CWE-248

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-58357"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-18T14:17:08Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "SurrealDB versions before 2.1.0 contain an uncaught exception vulnerability in the rand::time() function that panics when unwrap is called on a None result from timestamp_opt. Authorized clients can repeatedly invoke rand::time() to reliably trigger server panics and cause denial of service.",
  "id": "GHSA-3h9v-xwgf-h5c5",
  "modified": "2026-07-18T15:31:48Z",
  "published": "2026-07-18T15:31:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/surrealdb/surrealdb/security/advisories/GHSA-h4f5-h82v-5w4r"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-58357"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/surrealdb-before-denial-of-service-via-rand-time"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    },
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@podium/layout"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.6.110"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@podium/proxy"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.2.74"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-24822"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-04-07T15:20:23Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-04-06T18:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nAn attacker using the `Trailer` header as part of the request against proxy endpoints has the ability to take down the server.\nAll Podium layouts that include podlets with proxy endpoints are affected.\n\n### Patches\n`@podium/layout` which is the main way developers/users are vulnerable to this exploit, has been patched in version `4.6.110`. All earlier versions are vulnerable.\n`@podium/proxy` which is the source of the vulnerability and is used by `@podium/layout` has been patched in version `4.2.74`. All earlier versions are vulnerable.\n\n### Workarounds\nIt is not easily possible to work around this issue without upgrading. We recommend upgrading `@podium/layout` and/or `@podium/proxy` as soon as possible.\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [podium-lib/issues](https://github.com/podium-lib/issues)\n\n### Credits\nThe vulnerability was reported by [krynos](https://hackerone.com/krynos) from [Ercoli Consulting](https://www.ercoliconsulting.eu/) via FINN.no\u0027s private bug bounty program\n",
  "id": "GHSA-3hjg-vc7r-rcrw",
  "modified": "2022-04-07T15:20:23Z",
  "published": "2022-04-07T15:20:23Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/podium-lib/proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-3hjg-vc7r-rcrw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24822"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/podium-lib/layout/commit/fe43e655432b0a5f07b6475f67babcc2588fb039"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/podium-lib/proxy/commit/9698a40df081217ce142d4de71f929baaa339cdf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/podium-lib/layout/releases/tag/v4.6.110"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/podium-lib/proxy/releases/tag/v4.2.74"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Denial of Service vulnerability in @podium/layout and @podium/proxy"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-20919"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-20",
      "CWE-248",
      "CWE-755"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2022-09-30T19:15:00Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A vulnerability in the processing of malformed Common Industrial Protocol (CIP) packets that are sent to Cisco IOS Software and Cisco IOS XE Software could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to cause an affected device to unexpectedly reload, resulting in a denial of service (DoS) condition. This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation during processing of CIP packets. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by sending a malformed CIP packet to an affected device. A successful exploit could allow the attacker to cause the affected device to unexpectedly reload, resulting in a DoS condition.",
  "id": "GHSA-3mfm-pfv2-vmrp",
  "modified": "2022-10-06T00:00:55Z",
  "published": "2022-10-01T00:00:18Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-20919"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://tools.cisco.com/security/center/content/CiscoSecurityAdvisory/cisco-sa-iosxe-cip-dos-9rTbKLt9"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/quic-go/quic-go"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.37.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.37.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2023-46239"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248",
