static
Details

All versions of node-static are vulnerable to a Denial of Service. The package fails to catch an exception when user input includes null bytes. This allows attackers to access http://host/%00 and crash the server.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "node-static"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.7.11"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248",
      "CWE-400"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-09-22T18:21:20Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "All versions of node-static are vulnerable to a Denial of Service. The package fails to catch an exception when user input includes null bytes. This allows attackers to access `http://host/%00` and crash the server.",
  "id": "GHSA-8r4g-cg4m-x23c",
  "modified": "2025-10-03T18:27:42Z",
  "published": "2021-09-22T18:22:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-11149"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudhead/node-static/pull/213"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/pull/6248"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudhead/node-static"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cloudhead/node-static/blob/643a528ec7bbd05a59c4030655d94810570afb3f/CHANGES.md#-unreleased"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JS-NODESTATIC-1297183"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [],
  "summary": "Denial of Service in node-static"
}

GHSA-8RF5-92JH-3VC9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2021-05-13 22:31 – Updated: 2021-04-06 21:46
VLAI
Summary
Uncaught Exception leading to Denial of Service in json-sanitizer
Details

OWASP json-sanitizer before 1.2.2 can output invalid JSON or throw an undeclared exception for crafted input. This may lead to denial of service if the application is not prepared to handle these situations.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "com.mikesamuel:json-sanitizer"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.2.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2021-23900"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2021-04-06T21:46:21Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2021-01-13T16:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "OWASP json-sanitizer before 1.2.2 can output invalid JSON or throw an undeclared exception for crafted input. This may lead to denial of service if the application is not prepared to handle these situations.",
  "id": "GHSA-8rf5-92jh-3vc9",
  "modified": "2021-04-06T21:46:21Z",
  "published": "2021-05-13T22:31:32Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-23900"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OWASP/json-sanitizer/commit/a37f594f7378a1c76b3283e0dab9e1ab1dc0247e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/OWASP/json-sanitizer/compare/v1.2.1...v1.2.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://groups.google.com/g/json-sanitizer-support/c/dAW1AeNMoA0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Uncaught Exception leading to Denial of Service in json-sanitizer"
}

GHSA-8RJ5-2857-877J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-08-23 13:19 – Updated: 2024-09-27 15:46
VLAI
Summary
json2xml Uncaught Exception vulnerability
Details

The json2xml package for Python allows an error in typecode decoding enabling a remote attack that can lead to an exception, causing a denial of service.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "json2xml"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.14.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-25024"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248",
      "CWE-754"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-08-23T13:19:55Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-08-22T19:16:22Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "The json2xml package for Python allows an error in typecode decoding enabling a remote attack that can lead to an exception, causing a denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-8rj5-2857-877j",
  "modified": "2024-09-27T15:46:25Z",
  "published": "2023-08-23T13:19:55Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-25024"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vinitkumar/json2xml/issues/106"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vinitkumar/json2xml/pull/107"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vinitkumar/json2xml/pull/107/files"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/vinitkumar/json2xml/commit/a9cd75b61329801b47a8fba7473bce6c85a38b9b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/json2xml/PYSEC-2023-149.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/vinitkumar/json2xml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://packaging.python.org/en/latest/guides/analyzing-pypi-package-downloads"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "json2xml Uncaught Exception vulnerability"
}

GHSA-8RVJ-6HP5-GF5X

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-14 18:31 – Updated: 2025-11-14 18:31
VLAI
Details

On affected platforms running Arista EOS, certain serial console input might result in an unexpected reload of the device.153

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-8870"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-14T16:15:59Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "On affected platforms running Arista EOS, certain serial console input might result in an unexpected reload of the device.153",
  "id": "GHSA-8rvj-6hp5-gf5x",
  "modified": "2025-11-14T18:31:39Z",
  "published": "2025-11-14T18:31:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-8870"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.arista.com/en/support/advisories-notices/security-advisory/22811-security-advisory-0125"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

No mitigation information available for this CWE.

No CAPEC attack patterns related to this CWE.