      "CWE-476"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2023-10-30T15:08:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2023-10-31T16:15:09Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "quic-go is an implementation of the [QUIC](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc9000) transport protocol in Go. By serializing an ACK frame after the CRYTPO that allows a node to complete the handshake, a remote node could trigger a nil pointer dereference (leading to a panic) when the node attempted to drop the Handshake packet number space.\n\n**Impact**\n\nAn attacker can bring down a quic-go node with very minimal effort. Completing the QUIC handshake only requires sending and receiving a few packets.\n\n**Patches**\n\n[v0.37.3](https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/releases/tag/v0.37.3) contains a patch. Versions before v0.37.0 are not affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-3q6m-v84f-6p9h",
  "modified": "2023-11-01T06:07:08Z",
  "published": "2023-10-30T15:08:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/security/advisories/GHSA-3q6m-v84f-6p9h"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-46239"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/commit/b6a4725b60f1fe04e8f1ddcc3114e290fcea1617"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/quic-go/quic-go/releases/tag/v0.37.3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "quic-go vulnerable to pointer dereference that can lead to panic"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mcp"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.9.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-53366"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-07-04T22:06:49Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-04T22:15:22Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "A validation error in the MCP SDK can cause an unhandled exception when processing malformed requests, resulting in service unavailability (500 errors) until manually restarted. Impact may vary depending on the deployment conditions, and presence of infrastructure-level resilience measures.\n\nThank you to Rich Harang for reporting this issue.",
  "id": "GHSA-3qhf-m339-9g5v",
  "modified": "2026-07-16T18:30:56Z",
  "published": "2025-07-04T22:06:49Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-3qhf-m339-9g5v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-53366"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/pull/822"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/commit/29c69e6a47d0104d0afcea6ac35e7ab02fde809a"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3qhf-m339-9g5v"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/python-sdk/releases/tag/v1.9.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/mcp/PYSEC-2026-1616.yaml"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/mcp"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MCP Python SDK vulnerability in the FastMCP Server causes validation error, leading to DoS"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "undici"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "6.25.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.28.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "undici"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.28.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.29.1"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "undici"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.1.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.10.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-85024"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-28T21:42:37Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-04T17:17:02Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nundici\u0027s WebSocket client (including Node.js\u0027s bundled `globalThis.WebSocket`) crashes the entire Node.js process when a remote WebSocket peer sends a permessage-deflate compressed message that crosses the decompressed-payload size limit and then contains a malformed DEFLATE block. In `lib/web/websocket/permessage-deflate.js`, the size-limit cleanup calls `removeAllListeners()` on the internal zlib `InflateRaw`, removing its `error` listener, but leaves the stream running. The inflater then emits a `Z_DATA_ERROR` with no listener attached, which Node.js treats as a fatal unhandled `error` event and terminates the process. Application `error`/`close` handlers on the public WebSocket cannot observe or prevent this, because the failing object is the internal `InflateRaw`.\n\nA malicious or compromised WebSocket server can crash a client with a single connection, unauthenticated and without any application mistake. The attack is asymmetric (about 130 KB on the wire expands past the limit) and can be repeated on reconnect (crash loop).\n\nAffected applications are those using the undici WebSocket client (`new WebSocket(...)`) or Node.js\u0027s bundled `globalThis.WebSocket` that can be induced to connect to an attacker-controlled or compromised WebSocket endpoint.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici v6.28.1, v7.29.1 or v8.10.2.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nNo workaround is available.",
  "id": "GHSA-3wwx-pv8p-q78v",
  "modified": "2026-09-28T21:42:37Z",
  "published": "2026-09-28T21:42:37Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-3wwx-pv8p-q78v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-85024"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/07c60d9c7099a910451244afe42861bbdbdd974c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/4411a238a98e8791da5fff10cc9e3578a7668ed6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/commit/63cf698b611fecc6ee0a17b185b930051e4b982f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v6.28.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v7.29.1"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/releases/tag/v8.10.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "undici vulnerable to Denial of Service via unhandled error in WebSocket permessage-deflate decompression"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.74.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/rclone/rclone"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.75.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248",
      "CWE-476"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-05T20:26:07Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## 1. Summary\n\nA transport failure during the initial Infinite Scale TUS creation POST can return `(nil response, non-nil error)`. Rclone dereferences the nil response before processing the error and panics. The production `CreateUploader` path reproduced the crash against a closed endpoint.\n\nThe security case is deployment-dependent. A one-shot upload already fails when its endpoint resets, while RC jobs recover panics in `fs/rc/jobs/job.go` and return a job error. The incremental denial of service is strongest in a long-lived VFS mount or concurrent/multi-remote CLI process where the upload runs in an unrecovered goroutine and the panic terminates unrelated work.\n\n## 2. Affected Assets \u0026 Attack Surface\n\n- Verified rclone revision: `a0c09f1381ae93e2a9a33c529d170186c61ad058` (`v1.74.0-240-ga0c09f138`)\n- Current-master check: `backend/webdav/tus.go` was unchanged at master commit `961266888fe797390c535386f3b3aa46f4853602` on 2026-07-18\n- Response evaluation: `backend/webdav/tus.go:45-59`\n- Creation path: `backend/webdav/tus.go:61-107`\n- Unrecovered VFS caller: `vfs/write.go:71-81`\n- Contained RC caller: `fs/rc/jobs/job.go:107-115`\n- Configuration: Infinite Scale WebDAV uploads using TUS\n- Code triggers: any pre-response transport failure, including refusal, reset, timeout, DNS/TLS/proxy failure, or cancellation\n- Security trigger: a malicious/compromised configured endpoint resets an upload in a long-lived or multi-workload process\n\n## 3. Technical Root Cause Analysis\n\n`getTusLocationOrRetry` switches on `resp.StatusCode` before checking whether `resp` is nil or handling the accompanying error. A nil response is valid when the HTTP transaction fails before a response is parsed. There is no recovery boundary in the WebDAV operation itself. Whether the panic is process-fatal depends on its caller: the VFS write path starts `operations.Rcat` in an unrecovered goroutine (`vfs/write.go:71-81`), whereas RC jobs wrap their function in `recover` (`fs/rc/jobs/job.go:107-115`).\n\n## 4. Proof-of-Concept \u0026 Evidence\n\n1. Configure the actual Infinite Scale creation path to a closed local endpoint.\n2. Invoke `Object.CreateUploader`.\n3. The POST returns a transport error and no response.\n4. `getTusLocationOrRetry` dereferences `resp.StatusCode` and panics.\n\nA remote endpoint can produce the same `(nil response, non-nil error)` state by accepting and resetting the connection before returning an HTTP response. TLS prevents arbitrary response modification but does not prevent the configured endpoint from closing or resetting its own connection. Refusal, DNS, TLS, proxy, and cancellation failures exercise the code defect but do not by themselves identify a remote security actor.\n\n## 5. Impact Assessment\n\nIn an unrecovered CLI or VFS upload goroutine, the panic terminates the rclone process and any unrelated work it hosts. A hostile configured endpoint can repeat the condition whenever the victim initiates a TUS upload. RC jobs are excluded from the process-wide impact because their execution boundary recovers the panic and records an error. In a one-shot process dedicated to the hostile endpoint, the incremental security impact over an ordinary transport error is limited.\n\n## 6. Remediation Guidance\n\n- Check `resp == nil` before accessing response fields.\n- Pass transport errors through the existing retry policy and return a normal error after exhaustion.\n- Test refusal, reset, timeout, DNS, TLS, proxy, and cancellation paths.\n- Add panic containment to long-lived worker goroutines as defense in depth; keep nil handling as the primary fix.",
  "id": "GHSA-3x6r-wxxg-53vv",
  "modified": "2026-08-05T20:26:07Z",
  "published": "2026-08-05T20:26:07Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/security/advisories/GHSA-3x6r-wxxg-53vv"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/commit/5871d98c368751a6d992ed64f8cd22cb78c44cee"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/rclone/rclone/releases/tag/v1.75.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "rclone: Infinite Scale TUS Creation Transport Error Causes a Nil-Response Panic"
}

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2024-21983"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2024-02-16T23:15:07Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "StorageGRID (formerly StorageGRID Webscale) versions prior to 11.8 \nare susceptible to a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability. Successful \nexploit by an authenticated attacker could lead to an out of memory \ncondition or node reboot.\n\n",
  "id": "GHSA-3xcm-h7jg-4xm5",
  "modified": "2024-02-17T00:31:38Z",
  "published": "2024-02-17T00:31:38Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-21983"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://security.netapp.com/advisory/ntap-20240216-0012"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.14.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "PyJWT"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "2.0.0a1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-101918"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-30T15:41:05Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-28T21:17:13Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n`PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt(token)` \u2014 the first step of the JWKS\nverification flow documented in `docs/usage.rst` \u2014 must decode a token\u0027s\npayload before its signature can be checked, via\n`jwt.api_jwt.decode_complete(token, options={\"verify_signature\": False})`.\nThat call parses the payload with `json.loads` in `PyJWT._decode_payload`\n(`jwt/api_jwt.py:297-300`), whose `except` clause catches only `ValueError`.\nA payload that is valid JSON but nested ~20,000 levels deep makes\n`json.loads` raise `RecursionError`, which is **not** a `ValueError` and\nescapes as a raw, undocumented exception type \u2014 not `DecodeError`,\n`InvalidTokenError`, or `PyJWTError`, so every documented error-handling\npattern in `docs/usage.rst` misses it.\n\nThe token needs no valid signature and no network access \u2014 the crash\nhappens during payload parsing, before the `kid` is even looked up. A\nsingle unauthenticated ~50KB request crashes the caller\u0027s auth handler\n(HTTP 500 / dead worker), repeatably. The same path is reachable through\nplain `jwt.decode(token, options={\"verify_signature\": False})` too.\n\nNotably, this project already fixed the **identical** bug class for the\nJWS **header** path \u2014 `PyJWS._load` catches `(ValueError, RecursionError)`\nand wraps it in `DecodeError` (`jwt/api_jws.py:360-361`), and\n`CHANGELOG.rst` (v2.14.0, \"Security\") states \"Handle deeply nested and\nmalformed JWS/JWK input without uncaught recursion errors.\" The payload\npath \u2014 the one part of a forged token an unauthenticated attacker fully\ncontrols \u2014 was left catching `ValueError` alone, so that security fix does\nnot fully hold.\n\nA second, related instance: `PyJWKClient.fetch_data` (`jwt/jwks_client.py:168`)\nparses a JWKS endpoint\u0027s response with `json.load(response)` inside a\n`try` that only catches `(URLError, TimeoutError, http.client.HTTPException)`\n\u2014 a deeply-nested JSON response from a JWKS endpoint raises the same raw\n`RecursionError`, uncaught entirely (worse than the payload path, which at\nleast caught plain `ValueError`).\n\n**Affected versions:** confirmed present in the current release, 2.14.0,\nand on the current `master` branch (commit `4adcd02722f5011c60079d3978dfc167b9a8eaa5`).\n\n## Reproduction\n\n```python\nimport base64, json, jwt\n\ndef b64url(b):\n    return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(b).rstrip(b\"=\")\n\nheader = b64url(json.dumps({\"alg\": \"HS256\", \"typ\": \"JWT\"}).encode())\npayload = b64url(b\"[\" * 20_000 + b\"]\" * 20_000)\ntoken = (header + b\".\" + payload + b\".\" + b64url(b\"forged-sig\")).decode()\n\njwt.decode(token, options={\"verify_signature\": False})\n# raises: RecursionError (not DecodeError/InvalidTokenError/PyJWTError)\n```\n\nControl: the same deeply-nested structure moved into the token\u0027s **header**\ninstead of its payload is correctly converted to `jwt.DecodeError` by the\nalready-hardened `jwt/api_jws.py:360` \u2014 confirming the payload path is\nspecifically the missed half of the v2.14.0 hardening, not a general gap.\n\n## Impact assessment\n\nUnauthenticated denial-of-service via unhandled exception on an auth path.\nNot an auth bypass \u2014 rated medium. With signature verification enabled,\nthis parse runs after `_verify_signature`, so only the pre-verification\npaths (`get_signing_key_from_jwt`, explicit `verify_signature=False`) are\nattacker-reachable pre-auth; the JWKS-endpoint variant requires control of\n(or a MITM on) the configured JWKS endpoint rather than being reachable\nfrom an arbitrary client token.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nIn `jwt/api_jwt.py:299`, change `except ValueError as e:` to\n`except (ValueError, RecursionError) as e:`, mirroring\n`jwt/api_jws.py:360` exactly. In `jwt/jwks_client.py`, add the same\n`(ValueError, RecursionError)` handling around `json.load(response)` in\n`fetch_data`, raising `PyJWKClientError` (consistent with the method\u0027s\nexisting documented error contract). A patch implementing both, verified\nagainst the full test suite (457 passed, 4 skipped \u2014 pre-existing,\nenvironment-related) and against the reproduction above (now correctly\nraises `DecodeError`), is attached (`fix.patch`).\n\n## Discovery method\n\nFound and verified using `scopegrep` (https://github.com/not-ekalabya/scopegrep)\n\u2014 a semantic code-retrieval tool that surfaces every other call site of a\nsymbol alongside relevance-ranked results, which is what surfaced the\nalready-hardened header path as the direct comparison here \u2014 paired with\nan LLM coding agent (GLM-5.3) run as an open-ended security review of this\nrepository. Independently reproduced against the exact commit above before\nthis report was written. Happy to share the full session transcript on\nrequest.\n\n## Disclosure status\n\nNot shared with any other party or published. Submitting through this\nprivate channel per the project\u0027s stated security policy; no planned\npublic/conference disclosure ahead of a coordinated timeline.\n\n\n---\n\n## Maintainer triage update (2026-09-22)\n\n### Confirmed finding and scope\n\nWe confirmed that an attacker-controlled recursively nested JWT payload can cause a raw Python `RecursionError` to escape PyJWT at PyJWT 2.14.0 and the tested current source. The confirmed in-scope paths are direct decoding with `verify_signature=False` and `PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt`, where payload parsing occurs before key lookup.\n\nThe demonstrated impact is limited to an uncaught exception for the affected call, which may surface as an application HTTP 500 when the application does not catch it. Testing did not demonstrate a worker or process crash, persistent resource exhaustion, resource amplification, authentication bypass, or confidentiality or integrity impact.\n\nThe separate JWKS-response subclaim is out of scope under the policy boundary that requires the application to trust its configured JWKS source and transport. The confirmed payload finding is not a duplicate of the earlier protected-header parser finding: it occurs in a distinct payload parsing path that remained affected after the earlier header-only fix.\n\n### Version and remediation status\n\nHistorical testing reproduced the confirmed payload behavior in all 20 official supported PyJWT 2.x releases from 2.0.0a1 through 2.14.0, inclusive. Unsupported PyJWT 1.7.1 also reproduces the behavior, but it is excluded from the advisory range under the supported-2.x policy. No supported unaffected release and no patched release exists. The exact evidence is `/Users/jpadilla/.codex/security-advisories/pyjwt/GHSA-42vr-xj54-vc7v-historical-range-20260922.md` (SHA-256 `c48f1ac35641e9382d53e6a879a71ad9a8fb4432bbe871f2b8330f8d166a2d81`) and `/Users/jpadilla/.codex/security-advisories/pyjwt/historical-range-42vr-20260922/historical-range-results.json` (SHA-256 `324997f231561bf6da39b8f9d1e272f69bfde8871a7863f5cb7b70e22e91f076`). The evidence-backed supported affected range is `\u003e= 2.0.0a1, \u003c= 2.14.0`.\n\nHistorical range verification is complete. A local fix commit exists and has passed independent review and the complete local CI suite, but it has not been merged into `master` or released. Consequently, `patched_versions` remains empty and this advisory remains in `triage`. The remaining next step is a maintainer decision on remediation and merge. After a fix lands in `master` and is released, `patched_versions` and advisory lifecycle can be updated in a separate approved batch.\n\n---\n\n## Maintainer remediation update (2026-09-23)\n\nThe confirmed payload-parser finding has been fixed on `master`. Commit\n`5fde08a6cf906aa7698de2d6391d88b73006b17b` converts a recursive\npayload parse failure to the expected `DecodeError`; commit\n`9bc06658f875b9b40091539140bbbdc4639161c3` makes the regression tests\ndeterministic across supported Python versions. This update supersedes the\n2026-09-22 remediation-status statement that the fix had not landed.\n\nThe original pre-verification payload reproducer and the\n`PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt` path were covered by regression tests.\nThe exact landed tree passed the full 39-environment local tox matrix and\nGitHub CI for commit `9bc06658f875b9b40091539140bbbdc4639161c3` passed\nall 25 jobs, including Ubuntu Python 3.14 and 3.15. The demonstrated impact\nremains an uncaught request-level exception in affected releases; there is\nstill no evidence of process termination, persistent resource exhaustion,\nauthentication bypass, or confidentiality or integrity impact.\n\nThe supported affected range remains `\u003e= 2.0.0a1, \u003c= 2.14.0`. The latest\nreleased version is 2.14.0, which predates these commits; no released\npatched version exists yet, so `patched_versions` remains unset. CVSS v3.1\n5.3 (Medium) and CWE-248 remain unchanged. The advisory may now move from\ntriage to private draft. The next lifecycle step is a new supported 2.x\nrelease containing the fix, followed by separately approved patched-version\nand publication updates after release verification.\n\n---\n\n## Maintainer release update (2026-09-23)\n\nPyJWT 2.15.0 is the first released version containing the payload-parser fix. Its GitHub release tag points to commit `1d41a6478e1562e68ff667fcd703356acf085f68`, which includes fix commit `5fde08a6cf906aa7698de2d6391d88b73006b17b` and deterministic regression-test commit `9bc06658f875b9b40091539140bbbdc4639161c3`. PyPI published both the wheel and source distribution from that release commit through the successful production workflow at https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/actions/runs/35891602963.\n\nThe published PyPI wheel (`pyjwt-2.15.0-py3-none-any.whl`, SHA-256 `7a3742debf6b879e912dbb9819ceec1594be812452b78c5f2e2dfc56564954f8`) was checked directly: the deeply nested unsigned payload now raises `DecodeError`, while an ordinary unsigned payload still decodes. The supported affected range remains `\u003e= 2.0.0a1, \u003c= 2.14.0`; the patched version is `2.15.0`. Earlier statements in this advisory that no released patched version exists are superseded by this update.\n\nThe confirmed impact remains an uncaught request-level exception in affected versions, not a demonstrated process crash or authentication bypass. The separate JWKS-response subclaim remains outside this advisory\u0027s confirmed PyJWT-owned scope.",
  "id": "GHSA-42vr-xj54-vc7v",
  "modified": "2026-09-30T15:41:05Z",
  "published": "2026-09-30T15:41:05Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/security/advisories/GHSA-42vr-xj54-vc7v"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-101918"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/commit/5fde08a6cf906aa7698de2d6391d88b73006b17b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/jpadilla/pyjwt/releases/tag/2.15.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PyJWT: Unauthenticated RecursionError DoS in pre-verification payload parse (PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt / verify_signature=False)"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "code.vikunja.io/api"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "0.24.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-27819"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-248"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-02-26T15:23:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-02-25T22:16:27Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nPath Traversal (Zip Slip) and Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability discovered in the Vikunja CLI\u0027s restore functionality.\n\n### Details\n\nThe restoreConfig function in vikunja/pkg/modules/dump/restore.go of the https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/tree/main repository fails to sanitize file paths within the provided ZIP archive. A maliciously crafted ZIP can bypass the intended extraction directory to overwrite arbitrary files on the host system. Additionally, we\u2019ve discovered that a malformed archive triggers a runtime panic, crashing the process immediately after the database has been wiped permanently.\n\nThe application trusts the metadata in the ZIP archive. It uses the Name attribute of the zip.File struct directly in os.OpenFile calls without validation, allowing files to be written outside the intended directory.\n\nThe restoration logic assumes a specific directory structure within the ZIP. When provided with a \"minimalist\" malicious ZIP, the application fails to validate the length of slices derived from the archive contents. Specifically, at line 154, the code attempts to access an index of len(ms)-2 on an insufficiently populated slice, triggering a panic.\n\n### PoC\n\nWhen provided with a ZIP containing a traversal path (e.g., ../../../pwned.txt) and a missing migration structure, the application wipes the existing database and then panics due to unsafe index manipulation at line 154 of restore.go.\n\nReproduction Steps:\n1. Preparation: Generate vikunja_critical_poc.zip.\n2. Execution: Run echo \"Yes, I understand\" | vikunja restore vikunja_critical_poc.zip.\n3. Observation:\na. The application logs INFO: Wiped database.\nb. The application immediately follows with: panic: runtime error: index out of range [-2].\n4. The database is effectively deleted (Wiped), and the restoration process fails to complete, leaving the application in a non-functional state with total data loss for that instance.\n\nReproduction Python Script:\n\n    import zipfile\n\n    VIKUNJA_VERSION = \"v1.1.0\" \n    ZIP_NAME = \"vikunja_critical_poc.zip\"\n\n    def create_poc():\n        with zipfile.ZipFile(ZIP_NAME, \u0027w\u0027) as zipf:\n            # Mandatory version file to pass initial check\n            zipf.writestr(\u0027VERSION\u0027, VIKUNJA_VERSION)\n\n            # Malicious traversal path\n            # This triggers the traversal logic and the index panic simultaneously\n            zipf.writestr(\u0027../../../pwned.txt\u0027, \"Vulnerability Confirmed.\")\n        print(f\"[+] {ZIP_NAME} created.\")\n\n    if __name__ == \"__main__\":\n        create_poc()\n\n\nStack Trace:\ntime=2026-02-21T23:07:22.707Z level=INFO msg=\"Wiped database.\" panic: runtime error: index out of range [-2] goroutine 1 [running]: code.vikunja.io/api/pkg/modules/dump.Restore(...) /go/src/code.vikunja.io/api/pkg/modules/dump/restore.go:154 +0x1085\n\n\nRemediation:\nSanitize Paths: Use filepath.Base() to strip all directory information from ZIP entries before processing.\nImplement Bounds Checking: Ensure slices have sufficient length before performing index arithmetic.\n\nProposed Fix for restore.go:\n\n    // 1. Sanitize the filename\n    filename := filepath.Base(configFile.Name)\n    dstPath := filepath.Join(extractionDir, filename)\n\n    // ...\n\n    // 2. Prevent Index Out of Range Panic (Line 154)\n    if len(ms) \u003c 2 {\n        return fmt.Errorf(\"invalid migration sequence in backup archive\")\n    }\n    lastMigration := ms[len(ms)-2]\n\n### Impact\n\nVulnerability Type: CWE-22 (Path Traversal) / CWE-248 (Uncaught Exception)\nAffected Component: pkg/modules/dump/restore.go\nImpact: Arbitrary File Write and Permanent Data Loss\nStatus: Vikunja has not found an existing CVE for these issues; they appear to be undisclosed Zero-Days.\nSource File: pkg/modules/dump/restore.go\nFunctions: Restore, restoreConfig\nLine Number: 154 (v1.1.0)\nCommand: vikunja restore \u003cpath_to_zip\u003e\n\nAffected Party: Any administrator or automated process utilizing the vikunja restore CLI command.\n1. Specifically, instances where a user may be socially engineered into restoring a backup from an untrusted source are at high risk.\n2. Additionally, because the database is wiped before archive validation, even a failed exploitation attempt results in a complete loss of application data for that instance, impacting all end-users of the affected Vikunja installation.",
  "id": "GHSA-42wg-38gx-85rh",
  "modified": "2026-02-26T15:23:30Z",
  "published": "2026-02-26T15:23:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/security/advisories/GHSA-42wg-38gx-85rh"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-27819"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja/commit/1b3d8dc59cb5f2b759ab0ad2bc9915b993e3cb73"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/go-vikunja/vikunja"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://vikunja.io/changelog/vikunja-v2.0.0-was-released"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Vikunja has Path Traversal in CLI Restore"
}